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Last week as I was waiting for the subway at Times Square sta-
tion, I noticed a woman as she was coming off the train, fixed as I was by the 
enormous purple button pinned to her coat. In large white letters it asked, 
“Is It Fascism Yet?” I exchanged a knowing glance with a fellow passenger 
as we pushed into the car. “It’s getting there,” he said wanly as we pulled 
away.
 Fascism—as name, idea, political system, worldview, culture—seems 
ever to produce the difficulty of knowing whether or not it has arrived, yet. 
Historically referencing Germany and Italy circa 1930, ever beholden to par-
ticular European times and places, fascism provokes uncertainties about its 
reach, metaphorical and otherwise. How will we know when it’s fascism? 
Just like the question “Are we having fun yet?” the question “Is it fascism 
yet?” spurs us to wonder “Well, is it?” (“Well, are we?”). Or, alternatively, of 
course, with the barb already embedded in the question, we feel sure of the 
implied irony: we know that it is fascism, already. How much fascism is 
necessary before one can answer the question in the affirmative? When do 



















 One possible answer is that we know fascism is fascism when it’s too 
late, always after the fact. What my moment on the subway and others dis-
close is that fascism is a notion that outstrips its historical reference, one 
that has a theoretical and reflective afterlife that can allow us to think about 
a range of problems that weren’t, aren’t, thinkable otherwise. Like other 
comparative concepts—modernity, for example—the notion of fascism gen-
erates comparative frenzy and anxiety, a constant search to find and verify 
just one more fact that would allow us to claim that Japan, say, was a fascist 
state. Indeed, as Alan Tansman shows in his introduction to this volume, 
by the mid-1980s there was a “consensus” that the term fascism was not 
applicable to Japan. That consensus is no longer unbroken (if it ever was); 
as these essays and others seek to reveal, the arrival of fascism, the fantasy 
and culture of fascism, is known by its aftereffects and signs, its traces and 
remainders in domains seemingly distant from that of the political.
 I can’t think about fascism without thinking about Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno and their Dialectic of Enlightenment and the legacy of 
other, related critical theorists—notably, Walter Benjamin, of course, but 
also Ernst Bloch. For them, fascism had and has everything to do with the 
limits of capital, with the attempt to overcome those limits through the 
uncanny twins of gleaming technology and bloody archaism, both made 
productive through the spectacle of mass culture and its technological re-
producibility.
 As many have remarked, most vividly Slavoj Žižek in recent years, fas-
cism describes an attempt to have capitalism without capitalism—to have 
your capitalism and eat it, too, at the same time as it most assuredly devours 
you. As he states, “The fascist dream is simply to have capitalism without its 
‘excess,’ without the antagonism that causes its structural imbalance.”1 What would 
capitalism be without excess? It would, in a sense, be a “capitalism without 
capitalism.” It would be a capitalism without the specter of class division 
and all its implications. It would be a capitalism without the terror of labor 
unrest, of revolution—and the trains would run on time. To erase class divi-
sions by appealing to the nation as an organic community that transcends 
these divisions while keeping in place existing property relations—that, 
perhaps, is the core vocation of fascism.
 Fascism—or perhaps, if we prefer, the fascist fantasy—comes in to 
regulate the dangerous excesses of capitalism. It is important to remember, 
however, that the excessiveness of capitalism is its normal state; there is no 









depends on unevenness, and its state of normalcy is one of hysterical, ex-
cessive production. And that is why a discourse of the Master or Leader—of 
the Subject presumed to know—emerges repeatedly to regulate excess, to 
get rid of social antagonisms. At the same time, this dangerous excess is 
placed outside the social body.
 In Japan, the emperor occupied this position of Master, although not in 
the same modality as Hitler or Mussolini. The emperor, placed at the point 
of origin, also became the projected, mass-mediated effect of an always 
existing nation, notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—the reality of 
his distanced and deferred image. The figure of the emperor was thus both 
origin and projection, both subject and object. Excess was purged, assigned 
to the outside, as the foreign: the outside as the West, as the source of capi-
talist excess, of decadent modernity—or the foreign within: Koreans and 
communists, most notably. The aversion and fear of this excess was not 
only of the foreign as such but of that which embodies abstract universality, 
that which can’t be contained within the corporatist fantasy of a commu-
nity in which all participate as fraternalized beings (here, in the embrace of 
the emperor). The idea that an “individual can directly, irrespective of his 
or her place within the social organism, participate in the universal” (for 
example, as upheld in the idea of human rights) was thus anathema.2 Such 
abstract universality is the stigmata of Western modernity; thus, it was this 
modernity that cried out to be overcome in the name of an organically uni-
fied nation-culture.3 Instead of the ceaseless displacement of capitalism, a 
formation in which everyone would know his own place was theorized to 
encompass a global hierarchy. Organic community was restored under the 
gaze of the Master, who also became the effect of the gaze of the national 
masses (Takashi Fujitani is to be thanked here for elucidating this dimen-
sion of emperorship in Japan).4 What disturbs this organicism was dis-
allowed—modernity itself (although not technology as such)—and could 
only be definitively eliminated by the drive toward total war, as developed in 
the writings of Japanese ideologues and philosophers of the period. (Note 
that this narrative does not engage the question of how the West, for ex-
ample, entered and perturbed the existing communal space of Japan; Ger-
man fascists had their memories of oppression to reference, as well. But the 
question remains as to how these antagonisms constitutive to capitalism 
were occluded in Japan.)
 The “corporatist temptation,” the temptation to return to unmediated 











in Žižek’s words. Capital always already inscribes the possibility and the ne-
cessity of this reversal. In its seeming external negation of liberal, capitalist 
democracy, fascism in fact completes, as its “internal negation,” the truth 
of capitalist democracy.5 That is why Horkheimer and Adorno, generalizing 
from Auschwitz to the entire Enlightenment project, speak of the dialectical 
entwinement of myth and enlightenment, of the “wholly enlightened earth 
. . . radiant with triumphant calamity.”6 And that is why, in their analysis 
of the American culture industry, they can talk about the virtual fascism of 
the consumer in the midst of that which many presume to be the obverse 
of fascism: American liberal democracy. Fascism is the internal negation 
of capitalism; to negate the negation, something else must occur (in the 
classic sense, communism). We are ever naive if we think of democracy, 
that is, as the obverse of fascism.
 Japanese fascism (can we call it that?) strove to institute a world where 
everyone knew his place, while still working to keep capitalist relations 
of production intact. Thus, the economy had to be subordinated to the 
ideological-political domain, while the ideological-political domain was 
stylized through the techniques and technologies of mass cultural pro-
duction, in turn subordinated to the aesthetic demands of the “mass orna-
ment” and to the codified and singular norms of Japanese beauty.7
 We see here the contours of a reactionary modernism that was enabled 
by the spatial bifurcation (one indeed instituted by colonial relations) of the 
West and the East and the resolution that called for Western technology and 
Eastern spirit, the Japanese version of the German amalgam of technology 
and culture. This split position was virtually ordained historically by Japa-
nese attempts to form a national unity in the face of the West (a unity that 
could not be attained without the powers of capital and technology), and 
this split position is a fundamental armature of the fascist fantasy in Japan. 
It is a fantasy that emerges with the placing of Japan within the narrative of 
global capitalist unevenness.
 Ernst Bloch was profoundly attuned to this dimension of unevenness in 
capitalism, to the antagonisms that cannot be sutured, and to the different 
forms of temporality that then emerge: what he called non-synchronous 
synchronicity. He was also attuned to the intoxication of fascism, of folk-
loric nationalism, and to the spooky repetitions of “old dreams,” as he 
called them. He understood the pleasures to be had in fascist identifica-
tions, pleasures that the left could not mobilize.8 In the archaic revivals 
of interwar Japan, we find a similar reinscription of ghostliness across 









the peasant and the petite bourgeoisie. And we find, as well, machineries 
of desire that proffered the transferential pleasures of identification with 
power in the guise of the emperor and in the sacrifices of total war.
 If we think of the fascist fantasy as an integral part of the structure of 
capitalism, as a constitutive moment in the dialectic of enlightenment, 
then we won’t find it illegitimate to think of Japan as permeated with some-
thing we could call fascism in the interwar years. Nor would we think it 
strange to ask, “Is It Fascism Yet?” in any existing capitalist nation. That 
fantasy is always cultural, to the extent that fantasy is symbolic, but more 
important, it is the fantasy of culture itself that gives shape to many of the 
aesthetic and philosophical enterprises circulating around the fascist sign. 
That is, culture—the notion of culture—emerges as that which also works 
precisely to erase the political (that is, class division and unevenness) and 
the traumas of capitalism (the commodity form itself ). While we can in-
voke “culture” to signify, most broadly, the aesthetic, an awareness of this 
other nomination of culture is crucial for an attempt to bring together the 
notions of culture and fascism. With fascism, what is revealed is what was 
fascistic about culture to begin with (think of the invocations of “German 
culture” or “Japanese culture”). Attention to the fascistic potential in the 
modern notion of culture itself, such that the culture of fascism can also 
imply the fascism of culture; attention to fascism as the internal negation 
of capitalism; and attention to the synchronous non-synchronicity of the 
competing temporalities fascist fantasies strive to collapse: these are three 
forms of attention that will help us determine whether it really is fascism 
yet, in Japan or elsewhere, then or now.
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Introduction:  
The Culture of Japanese Fascism
The essays in this volume examine the relationship between 
culture and fascism in Japan in the decades preceding the end of the Pacific 
War in 1945. Gathering the evidence of a culture of fascism that was not 
always so named, the authors are more concerned with the diffusion of fas-
cism as ideology and representation than with its origins and consequences 
as a political movement or regime.
 Though a number of essays offer definitions of fascism and explore 
how Japanese culture and thought in the interwar years can profitably be 
understood as fascist, the volume as a whole does not present a unified 
definition of “fascism,” or even a uniform picture of Japan in these years. 
Indeed, some contributors resist applying the term and concept to Japan, 
even as they find areas of congruence with fascist states and cultural forms 
elsewhere. As a whole, however, the volume does argue for the presence of 
a fascist culture in Japan and for the presence of fascistic ways of healing 
the crisis of interwar modernity. It is an assumption of most of the essays, 
and of the conception of the volume itself, that to understand the Japanese 
inflection of fascism, we would benefit more from observing its marks on 






















of fascism that fits a generic definition across societies. As Mark Neocleous 
reminds us, focusing on the actual content of policies “obscures the com-
mon ideological prescriptions behind them.”1 Kevin Doak sets the tone by 
examining fascism in the 1930s not as an established political system, but 
as an ideology that sought to intervene in culture as the first step toward 
the eventual control of political institutions and ideology.
 Until fairly recently, scholars of Japanese history and culture, both in-
side Japan and out, generally treated the question of fascism in its political 
manifestations. The debates among these scholars over the very applica-
bility of the term to the Japanese state (was it fascist the way Italy and Ger-
many were?) dampened the possibility not only of analyzing Japan’s fascism 
(if it wasn’t fascist like Germany and Italy, then it wasn’t fascist), but also 
of examining its cultural manifestations (if Japan wasn’t fascist, it couldn’t 
have had a fascist culture).2
 There have been exceptions to this rule, of course. It seems that as insis-
tently as American scholars have asserted that Japan should not be consid-
ered fascist, Japanese scholars have applied the term more freely—perhaps 
because, having lived through the 1930s, many of them knew in their bones 
how the regime differed from other regimes.3 The groundwork for this 
understanding of Japan as fascist was established by such scholars, jour-
nalists, and writers who lived through fascism and who were attuned to the 
sphere of culture and language.4
 According to Richard Torrance’s essay in this volume, by the time of 
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the terms fascism ( fuashizumu), fascist 
( fuassho), and fascsistization ( fuasshoka) had already been in circulation and 
were “supported by a body of political theory that seemed to correspond to 
Japan’s social, political, and cultural realities.” For the Marxist philosopher 
Tosaka Jun, in 1937 the debate over the existence of fascism in Japan was 
over.
 Tosaka was perhaps the most penetrating and sustained prewar ana-
lyst of the relationship of fascist culture to politics in Japan. He described 
Japanese fascism as a response to the contradictions of capitalism, suffus-
ing politics, culture, and daily life, generally accepted and experienced by 
a great breadth of people, knowingly or not, across educational and class 
lines, including students, politicians, the petite bourgeoisie, farmers, and 
laborers. Tosaka argued that there was no ideal form of fascism with intrin-
sic qualities, and that with some differences its inflection in Japan was of a 
kind with other fascisms in the world.5 Fascism in Japan may have differed 


















been imposed from above rather than associated with a mass movement 
from below, but even those differences were fast disappearing as fascism 
gained momentum. The term itself was important to Tosaka because it al-
lowed him to insist on Japan’s kinship to European fascism; to call the Japa-
nese case too “special,” he argued, could result in losing the sense in which 
it was indeed part of global fascism.6
 Tosaka’s understanding of the relationship of culture to fascism was pre-
scient. In his essay “Against the Nazi Control of the Arts” (1937), he likened 
the silencing of critical thought in Japan to that in Nazi Germany. Central to 
Japan’s fascism, he argued, was the worship of beauty and the government 
ban on critique.7 At the heart of fascism, that is, lay the manipulation of 
representation and language. Tosaka noted that when not only movements 
such as the antifascist Jinmin Sensen (People’s Front), treated extensively 
by Richard Torrance in this volume, but also the use of the term people’s front 
itself, were banned because they were seen to damage the national essence 
(kokutai), problems of language had reached the level of law, and a theory 
of grammar had become a theory of political control. In “Nihonshugisha 
no bungakka (Japanism into Literature)” (1937), Tosaka took on the culture 
critic (bungei hyōronka) Kobayashi Hideo, the kind of thinker Tosaka consid-
ered fundamental to the functioning of fascism, and whom Harry Haroo-
tunian in this volume reveals to have attempted to mystify everyday life by 
the appeal of the auratic, timeless, fascist moment. Dominating Japanese 
letters in 1936, critics such as Kobayashi lent their work to smoothing over 
the economic, political, social, cultural, and class conflicts that wracked 
Japanese society. To Tosaka, it was no coincidence that such ideological 
work was being done by literature, and it was particularly dangerous that it 
was being done so, because literary ideas, he argued, easily became “ideolo-
gies of literature (bungakushugi)” that rejected positivism and logic and then 
served up aesthetic models for the social world. The fruit of such literary 
thinking was “Japanism,” by which Tosaka meant the ideology of Japanese 
fascism. Tosaka saw that “Japanism,” first laughed away in the realm of 
social thought, had worked its way back to society through the realm of lit-
erature, which could easily accommodate its mythmaking capacity. Litera-
ture thus came to serve the authorities as a “troop of trumpeters” unifying 
ideology. Tosaka called these literary intellectuals “critics writing in the 
mode of love and devotion (aijōteki hyōronka).” They made fascism palatable 
to liberal-thinking people who did not like fascism as a “mode” of being 













 Tosaka was describing a situation in which private languages became 
bound, through the combined force of censorship, inculcation, and the 
threat of punishment, to the words of the state. Fascism was thus the prod-
uct of an atmosphere seeded by purveyors of culture and also of the inculca-
tion of that atmosphere through official channels. The “culture of fascism,” 
Tosaka argued, was, like atmosphere, there to be sensed, even if denied by 
those who created it.9 The government understood how to work atmosphere 
all too well. It employed what one censor called a “tacit pressure (mugon no 
atsuryoku)” to have ideology accepted “naturally” by “creating atmosphere 
(kūkizukuri).”10 It was this spell of the atmosphere of fascism—functioning 
“like the gears of a giant opaque machine,” in the words of the critic Aono 
Suekichi in the 1930s—that the antifascist writers of “the spirit of prose” 
(discussed by Richard Torrance) warned their readers to guard against.
 In the 1930s, Tosaka Jun was already well on his way to discerning the 
aesthetic dimension of fascism. The general use of the term fascism in the 
1930s in its transliterated version preserves the etymology of the word, 
which is to “bind.” That original meaning helps us understand the “fascist 
aesthetic,” which reduced messy variety to timeless uniformity. If moder-
nity meant social abstraction resulting from increased urbanization and 
industrialization, threats of civil strife and economic uncertainty, and the 
dreadful consequences of mass consumption and commodification, then a 
discourse of harmony appealed to a timeless culture as an anchor of com-
munity and offered a restoration of cultural wholeness by poeticizing frac-
tured daily life into a harmonious, timeless, artistic space untouched by 
modernity—a mythic space evoked, for example, in the writings of the nov-
elist Kawabata Yasunari, which Nina Cornyetz reveals in this volume to be 
doing the work of the “fascist aesthetic”—an aesthetic that, in Susan Son-
tag’s description, glorifies surrender, exalts mindlessness, and glamorizes 
death.11 Fascist aesthetics attempted to resolve the conflicts of modernity 
itself, calling for a complete submission either to absolute order or to a 
violent, undifferentiated, but liberating moment of violence, or what Angus 
Lockyer here calls an “epiphanic abolition of . . . distance.”
 Tosaka Jun’s work in the 1930s provided one possibility for seeing 
through this atmosphere. This was a possibility for years left behind. Build-
ing on Tosaka, Maruyama Masao began in the late 1940s to analyze Japanese 
fascism not as a state structure but as a movement. Maruyama, the most 
influential postwar Japanese analyst of Japanese fascism, argued that what 
differentiated Japanese fascism from European fascism was that it took 


















lated from below by outbursts of radical fascism. The fascist movement 
from below was then absorbed into the totalitarian transformation that 
was taking place above, until, finally, the international situation required 
absolute unity.
 To Maruyama, these outbursts from below, inaugurated by intellectuals 
such as Kita Ikki, who called for constructing a revolutionized Japan, were 
“movements close to fascism in the true sense of the word.”12 What Maru-
yama called “radical fascism” became active after the Manchurian Incident 
in 1931—the unauthorized attack on and seizing of a Chinese garrison by 
the Japanese field army, leading to the conquest and pacification of Man-
churia and the creation of the Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo—eventu-
ally resulting in assassinations and attempted assassinations of government 
officials. Yet, Maruyama argued, the idealism of Japanese fascism never al-
lowed it to develop into a large-scale party capable of concrete action and 
political control. As for radical fascism “from below,” it came to an end in 
a failed coup by imperial loyalists in 1936, fueled by the thinking of Kita 
Ikki and intended to effect a spiritual reformation of Japan by restoring the 
Imperial Way of government.13
 By seeing fascism in Japan through the prism of European fascisms, 
and by localizing it in radical fascist groups, Maruyama may have set the 
stage for its later conceptual dismissal, even as his emphasis on fascism 
as a movement suggests a shift to the cultural sphere, to the realm of con-
sciousness and belief and, by extension, to representation. Yet as much as 
Maruyama helps us move in this direction, he does not take us far enough 
in seeing Japan’s fascism as a local inflection of a global, cultural phenome-
non—precisely what Tosaka had uncovered.
 By 1960, Japanese scholars easily used the word, but more as a talis-
manic signifier of the bad recent past than as an analytic term. Emphasis 
was given to the particularity of Japan’s fascism, to “Japanese-style fascism 
(nihongata fasshizumu)” or “emperor-system fascism (tennōsei fashizumu).”14 
Analysis of the “emperor system” as the force behind the mass mobilization 
that led to war was first articulated by Maruyama and others in the postwar 
years. The emperor system, it was argued, monolithically imposed obei-
sance in the name of the mythology of national cause. It was the product of 
the Meiji government’s ideological machinations, in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, to mystify 
the nature of the state, and it made the people submissive to the goals of the 
state through internal psychological inculcation and external force.15 For 












ling people from within, a perfectly functioning ideology, for “once within 
its confines, the corners of the box obscured in the darkness, the people 
were unable to see what it was that hemmed them in.”16
 Though the analysis of the emperor system would seem to imply an 
understanding of Japan as having partaken of global fascism while inflect-
ing it through its own idiom, in fact greater emphasis was given to the 
emperor side of the phrase, while fascism remained relatively unanalyzed, 
merely signifying Japan’s past of repression and colonialism.17 In fact, the 
use of the figure of the emperor system displaced fascism as a lens through 
which to understand the workings of a more global ideology. It has pre-
served (among Marxists and non-Marxists alike) a particular category for 
Japan, rather than seeing it as an inflection of a global phenomenon.
 It is an analysis of the cultural sphere that allows Japan to be seen as 
one of a number of modern, fascist nations in the years between the ends 
of the two world wars.18 This is because culture is where fascism gathers its 
ideological power. As Slavoj Žižek writes, “The ideological power of fascism 
lies precisely in the feature which was perceived by liberal or leftist critics 
as its greatest weakness: in the utterly void, formal character of its appeal, 
in the fact that it demands obedience and sacrifice for their own sake.”19 In 
recent years, analyzing fascism in its cultural form has become less uncom-
mon than it once was. Making a link between regime and culture during the 
interwar years in Japan, Leslie Pincus has noted a “fascist turn in cultural 
discourse.” Harry Harootunian has described a “fascist temperament” in 
the 1930s that fueled a language of renewal and harmony and attempted 
to recover a spiritual state of culture in order to heal social fissures. This 
aesthetic discourse aimed at poeticizing everyday life by offering the myth 
of a harmonious social order and by appealing to a timeless culture and 
community in the face of a fracturing mass culture of consumption.20
 Once one’s eyes are adjusted by the lens of culture, the terms used to 
describe European fascism come to work for Japan, as well. Fascism, in 
Roger Griffin’s phrase, converts cultural despair into passionate purpose. 
It draws its inspiration from the past, not merely in an act of nostalgia, 
but as a means of providing a this-worldly cure to malaise and anomie by 
regimenting people’s lives and creating consensus through propaganda, 
indoctrination, repression, and terror directed at internal and external ene-
mies. The “core myth” of fascism provides the possibility for an experience 
of immediacy and unity that counters the alienation and fragmentation of 
the modern individual.21


















ology of fascism that runs through Italian, German, and Spanish fascisms, 
despite local differences, and that applies to Japan, as well. According to 
Neocleous, fascism emerged as a reaction to the threats of social and po-
litical divisions created in the crisis of capitalism in the years following 
the First World War. In particular, it was a reaction to the threat of moder-
nity in its political forms, whether Marxism or liberalism. Based on earlier 
romantic philosophies, fascism promised an end to class division by evok-
ing a myth of a state and a nation unified by the natural bonds of its people 
through their blood and spirit. Fascism wanted cohesion and offered it in 
a language of faith that appealed, through images and myths, to feelings 
rather than ideas, sentiments rather than rational thoughts. It called for 
a unity that is “natural,” like a family’s, in which individuals might gain a 
spontaneous, intuitive grasp of their relationship to a more powerful entity 
and a feeling for their calling to a higher spiritual unity. Fascism elevated 
the will to an ideal, praising the intuitive act over the intellectually self-
reflective act. In this way, it was an assault on Enlightenment values of 
rational positivism.22
 Fascism was, then, an ideology for molding and controlling the masses 
to nationalize them—or to nationalize them to mold and control them—in 
the name of a myth of nature—of a “natural” nation with no history but is 
timeless, like myth, made of individuals connected through bonds of na-
ture.23 In place of history, fascism emphasized nature; in place of politics, 
it evoked beauty. In his essay in this volume, Harry Harootunian argues that 
the cultural critic Kobayashi Hideo partook of the language of fascism by 
replacing the lived time of history and politics with the timeless space of 
eternal beauty.
 Fascism found a solution to alienation and exploitation not in a radical 
change in economic systems, but also in policies and rhetoric ostensibly 
meant to beautify work, the workplace, and everyday life. Such an effort lay 
behind the proposal for reforming school dormitory life by Japan’s largest 
and most influential folk art organization, the Mingei Kyōkai (Folk-Craft 
Association), analyzed here by Kim Brandt. Though published in 1941 and 
never realized, the proposal was, according to Brandt, an exemplary and 
“recognizably fascist effort to employ aesthetics as a means of increasing 
industrial productivity for total war”:
In Japan as well as in Germany or Italy or France, one of the central goals 
of fascist thinkers and policymakers was to create a beautiful new so-












exquisite discipline of national unity and sacrifice. This vision had very 
concrete uses in mobilizing national subjects and resources for wartime 
labor and privation, but it was also held out as an end in and of itself. The 
ideal of “one hundred million hearts beating as one,” as one of the most 
often quoted slogans of wartime Japan put it, was presented as a source 
of aesthetic gratification, as well as of virtue and strength.
 Ultimately, fascism, argues Neocleous, is the culmination of a conserva-
tive revolutionary tradition, with roots in Nietzsche and Bergson and intel-
lectual branches that reached across national boundaries, encompassing 
modern and modernist writers such as Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis in 
the United States and England, Gottfried Benn in Germany, F. T. Marinetti 
and Gabriele d’Annunzio in Italy, Georges Sorel in France, and Ernesto Gi-
ménez Caballero in Spain. Fascism thus cannot be separated from mod-
ernism. An exchange of ideas—both modernist and fascist ideas—across 
Europe aligned Nazism with Italian fascism, though each employed dif-
ferent ideological mechanisms and styles of rhetoric according to its own 
traditions.
 Japan was part of the same conversation. Japan’s confrontation with 
modernity was coeval with Europe’s, and Japanese intellectuals maturing 
in the 1920s were as likely to know European texts as much as Japanese. By 
the 1920s, the background of any educated Japanese encompassed mod-
ern European literature and philosophy as much as—often more than—
Japanese traditions of philosophical and political thought. Modernism 
and fascism were the lingua franca spoken fluently in Japan and in Europe 
and, combined with local traditions and European letters, they fueled the 
organicist thought and rhetoric that underpinned fascism. The social, eco-
nomic, and cultural conditions that gave birth to European fascism were 
also shared by Japan, and the solutions, through the state’s imposition of 
mythic thinking that extolled natural bonds of blood and demanded devo-
tion and sacrifice of the individual to the state, nation, or lineage, backed 
by coercion at home, in the name of the domination of peoples of poorer 
bloodline abroad, made Japan one among other fascist nations.
Japan’s Crisis of Modernity and Fascist Mobilization
In the 1930s, the 1920s ideology of cosmopolitan liberalism and its ideal of 
the integrity of the free individual were already losing ground to a political 


















storing a sense of true “Japaneseness.”24 Intellectuals argued for the aban-
donment of the belief in individuality—an abstract, modern notion that 
festered at the core of the crisis—and searched for an identity grounded 
in native culture and life or mediated through absolute identification with 
the “people (minzoku)” and the state.25 The individual was viewed not only 
as selfish, but also as an inadequate source of meaning, while the “people” 
and the state became idealized as the sources of meaningful action and 
identity. Intellectuals critiqued modernity as an insufficient vehicle for 
either national or personal identity: it had led to a dead end that needed 
to be overcome.26 The revolt against modernity registered by writers was a 
revolt of writers betrayed by modernity’s promise.
 The earthquake that destroyed Tokyo in 1923 left in its wake dramatic 
physical evidence of the power of destruction, particularly of the fragility 
of the modern metropolis, feeding both the anxiety and the hope that the 
city and culture that had been destroyed could be invented anew.27 Dur-
ing the next decade, unemployment in the cities, fear of starvation in the 
countryside, right-wing assassinations, military coups, and the creation of 
a Japanese puppet state in Manchuria suffused Japanese life, through gov-
ernment propaganda, popular culture, and the media, with an atmosphere 
of imminent, dramatic transformation that lent various new ideologies 
meant to “overcome the modern,” as the 1941 symposium of intellectuals 
was named, a tone of crisis. From 1932 on, this was termed by the govern-
ment and media a “state of emergency (hijōji).” The rhetoric of “emergency” 
transformed Japan into a place of eternal crisis, thus providing the atmo-
spheric backing needed, in the name of national survival, to increase the 
power of the military, rationalize Japanese hegemony over East Asia, and 
eliminate dissent at home.28
 This sense of crisis laid the groundwork for a “politics of despair,” which 
Fritz Stern described as fundamental to the growth of fascism in Germany. 
The mood of the times was encapsulated by the catch phrases “overcoming 
the modern (kindai no chōkoku)” and “malaise ( fuan).” Malaise—the emo-
tional correlative of the political “emergency”—entered everyday language 
as a result of the 1934 translation into Japanese of Lev Shestov’s Dostoevsky 
and Nietzsche: The Philosophy of Tragedy (1903), which sold thousands of copies 
and provoked a flurry of essays by intellectuals who saw in it a statement of 
their own disillusionment and anxiety. In 1933, the philosopher Miki Kiyo-
shi had associated Shestov with the word “malaise,” which to him meant 












malaise par excellence and likened the spiritual crisis in Japan—which he 
said had begun in 1931 with the conquest of Manchuria—to the one that 
overtook the Europe of Heidegger and Andre Gide.29
 Only a drastic cure could heal the “confusion of everyday life, the futility 
and blindness of cultural life,” despaired Hirato Renkichi (1893–1922), the 
translator of F. T. Marinetti’s Futurist Manifesto in 1921. The cure, accord-
ing to Hirato, would take the form of a musical moment of wholeness and 
the binding together of all things: “the musical condition of Futurism de-
velops into an absolute symphony of the spirit and the skies, a freedom 
that allows all things to flow into one another, a magnificent orchestra that 
binds all things together in an organic relationship.”30
 Eight years after Hirato made his pronouncement, the Japanese Dada-
ist Tsuji Jun (1885–1944) expressed a feeling of creative despair: “Realism, 
Naturalism, Romanticism, human socialism, bourgeoisie, proletariat, Ex-
pressionism, Dada—it makes my head ache just hearing their names. Natu-
ralist novels, Symbolist poems, Romantic dramas, literature awakened to 
class-consciousness—they should all just do as they please.” Whereas Hi-
rato could still envision an escape from modern alienation, Tsuji had lost 
any sense of authority outside the self, and thus any set of objective ethical 
or aesthetic values. “Gods, Buddhas, humanity, society, freedom, the na-
tion” were nothing more than a “changing of idols.” To Tsuji, all Japanese 
culture was beyond repair: “the age rushes along, the flow of the currents 
of thought surges upon us and is greedily sucked up by the fresh minds and 
the instincts of the new age. Stemming the tide through base and absurd 
methods is even more pathetic. One might better surrender, helmets re-
moved, the rotting bourgeois castle. It is a great pity that one’s eyes only 
open when the fire is in one’s own storehouse.”31
 I quote a Futurist and a Dadaist not to imply any necessary connection 
between their aesthetics and fascism but to remind us that the “fascist” 
response to cultural crisis took place across the spectrum of participants in 
culture. Avant-garde and Futurist artists were as disturbed by the increas-
ing abstraction of language as were neo-traditionalist writers. For both the 
right and the left, as Harry Harootunian has argued, the task was to over-
come the division, disunity, and fragmentation that contemporary society 
was experiencing. Such cures to the crisis of modernity’s fragmentation 
were laid out in arguments, or evocations, of timeless communities, arts, or 
artistic practices that aestheticized history and social life by imagining an 
organic community, apotheosizing the “folk,” and waging what the cultural 


















 The assault was felt in the shocks of economic depression, military ex-
pansion, repressive government intervention in social conflicts (between 
labor and management), right-wing terror, cultural malaise, and fear of the 
Anglo-American powers; these provided the context for state-controlled 
mobilization for what the state called a “holy war (seisen)” under the ban-
ner of harmony and order at home and expansion and control abroad. This 
reached a climax in Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s outline of a “New 
Order” in 1940, which, through the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 
glorified the national body and called for military hegemony and the cre-
ation of an autarchic economic empire. The intellectuals in Konoe’s brain 
trust, the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Center),32 spoke a language 
close to that of European fascist thinkers and promoted a political struc-
ture akin to that found in Italy and Germany, attempting to take charge of 
all aspects of economic, political, and cultural life and striving to unite “the 
masses” in an attitude of reverence for one quasi-divine figure (in this case, 
the emperor). These intellectuals, like their fascist counterparts in Europe, 
argued for a new society to heal the ills of a crisis in society and saw control 
of freedom as part of that cure, for through control would be won a higher 
form of freedom.
 The government mobilized collectivism, war, and expansion and pro-
moted a new culture it deemed befitting Japan’s history and ethnicity. A 
combination of restrictive laws and the creation of local organizations set 
up to repress dissent and inculcate state values on a mass scale was orches-
trated by the government’s “National Mobilization (kokka sōdōin),” whose 
ultimate goal was to “extinguish oneself through service to the state (messhi 
hōkō).”33
 The ideological underpinnings of inculcation were kept abstract enough 
to be flexible—Japanese ideologues could fill fascism with a wide variety 
of content. The reach of the state extended throughout the realms of edu-
cation, cultural expression, entertainment, and the media, casting an op-
pressive pall over expression and action through surveillance, mass propa-
ganda, and censorship, and backed by police repression.34
 The government attempted to rationalize all aspects of life. How one 
nurtured the spirit (in worship), trained the body (in exercise), celebrated 
life’s progress (in weddings), created one’s image (through clothing or 
hairstyles, which would match the national spirit and essence), and nur-
tured one’s body (with food and sport) and senses (in the arts) would reflect 
the directives of centralized organizations. The material side of life was to 












tions and centralizing forces such as the draft.35 Appeals would be made to 
modify the “people’s lifestyle (kokumin seikatsu)” to invigorate the “people’s 
health (kokumin kenkō),” and to limit the more frivolous pleasures of life, 
summed up by the phrase “erotic grotesque nonsense (eroguronansensu).” 
National mobilization meant the beginning of the end of the pursuit of ma-
terial comfort and pleasure—the end, that is, of the fun of urban life.36 The 
time for play was over, except, perhaps, for spiritual play. Through a reading 
of the detective fiction of Edogawa Ranpo, James Reichert explores how this 
impulse to homogeneity and purity represented a stay against the modern 
mess, against the pleasure of the erotic, grotesque, and nonsensical, and 
that mess’s threatening transgression of fascist ideals. Keith Vincent’s ex-
amination of the detective novel The Devil’s Disciple (1929) examines a dizzy-
ing narrative of paranoia that displays a desire for the demands of fascist 
binding even as it exposes and resists it:
If the modern detective novel finds such clean closure indispensable, 
its precondition is to be found in another impossible project, described 
famously by Hirabayashi [Hatsunosuke] in an earlier essay as “the main-
tenance of the national order through a complete (kansei sareta) system of 
written laws.” The use of writing to “complete” a system of laws and to 
bring a novel to a single closural point is among the most cherished fan-
tasies of modernity. In a culture of fascism it becomes an obsession. The 
fact that it is a fantasy is a knowledge that most detective and legal fic-
tions work to suppress. Their chronic failure or principled refusal to do 
so are symptoms of and resistances to a culture of fascism that seeks to 
cure itself through the production of increasingly implausible fictions.
At the state level, the “cure” for the messiness and harshness of material 
reality was to come through the elevation of spiritual values. The attempted 
reach of the state into the realm of the spirit was manifest in the new con-
figuration of labor organizations, organized through the concept of “labor–
capital fusion,” referring to an ideal unity of purpose, fusing worker and 
manager with the emperor as one mind and one spirit.37 (Even baseball was 
played as a spiritual venture in novels of the time.)38
 Having a Japanese spirit meant having the authority of Japanese purity. 
Aaron Skabelund shows how Japanese bureaucrats, with the help of private 
enthusiasts, projected notions of Japanese purity onto the Japanese dog, 
then used that dog as a tool of indoctrination. The myth and representation 
of Hachikō, he argues, “played a prominent role in the culture of fascism 


















fascist critic Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875–1969) in 1935 as sentimentalism 
gone awry and as an example of “fascism from below”; the public, “influ-
enced by a swirl of rumor, sensational media reports, and theories,” had 
entered a “self-hypnotic, collective psychotic” trance that allowed them to 
believe things that they had not experienced and that they could not ratio-
nally explain. This tendency, Hasegawa worried, “might result in similar 
delusions about weightier social and political issues with more dangerous 
consequences than those created by the fervor over Hachikō.”
The Representational Vacuum
Fascism converted cultural despair into passionate purpose, providing 
a cure to malaise and anomie by regimenting people’s lives and creating 
consensus through propaganda, indoctrination, repression, and terror di-
rected at internal and external enemies.39 The state’s control of language, 
thought, and behavior created a vacuum that the cultural work of fascism 
filled. The cultural work of fascism was formed in this representational 
vacuum. It was through censorship codes that language was mediated for 
Japanese listeners, viewers, and readers. Although censorship of all media 
began as early as the beginnings of the modern state in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, with a tradition going back two centuries, in 
the mid-1930s it went even further toward creating an expressive vacuum. 
After 1937, the producers of newspapers, radio broadcasts, magazines, 
books, songs, comic books, films, and photographs were all subjected to 
strict codes, or subjected themselves, out of pragmatic necessity, to self-
censorship. Left-wing political organizations and journals were squelched, 
and language thought to deter from the war effort and the unity of a citi-
zenry behind it came under harsh review. As certain kinds of language were 
shut out, other kinds were pumped up. National organizations responsible 
for the dissemination of information or for the content and style of popular 
entertainment, such as the Jōhō Iinkai (Information Committee), formed 
in 1931, worked with the industries themselves in the censorship of ideas 
and language.40 The hand of propaganda went so far as to reach into the 
imagination itself.
 Beginning in 1937, and increasingly after 1941, popular songs uplift-
ing the spirit of national unity were promoted, while those that did not 
were controlled. Sensitive to the affective power of aesthetic form, cen-
sors assumed that, when censoring songs, they were to focus not on lyrical 












suretewa iya yo! (Don’t Forget Me!)” was considered dangerous because 
of the singer’s lascivious lingering on the final note in the title’s phrase. 
The song’s exclamatory “yo!” could, when rendered skillfully, make all too 
visible the sexualized body of the singer—and along with it a whole world 
of suppressed, tantalizing, erotic decadence.
 In the film industry, as in the other media, censorship intensified in 
direct proportion to the medium’s access to an ever growing audience. 
Between 1926 and 1934, the film audience, for example, increased by 60 
percent—as many as 35 percent of the total moviegoers were fifteen and 
under, an audience primed for the “decadent” messages of popular culture 
and for fantasies of foreign lifestyles, as well as, on the opposite extreme, 
to new state propaganda. Control extended to the lyrics of popular songs 
thought to corrupt the national language (kokugo) with foreign phrases and 
expressions. Words themselves were subject to the force of direct ideologi-
cal pressure. Loan words once written in the phonetic script that could 
transparently transliterate foreign words would now be changed to Japa-
nese ideograms.42 So suffused with the marks of twisted truths and of for-
mulated propaganda were the languages absorbed by reading, listening, 
and watching that it would be no exaggeration to say that all thought and 
expression were squeezed and molded to fit into state-imposed forms.
 The administration of aesthetics meant to make people support war and 
be willing to persevere stoically in dire conditions as war continued.43 This 
effort was dubbed a “war of ideas (shisōsen).” From the time of the failed 
coup by imperial loyalists in 1936, imperial thought dominated the lan-
guage of propaganda in phrases such as “eight corners of the world under 
one roof (hakkō ichiu).” From 1937 on, catch phrases like this one replaced 
news of casualties on the front. Language prevaricated, or simply lied, and 
was xenophobic. The new language conjured images of blood and race and 
heroism, creating what Tsurumi Kazuko calls a “halo of sanctity.”44
 As interventionist as they were, it is worth noting that artistic propa-
ganda policies never attained the level of elaboration they had in Italy, Ger-
many, and even Spain.45 It is no coincidence that the essays in this volume 
that treat the visual work of fascist aesthetics are less at ease with the appel-
lation “fascist” than those that examine matters of language and thought. 
Michael Baskett, for example, shows that the cultural interaction among 
the Axis powers led to imperfect and sometimes failed results and “did not 
lead to the successful creation of a collective ‘fascist’ identity,” even though 


















racial purity and imperialist expansionism, as well as a belief in the ability 
of the medium of film to create (or destroy) national prestige on a mass 
level.” Aaron Gerow argues that, although the Japanese did produce films 
meant to inculcate a citizenry with the ideals of the state, and although 
there was “a discursive framework for the production of stylistically fascis-
tic texts,” neither a national cinema nor a national cinematic audience ever 
developed that could effectively “contribute to the formation of common 
Japanese imaginaries, fascist or not, or to the effective aesthetic expression 
of the nation.” In part, he argues, this was because of the very hybridity of 
Japanese film, and in part because of limitations on material resources and 
the state’s unwillingness to nationalize (or lack of interest in nationalizing) 
mass entertainment.
 In the case of architecture, Jonathon Reynolds concurs with Baskett’s 
argument against the existence of a fascist style. The Diet building in Tokyo 
shared design elements with those of non-fascist states, and, more to the 
point, architecture and design were not used in Japan as they were in Italy 
and Germany. Japan never built monumental works capable of transform-
ing urban space on a grand scale.46 The state was not very interested in 
architecture and, moreover, lacked materials to execute it on a large scale. 
Reynolds argues that any political message the Diet building could carry 
was disrupted by the divisive issue of what Japaneseness meant, the avail-
ability of building materials, and arguments over the relationship between 
style and national identity: “the building was unable to meet the unrealis-
tic demands placed upon it. The Diet building emerged from the war as an 
unhappy reminder of failed military adventurism and ineffectual political 
leadership.”
 In her discussion of the national state-sponsored competitions to 
choose the best designs for memorial tablets commemorating Japan’s war 
dead, Akiko Takenaka concurs with Reynolds that there was no distinctive 
fascist design. But Takenaka goes on to show that the design itself, and the 
successful building and dissemination of actual statues, were less impor-
tant in the creation of a national aesthetic than was the very process of the 
competition itself:
The chūreitō [lit., “tower to the loyal spirits”] functioned like an icon in 
the civic religion of fascism, which, according to George Mosse, draws 
“its strength from an already present consensus.” . . . Mosse’s argument 
is confined to the visual expressions of fascist culture; the chūreitō 












of creation, even more so than through its actual appearance. That con-
sensus, fostered through education and mass culture, placed ultimate 
value on one’s sacrifice through death to the emperor and was demon-
strated not by the physical appearance of the memorials, but by individu-
als working throughout the process of design and construction.
Angus Lockyer also examines an aborted attempt at aesthetic management 
(the Japan World Exhibition to commemorate the two thousand six hun-
dredth year of the Imperial Era, planned for 1940) and finds that no unified 
aesthetic program could be produced, because as the planning “confronted 
the lessons of experience, . . . the exhibition entered the world of trade-
offs, accounting, and interest.” Lockyer is interested in how fascist culture 
can explain how and why aesthetics and ideology could become regime and 
suggests that fascist regimes “were distinguished by the extent to which 
the production of culture became the work of the state, rehearsing these 
tropes in an attempt to yoke subject to regime.” Spectacle, therefore, is 
“one point at which to connect fascist culture to fascist politics.” In this 
regard, according to Lockyer, Japan was lacking: “it is hard to find such a 
spectacle in Japan, however.”
 In his response paper included at the end of the volume, Alejandro Yarza 
argues that fascist consent in Spain was forged not by a totalizing state 
project but through diverse means, including the dissemination of Franco’s 
personal film projects; the inner contradictions that weighed down the cul-
tural policies of the various national fascisms did not prevent the power-
ful forging of such consent, which was effected by what he calls Francoist 
kitsch and its politics of time. Yarza’s description of the Spanish situation 
resonates with the Japanese, in which consent did not necessarily depend 
on a unified vision emanating from the state.
 For Takenaka, Baskett, and Gerow, it was the very process of attempting 
to forge a national aestheticizing project—which some in this volume call 
“fascist”—more than the aesthetic objects themselves that had a political 
effect. They imply that insisting on seeing fascism only in its relationship 
to the works of regimes may occlude seeing fascism in its discursive or 
aesthetic forms. Also potentially occluding our vision of fascism are the 
ways in which fascist discourses can partake of non-fascist and antifascist 
discourses or even overtly disavow their own fascism. The folk-art theorist 
Yanagi Sōetsu, discussed by Noriko Aso, was a cosmopolitan humanist 
“spreading the message of a beautiful . . . way of life for all people, every-


















been a trend to imitate fascism ( fuassho). How pitiful that even lovers of the 
nation (aikokushugisha) must learn from the West. No one has a greater un-
patriotic sensibility than the Japanese fascists ( fuashisto). It is disconcerting 
that Japanese learn the meaning of patriotism from Mussolini.”
 Japanese nationalists, Yanagi goes so far as to say, have been a cancer 
responsible for recent troubles. Nevertheless, despite his antifascist claims, 
Yanagi’s aesthetics could be inflected fascistically.47 Aso finds “striking 
similarities . . . between his folk-craft discourse and fascistic aesthetics of 
the wartime era.” More broadly, his “discursive ambiguities suggest points 
of articulation between mid-twentieth century humanist and fascist dis-
courses that made slipping from one to the other all too easy for many Japa-
nese intellectuals at the time.” Such slippage lay behind the work of cultural 
fascism. In Isaiah Berlin’s words, “Few things have played a more fatal part 
in the history of human thought and action than great imaginative analo-
gies from one sphere, in which a particular principle is applicable and valid, 
to other provinces, where its effect may be exciting and transforming, but 
where its consequences may be fallacious in theory and ruinous in prac-
tice.”48
 Cognizant of such slippage, we can be aware of the appearance of fas-
cism in cultural (or political) work that does not speak fascism’s name. In 
her discussion of the fascist aesthetics of the beautiful fiction of Kawabata 
Yasunari, Nina Cornyetz writes, “I would go so far as to argue that, even 
were there no texts by Kawabata that literally voiced support for Japan’s 
‘mission’ in Asia, the theoretical analysis of the signifying system that under-
pins Kawabata’s aesthetics . . . will reveal aspects shared by the various and 
different political forms of fascism.”
 Such slippage, and the fact that fascism need not be so named to do its 
cultural—or political—work, may account for the political and cognitive 
motivations for the fascist disavowal of fascism, which plays an important 
structural role in the working of fascism itself and in the postwar forget-
ting of Japan’s fascist past. This forgetting has been aided by the assump-
tion that fascism is so particularly imposing an ideology that only the most 
concrete and unambiguous of evidence might sufficiently prove its pres-
ence.49 While reading the evidence given in this volume for the fascism of 
Japanese culture and thought in the interwar years, we should keep caution 
against interpreting an ideology’s lack of complete success as evidence of its 
weak effect. Imperfect penetration is no guard against a culture’s (or even 












is quite obvious that mass support for totalitarianism comes neither from 
ignorance nor from brainwashing.”50
The essays in this volume are arranged according to broad generic cate-
gories. Part I, “Theories of Japanese Fascism,” opens with two essays that 
examine how fascism was understood in Japan in the 1930s. In “Fascism 
Seen and Unseen: Fascism as a Problem in Cultural Representation,” 
Kevin M. Doak discusses two early influential theorists of Japanese fascism: 
the Marxist Tosaka Jun and the liberal Christian Imanaka Tsugimaro. In 
“The People’s Library: The Spirit of Prose Literature versus Fascism,” Richard 
Torrance continues this discussion from the perspective of the antifascist 
literary group centered on the journal Jinmin bunko (The People’s Library). 
Both essays keep in focus the centrality of culture to the theorization of 
fascism. In “Constitutive Ambiguities: The Persistence of Modernism and 
Fascism in Japan’s Modern History,” Harry Harootunian analyzes the dis-
course of the everyday in the writings of Tosaka Jun and Kobayashi Hideo, 
revealing their differing solutions to the “issues of capitalist modernization 
and the resulting aporias of representation.” Kobayashi here emerges as 
a master fascist re-enchanter of the everyday for both the 1930s and the 
postwar years.
 The essays in part II, “Fascism and Daily Life,” reinforce the notion that 
fascism’s solution to alienation and exploitation was found in efforts to 
beautify work, the workplace, and everyday life. In “The Beauty of Labor: 
Imagining Factory Girls in Japan’s New Order,” Kim Brandt discusses how 
such an effort lay behind the Japanese government’s use of the ideas of 
the Japanese Folk-Craft Movement to create a culture of daily life infused 
with the beauty of preindustrial Asian objects and practices; Noriko Aso’s 
“Mediating the Masses: Yanagi Sōetsu and Fascism,” analyzes how Yanagi’s 
humanist discourse of daily-life amelioration bled into a fascist aesthetics. 
The government’s efforts to instill daily life with an ideology of beauty and 
purity is shown also in Aaron Skabelund’s “Fascism’s Furry Friends: Dogs, 
National Identity, and Purity of Blood in 1930s Japan,” which describes how 
the symbol of a loyal dog acquired pedagogic force for promulgating values 
of racial purity and national essence.
 Daily life was molded by public entertainment and spectacle, the focus of 
part III, “Exhibiting Fascism.” In “Narrating the Nation-ality of a Cinema: 
The Case of Japanese Prewar Film,” Aaron Gerow describes how the for-
mation of a fascist cinema was limited by the conflicts over the very for-


















ideological and commercial—involved in Japan’s forming a unified filmic 
aesthetic with the other Axis powers, in “All Beautiful Fascists? Axis Film 
Culture in Imperial Japan.” The same check on the creation of a singular fas-
cist aesthetic can be seen in the memorial design competitions discussed 
in Akiko Takenaka’s “Architecture for Mass-Mobilization: The Chūreitō 
Memorial Design Competition, 1939–1945,” and in “Japan’s Imperial Diet 
Building in the Debate over Construction of a National Identity,” where 
Jonathan M. Reynolds argues that the Diet Building’s symbolic value fell 
short of what could be called fascistic. Angus Lockyer takes this point fur-
ther in “Expo Fascism? Ideology, Representation, Economy,” in which he 
argues that the plans for a 1940 exhibition, while displaying some qualities 
of a fascist aesthetic, could not in the end be deemed fascist. Finally, Ellen 
Schattschneider, in “The Work of Sacrifice in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
duction: Bride Dolls and Ritual Appropriation at Yasukuni Shrine,” reveals 
how a newly renovated military history museum in Tokyo might be read as 
an illustration of fascist aesthetics but also as an example of a resistance to 
such an aesthetics.
 If the essays on visual forms of display argue for the heuristic limits, or 
complications, of the concept of fascism for the Japanese case, the essays in 
part IV, “Literary Fascism,” have little difficulty locating the fascist aesthetic 
in the work of language. In “Fascist Aesthetics and The Politics of Rep-
resentation in Kawabata Yasunari,” Nina Cornyetz analyzes the aesthetic 
discourse of timeless harmony and its relationship to a fascist politics of 
violence in the writing of Kawabata Yasunari. In “Disciplining the Erotic-
Grotesque in Edogawa Ranpo’s Demon of the Lonely Isle,” Reichert reads the 
detective fiction of Edogawa Rampo to explore how the fascist impulse 
toward homogeneity and purity represented a resistance to the threatening 
confusions of modern culture. Such threats belonged to what Keith Vincent 
calls a culture of paranoia, which he explores in “Hamaosociality: Narrative 
and Fascism in Hamao Shirō’s The Devil’s Discipline,” a novel that reveals the 
workings of, and against, the drive toward fascism.
 While we are interested in how aesthetics of Japanese fascism worked 
within texts and artifacts, we also want to know how they penetrated real 
life. James Dorsey’s “Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping, and the Nine 
Gods of War: ‘Fascist Proclivities’ Made Real,” makes the connection be-
tween culture (as rhetoric) and life (as violence) explicit by showing how 
true stories about Japanese submariners circulated around various modes 
of mass entertainment and became a model of action for flesh-and-blood 












he writes, had “been rehearsed through the participation—sometimes as 
active producers and sometimes as passive consumers—in the communal 
myth.” The process of securing that myth required a variegated “saturation” 
of the cultural sphere even more than a unified propogandistic assault.51 
As Alejandro Yarza argues in the concluding essay of this volume, a “re-
laxed” Francoist film policy in Spain illuminates the “hybrid and apparently 
contradictory ways in which fascist regimes attempted to secure ideological 
hegemony.”
 In the trenchant foreword that opens the volume, Marilyn Ivy puts a fine 
point on the cultural work of fascism. The fascist fantasy, she writes, “is 
always cultural,” and “it is the fantasy of culture itself that gives shape to 
many of the aesthetic and philosophical enterprises circulating around the 
fascist sign.” This volume represents an attempt to suggest the shape to 
that sign as it marked various works of Japanese culture.
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Fascism Seen and Unseen:  
Fascism as a Problem in Cultural Representation
Just as romanticism was the illusion of the nineteenth century, fascism is 
the illusion of our time.
—Imanaka Tsugimaro, Fuashizumu undō ron, 78–79.
Retrospection has advantages, but it also has its risks. No-
where is this more so than in the never-ending debate over whether, when, 
and how Japan was fascist. Unlike Mussolini’s Italy, where fascism was un-
deniable, or Hitler’s Germany, where (with a bit of conceptual revision) 
National Socialism could be made to play the role of a “fascist” revolution, 
wartime Japan never experienced an overthrow of the monarchical constitu-
tional order established in the late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the rise 
of militarist influences with the escalation of war on the Asian continent, 
Japan’s joining with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the anti-Comintern 
pact in 1936, then the Tripartite Pact in 1940 all have given postwar histori-
ans cause to lump Japan in the same “fascist” category as its wartime allies. 
The fascist label has been particularly appealing for two broad groups of 
critics: Marxists, who could draw from their wartime comrades who con-
sidered Japan’s wartime crackdown on communism as “fascist”; and post-
war nationalists (both Japanese as well as citizens of Japan’s wartime enemy 
states), who simply use the term to excoriate anything connected with war-
time Japan.1 Often lost in the recriminations and political posturings over 





















political structure, or even the cultural tendencies, of wartime Japan really 
“fascist”? And if so, what does this “fascism” refer to? How was fascism 
reconciled with Japanese imperialism? Finally—and, I believe, most im-
portant—what did Japanese at the time understand fascism to be, and to 
what extent did they consider their own political and cultural forms to be 
“fascist”?
 The problem of identifying how fascism works as a cultural ideology is 
not a simple one. Complicating the question is the difficulty in determining 
a “fascist” culture style. As Walter Laqueur points out in his authoritative 
Fascism: Past, Present and Future, the fascist “cultural malaise was most acutely 
felt in literature and the visual arts. . . . [yet] political indoctrination in cul-
ture was, on the whole, limited to prohibitions; there was no Nazi style in 
literature comparable to ‘Socialist realism.’” Further, Laqueur notes, even 
Hitler’s preference for monumentalism in the visual arts was not shared 
in Mussolini’s fascist Italy.2 It may not be possible in the end to identify 
a single fascist theory of culture, in this sense. Moreover, underlying La-
queur’s interrogation is the liberal understanding of culture as a broad—
perhaps even undefinable—field of human creativity. Given this assump-
tion about culture, it is not at all surprising that Laqueur finds it impossible 
to identify a specific Nazi or fascist cultural style. This failure to identify a 
universal fascist style aside, Laqueur’s point about literature’s historical 
relationship to fascism in particular seems especially fruitful in identifying 
how fascism and culture intersected in wartime Japan.
 When joined by the postwar reflections of Maruyama Masao, Laqueur’s 
emphasis on literature as a key site for fascist culture takes on added value 
in determining the place of fascist culture in wartime Japan. Maruyama was 
not only one of postwar Japan’s most important commentators on the po-
litical culture of wartime Japan. He was also a witness to historical fascism 
in Japan, having lived through the period while struggling to continue his 
work in comparative political theory. His reflections on the impact of fas-
cism among intellectuals are an important starting point in trying to cap-
ture the precise ways in which fascism and culture intersected in wartime 
Japan. Maruyama identified a double response in literary culture to the pres-
sures of fascism when he described the “typhoon” that swept up writers in 
the early 1930s:
There was another important shift in the basic circumstances surround-
ing politics and literature. This was of course the development of Japan’s 
















kuo and the escalation into all-out war between Japan and China that 
occurred as its historical consequence. This brought the problem of 
“national trends (kokusei)” once again front and center into literature. 
. . . One group among the tenkō writers folded their earlier image of 
keeping pace with politics—what had been for them a movement—into 
this new “politics” without any revision at all. Look how far politics has 
come, literature must not be left behind! (This was the direction of what 
was called state-policy literature, or continental literature.) Yet another 
group discovered in the myth of ethnic nationality (minzoku) and the 
emperor the ir-rationality [sic] which had been rejected in the previous 
clamor over “the supremacy of politics.” They tried very hard to burn up 
their literary selves in the totality of irrationality which was the flip side 
of the totality of rationality.3
Together, Laqueur’s and Maruyama’s analyses suggest that too little at-
tention has been given to literary texts, where fascist views were often es-
poused in terms of a return to ethnic national culture. In short, what is 
needed today is a different approach that, instead of uncritically ingesting 
postwar assumptions about Japanese fascism as the characteristic mode 
of wartime state power, seeks to uncover the place of fascism within and 
against dominant retrospective views by turning back to what was actually 
said about fascism by its critics during the time when fascism began to ap-
pear as a cultural movement in Japan.
 Two of the most influential critics of fascism who wrote during the 
1930s and early 1940s were Imanaka Tsugimaro (1893–1980) and Tosaka Jun 
(1900–45). These two men might be seen as a study in contrasts. Imanaka 
was a liberal Christian who resigned his post at Kyushu Imperial University 
in 1942 to take a position in the wartime government, whereas Tosaka was 
a Marxist who was arrested in 1938 and died in prison at the end of the war. 
Moreover, Imanaka’s studies drew attention to the historical connections 
between fascist movements and workers’ movements, while Tosaka em-
phasized fascism as an ideology linked to capitalism and liberal intellectu-
als. Yet they shared a deep concern about the rise of fascism in Japan and 
believed that the foundations for fascism stemmed from transformations 
that followed the First World War. Read together, their writings on fascism 
provide an important illumination on how fascism was seen, and subse-
quently “unseen”—a complex process of shifting signification that has had 
a lasting impact on the debate over Japanese fascism today. Most impor-











came to “unsee” fascism by discounting the centrality of an ethnic concept 
of national cultural identity (minzoku) and instead represented Japanese fas-
cism as a top-down ideology driven by the state and social elites. As I will 
note, this postwar unseeing of historical fascism has served to legitimate 
a new ideology of ethnic national culture whose contemporary adherents 
often claim to be the most virulent critics of wartime “fascism” even as they 
adopt a political position whose ultimate target is not limited to the ghosts 
of the wartime state but may even extend to the postwar liberal-democratic 
Japanese state.
Back to the Future: Imanaka Tsugimaro  
and Tosaka Jun’s Wartime Theories on Fascism
Imanaka Tsugimaro is a rewarding place to begin a reconsideration of cul-
tural fascism in Japan. Although not widely known in the English litera-
ture on Japanese fascism, Imanaka’s wartime studies are among the most 
important works on fascism in Japan during the 1930s and served as very 
early warnings of the dangers of fascism in Japan.4 In his first major work 
on fascism, On the Fascist Movement (February 1932), Imanaka confronted the 
problem of particular differences within any universal theory of fascism. 
Imanaka stated that the book would focus exclusively on the fascist move-
ment in Italy, but he added two important qualifications. First, he noted 
that he considered “movements like Hitler’s to be essentially the same” as 
the fascism in Italy. And second, he added that his major objective in the 
work was to focus on fascist movements rather than fascist states, “because 
I have been thinking about its [fascism’s] contemporary political signifi-
cance for Japan.”5 At issue was whether Imanaka could articulate a theory of 
fascism that could suture the differences in Italian, German, French, Swiss, 
Japanese, and other fascist movements. And whether he could do so rested 
on how he conceived of fascism as a general problem.
 Imanaka arrived at a universal understanding of fascism first from a his-
torical reading of the movement’s origins in Italy and second through a 
conceptual analysis that tried to isolate those elements of fascism that were 
common to all fascist movements. His analysis of the historical develop-
ment of fascism in Italy in three stages (Revolutionary Fascism of 1914; 
Combative Fascism of 1919; and Party Fascism after 1921) emphasized the 
social, economic, and cultural dislocations of the First World War as the 
universal conditions for the rise of fascism as a general phenomenon.6 Ima-
















fascism to the middle class and, especially, to understand the historical and 
theoretical ties between fascist and communist movements. He concluded 
that fascism was not merely a “reactionary” but also in some senses a “revo-
lutionary” movement whose origins were found in self-articulations by fas-
cists whose revolutionary beliefs had been honed within socialist move-
ments. The implications for cultural ideology were significant. Fascism 
was both revolutionary and reactionary, both a middle-class ideology and 
a force that went far beyond the middle class, ultimately betraying middle-
class hopes. Here, Imanaka was quite close to Walter Laqueur’s point that 
“fascism thought of itself as a movement of cultural revolution.”7 What 
they shared was a sense that fascism aimed at revolution, a breaking out 
of the restraints of constitutional politics to something entirely new and 
different. But what kind of revolution was the fascist revolution? And what 
role, if any, did culture play in addressing the social and economic disloca-
tions that flowed from the First World War?
 The key to grasping the apparently paradoxical nature of fascism was 
to recognize that the First World War had unleashed a historically specific 
form of nationalism (minzokushugi) centered on an ethnic appropriation of 
cultural identity. Defining culture as the culture of ethnic nations appealed 
to growing numbers of people, especially but not exclusively among the 
middle class, who turned to ethnic nationalism to address what existing 
political structures seemed incapable of resolving: the oppression suffered 
by “weak” capitalist economies at the hands of the stronger established 
capitalist states. Skirting a theory of historical backwardness, Imanaka pre-
ferred to describe these economic inequalities between nations in terms of 
whether their economic base was “fragile” or “sound.” In advanced capi-
talist states with a “fragile” economic base (e.g., interwar Italy), the influx 
of capital from advanced “sound” capitalist economies (e.g., England, the 
United States, Germany) is seen as a threat to their national survival.8 Ima-
naka’s point was that any attempt to understand fascism theoretically must 
consider these international relations of power, or what was really a theory 
of global imperialism, in addition to issues of domestic oppression.
 For Imanaka’s theory of fascism, the most significant point about these 
dislocations of imperialist capitalism was that, beginning around the First 
World War, it was the middle class in countries where capitalism had a 
fragile base who were the most seriously afflicted. In those economies, the 
middle class found its relative advantage over the working class—and its 
dreams of approximating the upper class—quickly disappearing. Fascism 











ist countries that capitalist methods had failed them, and they were easily 
seduced by fascism’s promise of a “third way,” imaginative (and thoroughly 
imagined) hopes for a social solution that would overcome capitalism 
itself. In this sense, Imanaka concluded that “fascism is not a concept that 
can be completely subsumed under the category of a capitalist reaction-
ary movement.”9 Indeed, he pointed to fascism’s origins in working-class 
movements in both Italy and Germany, noting the paradox that fascism 
was more influential in countries with active socialist politics than it was 
in England, France, and the United States, where socialists and commu-
nists had enjoyed much less success as organized players in national poli-
tics. One defining feature of fascism, for Imanaka, was its anti-capitalist 
 nature.
 Thus, a major problem confronting any global theory of fascism was the 
historical relationship between communism and fascism as forms of anti-
capitalism. As Imanaka put it, “The parallel direction in the force of fascism 
and communism is a fact difficult to ignore, but [the real problem is] how 
to explain this fact.”10 Imanaka rejected the notion that the turn to fascism 
was merely a “strategic mistake” by leaders of the communist movement, 
pointing instead to the longstanding influence of “nationalism (minzoku-
shugi)” among the Italian intellectual class. Those in the communist move-
ment who labeled fascism a “reactionary” force were simply reflecting the 
reality that middle-class socialists eventually turned against the communist 
movement. For those who did and became national socialists, the crisis of 
international capitalism meant their own position as a middle class was 
endangered and, unable to identify with an international proletariat due 
to their nationalistic education, they increasingly turned to the state. Ima-
naka’s underlying point was that fascism arose not as an ideology for, by, or 
of a state that was already supreme, but from an endangered middle class 
that turned to the state to shore up the fragile capitalist base of its own na-
tion. For this reason, Imanaka concluded that fascism was not simply the 
logic of reaction, but an extension of the revolutionary sentiment of the 
working class transferred by the nationalist middle class into a revolution 
by the “social mass.”11 His conclusions take on a prophetic tone when read 
in the light of the conversions to national socialism the following year by 
Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika, members of the Japan Communist 
Party’s Central Committee. Fascism, like communism, was a revolutionary 
movement against capitalism, but it sought its revolutionary subject not in 
a class-bound entity like the proletariat, but in the mass-based subjectivity 
















 Revolutionary fascism, then, had to involve cultural considerations and 
should not be merely reduced to an analysis of political institutions. Some 
theory of cultural identity was necessary to account for the dynamics that 
led the middle class to reject class-consciousness in favor of a “social mass” 
conceived as the embodiment of the ethno-cultural nation. Why should the 
social masses be signified in ethnic national terms? On this question, Ima-
naka’s comparative theory of fascism faltered. He did not sufficiently ex-
plore the cultural implications of fascism, except to note the power of this 
revolutionary ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi) that had emerged around 
the First World War and that had transformed socialist movements around 
the world. One might have expected Imanaka to develop a cultural theory 
of fascism when, a few months later, he offered a monograph on the rise of 
the national socialist movement in Germany, a movement that in mid-1932 
was a striking example of “bottom-up” fascism rather than “top-down” 
fascism growing out of a state. Here was a prime opportunity for Imanaka 
to explain how socialists, middle-class professionals, and especially the 
young were being enticed to join a movement that he argued would never 
serve their real interests. Surely, some form of culturalist ideology was the 
key. But in the end, Imanaka retreated from the cultural implications of 
his work, concluding only that the source of fascism’s power could not be 
found in any theory, cultural or otherwise.12 Fascism was merely a “move-
ment” and could only be studied as such.
 Imanaka’s disavowal of the significance of cultural representation is 
perhaps the most important legacy of his approach to understanding what 
fascism is. It was an ironic disavowal, given that Imanaka implicitly rec-
ognized the ethnic cultural ideology at the core of the fascist movements 
he described. In On National Socialism (June 1932), he rendered the concept 
of “nation” in both the Italian Partito Nationale Fascista and the German 
Nationalsozialistische movement as “minzoku.”13 Imanaka thereby cap-
tured the ethno-cultural nationalism that he believed linked both move-
ments together in their fascism. This conceptualization is revealing, not 
only for Imanaka’s subsequent disavowal of ethno-cultural elements in fas-
cism, but also for the ways this contemporary perception of fascism has 
given way to postwar emphases on statism. In their postwar “unseeing” 
of fascism, most historians of Japanese fascism have rendered national so-
cialism with an emphasis on the state (kokka shakaishugi), displacing the 
populist, ethnic sense of nation (minzoku) that emerges in the pages of Ima-
naka’s text as a witness to how contemporary theorists located the core cul-











states. In this indirect revelation of ethnic nationalism as the key element 
in fascism’s cultural ideology, Imanaka’s theory makes two contributions 
to understanding the rise of fascism: it located the historical origins of 
fascism in the anti-imperialist ethnic nationalism of the First World War 
period, and it suggested how bottom-up nationalist fervor had mobilized 
Japanese fascists to commit acts of terrorism against the multiethnic Japa-
nese state, to even assassinate Prime Minister Inukai in May 1932.14
 Unfortunately, an institutional bias that reduced the question of liberal 
democracy to parliament precluded a completion of the cultural theory 
opened up by the problem of ethnic nationality that Imanaka’s study of 
fascism had stumbled on. Instead of revealing the claims ethnic forms of 
nationalism make on national culture, Imanaka settled on an a-cultural 
theory of racism in the crudest biologically determinist mode. Imanaka 
simply wrote off Nazi cultural ideology as a form of biological racial con-
sciousness ( jinshu ishiki) and racial passion ( jinshu kanjō) that extended be-
yond ethnic German identity to encompass almost all white, non-Jewish 
Europeans (notably absent from the list were Italians).15 This determination 
to see (German) fascism in terms of biological race, rather than as part of 
the interwar turn to ethnic forms of national culture, required Imanaka to 
return to one of the central issues of interwar political discourse: the ques-
tion of how to define this newly emergent form of ethno-cultural identity 
called minzoku.
 Imanaka’s discussion of the problem of nationality (minzoku) in relation 
to fascism is the most important site for understanding his retreat from 
a cultural theory adequate to account for the object of his study. The en-
tire discussion was little more than an exercise in anti-theory. He began 
his discussion on “the concept of minzoku” with a statement that theories 
and concepts are of little value in understanding fascism before adding for 
safe measure that “the word minzoku has yet to be given a precise concept 
in political science”(although he gave it his own, rather straightforward 
definition as “nation”).16 Yet his discussion made it clear that Imanaka 
was in fact drawing implicitly on a body of specific theoretical discourse 
on nationality that equated minzoku with an ethnological concept of na-
tional identity (nasci) that posited the ethnic group as a natural body, dis-
tinct from both the modern state and constitutional forms of nationality.17 
Marching ahead, oblivious to the ground he trod, Imanaka made a con-
ceptual leap, applying this concept of “nation” to render Gobineau’s and 
Gumplowicz’s concepts of “race,” Walter Bagehot’s concept of nationality, 
















of minzoku and nation by applying them inconsistently across nineteenth-
century European discourses, Imanaka then turned to what he called the 
three dominant understandings of minzoku in his day: the cultural iden-
tity referred to by both Renan’s concept of nation and Herder’s concept 
of Volk (Imanaka’s amalgamation of these two only reveals his failure to 
grasp what Renan was arguing against); Harry Elmore Barnes’s concept of 
national consciousness; and the “orthodox school of Marxism’s concept of 
nation.”18 Recent allegations by some theorists of Japanese culture about 
the “multivalence” of the concept of minzoku notwithstanding, it is clear 
that all three of these traditions were really concerned with the same sub-
ject: how to understand the problem of the nation (minzoku), especially as a 
question of ethno-cultural identity.
 What ultimately underwrote this disavowal of the repressive cultural 
functions inherent in ethnic nationalism was Stalin’s economic argument 
in favor of a utilitarian embrace of this revolutionary (ethnic) nationalism 
in the struggle against imperialism.19 But to redeem this concept of min-
zoku for progressive purposes, it was necessary to sever, however disin-
genuously, its connection to racism. Citing Stalin’s position that the nation 
was a product of history rather than culture, Imanaka concluded, “I think 
it is best to put other ethnic (minzoku-teki) concepts that exist in a different 
relationship to the ethnic nation-state (minzoku kokka) under other concep-
tual headings. For example, forms of social community that spring from 
such identities as clan, tribe, race ( jinshu), language, religion, and life envi-
ronment are something other than ethnic nationality (minzoku).”20 In short, 
Imanaka followed Stalin’s utilitarian approach to ethnic nationalism while 
at the same time trying to exempt the cultural elements of ethnic nation-
ality from consideration.
 As the core of fascist social ideology, minzoku now signified race in a 
strictly biological mode (even though, as Imanaka admitted, fascists them-
selves often hotly rejected the suggestion that their understanding of the 
nation was coterminous with a biological concept of race).21 But when dis-
covered in the hands of those thought not to be fascists, minzoku had to be 
put under some “other conceptual heading”—an implicit theory of ethnic 
culture long before ethnicity became an explicit concept in cultural theory. 
And yet, as with Stalin, it was Imanaka’s failure to consider culture as more 
than a superstructure for an economically determined base that caused him 
to overlook the oppressive cultural features of ethnic nationalism and to 
turn instead to a reductive definition of biological race. Or perhaps one can 











the minzokushugi of fascism as a form of racism rather than the histori-
cally specific, culturally informed mode of ethnic nationalism that he had 
earlier identified it as being.
 Once the minzoku of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s nationalism was arrested 
in this racial lens, Japanese minzoku ideology could be exempted from fas-
cism as long as it was not affiliated with this biological racialism. And in-
deed, after demonstrating the centrality of minzoku ideology in European 
fascism, Imanaka explained the rise of fascist movements in Japan with 
no reference to the influence of this minzoku social identity, whether con-
ceived as “race” or “ethnic nationality.” Still, Imanaka’s analysis of Japa-
nese fascism remains interesting for several other reasons, not the least 
of which is his detailed history of Japanese fascism as a movement that, 
like Hitler’s and Mussolini’s movements, was an effort at revolution from 
below. After first noting the blow to parliamentary democracy with the at-
tack on Prime Minister Hamaguchi in November 1930, Imanaka traced the 
rise of fascism back to longstanding tensions between party politicians and 
a coalition of bureaucrats and military officers. He then gave careful at-
tention to the platforms and declarations of three fascist movements: the 
Japan Socialism group inspired by Takabatake Motoyuki’s state socialism; 
the Great Japan Production Party and its supporters in populist religious 
groups such as ōmotokyō; and the Japan National Social Party, especially 
Shimonaka Yasaburō and his “Economic Problems Study Group.”22 Ima-
naka was not mistaken: these men and their groups were indeed inspired 
by fascist ideals. Nor was he wrong about the connection between these 
fascists and the socialist and labor movement in Japan. But in approach-
ing the issue of fascism from his socioeconomic perspective, and having 
reduced the problem of ethnic nationalism to simply a matter of biological 
race, he had divested his argument of the broader cultural implications of 
the fascist agenda.
 This disavowal of the ethno-culturalism inherent in the fascist agenda 
had important consequences in encouraging Imanaka to personally draw 
closer to the Japanese state at the height of the war, as I will discuss later. In 
the end, Imanaka’s ultimate conclusion that fascism was merely a form of 
political dictatorship, along with his tendency to emphasize biological race 
over culture, determined his conviction that culture—and cultural inflec-
tions of the nation—could be dispensed with as insignificant factors in the 
rise of fascist movements, both in Japan and elsewhere.23 This exemption 
of culture from Imanaka’s theory of fascism laid the foundations for later 
















planations of fascism and substituting for ethnic national culture notions 
of biological race or by dismissing the question of fascism entirely, since 
Japan did not “go fascist,” as the Diet functioned throughout the war, and 
Japan never operated concentration camps as the Nazis did. In either case, 
the result was a theoretical failure to identify the place and power of eth-
nicity in nationalist ideology.
 In contrast to Imanaka’s institutional approach, Tosaka Jun’s theoreti-
cal approach emphasized fascism as a specific form of cultural ideology. 
Tosaka’s cultural critique of Japanese fascism was presented in Nippon 
ideorogii (revised edition, 1936) but stemmed from essays written between 
1929 and 1934. The timing is significant. Whereas Imanaka’s theories of 
fascism reflected influential events of the early 1930s (military actions in 
Manchuria and the fall of party government at home), Tosaka was able to 
reflect on the cultural and literary movements that had begun to change 
national discourse by the mid-1930s. As Watanabe Kazutami has noted, 
the year 1935 was a turning point in Japanese cultural discourse.24 In that 
year, Yokomitsu Riichi’s call for a “return to minzoku” by literary writers 
was simultaneously echoed in the formation of the Japan Romantic School, 
while Shimazaki Tōson’s Before the Dawn (1932) and the prominent discus-
sions on it in the Japanese press reinforced the move toward minzoku as the 
foundation of a new beginning for Japanese national identity.25 In addition, 
the mass exodus from the Communist Party following the “conversions” of 
Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika in 1933 made it clear that the com-
munist movement in Japan was in no way immune to the seductive appeal 
of minzoku.26 Throughout this period, Tosaka grew increasingly concerned 
that the abandonment of the political left and the turn toward fascism could 
not be explained without attention to these cultural developments, and he 
sought to identify the culturalist ideology of fascism that was crippling the 
Marxist movement.
 Tosaka made a substantial improvement over Imanaka’s theory in iden-
tifying the cultural ideology of fascism that was increasingly becoming 
visible in his day. He found the core of this culturalist ideology in the “cul-
tural renaissance (bungei fukkō)” that former proletarian writers such as 
Hayashi Fusao had loudly proclaimed in the early 1930s. Tosaka placed this 
ostensible “cultural renaissance” in the broader context of a fascistic desire 
for “restoration ( fukko)” of the past, an impulse that inevitably saw in the 
past a family system that was the essence of the Japanese ethnic way of life 
(nihon minzoku seikatsu no honshitsu).27 In contrast to Imanaka, whose liberal-











reducing fascism to political dictatorship and “race,” Tosaka emphasized 
the ideological functions of fascism that were centrally concerned with the 
ethno-cultural expressions of national identity often favored by Japanese 
liberals and writers. Tosaka’s major concern was in outlining the cultural 
ideological relations between fascism and liberalism. His characterization 
of the “cultural renaissance” as merely a “renaissance of pure literature” 
was a direct refutation of Yokomitsu’s call for a new literature of and by 
the entire ethnic nation.28 For Tosaka, the belief in a literature that was not 
defined by class identity was the most direct expression of what he called 
“fascism,” a term he used to characterize liberals and anyone who invoked 
a national culture that was not divided along class lines.29
 Under the pressures of the moment (when, it should be noted, there 
was at best only a weak liberal influence in Japanese intellectual and culture 
circles), Tosaka found it all too easy to equate any group, idea, or cultural 
work that was not Marxist with fascism. Indeed, any fair assessment of 
Tosaka’s theory of fascism must begin with an awareness that Tosaka was 
writing from a sense of frustration that, by the mid-1930s, the proletarian 
cultural movement was dead and its death had been hastened by a num-
ber of desertions from the Marxist movement. Again, the contrast to Ima-
naka is illustrative. Imanaka saw fascism as a “bottom-up” movement that 
was destabilizing parliamentary democracy around the world. Tosaka saw 
fascism as a “top-down” oppression of the proletarian movement, and he 
imagined historical parallels between Japan in the 1930s and Europe in the 
1850s. He explicitly cited Marx’s German Ideology as the inspiration of his 
own Nippon ideorogii, and like Marx, he traced the repression of the masses 
to a romantic, idealist ideology of national essence that he called “Japan-
ism.”30 Like Marx, Tosaka was really writing to condemn those who had 
abandoned the populist movement, and his ire was especially reserved for 
those who had wrapped themselves in the mantle of “liberalism.”
 Tosaka’s approach—through Marx’s critique of philosophical ideal-
ism—led him to describe the cultural ideology of fascism in terms of a 
Japanism that was ultimately defined by its idealist approximation of cul-
ture. Here, he came closer than most to grasping the cultural ideology that 
was often associated with fascism during the 1930s. As Harry Harootunian 
has pointed out, “Tosaka saw in contemporary Japanism . . . representations 
of this effort to transmute culture at a fixed moment in archaic times into 
nature and, thereby, fix, for all times to come, the essence of what it meant 
to be Japanese.”31 The key to this “Japanism” was a theory of ethnic nation-
















a proletarian culture. But the deployment of a bifurcated logic of idealism 
and materialism to represent the cultures of fascism and progressivism, 
respectively, precluded Tosaka from recognizing the role played by leftists 
within the Japanese fascist movement. Between 1934 and 1935, the Japanist 
movement had split between the “idealists” and the “progressives,” and in 
the following years it was in fact the progressive wing, not the idealists, 
who came to dominate the Japanist movement.32 To his credit, Tosaka was 
able to capture the contributions many liberals had made in making fas-
cism seem acceptable through his approach, which emphasized fascism 
as a form of idealism that sought to restrict the meaning of being Japanese 
in ethno-cultural terms. Yet he was unable from this perspective to address 
the fascism of the “right-wing nationalist labor unions,” although Tosaka 
closed Nippon ideorogii by recognizing these unions as factors within the 
fascist movement.33 Whereas Imanaka had identified the historical links 
between socialist and fascist groups in Europe, Tosaka was unable to accept 
the possibility that socialism and National Socialism might have something 
in common. At the same time, Tosaka was far more sensitive than Imanaka 
to the cultural theory behind Japanese fascism, an effort to supplant class 
with ethnicity in the interest of projecting a single identity that would sepa-
rate “true” Japanese from those who were deemed, on ethnic grounds, not 
to belong. Tosaka understood better than most the viciousness of ethnic 
identity posing as culture.
 The divergent fortunes of Tosaka and Imanaka at the height of wartime 
Japan offers a seductive, if superficial, way to sort out the value of their 
theories on fascism. Tosaka was arrested in a major crackdown on Marxists 
in November 1938 and released on bail in 1940. However, he was sent back 
to prison in 1944, where he died from illness the following year, just before 
the end of the war. Tosaka’s tragic end provides powerful material for those 
who would validate his theories by appealing to the notion of martyrdom 
(if not by outright accusing the capitalist Occupation forces of complicity 
with his “fascist executioners”). His imprisonment and death in jail seem 
to bear out his conclusions that wartime Japan was fascist, especially if one 
accepts that he was imprisoned for his antifascism.
 But Tosaka was not merely a foe of fascism: he wrote equally vitriolic at-
tacks on liberalism. Tosaka’s fate must be considered alongside that of Ima-
naka, also an implacable foe of fascism but a supporter of constitutional 
liberalism. In contrast to Tosaka, Imanaka found his fortunes improved as 
the war intensified. Even after 1942, when Imanaka accepted a position in 











body accused him of sympathy for fascism. The wartime state did persecute 
suspected communists, but given its warm reception of the antifascist lib-
eral Imanaka, and the close ties between socialism and fascism in Japan of 
the 1930s,34 it is not clear that the anticommunism of the wartime Japanese 
state is sufficient grounds ipso facto to render it “fascist.”
The Ambivalent Legacies of Fascism as Cultural Ideology
Assertions of wartime Japan as “fascist” need to account for the diver-
gent experiences of these two critics of fascism at the hands of the war-
time state. If they do not, then it is not clear what it means to call Japan at 
this time “fascist.” In assessing wartime Japan as fascist, it is important 
to recall not only Tosaka’s imprisonment and death, but also the wartime 
state’s embrace of Imanaka, a leading liberal, Christian antifascist. While 
it would be tempting to conclude with Tosaka’s defenders that Imanaka’s 
wartime fortunes only illustrate the complicity of liberalism and fascism, 
such a conclusion is premature, if not overly partisan. We must first give 
careful consideration to the different ways Tosaka and Imanaka understood 
the cultural impact of “fascism” and the relationship between culture and 
politics. Given the wartime state’s warm reception of liberal antifascists 
such as Imanaka, it is not at all clear that Tosaka’s imprisonment warrants 
concluding that his antifascism was what offended officials of Imperial 
Japan. Rather, the official reason for his original arrest in 1938 was sus-
picion of violating the 1925 Peace Preservation Law, which targeted those 
who espoused overthrowing Japan’s political system and the rights of pri-
vate property. And as Imanaka’s writings had already made clear, there was 
a fine and not always distinct line separating communists from national so-
cialists among those who sought to overthrow constitutional governments 
and capitalist economies.
 There is no question that wartime Japan turned increasingly authori-
tarian and conservative. There is, however, plenty of room for questioning 
whether the imperial state was “fascist.” Careful attention to the history of 
the Special Higher Police, and particularly to their use by Prime Minister 
Tōjō Hideki against his enemies even further to his political right, reveals 
that extreme rightists, fascists, and practically anyone deemed to pose a 
threat to the Meiji constitutional order were at risk.35 Imanaka, a consistent 
foe of fascism, was at the same time a strong defender of constitutional 
government, and his sense that constitutional government faced a crisis ex-
















proclivities on his part. Like conservative authoritarians in Germany (Paul 
von Hindenburg, Heinrich Brüning), Tōjō’s cabinet had turned against the 
idealists and populists, rejecting Konoe’s Shōwa Research Association and 
purging the “reform bureaucrats” and other openly fascist groups.
 For Imanaka’s career, the key moment came in March 1941. In what be-
came known as the “Cabinet Planning Board Incident,” Wada Hiroo, Kat-
sumada Seiichi, and fifteen other members of the Cabinet Planning Board 
were arrested on suspicion of violating the Peace Preservation Law—the 
same charge that had been leveled against Tosaka. They were not suspected 
of being communists themselves, but the rationale for their arrest is ma-
terial to understanding the manner in which fascism and communism were 
seen by the wartime government. The charge was that Wada and his group 
were members of the “reform bureaucrats” whose national-socialist ten-
dencies would aid in the realization of the Japanese Communist Party’s ulti-
mate objective of overthrowing the constitutional order. Thus, it is signifi-
cant that Imanaka joined the East Asia Institute (which had been founded 
in 1938 and placed under the supervision of the Cabinet Planning Board) in 
July 1942 as part of Prime Minister Tōjō’s effort to remove national socialist 
(“fascist”) elements from the government bureaucracy. Imanaka remained 
a policy analyst for the East Asia Institute until June 1945, convinced that he 
was best able to resist fascist movements from that official post. He dedi-
cated his efforts during the war to defending constitutional government, 
and his suggestions for reform of the capitalist economy were designed to 
avoid the more extreme proposals of the fascist foes of capitalism. In light 
of these facts, Gregory Kasza’s application of Stanley Payne’s character-
ization of “conservative authoritarian” rather than fascist to the wartime 
Japanese political structure seems a very apt one.36
 Conceding that the political system in wartime Japan never fully em-
braced fascism still does not answer the more troubling question: Was 
there fascist culture in Japan and, if so, how do we understand what it was 
and where it operated most strongly? Tosaka provides one sure guide to the 
presence and scope of fascist culture in 1930s Japan. He quickly grasped the 
political significance of the cultural renaissance that was being conducted 
under the sign of “minzoku,” although tragically he was less capable, or 
less willing, to recognize the inroads this ethnic cultural ideology had 
also made among socialist leaders and movements, transforming many of 
them to national socialism. Yet he was practically alone in connecting this 
ethnic national ideology with liberalism in Japan. Tosaka’s efforts to iden-











as a revolutionary movement “from below,” raises an important caution-
ary note: too heavy a reliance on “fascism” to explain the political culture 
of wartime Japan can render the fascist cultural ideology of minzoku in-
visible by simply rendering political oppression as a function of the wartime 
state rather than as the result of specific social and cultural movements 
that began to gather after 1918. As Harootunian has pointed out, the re-
narrativization of wartime fascism by both liberals and Marxists in the early 
postwar years was made possible by “a generally widespread denunciation 
of the wartime state for being the responsible agent in causing Japan’s de-
feat and destruction.”37 Condemning “fascism” has appealed to many in 
postwar Japan who have found it a useful means for legitimating their own 
anti-state ideologies, which, it is important to add, are not always on the 
political left.
 An important caution against this postwar rendering of cultural fascism 
invisible through a single-minded pursuit of the fascist state has been made 
by the leading cultural critic Karatani Kōjin. Karatani’s focus is on fascism 
as a cultural theory, especially as a cultural theory that seeks to negate rep-
resentation. He locates the origins of this rejection of representation in 
Japan in the prewar parliamentary system and how its “representatives” 
excluded some (lower) social strata from political representation, leaving 
those left out of parliamentary representation to turn to the transcendental 
emperor for their own cultural representation.38 Karatani’s analysis is rich 
with suggestions for any effort to rethink fascism, past or present, in Japan 
or elsewhere. His identification of the social origins of fascism in Japan 
as arising from within the lower classes that were excluded from liberal-
democratic institutions is not only historically accurate but is also sup-
ported by postwar historical research that has uncovered the “grassroots” 
of fascism in wartime Japan.39 This complex, dynamic approach helps us 
see how fascism was both a populist movement and a cultural ideology that 
drew from the ethnic revision of national identity that had emerged after 
the First World War and that took ethnicity to be the key to expanding the 
cultural, and eventually the political, franchise of the masses. In this sense, 
fascism was not a rejection of modernity but a kind of hypermodernity that 
sought to complete the democratic national vision unleashed by the French 
Revolution. But most important, it sought to do so at all costs.
 Karatani’s caution about the widespread use and abuse of the term fas-
cism with regard to Japan has significant implications for cultural theory.40 
Most historical accounts of fascism in Japan have been focused on the 
















approach to fascism often has been to overlook fascism as a cultural theory 
of anti-representation. This is not to say that fascist cultural theory has 
not offered its own peculiar theory of cultural representation. Whether in 
Hitler’s version or that of Japanese fascists such as Kamei Kan’ichirō, a 
theory of cultural representation centered on the ethnic collective lies at the 
heart of many fascist or national socialist cultural theories. Ethnic nation-
alism is often couched in terms of resistance to darker forces, frequently 
but not always imagined as coming from the outside, that would extinguish 
the ethnic Gemeinschaft (organic community). But as Karatani’s analysis sug-
gests, this cultural theory of ethnic social totality merely negates a host of 
other internal efforts at social representation while ultimately serving as a 
form of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “symbolic violence.”41
 In contemporary Japan, this anti-representational stance serves to re-
habilitate fascism, not openly by name, but through a more sophisticated 
ideology that displaces fascism by rendering it unseen while trying to estab-
lish lines of historical continuity that do not exist and erasing historical 
discontinuities that have occurred. Advocates of what must remain an un-
seen and unnamed fascism often themselves return to fascism’s modern, 
populist origins while simultaneously and, most importantly, shifting the 
source of fascist violence from the symbolic violence of cultural totality to 
the presumed physical violence of the constitutional state. In the process, 
fascism’s central cultural theory of an ethnically cleansed social totality is 
given a new lease on life as a form of resistance to the presumed cultural 
colonization of (an equally totalized representation of ) “the West.”
 In the face of this new ideology that renders fascism unseen while effect-
ing an ersatz image of fascism in the militarist state, we can no longer be 
satisfied merely to ask whether fascism has outlived its usefulness as a con-
cept for understanding wartime Japan. Such a question is simply unanswer-
able without first addressing the logic of cultural essentialism that informs 
fascist sensibilities (e.g., as manifested in the question of whether “Japan” 
is fascist or not). Beyond the generic risks of this kind of cultural essential-
ism, we must confront the possibility that fascism has found a new pur-
pose and a new meaning in postwar Japan. To the degree that debates over 
wartime Japan as fascist have been indebted to the theoretical influence of 
Imanaka, a single-minded pursuit of fascism in political and military insti-
tutions has allowed historians to exempt from critical attention the broader 
social and cultural forces—especially those expressed in ethnic national 
terms—that challenged the politics of the center, while informing the lib-











 Yet, alternatively, theorists following Tosaka (and there have not been 
many) have either discussed Japanism in such culturally particular terms 
that they remain at best remote from a general theory of Japanese fascism, 
or they have distorted the destabilizing functions of national-socialist 
movements in wartime Japan by conflating them with the state-supremacy 
model of Italian fascism. At best, they concede ethnic nationalism could be 
a kind of fascism, but only if it is conjoined to the (capitalist) state (thus 
conveniently excusing the cultural fascism of leftist ethnic nationalist move-
ments). In these eyes, the capitalist state remains the ultimate barometer of 
fascism, and culture can only be considered a fascist problem to the extent 
that it is an expression of state power. If we are still so deeply enmeshed in 
this assumption that the state is the ultimate agency of fascism (including 
national socialism and ethnic nationalism), perhaps deeper reflection on 
cultural fascism is long overdue. Then we can recover the significance of the 
question of fascism in Japan, but with a new twist. More attention to the 
ideology of ethnic culture and less obsession with this overwrought con-
cept “fascism” as the cultural politics of the state would be a useful starting 
point in capturing the dynamics of wartime Japan and its legacies for the 
postwar society.
 To continue this disavowal of the oppression of ethnic culturalist ideol-
ogy is not simply a misrepresentation of the past. Rather, it perpetuates a 
culture of denial about the broader influence of the ethnic nationalism that 
underlay the fascist, national-socialist, and other repressive movements 
in wartime and postwar Japan. Ironically, this culture of denial may been 
seen, at least in part, as a result of the combined weight of Imanaka’s and 
Tosaka’s representations of fascism. While historians who follow Tosaka 
tend to overemphasize a top-down interpretation of fascism, Imanaka’s 
legacy has been to exempt ethnic ideology from the critical attention given 
to fascist movements of the wartime period and later.
 Yet what is most striking about wartime and postwar illiberal conti-
nuities is not “fascism” as understood in these narrow frameworks. Rather, 
it is the ethnic cultural theories that have flourished in the postwar era. 
As Harumi Befu has noted, “What is common to the wartime Nihonjinron 
and postwar neo-Nihonjinron is that both rely heavily on primordial senti-
ments inherent in the presumed ‘ethnic essence’ of the Japanese.”42 Far 
more than continuities between the wartime and postwar state, the survival 
of the “reform bureaucrats,” or militarism in postwar Japan’s armed forces, 
















of “historical fascism” to our present. In other words, it is the specific form 
of nationalism anchored in a social imaginary of the minzoku that presents 
the most pressing danger to the practice of democratic politics and culture 
in contemporary Japan. Yet ethnic nationalism has largely escaped critical 
attention in debates on Japanese fascism because many on the left have yet 
to extract themselves from the seductions of ethnic national culture and 
remain deeply enmeshed in the appeal of ethnic nationalism as the best 
hope of an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist social revolution.43 For them, 
continuing the focus on fascism within its received modes of representa-
tion (“the capitalist state”) is a useful means of preventing their own ethnic 
nationalism from being rendered visible and thus from being held account-
able for various acts of oppression, both during the war and after.
 These are some of the reasons that those who wish to adopt a critical 
perspective on culture in Japan must take a broader view that incorporates 
concerns over the relationship between culture and national formation, 
concerns that often have been left unaddressed in the visible discourse on 
fascism. Nishikawa Nagao is one leader in this critical effort to make the 
unseen seen again, and his alternative to the tired debate over whether Japan 
is/was/will again be fascist is worthy of serious consideration. For Nishi-
kawa, the problem of culture and political extremism in pre-1945 Japan is 
less a function of Japanese fascism than a reflection of the broader issue of 
modern nation-state formation and its impact on cultural identity.44 One 
advantage of Nishikawa’s approach is that, by situating the problem of cul-
ture in terms of nation-state formation instead of merely in relation to fas-
cism, it avoids the cultural particularism that often seeps into attempts to 
describe Japanese fascism. Another advantage is that it provides a broader 
theoretical framework within which to think about similar responses to 
modernity in such divergent nation-states as Japan, the United States, the 
People’s Republic of China, and the (former) Soviet Union. Nishikawa has 
opened up a new line of inquiry with respect to the problem of cultural 
nationalism in contemporary Japan, as well, particularly in his provocative 
suggestion that while emancipation from the “state” has proceeded quite 
far in postwar Japan, emancipation from the concept of “ethnic nationality 
(minzoku)” has not.45 By exploring the relationship of culture and fascism, 
it should become apparent that this underlying cultural theory of minzoku 
has largely escaped critical attention under the cover of an obsessive focus 
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political system on January 6, 2001, under Prime Minister Mori, especially the 
creation of a new Cabinet Office and the reduction of the number of ministries 
and agencies from twenty-two to twelve, a step widely recognized as part of an 
effort to build a stronger state that could resist the centrifugal forces of bureau-
cratic infighting. While some might like to see this reorganization as part of a 
neo-statist agenda, most commentators understand it as part of a larger process 
of trying to secure democracy by curtailing the powers of bureaucrats and special 
interest groups and thereby enhancing Japan’s ability to make meaningful com-
mitments to international peacekeeping operations. The problem of a weak state, 
rather than a strong state, coexists strangely in Japanese public opinion with a 
broad antigovernment, even anti-statist, populism.
The People’s Library:  
The Spirit of Prose Literature versus Fascism
In 1936, in the literary journal Bungakkai (Literary World), 
Takeda Rintarō declared, “Our primary obligation is to take action in oppo-
sition [to fascism].”1 He was already in the process of establishing Jinmin 
bunko (The People’s Library), a monthly literary journal that was funded by 
his own, not inconsiderable earnings for works appearing in more popular 
publications. Although Takeda maintained ultimate editorial control, the 
managing editor was Honjō Mutsuo, a secret member of the by then clan-
destine Communist Party. Almost all of the fifty or so contributors were 
leftists who had been arrested for their political activities. “We are the leftist 
survivors,” Naka Kōhei, a regular contributor, declared.2 In a public reply to 
a letter from Jean-Richard Bloch, secretary of the International Association 
of Writers for the Defense of Culture, Takeda formally aligned the journal, 
in July 1936 with the International Popular Front against Fascism ( JB 1:7:2–
3).3 This alliance of the group with the international antifascist movement 
was formally accepted in a letter signed by the secretaries of the Interna-
tional Association of Writers for the Defense of Culture: Louis Aragon, An-

























 From the time of the first issue of The People’s Library in March 1936 until 
its demise in January 1938, the journal served as Japan’s most articulate, 
organized, and popular literary opposition to fascism.4 Yet the pages of the 
journal contain no sustained definitions or theoretical formulations of fas-
cism. Instead, one reads attacks on concrete targets: the Bungei Konwakai 
(Literary Harmonious Discussion Society), those associated with the neo-
romantic movement, or popular writers of historical fiction. To understand 
what fascism meant for the writers and readers of The People’s Library from 
1936 to 1938, it is first necessary to review what the concept of fascism sig-
nified in Japan in its historical context.
Conceptualizations of Fascism before The People’s Library
One can discern three broad phases in the development of the discussion of 
fascism in Japan of the 1930s by Japanese literary figures. Writers and jour-
nalists first conceptualized in theoretical terms the possibility of a Japanese 
fascism in periodicals and books oriented toward a liberal intelligentsia. 
They were particularly acute in their descriptions of the affinities between 
political, social, and cultural trends in Japan and those in Italy and other 
nations that had strong fascist movements. The concept of fascism as de-
fined for the intelligentsia was next taken up by the mass media, which used 
the term to refer to specific cliques and alliances within military and politi-
cal circles and to literary and political associations that identified them-
selves with fascism. Third, as repression of liberal and leftist ideas became 
more intense from the mid-1930s on, the term, which had generally been 
used in a derogatory or patronizing manner, fell out of use in the mass 
media, and it and its variants came to be used as a weapon by remnants of 
the left—notably, those associated with The People’s Library—in a fight with 
an increasingly sophisticated and respectable “new ultranationalism.”
 With few exceptions, after 1938, the term fascism ceased to be used in 
any sort of critical way, and consideration of Japanese ultranationalism in 
the 1930s as one manifestation of an international movement to the right 
would have to wait until after 1945, when the existence of a “Japanese fas-
cism” could once again be discussed freely. What should be borne in mind 
in the ensuing discussion is that if the concept of fascism seems ill-defined 
in the mid-1930s when used to characterize the political opponents of the 
left, this is in part due to increased political repression that did not allow 
















tuals in the early 1930s, but it is also because later writers and critics were 
referring to a term that had already been defined in the early 1930s.
 From 1931 until 1935 or so, the question of whether Japan was, or was 
becoming, a fascist country was extensively debated among Japanese jour-
nalists, academics, writers, and literary critics. Japanese liberal intellectuals 
in particular perceived analogies between trends in Japan and the growing 
power of ultranationalism in Europe—police brutality, violent suppres-
sion of freedom of assembly and association, increasingly severe censor-
ship, a high degree of central control based on dogmatic morality enforced 
throughout the school system—and they began to speculate about the pos-
sibility of fascism in Japan, a possibility that had formerly seemed remote, 
if not absurd.
 In March 1931, in the journal Hihan (The Critique), the novelist and jour-
nalist Hasegawa Nyozekan began publishing a series of articles warning 
of the prospect of a Japanese fascism. This series is remarkable not only 
because Hasegawa was one of the first non-communist liberals in Japan 
to recognize fascism as a dangerous international phenomenon but also 
because he was the first to apply a conceptualization of fascism to distinc-
tively Japanese conditions.5 Hasegawa saw fascism as the product of under-
developed capitalism in countries where the modern state was of recent ori-
gin. It arose because of economic depression, when confidence was shaken 
in large-scale bourgeois capitalism and its institutions, primarily bourgeois 
democracy. Since in Italy, as in Japan, politics represents the interests of 
middling and small capital, fascism is a movement of the middle class, 
which counters the organization and violence of the proletariat with orga-
nization and violence of its own: “Generally overlooked is the fact that the 
motor of the fascist movement is middle class violence,” Hasegawa wrote.6 
Though fascists saw international socialism as their implacable enemy, they 
nonetheless incorporated the methods of the communists, especially in re-
gard to the establishment of dictatorship: “just as violence is a requisite 
of the socialistic ‘dictatorship,’ so too is violence the sine qua non of the 
process of the formation of the fascist dictatorship.”7
 Fascism, however, argued Hasegawa, tends to legitimize itself over time. 
On the one hand, when the fascist regime gains power, it needs large-scale 
capitalism to make the economy function. On the other hand, it deflects in-
ternal protest by channeling it into external aggression against foreign ene-
mies and against internal enemies, particularly leftists. “Thus,” he wrote, 













 Hasegawa next speculated on whether fascism was possible in Japan. 
In terms of the economic conditions that give rise to fascism, Hasegawa 
maintained that Japan fit the model. Ironically, he believed that, in terms 
of the underdevelopment of its capitalist system, Japan was more prone to 
fascism than Germany, which had a more highly developed industrial base. 
Japan was also prone to fascism in respect to the persistence of a feudal ide-
ology: “the ideological concepts based on the economic positions of small 
and medium capital are essentially reactionary—racialism, nationalism, 
feudal morality, and so on. In other words, these constitute the ‘spirit of 
fascism.’”9
 Japan also conformed with the model in having an essentially reaction-
ary middle class. Given the weakness of the capitalist system in Japan, its 
middle class was dominated by small and middling capital and people in 
the public employ, including military officers, bureaucrats, and others in 
the vast state sector in Japan. The ideology of the middle class was not that 
of laissez-faire capitalism: “in order to garner the votes of the middle class, 
the political parties must adopt bureaucratic, that is to say, middle class 
social policies. In this sense, Japan is essentially a fascist State.”10
 Extralegal violence aimed at the suppression of the proletariat and dis-
sent in general, according to Hasegawa, was directed by “Japan’s bourgeois 
politicians who control numerous gangs of professional thugs (shokugyō-teki 
bōryoku dan), thugs who are the advance troops of fascism.”11 In addition, 
Hasegawa cites at least twenty-five associations with memberships of more 
than four and a half million. He argues that these reactionary extensions of 
middle-class morality—slavish faith in religion, unquestioning loyalty to 
the emperor, belief in a host of other traditional nationalist abstractions—
provide more than enough organizational support in terms of numbers for 
a Japanese fascism.12
 By the time of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, then, the 
terms fascism ( fuashizumu), fascist ( fuassho), and fascistization ( fuasshoka) were 
already in circulation and were supported by a body of political theory 
that seemed to correspond to Japan’s social, political, and cultural reali-
ties. Such political philosophers as Tosaka Jun, Miki Kiyoshi, and Kawai 
Eijirō, and a number of others continued to refine and expand the concept 
in the light of Japan’s continued militarization. Subsequently, the notion 
that Japan was becoming “fascist” began to dominate the mass media. A 
new term was needed to describe the series of shocking and dismal events 
that occurred in the early 1930s—namely, the right-wing assassinations of 
















and the Mitsui financier Dan Takuma; the several failed attempts at mili-
tary coups d’état; the mass arrests of leftists; the police torture and murder 
of the writer Kobayashi Takiji; and so on. In 1932, for example, the Japan 
Times, Japan’s authoritative English-language newspaper, would argue on 
its editorial page, “Fascism contributes a medium whereby the funda-
mental institutions of the Empire may be preserved and yet certain objec-
tives achieved.”13 Or again, the ideological conversions in prison of Sano 
Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika in June 1933 were described as follows in 
a headline in Yomiuri Shimbun: “The Two Leading Figures of the Communist 
Party, Sano and Nabeyama, Renounce Communism and Convert (tenkō) to 
Fascism.”14
 Organizations soon formed to oppose fascism in Japan. One of the first 
was begun in 1933 with nationwide student and faculty protests against the 
dismissal of Takigawa Yukitoki, a Kyoto University law professor who had 
written extensively on Kropotkin and who was accused by Hatoyama Ichirō, 
then minister of education, of supporting communism. Alarmed by the gov-
ernment’s blatant violation of the university’s autonomy, the increasingly 
severe repression of leftist cultural organizations and the Communist Party, 
the arbitrariness of censorship, and the Nazi book burnings, two hundred 
fifty prominent Japanese writers and intellectuals led by Hasegawa Nyoze-
kan, Miki Kiyoshi, and Nii Itaru formed the Gakugei Jiyū Dōmei (Alliance for 
Freedom in Academic Research and the Arts). In July 1933, the well-known 
novelist Tokuda Shūsei was chosen as president. Membership rose to four 
hundred, and the group was so effective that the government ordered it 
disbanded in 1935. In the years following the creation of the Alliance for 
Freedom in Academic Research and the Arts, numerous scholarly, religious, 
and political groups, with thousands of members, implicitly or explicitly 
opposed fascism in Japan. These cannot be enumerated here, but almost all 
had been suppressed by the state by the end of 1938.15
 Given the centrality of literature to all cultural endeavors in the Japan 
of the 1930s, it is not surprising that in 1932 literary periodicals and the 
literary pages of newspapers were crowded with analyses of the culture of 
fascism. Hasegawa, a respected novelist and literary critic who was never 
sympathetic to popular culture, seemed to express the consensus of the 
literary world in condemning popular culture, especially samurai fiction, 
for strengthening feudal values that led to fascist tendencies and state con-
trol.16 The identification of popular samurai fiction with fascism was re-













COOPERATION WITH THE MILITARY/FASCIST LITERATURE MOVEMENT/
FIVE RIGHT-WING WRITERS TO HOLD MEETING ON THE FIFTH
 As the political situation becomes daily more severe, the patriotic 
fervor and energy of people has swelled forth as a wave. . . . In touch 
with the intellectual tempo of the times, those generals of the right-
wing forces in the literary world, namely Naoki Sanjūrō, Kume Masao, 
Mikami Otokichi, Shirai Kyōji, and Satō Hachirō, have come to advocate 
“the realization and strengthening of Fascist literature.”17
 The “fascist literati ( fuassho bunshi)” mentioned in this article, and the 
other writers who participated in later fascist literary groups, were almost 
all novelists of popular historical fiction. Their political views seemed to 
reflect the romantic and combative content of their fiction. In the Janu-
ary 7, 1932, issue of Yomiuri Shimbun, Mikami Otokichi, the author of a fa-
mous novel about a transvestite samurai assassin, declared that he had been 
awakened to the magnificence of the Japanese spirit and had concluded 
that “neither the present capitalism nor Marxism could bring Japan’s small-
scale farming villages to life.” He hoped only to contribute to “bringing 
about a new racial and national movement in society and to live under a 
new social order.”18 Naoki Sanjūrō, the man for whom a celebrated literary 
prize was later named, began a series titled “My Declaration of Fascism” as 
follows: “to all the nations of the world, I hereby declare . . . that during the 
period from 1932 to 1933, I am a fascist. . . . During this year of my fascism, 
I am waging war on all leftists. Attack and I’ll cut you down.”19
 It seems to have been the general consensus that this group, and its sub-
sequent incarnations, which came to include such participants as Kikuchi 
Kan, Japan’s most successful literary entrepreneur; Satō Haruo, the famous 
poet; and Yoshikawa Eiji, whose epic Miyamoto Musashi is still popular even in 
America, were little more than excursions to share a meal with men in uni-
form and view the latest military technology. Their fascism was said to have 
had no effective ideology other than a vague ultranationalism, to have been 
incapable of inspiring radical action, and to have been merely an attempt 
at self-promotion by opportunistic novelists whose books were not sell-
ing well. Writing in the early spring of 1932, Fuwa Shiyō (Osatake Takeshi) 
best characterized this early “fascist literary movement.” First, it consisted 
of novelists of popular historical fiction who viewed Hitler as about the 
same as Kiyokawa Hachirō, the heroic but temperamental Restoration-era 
swordsman who first assassinated enemies of the Restoration and then as-
















who had lost popularity and used fascism as an advertisement to sell their 
literary works.20
 As the discussion of fascism in the literary press progressed, motivations 
in using the term became more complicated. The proletariat writer Toku-
naga Sunao, for example, accused his rival Inuta Shigeru and his agrarian 
literary movement of “being reborn as a fascistic and reactionary move-
ment.” Nakamura Murao, a well-known editor and critic who had been 
carrying on a running battle with the left for about a decade, saw nothing 
wrong with a fascist literature in Japan. The most splendid traits of the Japa-
nese people, according to Nakamura, were their love of country and loyalty 
to the emperor; yet modern Japanese literature had not dealt with these at 
all. A fascist literature would provide a welcome antidote to the vapidity of 
proletariat literature.21
 A roundtable discussion held in 1932 reveals other attitudes by writers 
and critics toward fascism and fascist literature. Kume Masao, primarily 
known as a writer of autobiographical fiction, stated that fascism was 
understood by most Japanese as “despotic rule by a military clique.” Shirai 
Kyōji, a popular writer associated with the fascist movement, offered the 
following definition: “it is said that fascism has no etymology, only results, 
but in the end, it can be summed up as dictatorial government based on 
an ultranationalistic, ethnocentric social policy and its philosophy.” Chiba 
Kameo, a leading modernist critic of the day, maintained that “tradition-
alism is the major ideological artery of fascism. In a certain sense, this tra-
ditionalism does not recognize the freedom of the individual . . . , [but] if 
fascist literature is to become popular, it must align itself with Japanese 
traditionalism.” Iwasaki Junko, one of the few female commentators on 
fascism, predicted that “a fascist literature [would] first appear as the lit-
erature of romanticism.”22
 Individual definitions of a fascist literature appear to have differed little 
from the writers’ attitudes toward popular genres of literature that were 
occupying more and more pages of magazines and newspapers directed 
toward a mass audience. It was nationalistic, romantic, and full of heroic 
martial valor, and it stressed love of family, the emperor, and traditional 
values. What made the self-proclaimed fascist writers appear particularly 
sinister was not what they wrote, or their innocuous meetings with military 
officers, or their pedestrian political ideas, but their enthusiastic coopera-
tion with attempts by the state to use them as the basis for the establish-
ment of a “Literary Academy” that would co-opt all writers into serving the 












when a number of new technological means for the control and motivation 
of the masses were coming into existence, and attempts by government 
authorities to bring these media—radio, movies, mass-circulation enter-
tainment magazines, and popular fiction—under state guidance seemed 
threatening to writers of progressive fiction, poetry, and essays.
 In 1932, Matsumoto Manabu, former governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, 
was appointed the chief of the Criminal Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, an office with direct jurisdiction over thought control. He 
was firmly allied with the so-called new bureaucrats, the reform faction 
of the bureaucracy with close ties to the elements in the military calling 
for a radical, antidemocratic, fascist transformation in society. In addition 
to drafting repressive legislation to control “dangerous ideas,” Matsumoto 
under the auspices of the nationalist Nihon Bunka Chūō Renmei (Japan Cul-
ture League), showed a prodigious talent for organizing cultural groups to, 
in his words, “promote domestic enterprises fostering the Japanese spirit 
and internationally to shine the light of the Japanese spirit throughout the 
world.” The activities Matsumoto promoted outside the Ministry of Home 
Affairs were funded by the corporations Mitsui and Mitsubishi.23
 Using the already formed organizations of the “fascist literati” as a core 
membership, Chief Matsumoto began the groundwork to establish a state-
sponsored Academy of Literature. This project took the preliminary form of 
the Literary Harmonious Discussion Society. For the next decade, writers 
struggled against this and other state-sponsored attempts to bring litera-
ture and the arts under control. In the end, of course, the early presenti-
ments concerning a Japanese fascism—at least for literary people—proved 
valid. By 1940, in imitation of models adapted from fascist Italy and Ger-
many, all Japanese writers who wished to continue working professionally 
were forced to join a variety of state organizations.
The People’s Library and the Literary Resistance to Fascism
The People’s Library was established in the wake of escalating arrests of politi-
cal dissidents, mostly on the left: 6,124 in 1930; 10,422 in 1931; and approxi-
mately 18,000 in 1933. Almost all those put on trial renounced their politi-
cal beliefs (tenkō) rather than serve long prison terms. Having decimated the 
political left with mass arrests, the Ministry of Home Affairs then began 
concentrating on cultural organizations and in 1932 arrested approximately 
400 leftist cultural activists.24
















had avoided arrest by fleeing to Manchuria and more or less going under-
ground on his return to Japan. He soon grew dissatisfied with the mood 
of compromise in the chastened literary world, and he resolved to “raise a 
little ruckus.” The magazine he founded soon reached a circulation of about 
five thousand. Groups throughout the country—notably in Osaka, Nagoya, 
and Sapporo—were established in support of the periodical. At one point, 
Takeda could declare, “At present, we are the most widely read literary jour-
nal in Japan” ( JB 1:3:140).
 The objectives of The People’s Library were made explicit by Takeda at vari-
ous points in the life of the journal. Takeda wanted the magazine to appeal 
to “workers in the city and young people in farming villages, those who 
read for enjoyment and to satisfy a desire for culture, those who read prose 
fiction as a part of their everyday life” ( JB 1:5:160). To this end, Takeda in-
sisted, “This journal has adopted the firm position that prose fiction is our 
primary reason for existence” ( JB 2:9:152). Takeda further envisioned the 
magazine as an unwavering voice of opposition:
We have no big money behind us, no one in authority to protect us. These 
are words we repeat quite often, but we believe this is in the tradition 
of not only Japanese literature but also, more broadly, the universal tra-
dition of literature. We are determined to bring to life the novelistic act 
within the tradition of “no money behind us, no one in authority to 
protect us.” To outsiders, it might seem we are doing splendidly, but 
management of the magazine for a year has been a difficult project. We 
foresaw the difficulties, and so we can declare with confidence that we 
shall not waver from our determination. The denunciation of the Liter-
ary Harmonious Discussion Society, the development of legitimate real-
ism, the flourishing of prose—such objectives can be summed up as the 
protection of culture and the popularization of narrative fiction of high 
quality, and we have exerted all of our meager strength in attempting to 
accomplish them. ( JB 2:4:1)
 As we have seen, at this point the widespread use of the term fascism in 
the pages of literary journals and newspapers described most concretely 
three trends in the literary world: the forcible suppression of the left; gov-
ernment attempts to control, homogenize, and encourage the arts, much 
as fascism was creating cartels of movie and steel production in Italy; and 
the reification of a unique Japanese spirit through government sponsorship 
of popular literature. In addition, there were two other clear aspects of fas-












Japan’s tradition of realism and the neo-romantic exaltation of the poetics 
of the past, especially in regard to a glorification of the aesthetics of hero 
worship and death.25
 Opposition to fascism took the following forms. First, in the pages of 
The People’s Library and elsewhere, there were frequent appeals to the tra-
dition of the independence of the Japanese literary world, a tradition of 
writers, in their work, maintaining freedom from support or obligations to 
church, state, and large moneyed interests. Next, the Literary Harmonious 
Discussion Society was the object of unflagging hostility. Third, a running 
battle was carried on with the Japan Romantic School. Fourth, starting with 
the works of Ihara Saikaku (1642–93), the value of a native Japanese realism 
was advocated, and realistic prose fiction served as the journal’s mainstay. 
Finally, as an alternative to the mainstream press, the pages of the journal 
were opened up to a variety of progressive, democratic, and antimilitaris-
tic causes. These “elements of resistance” will be discussed in more detail 
later.
 In 1935, Aono Suekichi, a leftist critic closely affiliated with The People’s 
Library, argued:
Except for a few popular writers, there are probably no novelists in Japan 
today who are not opposed to fascism. Even among those who hold no 
firm ideological positions, many are opposed to fascism because of a 
traditional spirit of the independence of literature built up in this coun-
try over a number of years. One can assume that if faced with the clear 
and present threat of fascism, the instinctive antifascism of most writers 
would come to the fore, and there would be a great deal of resistance. 
For example, almost every writer in Japan expressed anger and dismay 
over the book burnings by the Nazis. But what if it is the case that fas-
cism does not explicitly reveal itself; instead arrives in stealth? . . . If 
writers, maintaining as they do their instinctive antifascism, were to be 
drawn into the gears of a gigantic opaque fascist machine, what a ca-
lamity it would be!26
 When reading the literary critics of fascism, one cannot help but be im-
pressed by how sensitive they were to their contemporary society and how 
clearly they foresaw what was coming. In the political story unfolding be-
fore them, they recognized something new, a kind of amorphous perversity 
by which Japan’s objective historical situation and contemporary ideologi-
cal trends seemed to conform to those sweeping much of the rest of the 
















were fascist. As Hasegawa Nyozekan observed in 1932, though fascism was 
said to be raising its head in all areas of society, the political parties, the 
reactionary organizations, the military, the bureaucrats, everyone had de-
clared they were not fascist. Even that personification of Japanese-style fas-
cism, Hiranuma Kiichirō, leader of the new bureaucrats in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, had declared that his goal was not fascism but the establish-
ment of national morality. However, Hasegawa concluded, for Hiranuma, 
the state was “god,” and his national morality meant not that the state fol-
lowed morality but that morality followed the state.27 Similarly, Aono Sue-
kichi argued that Japanese fascism invoked the Shintō gods as the founda-
tion of the Japanese people, and yet those gods were subordinate to the two 
new gods, the modern state and the modern concept of race (minzoku).28
 As we have seen in essays by Takeda and Aono, one rhetorical strategy the 
writers and critics adopted again and again to resist this “gigantic opaque 
fascist machine” was to invoke the tradition of a modern Japanese liter-
ary world that had developed in opposition to the modern state, without 
support from outside institutions. This appears to have been particularly 
effective in the journal’s ongoing battle with Matsumoto Manabu’s Liter-
ary Harmonious Discussion Society. On a number of occasions, almost all 
of these writers reinforced the idea that a main goal of The People’s Library 
was to oppose and attempt to disrupt literary movements created by gov-
ernment officials or that acted in cooperation with the power structure.29 
Ueno Takeo wrote to the effect that the Literary Harmonious Discussion 
Society was the shame of Japanese literature ( JB 1:1:119). Nitta Jun accused 
writers who joined the society of “poisoning the literary scene and selling 
out Japan’s pure literary tradition to the bureaucrats and the wealthy” ( JB 
1:3:98). Kosaka Takiko wrote of the pride she felt as a woman in seeing that 
no female writers were associated with the Literary Harmonious Discus-
sion Society ( JB 1:1:119). Letters from readers contained comments such 
as, “I have heard that even younger writers and critics are defending the 
[Literary Harmonious Discussion Society]. Have they no common sense or 
conscience?” ( JB 1:5:3). Or, “I am in full support of The People’s Library’s bold 
challenge to the [Literary Harmonious Discussion Society]” ( JB 1:8:9). Sus-
picions of government intentions to bring the arts under state control were 
undoubtedly justified. It has become clear that Matsumoto Manabu was 
attempting to control and organize cultural activities in a manner reminis-
cent of the Nazi Reichsschrifttumskammer (Chamber of Authors). The consis-
tent pressure exerted by The People’s Library was probably a factor in disrupt-












 The fascism that writers for The People’s Library perceived in the Japan 
Romantic School was as much aesthetic and philosophical as it was po-
litical. This was natural enough, since the neo-romantics, led by Yasuda 
Yojūrō, confuted these categories, arguing that “poetry and war are blood 
relatives”; that “war is just and beautiful even if it is one of aggression”; and 
that “war is the greatest performance of poetic lyricism.”31 This “wartime 
aesthetic”—or, from the perspective of The People’s Library’s writers, the fas-
cist aesthetic, which the Japan Romantic School was constructing from 1936 
on—elevated the “poetic spirit” of a unique classical Japanese tradition and 
denigrated Japanese realism. Unfurling the banner of the “spirit of prose 
literature (sanbun seishin),” the People’s Library group actively defended prose 
realism in the context of the Japanese literary tradition and opposed the 
nationalistic aesthetic of death being formulated by the Japanese roman-
tics. The phrase sanbun seishin originated in a 1924 debate between Arishima 
Takeo, who argued that artists who devoted themselves wholly to their art 
were superior to those who were distracted by the petty matters of life, and 
Hirotsu Kazuo, who countered that the “spirit of prose literature” was the 
highest form of art precisely because it was the most common, immediate, 
and relevant to human existence.32
 By the mid-1930s, what had been a debate over aesthetics became, for The 
People’s Library and neo-romantic writers, politicized: prose narrative open 
to extra-literary diversity was either unaesthetic or democratic, while high 
poetic art forms were symbols of the nation’s beauty, or reactionary. The 
writers for The People’s Library felt the literature of prose narrative supported 
democracy, while the obtuse literary criticism and classical and neoclassi-
cal poetry that occupied the pages of the Japan Romantic School’s journal 
Nihon Rōman-ha (Japan Romantic School) were inherently authoritarian.
 Takeda Rintarō understood the “spirit of prose literature” in terms of 
a native tradition of realistic prose fiction in Japanese history. He traced 
this tradition from its origin with Ihara Saikaku to Japanese naturalism to 
his contemporary social realism ( JB 1:9:84). The progress of this evolution 
corresponded to the rise of the bourgeoisie ( JB 1:9:83), but social realism 
had frustrated the spirit of prose literature because in the haste to establish 
a politically effective ideology, it had succumbed to the seductions of theory 
and had become too abstract ( JB 1:9:71). “Human experience is a vast, fas-
cinating novel,” according to Takeda, and attempts to make this experience 
conform to narrow ideological or generic constructs were counterproduc-
tive ( JB 1:9:84). The proper subject of the novel was the disorderly lives of 
















tarian discourses, but especially to those propagated by the state. Needless 
to say, this idea of literature was anathema to the Japan Romantic School. 
The writers for The People’s Library were labeled proponents of “shit realism” 
by critics aligned with romanticism.33
 The ensuing debate between the two groups was the sharpest and most 
vituperative in the literary world during the years 1936 and 1937. In a con-
frontation between the People’s Library group and the Japanese Romantic 
School staged by Hōchi Shimbun in June 1937, there is the following exchange 
between Nitta Jun, a member of The People’s Library, and the neo-romantic 
Kamei Shōichirō:
Nitta: Since you believe that there is nothing worth protecting in con-
temporary culture, then it follows that today’s culture can be 
destroyed without great loss. If we follow your reasoning, isn’t 
this a logical conclusion?
Kamei: Yes. On the other hand, there are people who share our views. 
This is something worth defending.
Nitta: Yeah, that’s fascism!34
 Almost all of the writers of The People’s Library were convinced that the 
Japan Romantic School represented fascism. In the June 1937 issue, Izu 
Kimio noted the congruence between the formation of the Hayashi govern-
ment, with its policy of unity of religion, culture, and politics (saisei itchi), 
and the appearance of fascist cheerleaders for “Japanism” and “uniquely 
Japanese things,” for whom there was an “intoxication with the unique 
beauty of Japanese traditional culture and enthusiasm for the purity of Japa-
nese blood” ( JB 2:7:32–36).35 Shibukawa Gyō offered the most sustained 
critique of the Japan Romantic School in his essays serialized in The People’s 
Library. He accused the Japan Romantic School of cultural chauvinism, of 
implicitly approving of Japan’s aggressive war, hero worship leading to dic-
tatorship, and amorality ( JB 2:6:150–54). Yoshisawa Gen wrote, “Those 
who advocate a revival of ancient times probably do not consider them-
selves to be following a fascist line, but, objectively, the power of their ideas 
derives, more or less, from the ideology of Japanism” ( JB 1:7:136).
 In keeping with the position taken by The People’s Library concerning “the 
spirit of prose literature,” fiction occupied most of the pages of the maga-
zine. The journal and its parent company, Jinminsha, published some of 
the more important fiction and poetry of the latter part of the 1930s. Ta-
kami Jun’s Kokyū wasureubeki (Let Old Acquaintance Be Forgot; 1935–36), 












in The People’s Library and later published as a book by Jinminsha. The novel 
concerns a group of former student radicals who were active as labor orga-
nizers during the height of the left-wing movement and were subsequently 
arrested and renounced their political beliefs. One of the former comrades, 
Sawamura Minoru, has recently committed suicide, and the group has 
gathered to mourn his death. Shinohara Tatsuya, a former activist turned 
pleasure seeker, speculates on the reason why Sawamura took his own 
life:
The time of our political involvement was for Sawamura, indeed for our 
generation, a period when we had the most to live for. Then came the day 
of reckoning. During the five years after his arrest, Sawamura suffered 
one painful humiliation after another. Finally, he severed his ties with 
politics and found a good job at a race track. Before that, he eked out 
a miserable existence as a temporary clerk at the administrative court. 
Before that, he worked as a cook in a coffee house. Imagine a guy with a 
degree in economics from Tokyo Imperial University working as a cook. 
Then, to put it bluntly, just when he found a job that would let him live 
like a human being, he killed himself.
 Shinohara thought this was odd. Sawamura gave up on politics, lived 
in utter despair, and just when there was light at the end of the tunnel, 
he committed suicide. Still, Shinohara also thought he understood. . . . 
When Sawamura suddenly found a secure life, he lost the self that was 
struggling to survive. His old self died and a new self was born. His old 
self, a self of “ideas,” disappeared and was replaced by a new self, an 
“ignoble” self. ( JB 1:3:124–25)
The novel is a chronicle of the destroyed lives left in the wake of political 
repressions of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
 Mamiya Mosuke’s Aragane (Ore; 1937–38), which describes in detail 
the lives of miners, is now considered a classic of Japanese social realism. 
Takeda Rintarō’s Ihara Saikaku (1936–37) was well received when it first ap-
peared and has since gained a reputation as one of his finest works. Jinmin-
sha was the first to publish in book form Kaneko Mitsuharu’s Same (Sharks; 
1937) and Ottosei (A Seal; 1937), two poems fiercely critical of the sterility, 




















Slimy skin, like a tomb.
It makes me sick,







Pock marks mar their skin:
Huge balls.
Pushed aside by the fishy nauseating crowd.
I have always longed for the opposite direction.36
 Almost every major writer with a commitment to realism published fic-
tion or poetry in the journal at one point or another.37 They did so out of a 
sense of solidarity with the magazine, since none of the contributors were 
paid for their writing.
 The most politically daring fiction seems to have been created by young, 
relatively unknown writers. Yuasa Katsuei’s Tabako (Tobacco; 1936 [ JB 
1:7:34–51]) concerns discrimination against and police persecution of 
Japan’s Korean minority as perceived by a young boy. An anti-war theme is 
expressed in Hotta Shōichi’s Yanushi no musuko shusseisu (The Landlord’s Son 
Goes to War; 1937), which is about a wealthy old man left alone, doubting 
the value of his years of labor and frugality after his son is drafted to fight in 
China with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War ( JB 2:14:2–18). 
Nikutai no tsumi (Sins of the Flesh; 1936), by Hirabayashi Hyōgo, is an in-
spired mix of sado-eroticism, spy fiction, and social realism that concerns 
the suicide, after police torture, of a former prostitute who serves as a liai-
son between union leaders and strikers on the line ( JB 1:4:24–63). Literary 
works by women—Hirabayashi Taiko, Hayashi Fumiko, Sata Ineko, Miya-
moto Yuriko, Ōtani Fujiko, Yada Tsuseko, and several others—were also 
featured prominently.
 In addition to socially committed fiction, the pages of The People’s Library 
were open to a variety of progressive causes. Criticism of contemporary 
political trends tended to be very specific and was quite often carried in 
letters from readers. Dissatisfaction with government policies was often 












speechifying about the exhaustion of our farming villages, but I wonder 
how many really care?” ( JB 2:7:9). Another stated, “Rents charged our ten-
ant farmers are the highest in the world. More than 50 percent of the total 
harvest is taken by the landowner” ( JB 2:12:3). The titles of roundtable dis-
cussions provide a good indication of the editorial direction of the maga-
zine. “The Emergence of Socialist Literature in Japan” was made up of the 
“old men” of the left-wing literary movement, writers and critics such as 
Aono Suekichi, Akita Ujaku, and Eguchi Kan ( JB 1:6–8). Working women—
a secretary, farmer, reporter, café waitress, textile factory worker, and so 
on—formed the discussion “This Is How Working Women View Things” ( JB 
2:1). Working-class men were the main participants in “Ordinary Life and 
Literature” ( JB 2:6) and “Workers Speak Out about Their Lives” ( JB 2:9). 
Clearly, then, the journal was attempting to provide liberal, democratic, 
and progressive alternatives to the dominant political ideology of the day. 
Takeda Rintarō had a long history of opposing “imperialistic wars” and the 
militarization of Japanese society.38 For example, he wrote in 1933:
For the first time in many years, I am writing this under the light of a 
candle. Outside there is the noise of exploding gunpowder, and over-
head the constant racket of airplane propellers. When I walk through the 
neighborhood, everyone is dressed in khaki. Everywhere I go, I seem to 
be scolded about something. . . . This is the gloomy, overcast mood of 
fascism, and it is inimical to literature.39
Again, shortly after the China Incident of 1937, he wrote:
I’m shocked at the level of ignorance on the part of journalists about the 
idea of modern warfare. A rudimentary knowledge of modern science 
should be sufficient to understand that warfare in the past and the wars 
of the present and future are completely different organisms. Everyone 
would acknowledge that it is foolish to equate a whale and a sardine 
because they both swim in the sea. A few military men have explained 
their conception of modern chemical warfare. It is a horror beyond the 
imaginations of novelists. ( JB 2:10:47)
 However, because of the increasingly severe censorship around the 
time of the China Incident of 1937, antimilitary sentiment generally had 
to be expressed euphemistically through historical and literary allusion. 
For example, parallels were drawn between the present and the time of the 
Russo-Japanese War, and Shibukawa Gyō would conclude, “The opposition 
















today” ( JB 2:6:153). Here and there, an explicitly antiwar statement made 
it through the censors—for example, the following by Izu Kimio: “the so-
cial situation since the beginning of 1937 has undergone a strong tendency 
toward a fascism intent on full preparation for war, but at the same time 
this tendency has also given rise to the firm popular determination to op-
pose it” ( JB 2:8:97).
 The People’s Library writers also saw claims of Japanese uniqueness and 
hero worship as concomitant to the militarization of Japanese society. 
Izu Kimio wrote, “It is imperative that we analyze and oppose arguments 
based on ‘uniquely Japanese things’ and ‘the unique characteristics of our 
race,’ arguments which are repeatedly forwarded by the fascist literati” ( JB 
2:7:36). Shibukawa Gyō argued that the all-pervasive hero worship in his 
contemporary society reflected a state of affairs in which power had be-
come the cultural dominant: “the people, who have been stripped of their 
own sense of heroism, now take delight in being manipulated by heroes 
forced upon them” ( JB 1:5:121).
 The management and editing of The People’s Library remained consistent 
with the ideas expressed in the periodical, and this open, democratic edito-
rial policy proved to be remarkably successful. The company was turning a 
profit and had expanded into book publishing until the state intervened.
 The efforts of the authorities to eliminate The People’s Library probably 
stemmed from their overall effort to stamp out the idea of a popular front 
against fascism. The Criminal Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs was keeping close watch over the ideological dispositions of individual 
intellectuals; literary, arts, and academic journals; and the groups that sup-
ported them. Secret reports were circulated among authorities within the 
ministry and other relevant agencies, and these recognized that by 1934, 
because of internal dissension over the extreme politicization of the arts 
and repeated arrests, the cultural organizations affiliated with the Commu-
nist Party—most prominently, the Federacio de Proletaj Kultur Organizoj 
Japanaj (KOPF)—were on the verge of disintegration.
 However, the authorities were newly worried by the idea of a political 
and cultural strategy forwarded by Georgi Dimitrov, who, with Stalin’s ap-
proval, called for popular fronts of progressive forces against fascism at the 
1935 Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. To counter 
this threat, the police expanded their supervision and arrests to intellectu-
als, and the non-communist left. Roundups of people suspected of working 
to establish the popular front in Japan were carried out in December 1937 












Front Incident ( Jinmin Sensen jiken),” four hundred persons were arrested, 
among them the leaders of the Japan Proletariat and the Socialist Masses 
parties and the political theorists Yamakawa Hitoshi, Ōmori Gitarō, Ino-
mata Tsunao, and Sakisaka Itsurō. The second People’s Front Incident saw 
the arrests of forty-five persons, including such elite academic economists 
as Ōuchi Hyōe, Arisawa Hiromi, and Wakimura Yoshitaōr of Tokyo Imperial 
University; Minobe Ryōkichi and Abe Yūichi of Hōsei University; and Uno 
Kōzō of Hokkaido University.
 While it was easy for the authorities to detect the “danger” of left-of-
center ideas in the realms of politics and economics, it seems that in the 
case of literature, the officials had a more difficult task. To quote from one 
secret report in 1938:
Due to the pressures of the times and the increased arrests by the police, 
cultural organizations have adopted an attitude that they are following 
national policy, and they do not express their ideology as they did before. 
Because they appear to have adopted a basic tone of culturalism, it is 
difficult to distinguish them from ordinary cultural groups. This means 
we must go to great lengths to prosecute these cases.40
 The People’s Library, which is recorded briefly in 1938 in police records as 
a proletariat magazine that had failed, survived as long at it did first be-
cause the authorities did not perceive the threat of the Popular Front until 
1936 or so and were then busy prosecuting the more obvious figures on 
the left. They only later proceeded to the more difficult to prove cultural 
cases.41 Second, there was the craftiness of the editors of The People’s Library. 
Although the journal clearly aligned itself with the International Popular 
Front Against Fascism, it carried this notice and other potentially contro-
versial notices and editorial decisions in small print at the bottom of the 
page. Moreover, the journal carried many contributions from leftists once 
associated with KOPF, but editorial policy insisted that its primary focus 
was literary, and editors refused to carry literary theory or the formulaic 
political slogans and plots common to the proletariat literature of a few 
years earlier. Finally, the editors of and contributors to The People’s Library 
came up with creative ways to express political ideas: advancing the “spirit 
of prose literature,” as opposed to neo-romanticism; presenting as history 
the views of socialists active from the Meiji period; and group discussions 
concerning the “lifestyles” of male and female factory workers.
 In the end, though, The People’s Library was systematically driven out of 
















roundtable discussions and at nationwide events in support of the maga-
zine. In the later months of 1937, issue after issue was banned. Takeda in-
curred huge debts. Regular contributors to the magazine were repeatedly 
harassed and arrested both individually and when they met in groups. The 
journal was forced to cease publication in January 1938. Takeda declared that 
he felt as though his child had died and wrote nothing of significance after 
1938. A number of the journal’s most determined antifascist writers, in-
cluding Takeda Rintarō, Hirabayashi Hyōgo, Yada Tsuseko, Honjō Mutsuo, 
Furusawa Gen, and Kishi Takeo, perished during the Great East Asian War 
or in its immediate aftermath.
Conclusion
Concerning the actions of Japanese writers in relation to the government 
during the Greater East Asian War, Donald Keene has written, “There was 
no resistance to the militarists save for the negative actions of a few authors 
. . . , who refrained from publishing.”42 This may be true for the period 
Keene designates, from 1941 to 1945. But it ignores the fact that for a de-
cade before the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, Japan 
was in a continual state of domestic and international crisis. The gradual 
evolution of fascism identified by writers and critics during this decade en-
gendered a great deal of resistance.
 Fascism in a Japanese context consisted of a set of generic markers that, 
taken together, described and analyzed a social structure and historical pro-
cess functioning at a subconscious level, like “the gears of a giant opaque 
machine,” in Aono Suekichi’s words. Those who were creating this fascism, 
with few exceptions, were intent on not recognizing the universal genre 
within which they were working. Fascism was a social dynamic that writers 
and critics had to expose. Japanese fascism was identified by those opposed 
to the dominant political trends of the 1930s, trends toward total social 
control.
 Intellectuals, political activists, writers, and a large segment of the gen-
eral public used the term fascism from 1931 to 1938 to resist what they saw as 
unprecedented repression of leftist political dissidents at home; unprece-
dented military aggression abroad; unprecedented attempts to bring the 
arts, mass media, and the economy under state control; unprecedented vio-
lence and irrationality in the propaganda composed by writers and artists in 












to the golden age of Japan’s past; and unprecedented measures taken to 
mobilize the masses for total war. To sum up, in Takeda Rintarō’s words, 
“Every aspect of social life is being forcefully regulated by coercive control 
from above” ( JB 2:8:113). Until the late 1930s, writers and critics resisted 
this control, many with courage and at great personal sacrifice.
 After The People’s Library was forced to cease publication, a variety of gov-
ernment agencies took up and extended Matsumoto Manabu’s initiative 
to control literature. In the second half of 1938, the Cabinet Information 
Bureau organized more than twenty writers into two naval squadrons and 
sent them to the front to report on the Sino-Japanese War. Two months 
later, the minister of agriculture and forestry initiated the Nōmin Bungaku 
Konwakai (Agrarian Literature Harmonious Discussion Society). In 1939, 
the Department of Overseas Affairs organized the Tairiku Kaitaku Bungei 
Konwakai (Continental Colonial Development Literary Harmonious Dis-
cussion Society). So it continued with a plethora of government-sponsored 
literary societies with the objective of making writers fully aware of their re-
sponsibilities to serve the interests of the state, defend the nation through 
their art, and formulate and accomplish the cultural mission of the Japa-
nese empire. As the literary historian Senuma Shigeki has concluded, the 
period from 1938 to 1945 was one of subservience of literature to the state, 
at least in an institutional, if not an individual, sense.43
 From 1938 to 1945, Japanese literary discourse lost its autonomy, as The 
People’s Library writers had feared. It was also in 1938 that the discussion 
and critique of fascism in public discourse was systematically suppressed 
by the state, a time when the term was perhaps the most relevant to the 
description of contemporary social trends.44 But did fascism really exist in 
Japan? Close enough, one is tempted to say, at least from the perspectives of 
the young writers of The People’s Library. Clearly, the term before the war was 
used in a variety of contexts in Japan to identify and oppose ultranationalist 
political, social, and cultural trends that ultimately resulted in the loss not 
only of academic and literary freedom but also of tens of millions of lives. 
The more fruitful question to ask is how and why the concept of fascism was 
used so widely in Japanese contexts and whether those contexts are rele-
vant to our present. As we have seen, the possibility of the emergence and 
development of fascism served as a cautionary tale by writers and critics 
of the potential threat to extinguish a relatively free literary world. The fact 
that this cautionary tale came true, despite such valiant efforts to prevent 
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Constitutive Ambiguities:  
The Persistence of Modernism and  
Fascism in Japan’s Modern History
The coming extinction of art is prefigured in the increasing
impossibility of representing historical events.
—Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia
The [poet] Masamune Hakuchō said: “Abstract thinking is
like ghosts. While there are many people who fear the ghostly,
there are as many who conspire with it.”
—Kobayashi Hideo, Thought and Real Life
The Specter of Unevenness
Throughout the 1930s in Japan there was widespread agree-
ment among writers and intellectuals that they were living in a time of his-
torical crisis set into motion earlier by the implementation of a program of 
capitalist modernization that now confronted most of the industrial world 
and had begun to spill over into its colonial domains. World depression 
simply supplied the momentary occasion to prompt thoughtful people 
everywhere to identify the vast social, economic, political, and cultural 
contradictions capitalist modernity had unleashed but had successfully 
contained. Discourse privileged the cultural (artistic) domain especially 
where the lived contradictions were sharply etched into the fabric of Japa-
nese life and where the manifest ruptures, discontinuities, and different 
coexisting temporalities provided the focus for a rigorous assessment and 
evaluation to define Japan’s modernist moment. This was the recognition 
of a crisis that put into question a perceived separation between modes of 
cognition and the real and of the necessity of finding adequate and lasting 





























relationship had asked whether it was possible to assess the politics of art-
works or whether art must serve politics, which in Japan increasingly was 
expressed in controversies over art for art’s sake and “pure literature” as op-
posed to a committed art. The observation led to demands that attempted 
to secure a reunion by a call for making either everyday life into art (culture) 
or art into everyday life (politics). With capitalist modernization, concepts 
such as culture, representation, and modernity were increasingly recruited 
to supply mediation in a socio-historic context marked by the production of 
new forms of economic and cultural unevenness. As a result, the contents 
of artistic representations or their dismissals were invariably referred to 
as the modes of perception and consumption of the new industrial world 
of work and leisure that we call, depending upon our own politics, either 
capitalism and commodification or modernity and modern life (modan 
raifu). If, in any event, philosophers such as Miki Kiyoshi in the early 1930s 
gave coherent expression to this observation in his essay “The Philosophy 
of Crisis” and Kuki Shūzō defined its content in 1937 by warning Japanese 
that they had not considered the excessively enthusiastic cultural borrow-
ing since the Meiji period, many thoughtful observers before the 1930s had 
already designated the existence of vast unevenness as a commonsensical 
reality of Japan’s modernization: Marxists pointing to the persistence of 
feudal fetters in a capitalist society and a more liberalist persuasion com-
plaining of the effects of late development and the supposed consequences 
of an incomplete modernity prefigured in early Meiji social and economic 
policies.
 Nowhere were the issues of capitalist modernization and the resulting 
aporias of representation more intensely engaged than in those discussions 
that articulated, perhaps inadvertently, the connections of modernism and 
fascism through the texts of the critic Kobayashi Hideo and the Marxist 
philosopher Tosaka Jun, and in its continuation after the war, as if still con-
stituting unfinished business, in the writings of Mishima Yukio. Because 
both the question of finding lasting forms of representation proved to be 
an irresolvable problem and the reunion of art and everyday life remained 
an illusive fantasy constituted a shared ground for modernism and fascism, 
the figure of modernity itself appeared to be what T. J. Clark has called 
“a constitutive ambiguity” that was capable of mobilizing and directing 
their respective efforts to respond to the challenge it posed for finding the 
very means of political and cultural (artistic) representation.1 But it was the 
















ization in the cultural and political realms, not only apparently separating 
them but, more important, establishing coexisting different temporalities, 
that combined to become the principal source of the crisis of modernity 
and its representational dilemma. While it is the purpose of this essay to 
explore the often shared epistemological and interpretative dispositions 
of thinkers like Tosaka and Kobayashi and writers like Mishima in that 
troubled moment and to draw out some of the lines of the kinship between 
modernism and fascism (they are not necessarily connected) in Japan and 
the crucial role played by the recognition of unevenness, the representa-
tional crisis must be seen, as Tosaka had proposed (in Sekai no ittan to shite 
no Nihon), as a local inflection of a broader phenomenon found throughout 
the industrial and industrializing world.
 To add force to the observation that Japan was imperiled by wrenching 
cultural unevenness that promised to undermine the possibility of realizing 
stable forms of representation, many worried about the effects of an ob-
sessive desire to imitate European culture so unselectively and uncritically. 
Fearful of unforeseen consequences caused by superficial borrowing, many 
thinkers began pointing to how the new imports had not yet penetrated 
the essence of lived reality, which was still mired in the customs of feudal 
despotism. Implied in this conclusion was the unstated conviction—wide-
spread in the postwar period—that Japan’s modernization was still incom-
plete. But capitalist modernization was always defined by the production 
of unevenness as its normal condition. “Universal history,” Samir Amin 
has proposed, “is always the history of uneven development.”2 Despite the 
claims of its logic, capitalism never moves to establish a universal even ter-
rain and must always collide with counter-histories it encounters along its 
route. What this simply means is that once capital has been freed from fixed 
representations reflecting its primitive forms of emergence, it rarely leads 
directly to the establishment of a universal even grounding for all societal 
negotiations. This presumption has been at the heart of an ideology, most 
recently incarnated as globalization, which anxiously anticipates eventual 
realization of even development everywhere. The importance of this recog-
nition of historical unevenness allows us to understand the appearance of 
fascism at a certain moment in a number of places and explain divergent 
differences. But it also prevents us from wishing it away now that we have 
lived through its inaugural forms. Just as the metropole conceals what lies 
beyond the luster and sheen of its own self-image, which is always pro-
jected as universal, suppressing the surrounding countryside in its perma-














the interwar period remained hidden in the long shadow capitalist indus-
trialization cast over it. But as the histories of both modernism and fascism 
show, it is precisely in these concealed regions where the reality of uneven-
ness is probably lived more intensely and whose exposed existence demon-
strates the incapacity of capital logic to either veil it or contain its excess.3 
In this way, it is the irreducible and unwanted remainder of capital’s logic. 
Where capital confronts its other, so to speak, representation becomes an 
irresolvable problem, since it faces the twin demands of capital’s reason, 
on the one hand, and the claims of a prior culture of reference, on the other 
which, like a receding echo, retreats steadily into a remaindered world of 
irrationality and ghosts. But the ghosts of a forgotten world and discarded 
past tenaciously refused to remain still and returned as unscheduled reve-
nants to destabilize the present by reminding it of what it had repressed. 
What modernists aimed to realize in their practice in prewar Japan, and 
everywhere else in the capitalist world, thus attested to the impossibility 
of representing a historical object or set of events that signify the essential 
abstractness of what really happens at the same time they witness the with-
drawal of those fixed forms of representation identified with other, prior 
modes of existence.4
The Modernist Moment
What emerged in the interwar period, the time of modernism, was a 
theoretical discourse of modern aesthetics—or a cultural signifier in the 
broadest sense—that aspired to displace a politics embedded in abstract 
exchange, dominating the social nexus. Ultimately its distrust of represen-
tation was condensed in fascism, which itself announced a verdict on all 
political attempts to break the logic of reified social existence.5 Both mod-
ernism and fascism faced the problem of trying to find a mode of represen-
tation capable of mastering the essential abstractness of what really hap-
pens. Modernism found it increasingly difficult to represent fascism itself, 
as an object and as a historical entity and as a subject of realistic portrayal. 
By the same measure, fascism—Adorno’s “coming to itself of society as 
such”—defied the task of representation because it, and the subsequent 
contemplation of it, derived from the elimination of subjective freedom.6 If 
fascism was an impossible object to represent—and I am clearly referring 
to the regime of social abstraction—its cultural manifestation pronounced 
the final judgment on all political attempts to break the iron logic of a 
















sentation not susceptible to capitalist logic (a vocation shared by Marxists, 
as well)—the ever new in the ever-changing regime of consumer culture, 
“where everything solid melts into air”—so fascism struggled to promote a 
politics no longer anchored by the representational categories that had pro-
pelled all previous attempts even as they tried to overcome and transform 
the very political arrangements they had authorized.7 What modernism and 
fascism shared was the desire to resuscitate an aura that was no longer 
available, which often led to embracing myth, and the effort to construct a 
conception of semblance. Tosaka Jun, perhaps our best guide to both the 
culture of modernism and the privileged status enjoyed by the category of 
culture and its relationship to fascism in interwar Japan, charged the lit-
erary critic Kobayashi Hideo with being one kind of realist who had for-
gotten the class struggle, a type that “brandishes emotions without dis-
crimination.”8 Kobayashi was convinced and reassured that since art and 
culture had come to replace the vacated place of the nineteenth century’s 
historical subject, Marx’s proletariat, the poets who had been momentarily 
banished from Capital were now returning with a vengeance. But as I have 
already suggested, this was by no means a universalizing process, occurring 
in the same register everywhere capitalism had established a beachhead, 
but was powerfully mediated by the presence of vast and specific forms 
of unevenness that could only be understood historically. Because it was 
impossible to represent an essential abstractness, thinkers like Kobayashi 
looked to writers like Shiga Naoya and even Kikuchi Kan and the portrayal 
of the solitary and sensible concreteness of everyday life removed from the 
social, even though it was clearly embedded in the discernable world of 
the present, and Tosaka urged a return to the very materiality of everyday 
space founded on existing productive relations, which, he believed, had 
been philosophy’s original vocation before it was hijacked by Platonic ideal-
ism. While Tosaka sought to supply the space of everydayness with a sense 
of history (the “kernel of the crystal of historical time,” as he put it)9 and 
thus the identity of a temporal dimension invariably lost in the rhythms of 
daily routine and recurrence, a veritable chronotope as Bakhtin was already 
envisaging in the Soviet Union, Kobayashi would strive to spatialize histori-
cal temporality altogether, collapsing time into space, in the shape of an 
unmoving history or culture identified with nature (the law of statics, as he 
put it) marked by the constant reappearance of commonness. Perhaps the 
best example of this struggle was expressed in the conflict over the identity 
of figures such as the “people,” the “masses” and the “folk” and the claim 














abstraction. For Tosaka, the category of the “Japanese folk” had no reality 
whatsoever, since it occluded the lived experience of the “people” or the 
“masses” in the now, whereas for others like Kobayashi or Watsuji or Kuki, 
the folk constituted concreteness absent in terms such as minshū or taishū. 
The masses were intimately linked to the now of everyday life, while the 
folk derived from an indeterminate past that was always out there, whose 
temporality had no specificity and daily life remained the frozen sanctuary 
of its unchanged essence. In Kobayashi’s conception of classicism, the folk 
resembled the unchanging classic of life that folklorists such as Orikuchi 
Shinobu commemorated as the calling of native ethnology.
 What this difference involved was a struggle over the referent.10 Tosaka 
endeavored to reconfigure space and time in such a way as to restore his-
tory to the world of everyday space—making it a chronotope—and to show 
the possibility of change and transformation in a society driven by the ever 
new in the ever same, while Kobayashi abandoned the regime of tempo-
rality altogether to secure a timeless aesthetic free from both historical ac-
countability and an order driven by an identity between the rational and the 
real. It should be pointed out that modernism was always concerned with 
finding a stable ground, since it had recognized that everything already 
corresponded only to the agency of capital and its endless movement. But 
on its part, fascism had already dismissed all politics as afflicted by the 
same regime of reification, even though its own mission was paradoxically 
committed to stauching capitalism, in short, saving it from liberalism and 
itself.
 In the contest to resolve the aporias of representation by appealing to 
competing forms of concreteness, often signified by terms like “reality 
(genjitsu)” or “actuality ( jissai),” and the respective claims of life (seikatsu) 
and the veracity of representing history, nothing was more important than 
the status of the referent, which had either disappeared or was seriously put 
into question because of the installation of capital as agency and its cor-
responding regime of social abstraction. During the 1930s, especially, this 
dispute proliferated into attempts to resolve the relationship between life, 
the emergent domain of everydayness, and history, usually associated with 
the narrative of the nation-state. While it is difficult to know precisely why 
this theme was so overstated in discourse, it is evident that by the end of 
the decade, its centrality had engendered two principal symposia devoted to 
endorsing their respective claims: the conference on overcoming the mod-
ern, whose subject of discussion reflected the experience of everyday life 
















the conference on world history (Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nippon), which elabo-
rated on Japan’s mission in world history. Both were convened in Kyoto 
in 1942. Their differences could not have been greater and disclosed the 
profound disjunction, spatial and temporal, between a material everyday-
ness produced by modernization and a developed Japanese nation-state, 
which, according to Kyoto philosophers, was now poised to enter the do-
main of world history and realize its historic mission. The aporetic nature 
of this problem between everydayness and world history (the domain of 
the nation-state) had already been conceptualized by Miki Kiyoshi in the 
early 1930s with the publication of Rekishi tetsugaku (1932) and numerous 
essays concerned with the problem of history.11 Like so many of his con-
temporaries, Miki was drawn into discussions aimed at determining what 
constituted concrete “reality” in a world already dominated by the com-
modity form and abstract exchange. He was convinced that the answer to 
the question was to be found in “historicality (rekishisei),” echoing prior and 
parallel debates still taking place in Europe—notably Bergson and Lukacs, 
who, like Heidegger in Sein und Zeit (1926), expressed a growing impatience 
with and even rejection of a regime based on quantitative, measurable time 
(clock time, the time of science) for forms of interior and psychological 
time. In Heidegger’s powerful account, this misrecognition of the nature 
of temporality led to historicism and establishment of a world dominated 
by the They (das Man).
 The logic of Miki’s intervention was driven by conviction that the real re-
ferred to the realm of “actuality ( jissaiteki),” implying action (kōiteki). In this 
formulation, the actual signifies the meaning of everydayness—specifically, 
the situation humans find themselves living in the everyday. But Miki’s con-
struction failed to conceal an unease with the contradictory claims of his-
torical representation and the presentation of everydayness. To finesse the 
separation between two domains, he recommended situating action, his-
tory’s vocation, in the everyday, even though he recognized the distance be-
tween the routines of everyday living and the activity of people on the stage 
of world history, the latter constituting the precinct of eventfulness, the 
former a realm spare in events and fixed on the repetition of custom. There 
would be no contradiction, he declared confidently, between an “actual 
standpoint” and a historical one. Accordingly, the aporia surfaces when 
the original standpoint of anthropology, which seeks to emphasize every-
dayness, will be seen to be incompatible with an historical anthropology.12 
History, Miki observed, was invariably understood as opposed to the every-














act on the stage of world history. The question he posed, but never really 
answered, was how to move from the eventless world of everydayness to the 
register of an event-filled world history, from the singular experience to the 
non-experience of the nation, a temporality of the present, mixed and en-
tangled to a linear trajectory heading for a specific destination. Miki plainly 
grasped history as national narrative, whose content differed significantly 
from the mundane experience of time in the everyday present. Moreover, 
history pointed to the individual and unique, while everydayness was the 
context of averaging and the commonplace, routine and repetition. For this 
reason, the everyday could never be seen as identical with history, which 
presumably occurred elsewhere and in a different temporal register. How 
Miki sought to resolve this knotted contradiction was to link the everyday 
and world history to a ground called “originary historicality,” which autho-
rized the procession of a steady evolution progressing from the first to the 
third level. The different and mixed temporalities signaled by the everyday 
and world history were restructured into a narrative succession supposedly 
illustrating the inevitable maturation of time, its “ripening (zeitigen, kai-
ros).”13 In other words, Miki sacrificed the temporality associated with the 
sentient claims of everyday life to the higher necessity and abstraction of 
narrative movement and the final (Hegelian) revelation of history’s mean-
ing. Regardless of his decision to emplot the unity of the three categories in 
a linear progression representing the achieved “ripening ( jijuku, jukusuruji-
kan)” of history’s reason—the world historical (the nation-state), he never-
theless said, opened the path to recognizing the aporia of differing and 
distinct temporalities belonging to the separate spheres of everydayness 
and world history and the necessity of pursuing historicality from within 
the precinct of the everyday.14
 Both Tosaka Jun and Kobayashi Hideo, fully aware of this disjuncture 
of temporalities and thus the impossibility of representing history, re-
turned to the everyday and resisted its incorporation into the world his-
torical. Prompted by the need to rethink the source of the historical from 
within the everyday and rejecting Miki’s advice to link everydayness to the 
world historical, which sacrificed concreteness for abstraction in the last 
instance, Tosaka and Kobayashi discounted historicism (and the kind of 
philosophic history Miki had enlisted) and the cost of its valorization of 
continuity. What bothered both was the historical amnesia produced by an 
interruptive modernity that ultimately induced forgetting the present, as 
well as a past that had not yet been assimilated to the requirements of a 
















was reminding contemporaries that historicism trades remembrance of a 
historical present for the “re-establishment of an abstract continuity with 
the past, in a naturalized and merely chronological form.”15 This abstract 
continuity with a past was supposed to prove how the nation in the modern 
present derived its identity from an earlier, originating moment in the pas-
sage of a naturally chronological and homogeneous time. Yet the decision 
to return to the everyday as the ground of actual practice and history—the 
real—and the modern present promised presentation and construction, as 
such, rather than reconstruction and representation. It also meant seeing 
in the present the occasion for re-historicizing the experience of the now. 
While Tosaka abandoned the powerful narratives available to him from the 
Marxist debate on the nature of capitalism and looked to everyday life for 
the kernel of history, Kobayashi similarly embraced the present everyday 
as the site for recalling heritage and unchanging values as embodied in the 
classics housing the most common sentiments and emotions. For Tosaka, 
because the everyday resembled and behaved like the commodity form, it 
was necessary to devise a critical practice capable of releasing the mystery 
from its hidden side. This operation promised to reveal its concealed his-
tory and what might yet come. In Kobayashi’s reflections, the past would 
be gathered up in the present as an instructive and exemplary historical 
experience reinforcing what had already been there—a sense of common-
ness destined to continue and remain, unchanged and unaltered, securing 
an identity between past and present.
Periodizing Forgetfulness
Despite the promise of social democrats to establish a new political subject 
that was rational and capable of making informed and responsible deci-
sions, postwar Japan reaffirmed the problematic that before the war had 
sent modernism and fascism on their shared mission to engage in their 
respective struggles to find a stable ground for representation. In fact, this 
link was provided by Kobayashi Hideo, who completed his great work on 
Motoori Norinaga in the 1970s and carried forward an understanding of 
the problematic of representation he had already articulated in the heated 
discussions of the 1930s and, to a lesser extent, Mishima Yukio who, though 
younger, had passed through a kind of apprenticeship in spiritual essential-
ism in the Nihon Romanha. The importance of this repressed “continuity” 
and the concealment of what T. J. Clark has called the “constituent ambi-














perspective on the periodization of Japan’s modern history from accounts 
that have seen the war as an interruption separating the postwar from the 
prewar or those narratives that have persistently envisaged the war as a tem-
porary “derailing” from the true course of modernization and democracy 
which defeat and the U.S. Military Occupation put back on track. All of 
these accounts seemed to agree on a periodization that privileges the post-
war epoch over its predecessor and include even the most recent attempts 
of revisionists to retrace the steps leading to war to minimize Japan’s role 
to show the postwar as deformed, different, or discontinuous from a true 
history now remembered. Proof of its influence is manifest in the virtual 
disappearance of any consideration of fascism. Whether it was the “mod-
ernist party of the enlightenment” (I am referring here to the kindaishugisha 
grouped around Otsuka Hisao after the war who were in reality moderniz-
ers) who saw the postwar as a “second chance” or a diverse group of con-
servatives who felt they had been forcibly cut off from their past and made 
to forget it to live a deception in their present, the separation has had pro-
found social and political consequences that have scarcely been perceived, 
much less evaluated. But this announcement of a “second chance” barely 
concealed the invitation to actually forget the recent past of war and defeat. 
Even though principal advocate, Maruyama Masao, early seized the oppor-
tunity to provide an accounting of Japan’s drift into “ultranationalism” and 
the extent to which its fascism differed from the experiences of Nazi Ger-
many and Mussolini’s Italy, thus preparing the way for its eventual down-
grading, the effect of this strategy was to remove from contention Tosaka 
Jun’s earlier critique, which linked fascism to liberalism and its valorization 
of spiritual freedom. Under these circumstances, it is not hard to see why 
Maruyama’s analysis of ultranationalism and fascism concentrated on the 
question of social composition and the complicit role played by the masses 
and petit bourgeoisie. It also explains his modernist decision to educate 
the country in the proper (liberal) form of political subjectivity, equipped 
with rational knowledge informing responsibility. Strangely absent in this 
renewed liberal discourse was the status of the restored emperor (Hirohito) 
and the imperial court and its consequences for the reconfiguration of Japa-
nese society in the postwar period.
 Since the end of the Second World War, Japan’s history has been held 
hostage to a periodizing scheme that has marked off what came before 
1945 from what occurred after with the effect of transmuting war and de-
feat into an unbridgeable historical cleft. As a result, prewar Japan has been 
















stood, deformed, dysfunctional, derailed, delayed, and, even, an incom-
plete modernity; war, defeat, and the installation of the postwar immedi-
ately promised a new start and a genuine social democracy, armed now 
with informed, rational, and responsible political subjects who would be 
able to avoid the sins of the past. Instead, the sengo has turned into an in-
terminable duration that even today shows no sign of ever ending. In the 
more recent images of the postwar, Japanese are now reminded of how they 
have lived a deception since 1945, how they still endure under the weight 
of the American Occupation, transubstantiated into a permanent military 
base and outpost of the American imperium, and still remain captive to the 
neo-colonialism of America’s culture, which strikingly recalls similar com-
plaints made before the war. If the immediate years after the war were flush 
with signs of renewal and the hope of realizing what Maruyama Masao de-
scribed as a “second chance,” the years after the 1960s saw this optimism 
fold into the timeless politics of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which 
collapsed the future into an endless present at the same moment Japan’s 
economy headed for global hegemony. While the dreams for social democ-
racy and modern subjectivity soon vanished in the din of pronouncements 
promising higher standards of living, unlimited economic growth, and 
the conceits of exaggerated bureaucratic efficiency that literally called for 
the end of politics, Japanese were increasingly reminded that these were 
only signs of their defeated status and the price they were made to pay for 
having allowed themselves to be colonized—spiritually and materially—by 
the United States. This note was early sounded by critics such as Etō Jun, 
who repetitiously recalled how unconditional surrender forced on Japan a 
decision to cease being Japanese and has echoed down to the present in the 
writings of people such as Kato Norihirō, who has characterized the post-
war itself as a defeat and a disfiguration, and countless historical revision-
ists who busily disavow Japan’s depredations in Asia.
 In their eagerness to restore a truer identity or a more accurate history, 
Japanese were permitted to forget and repress more of the past—the pre-
war years—than they have actually remembered of that troubled but semi-
nal time in Japan’s modern history. When Kato singled out Dazai Osamu 
for praise as the one writer who could write about the war experience, he 
was, perhaps inadvertently, calling attention to prewar modernism and its 
struggle with the aporias of representation; and when historical revision-
ists contest prevailing accounts of Japan’s conduct in the war, they, too, are 
recalling prewar arguments that aimed to mask imperialism and colonial-














more muted register, the complex imbrications of modernism and fascism 
galvanized before the war and the related but mutually exclusive struggle 
with the crisis of representation Japan’s capitalist modernity had precipi-
tated. These battles were immediately ignored in the postwar effort to set 
the past right in a new present and were ultimately forgotten (repressed) 
and lost to memory in the long night of sengo. During the Cold War, this his-
torical amnesia reached down to penetrate the lowest levels of conscious-
ness, as exemplified by the fate of fascism. While Marxists in Japan con-
tinued to keep vigil by incessant and formulaic appeals to emperor-system 
fascism, the overwhelming attitude in those years was revealed in a steady 
lessening of interest in the category’s claim to either analytic precision or 
descriptive accuracy. In time, fascism was seen as simply a parenthesis in 
twentieth-century history rather than one of its constitutive and determin-
ing principles inscribed in the social life world of capitalism, the ghost in 
the machine. With the study of Japan, scholarship rapidly forgot the United 
States had fought a war against a nation identified with a fascist alliance 
and in the most recent efforts to assess the postwar fascism is rarely, if ever, 
mentioned. In fact, whole generations of readers and students have not 
been told that the very army that occupied Japan after 1945 to inaugurate 
the postwar had first waged war against a fascist nation.
 But if fascism and modernism were momentarily able to renew their 
leases on life after the war, the advent of a postmodern Japan in the 1970s 
aimed to bring about its final overcoming. What this entailed was fulfill-
ing the postmodern promise to finally eliminate the specter of unevenness 
that modernism had sought to displace and hide from view. LDP politics, 
despite its stranglehold on the bureaucracy, or vice versa, was a “one-party 
democracy” situated to discourage the replication of fascism in the forms 
that had dominated the prewar scene. Implied in this remarkable move was 
the conviction that the kind of society that had evolved in prewar Japan, 
one in which the bourgeoisie had struggled for cultural self-definition in 
the face of a lingering agrarian and “feudal” aristocratic other, no longer 
existed. As a class, according to Roland Barthes, writing about France in 
the late 1950s, that “did not wish to be named,” the bourgeoisie fought for 
the specific locus of cultural authority and won. War apparently brought an 
end to this struggle, to be sure, and American-sponsored democratization 
supposedly did the rest. As the specter of class power faded into the maw 
of mass consumer society, the need for class struggle and the space for 
criticism disappeared. By this time the bourgeoisie, like its counterpart in 
















tinguishable from the political classes and bureaucrats. From the 1970s on, 
political leaders and intellectuals began to proclaim the final achievement 
of a society in which everyone belonged to the middle class. New, techno-
logical hegemony, the regime of instrumental rationality, robbed modern-
ism of its imaginary—an outside—and processed its language into rapidly 
moving image circuits that managed to blur distinctions, level them, and 
turn “every idea . . . into a fifteen second vignette.”16 Finally, modernism’s 
long encounter with revolutionary projects, myths, and challenges to bour-
geois society, which powered it, led to a cancellation of political alterna-
tives other than the most conservative or reactionary affirmations pledged 
to upholding the cultural order of things.
 If we imagine from the respective projects of both modernism and fas-
cism a “constitutive ambiguity” toward modernity—capitalism’s relent-
less production of unevenness—and especially the problem it raised for 
the very means of representation (cultural/artistic and political), added to 
the visibility and invisibility of the bourgeoisie, its “positivity” but deeper 
concealment after the war, then it is hard to see how war, defeat, military 
occupation, and economic and technological superiority actually changed 
the social geography. Here is Clark: “for what was modernity except that 
set of forms in which a certain ruling class attempted to universalize its 
power, by having that power be individual freedom, or technical rationality, 
or the one as a condition of the other?”17 And what else was modernism 
and fascism—as twin modes of temporalization—but the “continual en-
counter” with precisely those effects of representation that evaded stabili-
zation, permanence in the void of the ever changing but similar commodity 
form? This was a problem not merely for cultural production but also for 
politics. Tosaka Jun observed early that Japan was already a liberal and bour-
geois society—capitalist order—and that the culture of representation was 
fusing with political representation to secure the stolidity and stability of 
both, just as political practice, limited to determining social relations, was 
beginning to enlist to its cause meanings from the wider domain of mytho-
culture to risk forfeiting the productive non-identity or separation between 
culture and politics. Tosaka recognized, with others, that an effective poli-
tics respects the asymmetry between its own limits and an expansive cul-
ture.18 Moreover, he saw exactly how modernism (liberalism) led to a can-
cellation of politics and a new partnership with fascism offering people 
the prospect of cultural rather than political representation. When we look 
back on the immense spectacle of postwar Japan, we must, I believe, read 














marked Japan’s entry into capitalist modernity, a continuation of what had 
been so constitutive of the prewar experience, rather than either a postmod-
ern departure or a distorted and crooked version of an authentic history—a 
what might have been.
Experiencing the Present, Re-historicizing the Everyday
One of the major casualties of the postwar desire for selective amnesia was 
the literal effacement of the memory of Tosaka Jun and his relentless criti-
cism of fascism, cultural liberalism, and defense of an intellectual devotion 
to the promise of rationality and science for the masses. The irony of this 
forgetfulness (in part supplemented by the misrecognitions of Marxists, as 
well) was that it made possible the claim of enlightenmentism by postwar 
thinkers such as Ōtsuka Hisao, Maruyama Masao, Kawashima Takayoshi, 
and even, for a time, Shimizu Ikutaro (who later wrote a book advising the 
necessity of forgetting the Enlightenment) who monopolized its concep-
tion of rationality even as these modernizers managed to water it down to 
fit the contours of a situational pragmatism put into the service of liberal 
democracy and the autonomous political subject. What this “party of the 
Enlightenment” managed to accomplish was an inversion of the very goals 
that had earlier induced Tosaka and others associated with Yuibutsuron 
Kenkyūkai (Society for the Study of Materialism) to promote the ideals of 
science and rationality as a way for the masses to liberate themselves. To-
saka saw in science a means to construct a critique against cultural liberal-
ism and academic philosophy, which already were making common cause 
with fascism in the 1930s by investing in the Enlightenment project, the 
prospect of disseminating knowledge for the masses. The postwar “party” 
of modernizers, by contrast, clumsily betraying their received distrust for 
the masses and failing at the same time to conceal the conceit traditionally 
accorded to the intellectual elite, deployed the program of Enlightenment 
as a means to create a rationally autonomous individual, responsible and 
informed, who, unlike the prewar masses, would possess the capacity to 
resist voluntary submission to a political leadership promoting an irratio-
nal ideology. What they accomplished was simply the reidentification of 
subjectivity with prewar elitism. If Tosaka envisaged Enlightenment as a 
way out of capitalism and liberalism, postwar thinkers made it a condition 
for the modernization of Japanese political society and the final achieve-
ment of a liberal-democratic order. Whereas Tosaka, like Antonio Gramsci, 
















of the masses, the postwar “enlighteners” replaced it with the authority of 
the average as expressed in the principle of consensus that derived its force 
from what counted to be seen and what would be visible as against what was 
not and remained left out. Tosaka’s commitment to Enlightenment ideals 
was thus distended beyond recognition in the postwar effort to shut off the 
present and the future from the past, casting him and his program to the 
shadow lands of repression and ghostly occupancy, his critique of fascism 
(ideology) no longer accessible to a discourse on direct substantive democ-
racy fated to simply reproduce the worst features of its prewar predecessor. 
Yet the importance of Tosaka’s critique, delivered in Nihon ideorogiiron (1935) 
and devoted to dissembling a perfervid archaism authorized by academic 
hermeneutic philosophy—what he called cultural liberalism—was its deep 
commitment to understanding the nature of Japan’s modernity and how 
capitalist modernization had transformed society. It was this approach that 
enabled the construction of a theory (he called it a science) of criticism and 
the development of a critique of the everyday that would target both mod-
ernism and fascism as effects of Japan’s modernity and the crisis of repre-
sentation provoked by capitalism and the commodity form.
 In an early text on the scientific method written in 1929, Tosaka first 
addressed the changing relationship between method and object (negoti-
ated in the mode of the Kantian dialectic) and proposed that its foundation 
and growth into a practice corresponds to a “scholarly practice” that must 
pursue the “acquisition of truthfulness.”19 By the same measure, the ac-
quisition of truthfulness always aims at securing the identity of a problem 
at the same time it seeks to grasp the proper form of criticism. Echoing 
Marx, criticism for Tosaka inevitably involved seizing hold of the “roots” of 
the relationship between self and other. Any criticism, hence, was also an 
expression of self-criticism, since the observing self ’s understanding of an 
object would always enforce a distance between itself and its relation to this 
other. What this formulation referred to were “social rules” that inevitably 
link self to the other of its object of inquiry. When learning connects with 
the social, it discovers its “condition of separation” because society—the 
practical life of people—is a ceaseless critical negotiation. But since learn-
ing is a critical practice striving to uncover the “roots,” it must be armed 
with an ideal of life. In this way, Tosaka reasoned, “learning constitutes a 
method of everyday living (seikatsu)” that constantly demands the exercise 
of social self-criticism as the principle of life, resulting in “a method for 
living.”20 It is interesting to recall, in this connection, that Yanagita Kunio 














assisting contemporaries to solve everyday problems as the principal voca-
tion of minzokugaku. Where Tosaka differed was in his insistence on the pri-
macy of criticism, absent in Yanagita’s formulations, and the importance of 
taking a critical position to force ideological formations to yield their ideal-
ist assumptions and aspirations. The significance of grasping logic itself 
as ideological required the arduous labor of “moving upstream until one 
reached the headwaters”—the social position—that had distantly “pro-
duced the logical position” but whose history now remained concealed from 
the present.21 What seemed to interest Tosaka most was determining the 
identity and location of the all-important “characteristic (seikakuteki)” that 
ultimately made logic logical (as it made history historical) and required a 
full understanding of the “problem.” Even the selection of a problem ap-
peared to be problematic, he acknowledged, and grasping it was demanded 
by historical society. At the heart of the problem hovered the all-important 
identity of the “characteristic”—the “problem of the epoch” itself and its 
specifically emblematic historical and social conditions. The contemporary 
moment confronted the “problem of the present” and engaged the now of 
actuality embedded in the space of everyday life as the entry point into all 
subsequent reflection.22 Despite its similarity with Heidegger’s identifica-
tion of reflection and the circumstances of Being’s primordial everydayness 
and the decisionism demanded by destiny, Tosaka’s formulation was atten-
tive to the chronotope of the now and its “thereness (soko)” and thus open 
to the promise of actualizing a possibility offered by a processional and 
historical moment in the present.23
 Historical reality foregrounds the “practical idea” as the political actu-
alization of history’s movement. Hence, the logic of the “characteristic” is 
also a political logic, as well. History’s movement in the present had already 
introduced the primacy of social relations and class as its new content, in-
tensifying the demand for a “massification of science.” Since science was 
always class-based, it was now immediately necessary and proper to refig-
ure its basis by reorienting it toward the masses. (Tosaka was referring also 
to social science.) Convinced that only the masses were in a position to 
shoulder the immense power of history’s movement, science had to be lib-
erated from its narrow class fetters—the task of criticism—and put into the 
service of enlightening the social constituency. Tosaka was clearly calling 
for a science capable of assisting the subaltern masses as the great libratory 
instrument of self-transformation rather than its mere “popularization” in 
the commodified knowledge packaged and circulated by journalism. Both 
















the two fundamental errors made in the name of the masses that required 
rectification through the practice of criticism.
 In keeping with the general program of the Society for the Study of Ma-
terialism, Tosaka’s conception of ideological criticism was made to assist 
the “cultural struggle” against fascism. Yet the critical practice could just 
as easily have targeted modernism, as well, which, while explicitly eschew-
ing political fascism, more often than not shared its epistemological and 
hermeneutic presuppositions. Tosaka recognized that the critique necessi-
tated a reconstitution of ideology. Understood in its original eighteenth-
century manifestation as a science of ideas but also resembling Miki 
Kiyoshi’s “logic of conceptual power (kōsōryoku no riron),” the concept of 
ideology now had to be grasped as an effect of consciousness derived from 
historical and social existence, which “narrates concretely the reflection of 
existence.” Its task was to ferret out the hidden logical and social structure 
from its concealed recesses of commodified confinement and to display a 
repressed history that academic philosophy (if not historical studies) and 
journalism had conspired to efface. Whereas journalism had bonded with 
the “daily” and contributed to the formation of the ideological basis of 
the “everyday life of humans,” academic philosophy had ignored everyday-
ness altogether in its aspiration to transcend both the movement of the real 
and contemporary events. If the true vocation of journalism was to report 
on “real movements” and “contemporary events,” disclosing its commit-
ment to practical and political purpose, academic philosophy had feigned 
devotion to the culture of diverse disciplinary and specialized sciences, a 
Kantian gesture enabling it to act as a meta-discipline charged with the 
task of integrating knowledge according to a worldview of unification.24 
Yet both had failed to realize their calling under contemporary capitalism: 
academic philosophy forfeited its basic function as a meta-discipline, and 
journalism forswore its obligation to public opinion to submit to the lure 
of commercialization and the dictates of the commodity form. Hence, 
journalism deserted its ideological purpose to supply a daily criticism of 
events, as philosophy fell short of providing positivist evidence and the 
verification of proof—two moments of the same gesture: “critical proof ” 
and “positivistic criticism.”25 In the vacated terrain, Tosaka, like Gramsci, 
recommended installing “common sense” and “science”—the world of the 
immediate and concrete.26
 In appealing to a return to common sense, Tosaka was repositioning the 
materiality of everyday space as the temporal and spatial focus of all sub-














of the immediacy of the now (ima) and its thereness (soko) as an index of 
historical movement. On more than one occasion, he dismissed most phi-
losophy precisely because it had evacuated the everyday for some form of 
religious or theological and transcendental and otherworldly preoccupa-
tion, even though thought and reflection always derived from the actuality 
of everyday life. Because everyday space returned to materiality to form 
with time a minimal unity of contemporary existence, it was necessary 
for philosophy to redirect its task to resuscitating its original vocation of 
uniting with the quotidian. Hence the everyday and the “now” constituted 
the scene of concrete existence and the place to begin all subsequent analy-
sis of contemporary “custom” and history. It was not the past, as such, that 
directed the present to act but, rather, the present that authorized its proper 
history. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Tosaka’s concep-
tion of everyday space represented the last moment in a broader inventory 
of space itself—the physical, mathematical, and psychological dimensions 
constituting its others modalities. Ultimately, all were reducible to the actu-
ality of everyday space (an obvious glossing of the Husserlian conception 
of the origins of geometry in everyday usage)—to signal the recall of a pre-
Socratic ideal first revealed in materialist philosophy, which had been re-
pressed in a history dominated by the idea. Just as Tosaka managed to recu-
perate the repressed materialism from the history of philosophy, so he was 
able to mount a critical assault against the contemporary claims of cultural 
theorists who had elevated archaic categories as signposts of timeless and 
unchanging value guiding the present according to the imperatives of an 
indeterminate past. But the real importance of his recovery of the every-
day was its recognition of the primacy attributed to spatiality in modern 
capitalist society and its success in suppressing signs of its own tempo-
rality. Everydayness was not only the spatial location of a critical beginning 
but also the temporality that, despite its assertion of eternality, signified 
an instant in history that would forever remain incomplete. Despite the 
rarely conceded temporal and spatial disjunction separating the everyday 
and nation-state, especially how the latter constantly tried to assimilate the 
former to its temporal and spatial matrices, the everyday still offered the 
occasion for constant re-historicization against the claims of a completed 
national history.27 The mark of its—the everyday—temporality was not only 
its invitation to perceive new social relationships and the emergence of the 
masses, but also its identification of a distinct colonial space that figured 
importantly in so many of Tosaka’s timely essays on the current situation to 
















With the now of a material everydayness as the starting point for seizing 
hold of the contours of an historicized present against a memorialized and 
commemorated past envisioned by cultural theorists, Tosaka believed he 
had located the referent for subsequent analysis and presentation rather 
than representation, since everyday life was always in the process of show-
ing itself. Philosophy, he wrote in “Tetsugaku no gendai igi,” delegates to 
the everyday the “historical starting point of its speculative reflections.”28 
Despite acknowledging that the concrete and abstract have diverse mean-
ings, it is still impossible to reflect on thought without considering first 
this “concreteness” in the “original meaning” of the word. In fact, thought 
occurs universally in places that are “plentifully” endowed with everyday-
ness.29 Compared to literature, whose claim to concreteness derived from 
the desire to flesh out a narrative (nikutai), thought must first be “concrete 
thought.” Anything less imperiled the difference between philosophy and 
literature. In this sense, Tosaka’s conception of materiality avoided filling 
the everyday with mere things, accessorizing it, as he accused the urban 
ethnographer Kon Wajiro and countless native ethnologists of doing, but, 
rather, linked the everyday to the concrete thinking of the subaltern masses, 
which had only recently found expression in its voice.
 Tosaka was thus persuaded that abstract thought collapses into irrespon-
sibility when it relies on literature for its concreteness. Since literature itself 
is but an inflection of thought, its “philosophy,” its concretization must 
appear at a different level.30 The first principle of criticism therefore entails 
the act of verbal expression, and this meant carefully identifying a relation-
ship between the referent of everyday time and space mediating the lived 
experiences of the masses and its critical articulation. Once literature and 
the varieties of culture have been subordinated to the mediation of concrete 
thought, only the referent and its capacity for denotation remain. It was, I 
believe, this move that explains Tosaka’s difference from Kobayashi Hideo 
and the clash he represented between “two different kinds of realists,” and 
supplies the basis for understanding his scorching attack on the claims of 
culture and cultural theory. In his view, cultural theory rested on a form of 
signification (this is what he undoubtedly meant when he exclaimed that 
“territory (tochi) exists nowhere in the world without culture”31—that is, 
on the action of connotation rather than an appeal to a specific referent.32 
In a circular move, connotation was the underlying epistemological (and 
linguistic) principle authorizing spirit itself and empowering all those 
programs of signification summoned in the name of cultural—spiritual—














the folk with a sense of shared solidarity since the time of origins. While 
invoking the authority of space, cultural theorists such as Watsuji and Kuki, 
especially, literally banished time from their considerations to secure the 
effect of a timeless and unchanging cultural essence—a maneuver Koba-
yashi called social “statics.” Under this circumstance, culture never called 
forth a determinate and historical formation as such; it beckoned only an 
indefinite imaginary that is always out there. Kobayashi especially insisted 
on the marginal role of denotation, as shown in his dismissal of history 
and his attempts to assimilate it to a literature that had successfully ex-
ceeded time to always express ineffable and eternal values and emotions. If 
he envisioned an everydayness in his valorization of writers such as Shiga 
Naoya, it was vastly different from Tosaka’s chronotope of daily life because 
it merely represented an indeterminate, unmoving space of stillness, where 
a sense of commonness always prevailed to mark Japanese literature since 
its beginnings rather than the instantaneous suddenness of the modern 
present. In this regard, Kobayashi believed that writers, like poets, were 
committed to “employing everyday words” in their compositions, but like 
those for earlier nativists, this act referred only to mobilizing fresh words 
to describe the affective life and states of personal emotionality.33 Reject-
ing the “necessity of history,” which he contrasted to the “necessity” of 
everyday life, because of its “thinness,” he advised the active pursuit of a 
more intense “experiencing of everyday life,” which meant rescuing the 
residue of feelings and emotions that have remained the same since the be-
ginning.34 Kobayashi defended “one’s culture” against the charges leveled 
at him by Tosaka, whose conception of criticism proposed to “extract” the 
abstract from cultural phenomena to lay hold of the very “commonness 
(kyōtsūsei)” Kobayashi had centered as something “lively”—that is to say, 
a living form.35 For Tosaka, the “most dynamic content of cultural logic 
demands criticism of the several cultures of reality.”36
 Yet Kobayashi managed to fulfill the modernist expectation to distill, 
like Baudelaire, the eternal from the merely transitory and contingent. With 
Tosaka, he affirmed an appreciation of the new, to be sure, but departed in 
his decision to valorize the present, the modern, as the designated stage 
for enacting living, classic commonness. For Kobayashi, the present was 
assigned the responsibility of re-presenting classicism. But this recommen-
dation risked realigning modernism to the idea of heritage and cultural 
treasure promoted by historicism and threatened to undermine an ambi-
tion to see in modernity a living form, despite his endorsement of writers 
















to demonstrating how Marxist writers had rejected the mundane as ma-
terial for fiction. “It was not that young Marxists had lost the feel for every-
day life,” he wrote, “but that their ideology instructed them to transform 
the concept of ‘life’ from the mundane to the ‘historical’.” In the enthusi-
astic welcoming of Marxism in Japan and its theory of inevitable progress, 
he observed, “honest history got lost.”37 But in its place, he recommended 
a “healthy interest in history,” which meant sensitivity to the “sentiment,” 
“sensible,” or “feeling” embedded in history; without it, there would be no 
chance “to inhale such things as the idea of kokutai.”38 This idea of “breath-
ing in the national polity” adds up to a different form of understanding that 
“dwells within the recesses of love for the history of one’s country.”
 In the essay “Thought and Real Life,” he warned that no worthwhile 
thought is ever separated from real life. There is no thinking separate from 
real life:39 “An act of thinking that fails to pursue making sacrifice in real 
life is lodged only in the head of animals. Social order is nothing more than 
the sacrifice that real life pays in thought. The [dappled] light and shades 
of this contemporaneity occurs in proportion to the depth of sacrifice paid. 
It is there that the word ‘tradition’ is established . . . [and] thought is nour-
ished according to the habitual sacrifices of everyday reality.”40 Kobayashi 
complained of the failure of ideas to capture the complexity of real, every-
day life and how abstraction, a ghostly apparition, had come to prevail in 
his present. No writer, he added, was more devoted to transmuting theories 
of everyday life into art than Shiga. It was precisely because literature was 
better able to communicate the experience of everyday—the concreteness 
from which it was shaped—that it was a more superior form of historical 
narrative, which he saw sliding into unrelieved abstraction and forgetful-
ness. In this regard, Tosaka’s conception of historical temporality driven by 
the principles of everydayness came close to Kobayashi’s own rejection of 
historical narratives. Yet where Tosaka sought to reconfigure the relation-
ship between space and time to grasp a history that begins in the present, 
as a constant act of re-historicization showing history’s incompleteness, 
Kobayashi early confessed to an allergy to history altogether and dismissed 
it as low-grade fiction, at best accidental and contingent, since “men do 
not actually see historical reality” but only create it by seizing hold of re-
ceived “historical materials.” To see history and to grasp the true and en-
during forms of life, it was necessary to possess the “genius of a poet” or 
to be one who stands in the position to “polish mightily the mirror of the 
self,” an obvious reference to the Buddhist gesture of “polishing the dust 














the “true spirit of history” necessitated distinguishing the fixed, unmoving 
forms, unseen to the naked eye, the constant recurrence of expressions of 
commonness, which involved exercising the power of “recall,” not simply 
remembering as one does a chronology of events recorded by historians.41 
Only poets like Motoori Norinaga and Kitabatake Chikafusa possessed such 
powers of direct “intuition” and “insight” with which to penetrate reality 
or, indeed, the first poets of ancient Japan who were “firmly embraced by 
the heart of history, as they were enclosed in nature’s heart” to see through 
the distorted explanations that concealed true humanity. In this regard, 
history was elevated to the status of the “classics.”42 What seems most im-
portant about this decision to discard history was the way time disappeared 
from his considerations and the resulting diminution of political possi-
bility other than one dedicated to affirming the “way things are”—that is 
to say, maintaining the status quo.
 In “History and Literature,” written just before the war, Kobayashi vig-
orously upheld the contention that historical narrative had lost its relation-
ship to the present real life. As a form, it could no longer convey memory 
and now stood as an ominous figure for modern forgetting by imaging the 
present as the culmination of progress. Even though he wished to show 
how history never repeated itself, the incessant circulation of commonness 
manifest in the art of great poets came closer to a theory of historical repe-
tition than he might have imagined. At its best, history’s claim to represent 
the narrative of progress vocalized a fiction of unimaginable proportions. 
Rather, Kobayashi was eager to reinforce a view of history completed long 
before the present, one that had accompanied the inaugural experience of 
the race. Modernity demands forgetting and forfeits the possibility of real-
izing commemorative communication, which only literature is in a posi-
tion to rescue in the present. What is forgotten is particularly the every-
day, which, according to Blanchot writing much later, “We cannot help 
but miss,” because it is not yet information. If, for example, the attitude 
of a mother whose child has died is considered, the historical reality of 
the event will be different from how it was experienced. Historical recon-
struction would stop with a consideration of the causes and conditions. In 
the process, though, meaning will be lost if the event, exemplified by the 
loss of the child, is not accompanied by a recognition of the emotion it was 
capable of evoking. And if sentiment and feeling are not accounted for, 
there is no reason for the figure of the infant to “flicker before the (mind’s) 
eye as a memory image.”43 What Kobayashi hoped to emphasize with this 
















was always incomplete because it recorded only the existence of the event 
at the expense of forfeiting experience. The mother knows this lesson, he 
remarked, and she understands that the death of the child will fail to qualify 
as historical reality unless it is also invested with genuine feeling. Meaning 
comes not from the event, as such, but from those who feel its force, which 
strangely becomes the event to be remembered. The love of the mother is 
the source of this meaning, and the child thus continues to exist because 
she still loves it “today,” long after it has died. For this reason alone, it is 
not necessary to appeal to the details surrounding the cause of death to 
remember the child in the heart. In the mother’s thinking, the facts are 
not reliable or even necessary for restoring the memory of the child. Koba-
yashi complained that the easy invocation of historical consciousness and 
objectivity made by historians attests only to abstraction and vagueness. 
These things experienced everyday, he believed in his “gut,” are what really 
constitute history and are generally omitted from historical accounts. “Are 
we being paradoxical,” he asked, “when we talk about things experienced in 
daily life?”44 Everyday life is both the setting of experience whose meaning 
is supplied by those who lived it and the reservoir of memory that histori-
cal narrative must forget in the interest of communicating reason. Owing 
to its obligations to reason, historical practice resembled a large bamboo 
basket that scoops up from the “great sea of history” nothing more than 
minnows.45 In this way, history misses the vast spectacle of human experi-
ence taking place before its eyes. Contemporaries find the contingent and 
“unreasonable” in history to be inconvenient, unacceptable, since only 
progress is necessary and desired. Causal relationships the brain invents to 
tell this story have nothing to do with the experience close to everyday life 
that creates fresh historical emotions in the heart. It was for this reason 
that Kobayashi invested everydayness with the power to imagine and recall 
the common, as opposed to a history driven by reason and the will to for-
get. History, Kobayashi concluded, is a “classic,” and literature shows that 
history occupies a place that never moves; it is the “mystery of the place that 
never moves” that is precisely the indeterminate space of everydayness of 
common feeling and sentiment, not for acquiring a knowledge of but for 
restoring the spirit.46 It is this commonness of experience lived in the every-
day in which history appears motionless, timeless, and eternal and as the 
sign of a common tradition of emotional life derived from the ancient past. 
Kobayashi put this sentiment more assertively in his dialogue with the his-
torian Suzuki Shigetaka during the conference on overcoming modernity. 














was avoiding complexity that required abstraction, Kobayashi responded to 
his questioning of an “unchanging history” or statics. “The experience of 
appreciating the classics by even ordinary folk teaches the fact” that no time 
and development intervenes in the creative work of any artist who is able to 
stand in the position to experience the “route of the ancients” as a model. 
“It is the experience of our everyday.”47
 But in the end, Kobayashi managed only to mystify everyday life, making 
it impenetrable to all but a few who, like poets and artists, could under-
stand the “mystery of the place that never moves,” which required recall-
ing—signifying—the commonness of feeling and emotion. By reidentify-
ing everydayness with the auratic, he ran the danger of arriving at the same 
place contemporary fascist theorists had already reached. Whereas Tosaka 
saw everydayness “anywhere” welded to the larger processes of world his-
tory and the temporalizing of modernity, Kobayashi saw in it an alternative 
to history, a free-floating everydayness always calling forth the recurrence 
of common feeling fixed in a specific space, without time or duration, a 
complete and completed history.
 In many ways, Kobayashi’s postwar masterpiece, Motoori Norinaga, com-
pleted the argument for eternalizing a native aesthetic endowment, which 
had miraculously succeeded in exceeding history itself. Such a society, one 
Tosaka never lived to see, would be better served by the idea of culture pre-
figured in Kobayashi’s conception of everyday life, and its celebration of 
eternal core values that promised to transcend past and present (history 
itself ) and elevate culture over social formation. This perspective, it was be-
lieved, would reinforce an arrangement that drove a wedge between every-
day life and history, removing custom from its conditions of production 
and aesthetics from politics and even ethics. But this solution would resolve 
nothing and empty society of everything but consumption rather than the 
possibility of actualizing critique in the interest of a genuinely participatory 
politics, one that he—Kobayashi—has already dismissed during the war be-
cause he had no knowledge on the subject. During the war, he continued to 
carry on the project to naturalize history into the space of timeless cultural 
form and repository of enduring value, which had escaped the demands 
of time. This elision of history and culture into what he had earlier called 
“second nature” was finally realized in the text on Motoori Norinaga. In this 
text, he returned to an exploration of “seeing” and “vision” and appealed 
to Buddhist modes of “knowing,” which he contrasted with Western “real-
ism” based on “observation.” But it was the great eighteenth-century nativ-
















methodological and philosophical means with which to envision “spirit” 
and “thingness” in “direct experience.” It was Norinaga’s own conception 
of empathic understanding of things, mono no aware, embedded in native 
everyday life, language, and culture that supplied the model for “seeing” 
and “knowing” that could not be grasped by other theories of cognition. 
Motoori had been certain that true Japanese emotionality, before it had 
been clouded over by the Chinese language, still existed in the sedimented 
residues of national life, despite the long dependence on imported and alien 
principles of knowledge. According to Kobayashi, the restoration of this 
natural emotionality as envisaged by Motoori invited a determinate stand 
against “rational norms” and the domination of abstraction in conduct and 
cognition. Motoori had already dismissed the “Chinese mind” as an expres-
sion of abstraction that had actually imprisoned the natural, affective life 
of the Japanese and was thus prompted to underscore the importance of 
resuscitating the spoken language (before the importation of ideographs) 
as the surest way to escape confinement in order to express true emotion-
ality. But the great appeal of this theory of cognition was its promise to 
repress time altogether by fixing on the place where negotiation between 
knower and known was carried out, whereby the speaker of Japanese used 
a language that called attention to a particular place that was capable of 
interpellating the speaker as its subject. What this aesthetic mode of cog-
nition produced was thus a static affirmation of the “way things are,” not 
movement but the primacy of space over time, an acceptance of any histori-
cal givenness and any present as it has been received. In this regard, there 
would be no distinction between present, past, and future—echoing a form 
of fascist temporality already configured in Mircea Eliade’s myth of the eter-
nal return. What apparently attracted Kobayashi to Motoori’s hermeneutic 
was the prospect of realizing a natural emotionalism freed from artificial, 
normative, and abstract constraints of the social, politics, and history—
one more fully passive than active, always prepared to receive what was im-
mediate, sentient, and, presumably, concrete. But it was reached through 
the exercise of a “spirit” embodied in language. “We take to language,” 
Kobayashi wrote, “as we take to our own body.”48 He feared, like Motoori 
before him, that in his own time word and thing had been divided, and that 
this separation would remove speakers from precisely the world that had 
made them a community interacting with nature and each other through 
the medium of a sacralized language (kotodama). It would also alienate 
them from themselves, their own bodies. “People,” he remarked, “should 














with the way of rationalism (representation).”49 For the “pure power of ex-
pression that inheres originally in language makes possible a stout-hearted 
community life for us.” Kobayashi’s conception of language, as the basis 
of communal life, reflected only a unique endowment and “a possession of 
this place,” indistinguishable from its speakers. Language is the same as 
place because “it is closest to us” and “most like our bodies.”50
Neo-fascist Spectacle: Transforming the Nation  
into a Theme Park of Cultural Memory
The escape from a debilitating abstractness and the desire to resituate the 
concreteness of timeless living cultural forms in the postwar period pre-
occupied the writer and would-be activist Mishima Yukio. With Mishima 
the representational but constitutive aporias faced by modernism and fas-
cism came together to blur the line between a cultural politics and a politi-
cal culture. Mishima’s rejection of postwar history stemmed from a convic-
tion that the times demanded a rearticulation of a theory of cultural holism 
that would center pure form, once more, unmediated by the demands of 
history. The model he offered of a culturally whole Japanese order distinct 
from the history of the “postwar” required a break with the West, even 
though he was Japan’s most “Western” writer. The backdrop of his anticom-
munist manifesto, “Bunka bōeiron (Essay on the Defense of Culture)” was 
the emerging Japanese “super state” of the late 1960s, which, according to 
his text, was now compelled to defend culture against its destruction by 
socialism.51 But Mishima did not really need the alibi of socialism to autho-
rize his call to arms, since he was already complaining about his present, 
the showy “culturalism” of the 1960s that incessantly transformed culture 
into “things.” Often he echoed the anxious plaints of cultural critics of the 
1930s who worried about the loss of spirit to the machine and consump-
tion. Everywhere he saw only “ornamentation,” “exhausted emotionality,” 
and the “elimination of the real.” Contemporary cultural life was counter-
feit, “diluted for mass consumption,” revered as a thing and removed from 
the source of all things and value—the emperor—which had given mean-
ing to all things but had managed to remain free from the alienating and 
abstracting world of commodification.52
 Like many of his contemporaries and successors, Mishima was per-
suaded that cultural and aesthetic form offered a glimpse of national spirit 
and thus provided the surest defense against the erosions inflicted by time 
















fested in continuities and repetitions, which, like the punctual rebuilding 
of the Grand Shrine at Ise every twenty years, have always defied mere his-
tory.53 But the greatest sign of repetition, continuity, and the autonomy of 
form was the emperor, who was always present even when absent in certain 
periods of Japan’s history. The emperor represented a “free creative subjec-
tivity” who acted as a transcendental subject that authorized cultural mean-
ing but who was not bound to a signification. He was always capable of 
transmitting form itself on its endless itinerary through time. If the rule of 
consumption and commodity form introduced interruption into national 
life, precipitating a genuine crisis in the cultural order of things, it could 
only be overcome by appealing to the agency of an emperor, who embodied 
the principles of both repetition and “free creative subjectivity” necessary 
for realigning culture to form. This image was intended to directly challenge 
the Shōwa emperor (Hirohito), who, according to Mishima, was indistin-
guishable from the content of contemporary everyday life.54 The contem-
porary crisis involved a struggle over competing claims of cultural conduct 
and the defense of an idea of timeless culture as form.
 To defend culture meant ridding society of egoism and encouraging 
self-sacrifice to conserve the “continuity of destiny.”55 Accordingly, the 
“mother’s womb” of the vast cultural idea, whose surplus always escaped 
being assimilated to the logic of history, exemplifying a general economy of 
excess and expenditure, was performed as an imaginary community, itself 
a form remaining immune to history. The lynchpin in this vision of cultural 
wholeness was the emperor—the Tennō, as Mishima preferred to call him—
representing fully the “ideal of cultural continuity.” For Mishima, the Tennō 
incorporated into his person irreducible heterological elements opposed to 
mere utility, the useful, and abstract exchange and presented an alternative 
to the homogenous and safe world of contemporary commodity culture. 
The Tennō existed for himself first, before community and nation, as a kind 
of pure “having-to-be.” With this understanding, Mishima challenged a re-
cent history that had fixed on the identity of the Tennō and the “political 
body” to demonstrate that, even though the heterological force of emperor-
ship relied on the homogenous existence of the state, it still had to remain 
apart from it. The state had to be seen as the abstract and degraded form 
of the living body of “having-to-be”; separation from impurity guaranteed 
the preservation of the continuity even when the political system had been 
disrupted. But an emperor unconstrained by time, that is political time, 
was free to enter it at will and “make a sudden outburst in time,” which, in 














to an “undifferentiated inclusive culture.” For Mishima, the present was the 
appointed moment for the emperor to enter time to act decisively in the 
interest of making culture anew and to enact an age-old repetitive gesture 
aimed at destroying culture, only to re-create it. Such an intervention would 
combine the “national polity (kokutai)” of the Tennō’s “state” with some 
form of economic order that, more often than not, resembled “capitalism 
and a system of private property,” the classic equation already proposed be-
fore the war by fascist theorists now reformulated for the postwar present.56 
The act, he was convinced, would reveal the connection between temporal 
and spatial continuity in the performance of rituals and the identity between 
archaic divine authority and political disorder, eroticism, and anarchism.57 
Yet behind this appeal to imperial intervention in contemporary history 
from outside of time was also the attempt to articulate the classic reunion 
between art and everyday life—by making life into art and art into life in one 
stroke through the act of divine destruction and creation. To achieve this 
ideal, Mishima staged his last, great spectacle: suicide by ritual decapita-
tion, which, far from moving his countrymen and -women to follow his call 
to action, was simply another commodity that was rapidly consumed and 
forgotten. We must acknowledge that nearly thirty years after the event of 
Mishima’s suicide, the writer and critic Kato Norihiro revisited his concep-
tion of emperorship and its authorization of a holistic cultural state, which 
he juxtaposed to the Shōwa emperor, Hirohito, as a reminder of precisely 
what modern Japan had once gained but lost to forgetfulness demanded by 
commodity culture and unguarded Americanization.58
 Modernism and fascism, like modernity itself, were constituted as his-
torical temporalizations through which capitalism gained access to lived 
experience, the mediate forms through which a specific history is lived as 
the continuous historicization of existence. Through these forms, we are 
able also to identify the aporias of representation provoked by the con-
stituent ambiguity produced by capitalism, which has continually marked 
Japan’s modernity to the present. Peter Osborne has argued that these are 
not necessarily products of competing totalizations of historical material 
but, rather, coeval temporal structures, coexisting temporalizations that 
seek to find modes of relating past, present, and future in diverse and dif-
ferent ways yet also resolve the aporias and ambiguities created by capital-
ism and its ceaseless production of unevenness.59 What this struggle has 
underscored has been the singular importance of this critical relationship 
between politics and time in modern society and, especially, how the cen-
















also illustrates how a society such as contemporary Japan has moved away 
from the modernist project imagined by people like Tosaka Jun, who saw in 
the present the promise of political possibility in the register of historical 
time that starts with the everyday. But Tosaka also looked to the political 
significance of a culture of formation based on an understanding of the 
now of everydayness and its critique positioned in such a way as to offset 
the reified claims of core value as culture and its consequent dependence 
on fixed space. Spatializing culture as core value, without considering pro-
cess and temporality, which was promoted by Kobayashi and acted out by 
Mishima, risked making culture look like the mysterious commodity form 
and its relationship to value and exchange. We know that this critique van-
ished in the postwar desire to substitute economic well-being for politi-
cal accountability, which insisted on cementing cultural “essence” to the 
realization of successful performance as a natural coupling. In this way, 
the effort to figure the now as temporally marked presentation—a showing 
of itself—gave way to the act of representing a reified past and its identity 
with the present. Its greatest outcome was to seek a realignment of a dis-
crepant culture and politics, where in the past it had been recognized that 
the restricted nature of the latter could never metabolize the former. The 
effect was literally to eliminate both the incommensurability that had once 
divided these temporalizations—culture and politics—and the source of 
their respective productivities. Under these new circumstances, the con-
stituent ambiguity produced by capitalist modernization and its penchant 
for a discrepant politics and culture capable of generating alternative but 
coeval forms of temporalization has probably come to an end. This genera-
tive force will have been removed from the place originally assigned to it in 
the overdetermined historical field and re-emplotted in a less charged con-
figuration. The new configuration will now be composed of an image of a 
different and distant social order in the past designated to continually pro-
duce nostalgia for what has been lost; such a move is made in the interest 
of actualizing an ecstatic dissolution of time itself rather than seeking to 
find modes of relating past, present, future in politically distinct ways and 
alternative temporalizations of history. In the interminable prolongation of 
the postwar in Japan and the steady incorporation of politics into culture, 
we have, I believe, the sign of an obsessive desire to forestall the tempo-
ralizing process that has endangered the survival of politics altogether and 
opened the way to converting the social imaginary into a vast theme park 
of bad cultural memory. But the staging of bad cultural memory today still 














rallies, pageants, and marches undertaken with fascism’s first appearance 
in the historical field.
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The Beauty of Labor:  
Imagining Factory Girls in Japan’s New Order
In early 1941, leading members of Japan’s largest and most in-
fluential folk art organization, the Mingei Kyōkai (Folk-Craft Association), 
published a proposal to reform the dormitory life of female workers at a 
spinning factory. Much of the March issue of the organization’s magazine 
Gekkan mingei (Folk-Craft Monthly) was given over to the proposal and to 
various articles and editorials in connection with it. Yet the factory girl 
project, which centered on the construction, furnishing, and use of a spe-
cial dormitory, appears never to have been realized. After the one special 
issue, there was little further mention of the project or even of the factory 
in the magazine, or in other association publications. And even in the pages 
of the special issue itself, the editor, Shikiba Ryūzaburō, expressed doubt 
that the project would ever be anything more than a “paper plan” (he was 
quick, however, to add, “We have grasped a truth,” and “I believe the day 
will come when this material is put to use in some way”).1
 Nevertheless, the association’s approach to what it called the “Problem of 
the Daily Lifestyle of Female Workers” is worth considering in some detail. 
A recognizably fascist effort to employ aesthetics as a means of increasing 


















nate several important but as yet under-studied aspects of the Japanese fas-
cist experiment. Most discussions of the question of Japanese fascism have 
focused on political institutions and movements or on economic policy. 
There has been some study, also, of fascist ideology and literature.2 How-
ever, it remains to assess the crucial question of the role played by aesthet-
ics in fascist policymaking. As has long been stressed in the study of Euro-
pean fascism, aesthetic considerations were central to the fascist project. 
Not only were fascist politics characterized by the deliberate manipulation 
of spectacular new forms and symbols, such as architecture, film, mass 
festivals and rallies, posters, and uniforms, but the fascist renovation of 
society and the state was framed in explicitly aesthetic terms.3 In Japan as 
well as in Germany or Italy or France, one of the central goals of fascist 
thinkers and policymakers was to create a beautiful new society in which 
individuality could be both exalted and sublated by the exquisite discipline 
of national unity and sacrifice. This vision had very concrete uses in mobi-
lizing national subjects and resources for wartime labor and privation, but 
it was also held out as an end in and of itself. The ideal of “one hundred 
million hearts beating as one,” as one of the most often quoted slogans of 
wartime Japan put it, was presented as a source of aesthetic gratification, 
as well as of virtue and strength.
 The factory girl project points to the presence within wartime Japan, as 
in Nazi Germany, of a campaign to resolve some of the contradictions cre-
ated by capitalism and industrialization through the beautiful rationaliza-
tion of factory labor. Only recently have scholars begun to explore the cul-
tural dimensions of industrial labor policies and practices during the late 
1930s and early 1940s and the extent to which Japanese officials and agen-
cies sought to create cultural programs for industrial workers comparable 
to those of the German Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) organization 
or the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (National Organization of Afterwork) en-
deavor.4 The efforts of the folk-craft or mingei activists in particular, and 
the interest and support those efforts received from key members of the 
so-called renovationist bureaucracy within Japan’s New Order (shintaisei), 
suggest that in addition to the more familiar initiatives to entertain and 
uplift workers through traveling theatricals, sporting events, hiking trips, 
factory choirs, and the like, there was also attention to the possibility of a 
more thoroughgoing reconstruction of worker culture along the aestheti-
cizing lines marked out by the architect Albert Speer’s “Beauty of Labor” 
office within “Strength through Joy.”5














important set of ideas and programs linking wartime Japan to the fascist 
regimes of continental Europe, it also offers insight into the distinctive 
nature of fascism in Japan. The fact remains, for example, that the Folk-
Craft, or Mingei Association’s plan was never realized. To some degree, the 
failure of the factory girl project is emblematic of the larger failure of fas-
cist planners to impose their ideals of managed productivity on Japanese 
industry. For a variety of reasons, the technocrats who dreamed in the late 
1930s and early 1940s of rationalizing worker culture had far less scope or 
capacity to enact their plans than did their counterparts in Italy and espe-
cially in Germany.6 But in addition, close study of the particular nature of 
the Mingei Association’s factory girl proposal, along with the interest it 
elicited from various government and semi-governmental groups, makes it 
possible to see that the ideas about managing worker culture put forward 
by Japanese planners in the early 1940s were in fact distinctive. In their spe-
cial emphasis on the aesthetics of a self-sufficient domestic creativity, or 
what they called seikatsu bunka, New Order officials and their collaborators 
sought to adapt fascist practices and ideals to the circumstances peculiar 
to Japan as a non-Western nation attempting to secure an Asian empire 
through total war.
The Factory Girl Proposal
For all fascist polities, folk art was useful as an impeccably indigenous aes-
thetic resource that evoked the social harmony of premodern communal 
forms. It is not surprising, therefore, that the bureaucrats who directed 
the key agencies of Japan’s New Order from 1940 regarded favorably the 
complex of mingei institutions and organizations that had developed over 
the previous decade. Both of the monthly magazines put out by the Min-
gei Association were allowed to continue publication without apparent 
interference until late 1944. Only official complaisance on the part of such 
key state organs as the Cabinet Information Bureau and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry could have ensured the survival of not one but two 
mingei magazines during a period when forced consolidations and even 
outright dissolution drastically reduced the number of periodical publica-
tions.7 Moreover, the Mingei Association grew significantly during the early 
1940s, establishing its first three regional branches in 1942 in Tōhoku, or 
northeastern Japan, with the official approval of local branches of the na-
tional Taisei Yokusankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association, or IRAA).










gested by an editorial entitled “Principles and Policies for the Establish-
ment of Regional Culture,” which appeared in early 1941 in the IRAA news-
paper. Declaring that “the correct tradition of Japanese culture exists more 
today in the regions than in the culture of the center, which has developed 
under the influence of foreign culture,” the article proposed that, properly 
developed, regional culture would form the basis of a new national and 
East Asian culture. Mingei was included as a separate category in a brief list 
of those aspects of traditional regional culture to be preserved and devel-
oped.8 It is not surprising that the association of mingei with an indigenous 
way of life in the Japanese countryside gave it special legitimacy within the 
context of escalating war and nationalism. Much in the way that folk cul-
ture and folk arts were conspicuously celebrated and promoted by official 
agencies in Italy and Germany, or in Vichy France, mingei was taken up by 
a Japanese state increasingly concerned to mobilize a national and imperial 
identity founded on blood and soil.9
 But there was another, rather different way in which it might be argued 
that mingei appealed to the renovationist bureaucrats who came to promi-
nence during the heady days of the New Order. The Japanese handicraft 
objects identified as mingei offered access to international modernity, as 
well as to the preindustrial, folkloric past of the native landscape. Indeed, 
they joined the two, much in the way that Japan’s “left fascists” hoped to 
join industrial productivity with premodern, indigenous social forms and 
ideals.10 For one thing, there were strong affinities between the mingei 
aesthetic, as developed during the 1920s and 1930s by the art critic Yanagi 
Muneyoshi and his closest associates, and that of design modernism, 
which was fast becoming an international aesthetic orthodoxy throughout 
the industrialized world. Like the founders of such classic modernist in-
stitutions as the Bauhaus art and design school (1919–33), Yanagi and his 
cohort were inspired by selected handicraft objects to insist on the unity of 
art and craft and to exalt simplicity, functionality, and artisanal community 
as the guarantees of true beauty.11 In the late 1930s, the affinities between 
mingei and modernity were lent special credence for bureaucrats in the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry by the pronouncements of modernist 
foreign experts. Both the architect Bruno Taut and, especially, the designer 
Charlotte Perriand, hired by the ministry to advise on craft production for 
export, waxed enthusiastic about the timelessly modern beauty of mingei 
and the possibilities it offered for a uniquely Japanese contribution to mod-
ern design.12














intrigued by the idea that mingei might help to expand export markets in 
the industrialized West for Japanese consumer goods.13 But finally, it was 
the activities of the Mingei Association itself that were most effective in 
persuading “managerial fascists,” during the latter’s brief ascendancy in 
the early 1940s, that mingei might have other, more practical uses in the dif-
ficult task of reconciling agrarian Japaneseness with industrial modernity.
 Beginning in late 1940, the leaders of the Mingei Association eagerly 
embraced the premise of a New Order for Japan—announced in August by 
the newly formed Konoe cabinet—as an opportunity to promote their orga-
nization and ideology and to demonstrate mingei’s relevance to Japanese 
society and culture in the broadest possible terms. The October 1940 issue 
of Gekkan mingei was devoted to the theme “The New Order and Mingei” and 
opened with a proposal for the establishment of an official organization to 
encourage regional handicrafts. This agency, in which the proposal’s au-
thors envisioned the participation of various government ministries (Agri-
culture and Forestry, Education, Commerce and Industry), was to repre-
sent an expansion and recognition of the Mingei Association’s work of the 
past decade.14 The October issue also included a long article by Yanagi titled 
“The New Order and the Question of Craft Beauty,” a discussion of German 
handicraft organizations by Graf von Dürckheim, and the first mention of 
a new project on the dormitory life of female workers at a spinning factory, 
to be the subject of a special issue of the magazine only a few months later. 
“It is just this sort of problem, of a social nature, that the true mingei move-
ment takes on,” commented the reporter.15
 Although the factory girl project was first mentioned only in October 
1940, planning by the Mingei Association leaders seems to have begun in 
the summer of that same year, possibly during meetings in July with the fac-
tory owner Ōhara Sōichirō.16 It soon eclipsed other initiatives. In early 1941, 
the special issue devoted to the project opened with a statement declaring 
that the “problem of the daily lifestyle of female laborers” represented the 
mingei movement’s first major undertaking since it had begun, the pre-
vious fall, to become a powerful new cultural movement “for the purpose 
of constructing a new cultural order, by means of actively integrating with 
aspects of present-day society.”17
 The factory girl project demonstrates very specifically how activists 
worked to demonstrate the capacity of mingei to overcome contradictions 
between the farm village and the industrial city, or premodern handicraft 
and modern machine manufacture. The project reveals, moreover, that Min-










to a significant degree in their efforts to aid in the construction of the New 
Order. Despite an earlier stance sharply critical of machine industry, mass 
production, and the lifestyle associated with these for both workers and 
consumers, for example, now even Yanagi seemed to support the idea of 
association work within the modern factory.18 Perhaps most interesting 
about the factory girl project, however, is the insight it offers into the con-
cept of “daily life culture (seikatsu bunka),” a watchword for Japanese fascist 
policymakers and ideologues in the late 1930s and early 1940s. By aestheti-
cizing the seikatsu—or the objects, architecture, gestures, and routines of 
dormitory life—for teenage girls working at a nylon-spinning factory, the 
Mingei Association proposed not only to resolve the basic contradictions 
underlying the fascist ideal of Japanese society, but to ensure the managed 
hyper-productivity that was arguably its ultimate end. “The culture of daily 
life,” in this context, became a way to suggest a beautiful, native discipline 
of maximal production and minimal consumption that would smoothly 
integrate city and country, industry and agriculture, and work and leisure, 
as well as women’s roles as wage laborers and as wives and mothers.
 The most immediate concern addressed by the association’s plan was 
that of potential conflict between “farm village culture (nōson bunka)” and 
the culture of the urban factory. The nylon-spinning plant studied by the 
association, one of several large factories owned by the Kurashiki Silk Com-
pany, was located in the city of Kurashiki, in Okayama Prefecture. A sur-
vey conducted by the association of about half of the approximately 900 
girls and women working at the plant (out of a total worker population of 
over 2,000 in 1940) revealed the unsurprising fact that the vast majority—
about 85 percent—came from farming households in rural villages.19 The 
association stressed the importance of its finding that well over half of the 
359 female workers who had left the factory had done so to return to life 
in farming villages.20 One goal of the proposed reform of dormitory life, 
therefore, was to reduce the presumed shock of the factory girls’ re-entry 
into small-village farming life.21 This was only part of a larger, related prob-
lem, however. The opening statement published in the special issue of Gek-
kan mingei devoted to the factory project noted that a national initiative was 
under way to disperse urban factories to rural locations, and that “even now 
we can see the great and intractable confusion to lifestyles that will occur 
in future. . . . Indeed, it is our urgent duty to plan for the contact between 
modern factory culture and traditional farm village culture, and to establish 
a path for their integrated development.”22














integration. The dormitory planned by the Mingei Association, and hand-
somely illustrated in Gekkan mingei by Serizawa Keisuke’s woodblock prints, 
was modeled on the Okayama farmhouse, or minka. In what was claimed to 
be the characteristic Okayama style, the building was to be one story, with a 
gabled roof, and it was to be surrounded by a well-tended hedge “such as is 
often seen in Okayama Prefecture.” Inside, the dormitory—scaled to house 
approximately ten workers at a time—was to be organized around two cen-
tral rooms: a main common room, or hiroma, immediately accessible from 
the earth-floored entrance, and a combined kitchen and dining room. The 
rest of the plan was composed of two sleeping rooms for the workers, the 
matron’s room, a guest room, and a bathroom. Most of these, except for the 
kitchen and dining room, which was envisioned with a wooden floor, were 
to be tatami (mat-floored) rooms (the tatami of Okayama manufacture).23
 By building the dormitory in farmhouse style, and by furnishing it with 
a broad assortment of mingei objects—from the cushions the girls were 
to sit on, to the bowls and plates they used at mealtime, to the altar shelf 
(kamidana) in the main room—the association planners expected to instill 
in workers an appreciation of the “culture of daily life” of rural Japan gen-
erally, and of their own, specific farm villages in particular. As they put it, 
“The family-style dormitory (katei ryō) we have planned chooses its furni-
ture and fittings, as well as utensils and other small items, from the mingei 
now extant in the various regions of Japan. We want thus to establish the 
facilities and the guidance that will give female workers, when they return 
to their villages and begin their lives there, the knowledge that will enable 
them to identify the things of their own village comparatively with respect 
to the mingei of other Japanese regions, and also so that they themselves 
understand the value of the culture of daily life in their own village.”24 It is 
worth noting here that the mingei from “other Japanese regions” included 
stencil-dyed cloth (bingata) from Okinawa, which was to cover cushions in 
the matron’s room; Korean flooring (ondoru) paper for the sliding doors 
of the guest room; and various other items in the “Korean style.”25 Thus, 
a reformed culture of daily life might serve to integrate not only farm and 
factory, but also colony (or semi-colony) and metropole.
 But the mingei aesthetic was to shape not only the housing and furniture 
of the female workers’ after-work lives, but also the way they passed their 
time. The reformed “culture of daily life” imagined by association planners 
would integrate not merely the material culture of the Japanese periphery 
into its metropolitan center, but also the rhythms of rural productivity into 










disapproval that the many girls at the Kurashiki plant who chose to spend 
some of their earnings and leisure time on needlework tended to favor 
French-style embroidery. And yet, the authors of the initial report pointed 
out, there still existed in Japanese farm villages a beautiful style of em-
broidery known as sashiko, which had developed as a means of reinforcing 
clothing. The implication was that somehow factory girls could and should 
be induced to take pleasure in the useful native art of sashiko rather than in 
foreign furbelows.26
 By offering to replace decadent, consumerist, Westernized tastes and 
habits with an active appreciation for the homely arts of rural Japan, the 
Mingei Association’s proposal advertised the disciplinary and educational 
as well as integrative potential of mingei. Not only would workers be pro-
tected by reformed dormitory life from the urban and foreign influences 
that boded ill for their reacclimation to the village, but mingei would train 
them to become more useful, productive farmwives. By learning how to 
mend and strengthen work clothes in an austere if attractive indigenous 
style, for example, factory girls would develop a skill that enhanced farm 
productivity, rather than one that diverted them (as well as scarce cash re-
sources) with colored silks and urban fancies. Similarly, the authors of the 
proposal bemoaned the common practice of attracting rural workers to 
factories by promising such urban amenities as Western-style dormitories 
and after-hours cooking classes in kitchens equipped with gas lines and 
electric burners.27 By contrast, the reformed dormitory would serve as a 
rustic classroom where factory girls would learn how to perform house-
hold chores—cooking, cleaning, and so on—in a manner and setting more 
appropriate to their final destinations. Along the same lines, the dormitory 
grounds were to include facilities for kitchen gardening and animal hus-
bandry: a vegetable garden, a chicken coop, and a pig sty. Female workers 
would receive training at these sites in the “subsidiary industries ( fukugyō)” 
appropriate to the farm household and increasing its self-sufficiency.28
 Yet there was a certain ambiguity about the ends to which after-hours 
training was to be put. Was it only after leaving the factory, back on the 
farm, that mingei-inspired discipline and productivity would be useful? 
The culture of daily life promoted by mingei reformers is notable for a de-
gree of surveillance and bodily discipline that, while meant to suggest the 
orderly harmony of the preindustrial household, has somewhat more dys-
topic implications within the context of what was, after all, an industrial 
labor camp. Tanaka Toshio, a young journalist and textile researcher who 














1930s, was one of the chief planners of the factory project and the probable 
author of the initial report. In it, and in the roundtable discussion (zadankai) 
published in Gekkan mingei, he expressed concern that those female workers 
who lived in company dormitories—by far the majority at the Kurashiki 
plant—ordinarily spent as many as four hours a day as they pleased, with-
out guidance or observation. He imagined that, by contrast, the minority of 
female workers who commuted to the factory were never left to their own 
devices when at home. Instead, “as soon as they return home and open the 
door, they are monitored in the way they open and close the door, in the 
way they take their coats off, in how they make their greetings, how they 
put down their parcels, how they sit, how they stand up, and in such ways 
an entire training in daily lifestyle occurs.”29 This was the sort of training 
that ought to occur, Tanaka asserted, in the reformed, mingei dormitory. 
“If a girl were at home, then for example to take a teacup, her parent might 
talk during mealtime about where the teacup was made, or teach her about 
whether it was good or bad. Or she would be taught how to hold the tea-
cup, and how to eat, and further how to wash and dry it after the meal, and 
how to put it away. And then after eating, if she was sprawling about (neso-
bette ireba), she might be reprimanded, and even warned about opening and 
shutting doors. Well, I think this is the kind of education in living that is 
missing in factory dormitories at present, and that would be conducted at 
the family-style dormitory.”30
 It is unclear whether or not Tanaka was interested in the obvious advan-
tages to factory managers and owners of a workforce under the constant, 
paternalistic surveillance he admired. But other Mingei Association mem-
bers were readier to acknowledge the relation between reforms they pro-
posed and enhanced factory productivity. Shikiba Ryūzaburō, for example, 
the editor of Gekkan mingei, wrote up for the special issue the results of an 
elaborate questionnaire on daily life he and another leading association 
member had composed and distributed among 362 female workers at the 
Kurashiki plant in January 1941. In his commentary on the section of the 
questionnaire dealing with music, Shikiba suggested that radio music and 
songs might be used in the factory to increase productivity. Noting that 
“Germany and other ‘musical nations’ are skillfully making use of indus-
trial music,” Shikiba wrote, “I think it would be good if at this factory as 
well, songs were selected appropriate to the various work stations, and 
[workers] were made to sing them or listen to them while working.”31
 Shikiba’s questionnaire also included a section dealing with the topics 










sumed under these categories, and particularly Shikiba’s discussion of 
them, suggest that at least some of the association planners also sought 
to address one of the most difficult conflicts inherent in the fascist social 
model. Female factory workers were a particular node of anxiety in New 
Order Japan, as they were in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, because of the 
threat they posed to a social ideology that claimed to value women first and 
foremost as a means of social and racial reproduction. Women, in short, 
were to be wives and mothers in the home, not laborers in the factory. Yet 
female labor was increasingly indispensable to industrial productivity, par-
ticularly in the context of total war and the military mobilization of ever 
growing numbers of men.32
 The mingei proposals for dormitory reform, with their explicit intention 
of training the factory girl for a contented and productive life in a farm-
ing household, downplayed the contradiction by emphasizing the relative 
brevity (about five years) of the average factory girl’s term of employment 
and the near inevitability of her fate as a village bride.33 Nevertheless, Shi-
kiba’s questionnaire reveals worry about the possibility that the industrial 
labor experience might compromise the smooth fulfillment of feminine 
destiny as wife and mother. For example, he commented on the (alleged) 
paucity of the girls’ experience of romantic love and their inability or un-
willingness to describe an ideal marriage partner.34 Shikiba blamed these 
responses, which he believed to reveal the belated development of passion 
(aijō), on the infrequency with which factory girls watched movies and on 
the rigid segregation of the sexes imposed by factory dormitory regula-
tions. While he conceded the importance of guarding against “immorality,” 
he insisted on the need for some education in sex and a “proper love life.” 
As he put it, “At present, when early marriages are being encouraged, an 
environment that is overly indifferent to romantic love and marriage is not 
good.”35 There was further, if implied, criticism of the factory experience in 
Shikiba’s discussion of menstruation. An active and well-known psychia-
trist specializing in gynecology, Shikiba wrote with authority on the sub-
ject. “Most of the young girls at this factory [first menstruate] at the age of 
sixteen, and this is close enough to the Japanese average. But it is dreadful 
that as many as twenty-two are so delayed as not yet [to be menstruating] 
at the age of seventeen, nor even at eighteen, nineteen, and twenty, and this 
is something that must be attended to (chūi seneba naranai).”36
 Perhaps Shikiba’s attention to what he considered the low level of factory 
girls’ interest in their own appearance should be understood in this context 














tion of the questionnaire, which dealt with the issue of clothing, Shikiba 
deplored the fact that the majority of respondents (sixty-six) expressed a 
lack of desire for any particular dress. He wrote, “As a rule, for women there 
is no such thing as too many dresses. Especially for young women. How sad 
this lack of desire is, then! . . . A diminished interest in clothing is certainly 
not a good thing.”37 Elsewhere, in commenting on responses to questions 
about the purchase and use of cosmetics, Shikiba expressed similar worry 
about what he perceived as an unusual lack of interest in makeup. The solu-
tion, he opined, was to educate workers on the nature of simple yet femi-
nine beauty. He concluded, “It is important that [workers] be plain and yet 
that they not be permitted to lose their womanly flavor (onnarashii nioi).”38
 Some of the education Shikiba called for to remedy the inadequate femi-
ninity of factory workers was to be provided in the context of classroom 
instruction. At the Kurashiki factory, workers were supposed to spend an 
hour most evenings in shōnen gakkō (youth school). It may be presumed, 
however, that like other mingei planners, he expected life in the family-
style dormitory, with its watchful matron, carefully chosen furnishings, and 
round of homely farmhouse chores, to give workers a much more pervasive 
educational experience. The simple beauty of a reformed culture of daily 
life would teach workers femininity as well as discipline and productivity, 
thereby helping to ensure the reconciliation of their labor function with 
biological function. Shikiba wrote with approval of the sight of workers 
after they had returned to the dormitory at the end of the workday and had 
changed out of their Western-style uniforms and into “colorful” kimono. 
As he put it, “At last their femininity comes forth, giving the viewer a sense 
of relief.” He added, in conclusion, “The rooms and the uniforms are too 
colorless, too cold. Shouldn’t there be more color in the life of young 
women?”39
 By proposing to aestheticize the “daily life,” or life before and after the 
factory shift, of female industrial workers, Mingei Association leaders 
hoped to demonstrate the broadly useful potential of mingei in New Order 
Japan. They worked to show that the mingei aesthetic, far from being the 
plaything of urbane antiquarian dilettantes, was an authentically indige-
nous tool that might serve to help integrate, manage, and finally increase 
factory production, farm production, and social reproduction. Even if the 
factory reforms were never realized, therefore, they might be said to have 
served their true purpose after all. By helping to publicize a gritty, activist, 
even industrial image of the Mingei Association and its mission, the factory 










context of national crisis. Certainly the increasing tempo of collaboration 
in 1941 between the Mingei Association leadership and various official and 
semiofficial agencies was at least in part a direct outcome of the project. 
Several months after the special factory girl issue of Gekkan mingei came out, 
for example, a roundtable discussion was held at the Mingeikan (Mingei 
Museum) in Tokyo, with official participants from the Information Office, 
the Culture Section of the IRAA, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 
and the Sangyō Hōkoku Kai (Industrial Patriotic Organization). Most of 
the discussion revolved around the possibility that the mingei organization 
might aid the state in helping to design worker housing and, more gen-
erally, a new lifestyle for factory laborers.40 Two more roundtable discus-
sions on worker housing and culture were sponsored by the Mingei Asso-
ciation during the summer of 1941; government officials were conspicuous 
at both.41
Fascist Leisure, East and West
For some decades, European and especially North American scholars have 
persisted in dismissing the idea of a Japanese fascism. While the main-
stream of postwar Japanese historiography in Japan has generally operated 
on the assumption that the central structures as well as ideology of rule in 
wartime Japan were recognizably fascist, the North American scholarship 
that dominates postwar Japanese studies outside Japan has tended to pro-
ceed instead from the conclusion that Japanese “militarism” or “ultrana-
tionalism” produced a form of government fundamentally different from 
the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany.42 Yet as Andrew Gordon has 
pointed out, many of the Western critics who reject the fascist label for 
Japan are vulnerable to charges of “an implicit Eurocentrism and an explicit 
nominalism”; they rely on European cases, usually Germany, to generate a 
list of characteristics indispensable for “fascism.” To the extent, then, that 
Japan lacks such features as a charismatic dictator, takeover by a mass fas-
cist party, or genocidal domestic policies, it is said to be disqualified from 
fascist status.43 However, as Gordon has argued persuasively, despite clear 
differences “we can find similarities in the historical contexts to the rise of 
fascist systems in Italy, Germany, and Japan, the ascendant ideas that justi-
fied the new order in each society, and the programs that resulted.”44
 Recently, Japanese historians have begun to study one particular set of 














that may be argued to provide another link between the Japanese wartime 
system and the fascist polities of continental Europe.45 The Mingei Associa-
tion’s factory girl project, along with the discussions and proposals about 
worker housing and worker culture to which it gave rise, gives further evi-
dence of both official and nongovernmental interest in a specifically fascist 
resolution to what had come to be seen throughout much of the industrial-
ized world as the “problem of worker leisure.”
 By the 1930s, a variety of movements had emerged in the United States 
and western Europe to organize and manage the leisure time created by 
the widespread adoption of the forty-eight-hour work week. However, only 
in Mussolini’s Italy, and later in Germany and other European right-wing 
dictatorships, was the effort to manage leisure first initiated, and then 
largely controlled, by the state through large agencies designated for that 
purpose.46 Fascist Italy and Germany, in particular, pioneered efforts to en-
hance productivity by means of national, state-directed institutions dedi-
cated to the authoritarian organization of mass leisure.47 As Takaoka Hiro-
yuki has pointed out in his study of managed recreation in Japan, it was the 
European fascist model that would become particularly influential in Japan 
from the late 1930s.48
 Beginning in 1938, the hodgepodge of recreational organizations and 
movements that had already emerged in some of Japan’s larger cities and 
industrial plants—hiking clubs, the youth hostel movement, factory sports 
programs, and so on—were brought together under the Nihon Kōsei 
Kyōkai (Japan Recreation Association), which had been created by the 
newly established Kōseishō (Welfare Ministry).49 The initial impetus driv-
ing the formation of the Japan Recreation Association (and, arguably, the 
Welfare Ministry itself ) was alarm within the military about the poor physi-
cal condition of the nation’s conscriptable youth and the need to combat—
largely through exercise and outdoor activities—what was perceived as the 
particularly deleterious effects of city life and factory work on Japan’s war 
effort in China. As the conflict in China escalated into the all-consuming 
total war of the late 1930s and early 1940s, however, the Japan Recreation 
Association, along with several other state-directed agencies, became con-
cerned not only with the physical health of military recruits, but also with 
the larger goal of managing and systematizing leisure throughout Japanese 
society. There was special worry in the late 1930s about the need to curb 
excess consumption and frivolity on the part of urban workers, who were 










considered an “unhealthy” consumer culture in the cities, and there was 
special interest in the possibilities offered by emulation of the Italian and 
German examples.50
 Yet the discussions of worker housing and culture organized by the Min-
gei Association in 1941 illustrate some of the problems as well as the attrac-
tions associated with the effort to rationalize factory leisure according to 
established, Western models. One difficulty concerned the content of the 
various entertainments and activities commonly used to divert workers and 
to raise their morale. The Italian and German programs for worker recre-
ation prominently featured modern, even American-style, forms of mass 
entertainment, such as movies, jazz revues, and tourism. Japanese efforts 
to improve worker morale and productivity—both the earlier initiatives in 
individual plants, as well as the later, more coordinated programs directed 
by semiofficial agencies—also relied heavily on traveling theatricals and re-
vues, movies, and other types of modern mass entertainment. Participants 
in the mingei roundtables worried, however, about the impact of such ma-
terials on workers, many of whom were presumably impressionable teen-
agers from rural villages. Tanaka Toshio, one of the chief planners of the 
Kurashiki dormitory, complained of the practice of having cabaret-style 
revues performed at provincial factories: “I heard of one nylon-spinning 
plant where they brought in a group from the Takarazuka. The result was 
that the workers decided to put on their own theatrical, [singing] in strange 
voices and performing an imitation revue. They’ve stopped this, and I do 
think that theatrical groups are a very good thing, but isn’t there also a 
danger?”51 Or, as Yamamoto Shōzō, a representative from the Japan Tech-
nological Education Association, put it: “when you suddenly bring into the 
dull existence of the factory dormitory a bunch of pretty girls to perform 
a revue, then doesn’t that factory life become even more unbearable [to 
workers]? I think it’s very dangerous simply to give them entertainment 
culture (goraku nari bunka), and especially strange, urban culture.”52
 One of the highest-ranking government bureaucrats present at the 
roundtables was Kamiizumi Hidenobu, the assistant director of the Culture 
Section of the IRAA. He concurred with the criticism of the entertainment 
approach to worker recreation, noting that “officials in the Welfare Minis-
try” see only the immediate gains in productivity that seem to result from 
giving workers entertainment. “But I think that we will pay for it in two or 
three years, or in five years, or ten,” he said. “They don’t consider this and 
use these methods to ensure labor power in the moment. We must revise 














sequence of the entertainment approach was simply to increase workers’ 
desire for escapist leisure.53
 Kamiizumi’s comments reveal a more fundamental dissatisfaction with 
the very premise of a separation or opposition between work and leisure. 
Not only were conventional factory-sponsored diversions disturbingly 
exotic and decadent, but they encouraged workers to find labor hard and 
dull. In other words, not only was the usual sort of organized worker recre-
ation alien, but it was alienating. Kamiizumi noted that until recently, the 
Culture Section of the IRAA had been preoccupied with the rural culture 
of farming people and had only just come to recognize that the culture of 
factory workers needed to be considered on a separate basis. His charac-
terization of the difference between farm and factory work is revealing: 
“People in factories think that they work in order to conduct their daily lives 
(seikatsu), that they work in order to eat, and that their work in no way enters 
into their daily lives. But people in farm villages consider their own work 
to be a pleasure. That is very different from factory workers. People who 
work in factories and mines do not think that way. . . . I believe that work 
must be integrated within daily life.”54 Unlike farming, industrial labor was 
somehow conducive to a fragmenting of life experience. As a result, fac-
tory workers found themselves leading an existence divided between labor, 
on the one hand, and “daily life”—or the hours before and after the work 
shift—on the other. The goal, Kamiizumi suggested, was to find a way to 
reintegrate work and leisure for factory laborers in a manner comparable to 
that of farm workers.
 Kamiizumi’s views reflected the position on “work culture (dōrō bunka)” 
associated more generally with the IRAA and the Cabinet Information 
Office, as distinct from the Welfare Ministry’s Japan Recreation Association 
or the Recreation Section of the Industrial Patriotic Organization. While 
the latter agencies, which had undertaken to organize and direct worker 
leisure since the late 1930s, tended to define an appropriate work culture 
in terms of ordinary forms of recreation and relaxation, the more radical, 
“renovationist” vision promoted by officials in the Information Office and 
the IRAA during the early 1940s was of a new, “healthy” culture actively 
created by workers themselves in a manner that would integrate and “clar-
ify” their daily lives. Takaoka Hiroyuki has shown that the latter view came 
to prevail in the early 1940s, replacing the previous emphasis on recreation 
with a new campaign to have cultural “specialists” guide factory workers in 
the spontaneous creation of new types of music, theater, or literature that 










 In one sense, the objections to the recreational approach to worker 
leisure, and to the opposition between work and daily life apparently pro-
moted thereby, represented an impulse to break away from the Western, 
specifically Italian and German models of leisure management. Yet it is also 
true that the ideal of integrating work and leisure within a more organically 
unified daily life was very much a part of the National Socialist program for 
industrial labor in Germany. Indeed, as Shelley Baranowski points out, the 
directors of Strength through Joy criticized the Italian program of worker 
recreation for seeking only to manage workers’ time off the shop floor, and 
they insisted that “leisure unconnected with work would result in mindless 
entertainment rather than the ‘elevation of personality.’”56 It was precisely 
to demonstrate Strength through Joy’s commitment to the integrated whole 
of workers’ lives that the organization showcased a Beauty of Labor office, 
which was dedicated to aestheticizing the work experience itself through 
improvements in plant architecture and layout, the provision of specially 
designed furniture and decorations for canteens and recreation rooms, the 
organizing of cultural events for work breaks, and so on.57
 It is clear that many of the Japanese who occupied themselves with the 
question of a properly managed worker culture were favorably impressed 
by the efforts of Strength through Joy, and particularly of Beauty of Labor. 
Admiring references to the German example, and specifically to Beauty of 
Labor projects, were scattered throughout the discussions sponsored by 
the Mingei Association. Taniguchi Kichirō of the Tokyo Industrial College, 
for example, spoke at enthusiastic length about the model barracks con-
structed in 1934 by Beauty of Labor for construction workers on the Auto-
bahn, or national highway system. Apparently, Taniguchi had toured the 
barracks during a visit to Germany; he dwelled on the hygiene and recre-
ational facilities provided and noted with approval that workers marched in 
lines from recreation hall to canteen, “singing songs and beating a drum.” 
He concluded, “I think they are giving workers a degree of guidance in their 
daily lives that is extremely rational, culturally.”58 At another roundtable, 
there was animated discussion of the desirability of the joy in work that one 
speaker insisted was experienced by German workers at a machine com-
pany.59
 And yet the Kurashiki dormitory proposal and the discussions hosted by 
the Mingei Association suggest that, even as Japanese embraced the ideal 
of a managed leisure that was somehow seamlessly integrated with work, 
and that might produce the sort of regimented, communitarian joy prized 














ferent model of integration. For some Japanese planners, the emphasis 
seemed to fall less on the effort to aestheticize the industrial work experi-
ence than on the notion of a more beautifully productive daily life, by which 
they meant the space and time occupied by laborers when they were not at 
their workstations. Rather than seeking to integrate leisure or recreation 
into work, in other words, they sought to integrate productive work into 
leisure. Thus, for example, Mingei Association leaders and their supporters 
were primarily interested in the possibility of “guiding” a new worker cul-
ture through the design and furnishing of worker housing, whether dormi-
tories for single men and women or individual homes for families.60
 The preference among at least some Japanese for a means of managing 
workers that focused less on the factory and more on the home may help to 
explain why Japan never saw the full development of anything like Strength 
through Joy or the Italian National Organization of Afterwork. Recent re-
search has shown that the Japan Recreation Association attached to the 
Welfare Ministry, along with the Recreation Section of the Industrial Patri-
otic Organization, were larger and more effective in their efforts—which 
were often explicitly modeled on the Italian and, especially, the German ex-
amples—than has previously been acknowledged. Nevertheless it remains 
true that the Japanese agencies committed to managing “work culture” re-
ceived little direct state support and never achieved anything approaching 
the scale and influence of their European counterparts.61
 A variety of factors contributed to the failure or unwillingness of Japa-
nese policymakers to rationalize worker leisure in the manner of the Euro-
pean fascist regimes. The political philosopher Maruyama Masao has ar-
gued in a classic essay that the relative absence in Japan of anything like 
Strength through Joy revealed the much greater influence of agrarianism 
in Japanese fascism and the comparative weakness in Japan of the “demo-
cratic movement” and the proletariat “prior to the fascist structure.” It was 
also connected, as Maruyama noted, to the lesser degree of capital accumu-
lation in Japan.62 Moreover, it seems likely that opposition from private in-
dustry to any significant interference with labor management was too great 
for the state bureaucracy to overcome.63 In the roundtable transcript pub-
lished in the special issue of Gekkan mingei on factory girls, Ōhara Sōichirō, 
owner of the Kurashiki spinning factory, expressed his own objections to 
the German and Italian models quite forcefully. Arguing that the European 
systems entrusted all welfare and recreation functions to state agencies, 
thereby leaving the individual company and its managers little responsi-










“Isn’t it the case that if all recreation functions are left to some agency, then 
the true, integrated, cultural mission of the company as a social being will 
be impossible?” Ōhara went on to argue that the nature of the leisure activi-
ties promoted in “foreign countries,” which involved individual workers’ 
leaving the company to “travel, or go to the theater, or engage in sports,” 
was inappropriate for Japan, whose “special circumstances” included the 
accommodation of the great majority of female workers, especially, in fac-
tory dormitories.64
 But another possibility suggested by the mingei dormitory project, and 
the discussions about worker culture and housing to which it led, is that the 
rationalization of leisure in New Order Japan was not so much thwarted or 
neglected as it was pursued somewhat differently, by means of an empha-
sis on the beauty of a daily life culture that, while authentically native and 
non-Western, was as regulated and productive as modern, industrial labor. 
The German historian Anson G. Rabinbach has written that the histori-
cal function of Nazism “was to exorcize the traditional patterns of culture 
which conflicted with modern modes of production.”65 Rabinbach studied 
the Beauty of Labor office to show that, during the late 1930s, a cult of 
productivity and efficiency eclipsed an earlier emphasis on pre-industrial, 
völkisch forms and modes to give mature Nazi ideology and culture a dis-
tinctively modernist cast. In Japan, however, preindustrial folk forms and 
modes were not so much eclipsed as they were transfigured, to create a 
culture of daily life that was both non-Western and modern in its managed 
productivity. Faced with the challenge of mobilizing an only partially indus-
trialized economy, and by the ambivalent associations of modern industry 
with the racist West, Japanese fascists made a virtue—or, rather, a beauty—
of necessity.
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Mediating the Masses:  
Yanagi Sōetsu and Fascism
In 1944, Yanagi Sōetsu (also known as Yanagi Muneyoshi), 
founder of the Japanese Folk-Craft Movement, wrapped up an essay sum-
marizing his organization’s achievements with a solemn reminder that 
“aesthetic questions are not simply about beauty.”1 While Yanagi was simply 
reiterating an argument he often made that aesthetics and spirituality were 
inseparable, his observation also serves as an occasion to set his writings in 
relation to larger historical currents. Yet the essay “Mingei undō wa nani o 
kiyo shita ka? (What Has the Folk Craft Movement Contributed?)” presents 
a curious dilemma when we try to fix it within its historical context. Writ-
ten in 1944 but first published in 1946, the production of the essay spanned 
what was arguably the deepest rupture in modern Japanese historical con-
sciousness. Read as a relic of 1944, the essay clearly supports such aspects 
of the wartime government’s ideological dictates as anti-individualism: “I 
am one who sees greater depth in the beauty of the public (kō/ooyake than in 
the beauty of the individual (ko).”2 Read as an artifact of the era of American 
occupation, Yanagi’s claims made on behalf of crafts appear very postwar 






















(minshū) are regarded as banal (bon’yō) . . . but we see a positive beauty 
within those thus abandoned.”3
 This is not a problem confined to just the one essay. Many of Yanagi’s 
writings uneasily shift shape under this kind of double vision, aspects of 
Yanagi’s discourse lending themselves equally to interpretation as liberal-
leaning and humanist or as fascistic in tendency. Moreover, this slippery 
quality was far from being Yanagi’s personal idiosyncrasy.4 Such discursive 
ambiguities suggest points of articulation between mid-twentieth-century 
humanist and fascist discourses that made slipping from one to the other 
all too easy for many Japanese intellectuals at the time.
 The body of this paper will closely examine a number of Yanagi’s essays, 
including “What Has the Folk Craft Movement Contributed?” in Tami to bi 
(The People and Beauty). Completed in 1944 but published as a whole in 
1948, the collection is a historical curiosity in terms of its publishing his-
tory yet quite in line with the general thrust of Yanagi’s theoretical writings. 
A couple of points emerge from this reading. First, while Yanagi’s writ-
ings have generally been perceived as humanist, often of a romantic cast 
but with liberal moments, striking similarities exist between his folk-craft 
discourse and fascistic aesthetics of the wartime era. Second, Yanagi’s dis-
cursive strategies were organized by a particular consciousness of the im-
portance of the “masses” in the modern world, a group he sought to “rep-
resent” in an aesthetic and, broadly speaking, political sense. This form of 
discursive mediating agency constituted a bridge between a kind of reform-
oriented humanism and fascism in the historical context of Japan in the 
1930s and 1940s.
Yanagi as Cosmopolitan and Humanist
Yanagi Sōetsu (1889–1961) was a prolific writer, avid collector, and re-
spected educator who founded a folk-craft movement in the early twentieth 
century, inspired in part by the earlier Arts and Crafts Movement of Great 
Britain led by John Ruskin and William Morris.5 Not only did Yanagi coin the 
term mingei (folk crafts, an abbreviation for minshūteki kōgei, or “handicrafts 
of a popular character”), which has long since entered into common par-
lance, but his Japan Folk-Craft Museum is well frequented by both Japanese 
and international visitors today. Though not an artist or craftsman himself, 
he was instrumental in promoting the careers of several important figures 










(1895–1984) and the potter Hamada Shōji (1894–1978), both of whom were 
designated Living National Treasures in the postwar era. Particularly noted 
by friends and followers for his discernment or “seeing eye,”6 Yanagi was 
eulogized by Hamada this way:
Critics, in general, may be divided into those who collect, and who get 
bogged down in collecting, and those who split hairs of aesthetics. 
Yanagi escaped both pitfalls. He employed no intellectual foot-rule. His 
was an immediate and intuitive faculty of an extraordinary kind.7
As this quote suggests, Yanagi has generally been portrayed as free from 
rigid ideology, political or otherwise. Equally well versed in Asian and Euro-
pean thought, his dogmatism appeared to lie only in his efforts to win rec-
ognition within the aesthetic canon for humble objects embedded in the 
daily life of ordinary people.
 To provide some basis for understanding Yanagi’s enduring reputation, I 
will provide a brief biographical sketch of Yanagi’s background and career.8 
From a Tokugawa merchant class background, Yanagi’s father rose to the 
rank of rear admiral in the Navy of the Meiji period (1868–1912) through 
his research into Japanese and Western-style applied mathematics. Yanagi 
himself was educated at the elite training grounds of the Gakushūin and 
Tokyo Imperial University. While at school, Yanagi joined with Mushanokōji 
Saneatsu (1885–1976), Shiga Naoya (1883–1971), and other future literary 
lights to publish the journal Shirakaba (White Birch), which introduced the 
latest in modern Western art, literature, and philosophy to a Japanese read-
ership. After graduation, Yanagi made his living in the private sector by 
teaching topics ranging from English literature to Buddhist aesthetics at 
a number of academic institutions, including Meiji and Dōshisha universi-
ties. He also published numerous essays and books on philosophy, religion, 
and aesthetics, such as Bureiku to Hoittoman (Blake and Whitman).
 In 1916, Yanagi was introduced by a friend to Yi Dynasty Korean ceram-
ics. This led to nearly a decade of intense engagement with Korean crafts, 
involving annual trips to the peninsula and the eventual establishment of a 
museum in Seoul. Based on this close contact, Yanagi was moved to express 
direct criticism of the Japanese government after it brutally crushed the 
Korean independence movement in 1919 in what is one of his best-known 
pieces, “Chōsenjin o omou (Regarding the Koreans).”9 Yanagi’s deep love 
for Korean crafts initiated his general turn toward the East: until the end 













throughout Japan and the rest of Asia. By the late 1920s, he had established 
a terminology and set of principles for advocating folk crafts. By the late 
1930s, a genuine movement was picking up steam, with membership and 
donation rolls, two journals in publication, numerous exhibits held in de-
partment stores and other similarly prestigious venues, a museum that 
opened its doors in 1936, and invitations for Yanagi to lecture on Japanese 
aesthetics not only within Japan but also abroad—most notably, at Harvard 
University and the University of Hawai’i. He was also invited to talk in Oki-
nawa, which soon became a cultural mecca for members in the Folk-Craft 
Movement. During one of his trips there, Yanagi again challenged govern-
ment authority by criticizing the draconian measures taken in Okinawa to 
make local inhabitants speak “standard” Japanese rather than their native 
“dialect.”10
 His early immersion in the study of various cultures and his extensive 
travels marked Yanagi as thoroughly cosmopolitan, more so than many can 
claim even in this current age of “globalization.” He also demanded respect 
as one willing to criticize the state precisely at a time when the risk for such 
actions was becoming greater and greater. He was not a radical, however. 
While the police kept a close eye on Yanagi during the wartime years, he 
was never sent to jail. In the words of his biographer, Mizuo Hiroshi, Yanagi 
pursued a more subtle path: “he sought to correct the mistaken direction 
of the times with beauty, by protecting regional culture and handicrafts.”11 
The end of the war meant the end of an old order, while the arrival of the 
American occupiers suggested sweeping changes on the horizon. Despite 
the general atmosphere of uncertainty, Yanagi and the Folk-Craft Movement 
hit the ground running. Yanagi was invited in 1946 to become a member of a 
joint American and Japanese education committee, where he gave a talk on 
“Handicrafts in Japan.” He continued to travel frequently within Japan; his 
publishing, if anything, picked up pace; and from 1952 to 1953, he served 
as a cultural ambassador to Europe for the Mainichi newspaper.
 If we round out Yanagi’s biography with an examination of his written 
work, we find ample evidence of not only his cosmopolitanism, but also 
of his humanism. While humanism is, of course, a term both familiar and 
vague, its roots stretch back to the European Renaissance, and it tends 
to be loosely associated with such social attributes as pluralism and such 
political formations as liberal democracy.12 One succinct (if somewhat a-
historical and partisan) definition is offered by Tzvetan Todorov: “the three 










for all members of the species; the elevation of the particular human being 
other than me as the ultimate goal of my action; finally, the preference for 
the act freely chosen over one performed under constraint.”13
 A quick glance at “Chihōsei no bunkateki kachi (The Cultural Value 
of Regionality),” another selection from The People and Beauty, provides a 
number of humanistic statements in this vein. In that essay, Yanagi both 
acknowledges the unevenness of modern development separating urban 
from rural areas and demands that the countryside be accorded equal re-
spect to, if not greater respect than, the cities: “cities advance with great 
speed. But we must admit upon reflection that there are many points in 
which the cities lag behind the regions, which have much to contribute to 
the healthy development of culture.”14 Yanagi insists that we not misrecog-
nize mere change as essential progress, comparing the latest in women’s 
fashion on parade at the city center of Ginza most unfavorably to the work 
clothes of the women of “backward” and impoverished Okinawa. Yanagi, in 
the same vein, further reiterates his criticism of the Japanese state’s policy 
to stamp out native speech patterns: “our position is that, along with the 
encouragement of standard language, the value of Okinawan speech must 
also be respected.”15 Yanagi suggests that Okinawans not only have a right 
to freely choose how they speak, but that Japanese as a whole benefit from 
the existence of such differences. As for Yanagi’s desire to contribute to 
the betterment of his fellow human beings, it is not hard to read his hopes 
from such statements as the following: “we whose hearts are attracted to 
regional crafts are necessarily drawn to ponder their aesthetic value. Ac-
cordingly, we must inquire into the social and ethical qualities that give 
birth to this kind of beauty, digging deep into the very essence of that life-
style.”16 Promoting folk crafts, for Yanagi, was not just about urging the 
production and purchase of pretty objects. It was about spreading the mes-
sage of a beautiful—in a visual sense, but also in an emotional, ethical, and 
even economic sense—way of life for all people, everywhere.
A Slippery Slope
However, another reading of Yanagi’s writings is possible. Indeed, not only 
is it possible, but it is critically important to pursue this rereading to begin 
thinking about the conditions of prewar and wartime Japan that made it 
possible for a broad range of intellectuals to contribute, consciously or not, 
to the “fascistic” tendencies of the era. While various scholars argue that, 













opments in early-twentieth-century Europe, Harry Harootunian points out 
that, taken to an extreme, such cautiousness “permits the easy presump-
tion that what has been taken as fascism was mistaken for something else, 
that its historically specific appearance means it could not have occurred 
elsewhere and that it will not recur again (unintentionally reinforcing the 
exceptionalist claims fascisms usually employ to explain the superiority of 
their own agendas).”17 In this spirit, I will explore certain congruences be-
tween Yanagi’s theories and fascist currents of the day as a means of ap-
proaching the larger question of the “slippery slope” that can take one from 
respectable to unacceptable ideological formations.
 Without replaying the entirety of ongoing debates regarding the defini-
tion of fascism and its application to prewar and wartime Japan, I will draw 
out a few points germane to a potential reassessment of Yanagi’s work. 
Based on his magisterial review of literature on the subject, Stanley Payne 
provides the following definition of fascism as a historical movement:
Above all, fascism was the most revolutionary form of nationalism in 
Europe to that point in history, and it was characterized by its culture of 
idealism, willpower, vitalism, and mysticism and its moralistic concept 
of therapeutic violence, strongly identified with military values, outward 
aggressiveness, and empire.18
Style was particularly important to fascist movements, which “went beyond 
spectacle toward the creation of a normative aesthetics . . . to create a ‘poli-
tics of beauty’ and a new visual framework for public life.”19 According 
to George Mosse, fascists themselves “described their political thought as 
an ‘attitude’ rather than a system,” paying far more attention to the visual 
than the philosophical coherence of the movement.20 In this way, the con-
fused and often contradictory tenets of fascism were welded together with a 
powerful aesthetic aimed at binding the masses into a national body. Above 
all, the beauty of organic harmony—“transcending” modern alienation 
and divisions between capital and labor—was repeatedly extolled through 
paeans to healthy human bodies, an authentic everyday life, and meaning-
ful work.21
 The aggressive and militarist thrust of fascism and fascist aesthetics cer-
tainly had little to do with the generally pacifist values espoused by Yanagi 
and his Folk-Craft Movement. Moreover, the humble craftsmen and cheap, 
ordinary wares promoted by the man and the movement could hardly seem 
further from the monumentality of that touchstone of fascist aesthetics by 










before, during, and after the Asia-Pacific War shared a number of tendencies 
with fascist aesthetics. Yanagi’s work was marked by an ongoing aesthetic 
critique of modern alienation and decadence. Indeed, Yanagi’s project can 
in various respects be described as “reactionary modernist,” a term em-
ployed by Jeffrey Herf to make sense of the simultaneously past- and future-
oriented drive of the German Nazi and Italian fascist regimes.22 While in 
Yanagi’s eyes the past rather than the present better represented a complete 
and harmonious way of life, he was certainly no fusty antiquarian, for he 
insisted that the past was important primarily as a resource to reform the 
present for a more fulfilling, or authentic, future.23 Yanagi’s proposed solu-
tions to the ills of contemporary society included elevation of the commu-
nity over the individual, a revalorization of native tradition in opposition to 
slavish Westernization (particularly in reference to the West of the Enlight-
enment), adherence to normative standards of un-selfconscious health and 
wholesomeness, and concomitant rejection of finicky frailty and intellec-
tual indulgence. European fascists would have found little to quarrel with 
in this platform.24
 Let us return to the essay collection The People and Beauty. Its title pro-
claims from the outset a faith in collective identity, while Yanagi’s profound 
antipathy to the individualism he sees as characteristic of the modern age 
is made abundantly clear throughout. In the preface, Yanagi writes that his 
inspiration for the volume is a desire to contest the prevalent belief that 
beauty is solely the product of rarity (keu), genius (tensai), and, ultimately, 
individuality (kosei): “the Folk-Craft Movement challenges such individu-
alist (kojin chūshin) views, claims to freedom ( jiyū), and bias toward fine 
art [over craft].”25 Indeed, while Yanagi quite carefully eschews any overt 
references to the state of war that engulfed him as he wrote this preface, a 
certain congruence with that era’s propaganda is hard to miss in such state-
ments as, “We must mature from individual (kojin) work to public (kōjin) 
work. Henceforth there will be no allowances for the pursuit of the way 
(michi) of the individual in the absence of social consciousness.”26 The stern 
quality of this prediction of a new social order is rather chilling, quite un-
like the gentle tone of remonstrance usually associated with Yanagi,27 and 
quite unlike the celebration of individualistic decadence that swept through 
Japanese popular culture in the immediate postwar period.28
 This individualism to be challenged is portrayed by Yanagi as part and 
parcel of the problems brought on by allowing Westernization to go too far 
in the modern era. In “What Has the Folk Craft Movement Contributed?” 













When we examine Japanese aesthetics and art theory in recent years, 
they are almost entirely in the Western vein. . . . Why have Japanese not 
been able to pioneer their own Japanese aesthetics? Is it not because 
they have sought to form their opinions on the basis of Western style 
academic knowledge, rather than grounding themselves in Eastern aes-
thetic experiences?29
While Yanagi does not claim that Western influence has been all bad, he 
suggests that it has done a great deal of harm by clouding the ability of 
people to see objects directly rather than through a veil of misleading 
“knowledge.” The solution Yanagi proposes for this dilemma is naturally to 
be found in folk crafts. They are not individualistic like the fine arts; nor are 
they foreign or “borrowed (karimono).” Rather, folk crafts visually inspire 
“a state of perception born from Japan itself.”30 While erudite cosmopoli-
tanism is more commonly seen as characteristic of Yanagi, this should not 
be allowed to obscure the strong strain of nationalism that also informs 
his work. Indeed, in this particular essay Yanagi develops a nuanced dis-
cussion of British, French, and German aesthetic terminology precisely to 
make the (rather specious) case that the term “mingei (folk craft)” has no 
precise equivalent in any Western language. The corollary is that “there is 
no influence at all from foreign thought” on Japanese folk-craft theory.31 
The common assumption that cosmopolitanism and nationalism are anti-
thetical undoubtedly contributed to the ease with which figures such as 
Yanagi were able to form amicable working relations with the American 
Occupation. However, this is clearly an assumption that does not take into 
account the ways in which the two positions can surreptitiously contribute 
to one another.32
 Threatened by modern individualism, Yanagi as well as fascist thinkers 
looked with particular hope to aesthetics as a set of norms to bind and heal 
an alienated and ailing society. In 1933, Adolf Hitler complained in reference 
to modern rationality that “it is not chance that this age, propagated and 
protected by sick persons, necessarily led to a general sickness—not only 
to sickness of the body but also to sickness of the mind.”33 The occasion 
for these comments was a gymnastics festival, one among many programs 
promoted by Nazis to build up the body politic. In “Kenkōsei to bi (Healthi-
ness and Beauty),” Yanagi hits some of the same notes in his criticism of 
the nervous (shinkeiteki) and sickly (byōteki) character of modern art, which 
no longer evinces interest in expressing the holistic nature of living (seikatsu 










 As a remedy, Yanagi proposes that “healthiness (kenkōsei)” receive long 
overdue recognition as the foundation of true beauty: “‘healthiness’ is the 
measure of beauty. ‘Health’ constitutes aesthetic value. Is it not the duty of 
aesthetics in the future to deepen its perception of this value? And is it not 
the essence of art in the future to express this beauty?”35
 What exactly is “health”? According to Yanagi, it is the unimpeded em-
ployment of god-given (ten’yo) faculties, which until the present day was a 
commonplace ( jinjō) and taken for granted (ishiki shinai) state of affairs.36 
More broadly, however, health serves Yanagi as a synonym for normality 
( jōtai, heijō),37 both in the sense of near-universal practice and in the sense 
of the supreme measure of social virtue. Not surprisingly, Yanagi believes 
that folk crafts as a category best embody the quality of health. While “too 
much consciousness (ishiki), taste (shumi), and assertion (shuchō) do not 
give rise to health in objects,” folk crafts are “born from a more natural, 
simple, and peaceful world” in which “the producers do not have dirty am-
bitions” and “the customers do not lapse into individual preferences.”38 
Ultimately, health is a norm rooted in survival (seizon) and daily life (nichijō 
no seikatsu) that Yanagi sees as a link between aesthetics and the world at 
large: “whether it be in physiology, in ethics, in society, or in aesthetics, 
health is the fundamental truth that must become the natural standard.”39
 Western individualism as a common enemy brought Yanagi and fascist 
thinkers uncomfortably close on a number of theoretical points. Earlier we 
saw resonances in the way in which Yanagi posited the nation as a natural 
and self-referential community and in his obsession with health as an aes-
thetic merging art and society into a single unified field. There are other 
areas of discursive overlap that could also be discussed if there were more 
time. However, must we say on this basis that Yanagi was a fascist in spirit? 
Was he simply being hypocritical in his more liberal-seeming moments? Or 
should we look instead to a larger historical movement that encompassed 
a wide range of possibilities, ranging from totalitarian fascism on the one 
hand to a democratic liberalism on the other?
Mediating the Masses
Yanagi’s ongoing championship of folk crafts and their producers may have 
been humanist, even liberal on occasion, but during the 1930s and 1940s 
it strongly resonated with a fascistic ideology promoted at both state and 
popular levels.40 How can we start to make sense of the seemingly contra-













postwar environments? One approach is to step back and survey the general 
landscape. What was the area of overlap among these various ideologies 
that would allow someone like Yanagi to be embraced by differing camps at 
one and the same time?
 George Mosse suggests that, as an object of desire, the “masses” pro-
vided just such a point of potential articulation among a broad range of po-
litical programs that otherwise might be quite at odds with one another.41 
Mosse sees fascism as a particularly naked, but by no means unique, mani-
festation of what he calls the “new politics” of the modern masses. The 
roots of these “new politics” go back to eighteenth-century Europe, where 
the emergent concepts of nationhood and popular sovereignty intertwined. 
As a result, “The chaotic crowd of the ‘people’ became a mass movement 
which shared a belief in popular unity through a national mystique. The new 
politics provided an objectification of the general will; it transformed po-
litical action into a drama supposedly shared by the people themselves.”42 
While it was clear to many that the modern masses—industrial labor as 
well as national subjects—would play an increasingly prominent but un-
ruly and undetermined part in reshaping society, many questions remained. 
How could this “general will” be known? To what ends would this “general 
will” be directed? Who would do this directing? In other words, “represen-
tation” was an open and contested field, with the definition and invention 
necessary to the political and aesthetic process shading all too quickly into 
questions of manipulation and control. Moreover, by the 1930s parliamen-
tary politics, although they had opened the door to representation of the 
masses, were widely perceived as ailing or having failed in Italy, Germany, 
and Japan. Fascists, National Socialists, and “revolutionary” military and 
bureaucratic figures in Japan seized on this conjoined crisis and opportu-
nity. So, too, did Yanagi in his own way.
 The People and Beauty as a whole certainly raises the masses up as an object 
of veneration, and in such essays as “Hin to bi (Poverty and Beauty),” Yanagi 
stakes out a specific position for himself as their advocate. “When the world 
will not grant them recognition, I want to rise up and defend (bengo shitai) 
them.”43 As indicated earlier, specific terms of his defense include stressing 
such virtues as communal character and health. However, the dynamics 
of exclusion and inclusion within the defense reveal an unstated but abid-
ing politics within Yanagi’s program. Who is the prosecutor—that is, the 
oppressor? Who is the plaintiff—that is, the victim? Where does Yanagi 
belong within this dichotomy? What qualifies him to speak as an advocate? 










 We might begin by noting that, in the quote, Yanagi characterizes his 
opposition as the “world” or general public opinion (seken). Indeed, Yanagi 
consistently presents his position as fiercely embattled, framing his essays 
either in anticipation of criticism or in response to actual critics. The latter 
certainly existed, including some contemporaries who at first glance might 
seem natural allies, such as Yanagita Kunio, who is generally credited with 
the founding of Japanese folk studies or native ethnology (minzokugaku),44 
or Kitaōji Rosanjin, restaurateur, potter, and craft aesthetician.45 However 
sharp the words exchanged between Yanagi and his critics may have been, 
however, we need to take Yanagi’s claims to iconoclasm with a grain of 
salt. Yanagi did after all found a movement that exists to this day, so it was 
hardly the case that he lacked listeners. Yanagi himself somewhat boast-
fully grumbles in Shūshū monogatari (Tales of Collection) that all too often 
he “discovered” a new craft genre only to soon find himself outbid for such 
objects at auctions by less discerning but better-heeled collectors capital-
izing on his keen eye.46 What is more, recent works by Harootunian, Leslie 
Pincus, Miriam Silverberg, and others have clearly demonstrated that the 
masses and everyday life were the object of intense scrutiny and celebration 
on the part of a considerable number of intellectuals during the prewar 
era.47 While Yanagi offered an unusually concrete and active program to 
promote this vision, he was not alone. The embattled attitude did, however, 
add particular force to his expressions of alliance with the masses against 
their oppressors, discursively generating a fierce sense of “we” against 
“them.” But can we say that he thus became one with the masses? After all, 
to do so might put at risk his very ability to protect or “represent” them.
 It is telling that Yanagi speaks as a rule on behalf of and in dialogue 
with craft objects rather than with potters, weavers, woodworkers, and the 
like. In fact, the pronoun “them” in the “defense” quotation specifically 
refers to the products of the folk or masses. It is the humble class of dishes 
known as kurawanka that inspires a feeling of warmth and familiarity (shita-
shisa) for Yanagi. It is kurawanka that Yanagi imagines ascending to heaven 
to be placed near the sacred throne (Kami no goza ni chikai tokoro ni). It is 
kurawanka that suggests to Yanagi the very mind of the deity: “whenever 
I see such goods (shina), I have faith that some kind of salvation has been 
promised.”48 The linguistic conceit of attributing spirit or soulfulness to 
objects is hardly confined to this one essay. In “Bi to keizai (Beauty and 
Economics),” for example, Yanagi paints a picture of utopia as a place and 
time in which folk-craft objects have become the companions (hanryo) of 













jects as teachers providing lessons through their physical attributes, such 
as textures, designs, and durability. In contrast, he does not speak of literal 
lessons with a potter or weaver as the gateway to understanding. Even the 
essay “Omoidasu shokunin (Craftsmen I Have Known),” which would seem 
to promise some kind of dialogue, is in fact a melancholy account of how 
death prevented him from meeting various craftsmen except through their 
works.50 In sum, in Yanagi’s texts, folk-craft objects tend metonymically to 
replace their makers. What are the implications of this substitution? While 
people can speak, be quoted, and review their words, objects cannot. Ob-
jects must be read. Objects must be interpreted. Objects must be spoken 
for. And Yanagi takes upon himself the role of representing their virtues.
 This kind of simultaneous celebration and silencing of the masses in 
“Poverty and Beauty” is further apparent in the essay’s central argument 
regarding an intimate connection between these two conditions. Yanagi in-
sists that the beauty of ordinary wares such as kurawanka should be under-
stood as inseparable and deriving from the destitute circumstances under 
which they were created. While this does not mean that all things manu-
factured by poor craftsmen are necessarily beautiful, rich craftsmen are 
all too prone to cater to the whims of their wealthy patrons by adding ex-
travagant decoration. Yanagi laments that such luxury goods (objects sup-
planting subjects once more) tended to be “clamorous (sawagashiku)” and 
“arrogant (takabutta).”51 However, ordinary craftsmen “fortunately (saiwai 
ni)” lack lucrative contracts to lead them into temptation.52 The goods they 
produce do not kick up a fuss or demand attention, but are instead “humble 
(kenkyo).”53 Poverty enforces the rule of necessity and humility over crafts-
men. According to Yanagi, in aesthetics, as in ethics, “Poor people are more 
closely associated with modesty (kenson), honesty (shōjiki), and simplicity 
(soboku) than rich people. Therefore, [they are] closer to a lifestyle that 
matches (kanau) the will of the deity (kami no i).”54 When one is poor, there 
is no time to anguish over original designs or perfect structural symme-
try. It is enough that the final product is sturdy, functional, and affordable. 
Conscious thought is erased and replaced by tradition, community, nature, 
and, ultimately, the sacred. In this way, poverty becomes a fundamental 
condition for beauty.
 Having characterized the hardworking folk as a group that could not and 
should not engage in self-conscious thought and speech, to serve as their 
spokesman Yanagi necessarily had to distinguish himself from his objects 
of veneration. Yanagi’s use of “we” is revealing: “we should repent (zange) 










beings.”55 While Yanagi speaks on their behalf, he does not in the end iden-
tify with either the physical or the mental state of humble craftsmen. In-
stead, the lives and the material goods of the working classes are used as a 
mirror to inspire reform on high:
When we look at the poor (mazushii) life of a craftsman deep in the 
countryside, we are especially struck by what we ourselves are lacking 
( jibun no tarinai mono). Those people do not have what could be called 
economic privileges. But they, not us (wareware), possess many superior 
privileges, with their hearts so far from sin.56
One of the main thrusts of “Poverty and Beauty” is to redefine a social per-
ception of lack as its opposite, richness. Along with this, Yanagi seeks to 
shake up complacency among members of the middle or upper class re-
garding the quality of their “full” lives. There should be no question that 
Yanagi genuinely desires to pay honor to a class long overlooked in terms 
of aesthetic theory. However, we also need to recognize that Yanagi has 
staked out for himself a very distinct position as mediator between poor 
producers and wealthy consumers. Action and agency entirely lie in this 
middle ground, as the masses are mobilized as models to dislodge the heredi-
tary privileges of more established socioeconomic classes.
 This move reveals a key, and unfortunate, congruence with fascism: labor 
and the laboring classes are glorified without resulting in the actual libera-
tion of workers. In reference to the way in which fascist regimes trumpeted 
the concept of “nation” to erase recognition of existing social divisions, 
Mark Neocleous points out that “the fascist ‘resolution’ of the problem 
of class is thus a mystification; it deals with class on an ideological rather 
than a material level.”57 As an illustration, he points to the Nazi “Beauty of 
Labor” campaign that aestheticized rather than significantly reformed the 
workplace. Similarly, it must be acknowledged that Yanagi’s celebrations 
of folk virtues did not offer means to free or change anything for the poor 
or the producers. They were already perceived to be in a state of grace. In-
stead, Yanagi privileged consumption over production, both reflecting the 
socioeconomics of his middle-class background and returning the masses 
to a subordinate position. Action and power were reserved for the advocate, 
Yanagi, and a better future for his followers, the tasteful consumers. And yet 
it would be unjust to say that by positioning himself in this manner, Yanagi 
was in effect fascist. An abstract concept of the poor or the masses used 













liberal humanist projects of political and social reform. What links these 
positions together is the polymorphous “new politics” of the masses and 
the intoxicating opportunities opening up to those who claim to represent 
them.
Fascism in the Japanese Context
It has not been my goal in this essay to simply indict or acquit Yanagi on 
the charge of fascism: it should be clear by this point that both the prose-
cution and the defense in such a trial would have plenty of evidence to sup-
port their cases. My main concern has instead been to demonstrate the very 
ease with which Yanagi’s work can be assimilated to different political dis-
courses. This in turn suggests the dangers of depending too much on as-
sumptions of internal coherence and logic transcending time and place in 
such systems of thought as humanism or fascism as they organize specific 
texts such as those of Yanagi. This is a truism, perhaps, but context remains 
critical for interpretation.
 It is in this sense that I think we might still ask about the degree to which 
Yanagi bears responsibility for contributing to fascistic tendencies in war-
time Japan—not, of course, to vindictively punish Yanagi after the fact by 
devaluing his tremendous contributions to the field of folk crafts, which 
constitutes a distinct and thriving aspect of Japanese aesthetic production 
today. However, serious consideration of his complicity can serve to high-
light a couple of points. First, it should give us pause that Yanagi, known 
for championing the marginal and downtrodden, seems to have been led 
down a slippery slope that took him from respectable to unacceptable ideo-
logical formations by this very act of representation. The social critic Tosaka 
Jun pointed out at the time just how common this “downward” movement 
was in his classic work Nihon ideorogiiron (The Discourse of Japanist Ideol-
ogy), his indictment of the Japanese intellectual world during the prewar 
and wartime years.58 Yet the danger of such slippage is hardly relegated to 
the distant past. Second, the resonances between Yanagi’s work and that 
of European proponents of fascism proper suggest that we should not feel 
bound to identify a critical mass of card-carrying fascists in wartime Japan 
before positing the existence of a fascistic culture. Just as context is impor-
tant in reading Yanagi’s work, so context is important in reading Japanese 
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Fascism’s Furry Friends:  
Dogs, National Identity, and Purity  
of Blood in 1930s Japan
Nearly everyone in Japan is familiar with the tale of Hachikō 
(1923–35). Better known as the “Loyal Dog” (Chūken) Hachikō, this Akita 
breed was born in the town of Ōdate in Akita prefecture in northern Hon-
shu. About two months later, the puppy was shipped nearly twenty hours by 
rail to Ueno Eizaburō (1871–1925), a professor of agricultural engineering 
at Tokyo Imperial University. For the next fifteen months, the dog walked 
with his owner to the nearby Shibuya railway station in the morning and 
accompanied him home each evening until May 21, 1925, when Ueno col-
lapsed and died while at work. For the next decade, Hachikō was said to 
appear each evening at the station to await the return of his master. In 1934, 
while Hachikō was still alive, his purported loyalty was memorialized with 
a life-size bronze statue just outside the station, which immediately be-
came a destination for sightseers. It is now best known by Tokyoites as a 
favorite landmark near which to rendezvous in the fashionable shopping 
and entertainment district of Shibuya. An even more authentic likeness of 
Hachikō, preserved by taxidermy, is often on display at the National Sci-
ence Museum in Ueno Park. Though long dead, Hachikō remains very much 





























service for the selection of a series of commemorative stamps, the public 
chose Hachikō as one of one hundred and seventy images that most aptly 
illustrate the Japanese experience in the twentieth century.1 The dog’s story 
has been retold in many children’s books over the past seventy years, in 
a Japanese motion picture and animated film in the late 1980s, and most 
recently in a Hollywood knockoff starring Richard Gere (scheduled for re-
lease in 2009 as Hachiko: A Dog’s Story). It is no surprise that visitors, both 
young and elderly, frequently exclaim, “Ah, it’s Hachikō!” when they spot 
his stuffed figure at the museum.
 What few people realize is that Hachikō played a prominent role in the 
culture of fascism as experienced in Japan. To characterize the Hachikō 
phenomenon as a warm and sentimental episode in a country slowly sub-
merging into political turmoil and militarism, as the literary scholar Edwin 
Seidensticker did in his masterly history of Tokyo, may be true to some 
extent, but in the context of the 1930s the story of Hachikō had complex, 
even disturbing, implications.2 Hachikō became famous precisely because 
dog enthusiasts and government bureaucrats cast the dog as an exemplar of 
what they defined as the country’s canine ideal: Japanese in character, pure 
in blood, loyal to a single master, and a fearless fighter.
 In recent decades, scholars have written extensively about the deploy-
ment of the past and place in the imagination and invention of national 
communities and traditions.3 Non-human animals, too, figured in the for-
mation of national, ethnic, and racial identities. Perhaps their most obvi-
ous use is as national symbols, like the American Bald Eagle, the British 
Lion, and the Russian Bear. Another more, subtle example is the intimate 
connection that developed among fascism, nationalism, and canines in the 
course of the early twentieth century. The association goes beyond the cli-
chéd image of Hitler’s personal fetish for his Shepherd dog Blondie. Rather, 
within the cultures of fascism, which were characterized by an idealization 
and glorification of nation, race, loyalty, and violence, dogs played an im-
portant role in defining the patriotic, pure, faithful, and ferocious qualities 
that were expected of the state’s human, and non-human, subjects.
 As the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure has asserted, meaning can only be 
found in difference. What it means to be human is understood in relation 
to the non-human—whether the divine or bestial—so animals often serve 
as metaphors through which to assert the humanity and civilized nature 
of one’s own group and the animality or barbaric character of “Others.” 
While always based on supposed differences, such discourses usually place 
















or the quintessential characteristics of “Other” people. As I have discussed 
elsewhere, Westerners in colonized and colonizable areas in the nineteenth 
century explicitly commented on the character of native dogs and, by exten-
sion, native peoples, but spoke less often of the admirable qualities of the 
“colonial dog” or human colonizers, which were usually taken for granted.4 
The reverse was the case in the imperial metropole, where discussions about 
canines usually centered on the admirable attributes of newly nationalized 
national dogs. This also occurred in the fascist rhetoric of the first half of 
the twentieth century. Domestic discourses about canines overwhelmingly 
concerned themselves with describing the character of the national dog 
while using foreign or mixed breeds as foils.
 Canines provided a powerful if understated symbol in the language of 
fascism. Rapid industrialization, urbanization, and societal upheaval left 
many people uncomfortable with modernity. Suspicious of universalism, 
individualism, and cosmopolitanism implicit in liberal thought, fascists 
offered their own exceptional and indigenous versions of civilization, based 
on the prowess of race, nation, and community. Influenced by Darwinian 
thought, they feared bourgeois degeneration and racial miscegenation and 
celebrated violent struggle. As in the previous century, when people spoke 
about the character of dogs, they projected human attitudes about national 
and racial identity onto animals. The ubiquity, familiarity, and emotional 
connection of dogs, as well as their malleable symbolic power, made them 
an ideal vehicle by which to define identity. The nationalization of an every-
day animal, purported to possess an ancient and intimate relationship with 
native place and people, served to bolster and to emotionalize allegiance to 
the nation-state; distinct, indigenous breeds provided a graphic and com-
prehensible way for those concerned about human racial purity to express 
their views; dogs, celebrated in many cultures for their fidelity, offered a 
prosaic device to encourage individual submission to and sacrifice for the 
nation; and violence unleashed with a single command epitomized the con-
trol that many people wished to exercise over their world. Indeed, the rela-
tionship between a master or breeder and his dog may be seen as an arche-
type of the discipline and unity revered by fascist cultures.
 The link between fascism and dogs was most readily apparent in two 
countries, Japan and Germany, during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury. In the fascist discourses of other places, different animal metaphors 
may have been more prominent, even if they were deployed in similar ways 
and for analogous ends. In Italy, for example, predators such as lions seem 















portrayed as a modern tamer of wild animals. He made a practice of being 
photographed “completely at ease visiting the cages of lions” and riding in 
the back of an automobile with a lion cub in his lap.5
 Although some historians and political scientists have contested the 
characterization of 1930s Japan as authentically fascist, it is necessary 
both to recognize the particularities of time and place and to recognize 
the commonalities. Popular mass anti-liberal and anti-socialist national-
ist movements and regimes that used a common language of unity, purity, 
and violence appeared in a number of modern nations that had previously 
seemed to be on a path toward expanding democracy in the early twen-
tieth century.6 Societies displaying these characteristics can be meaning-
fully grouped under the label “fascist” as long as we keep in mind that no 
two societies are the same. It is also important to remember that fascism’s 
influence affected the entire globe, its thought and language infiltrating 
even such democratic countries as France, Britain, and the United States. 
Nevertheless, fascism’s sway over Japan was far closer to the historical ex-
perience of Germany and Italy. This is especially true in the realm of cul-
ture. While politics and ideology in Japan differed in some ways from the 
situation in Germany, Italy, and other countries that took a fascist turn in 
the interwar period, the cultural landscape showed a strong resemblance to 
these two European counterparts. As in Germany and Italy, many members 
of Japan’s urban and educated middle class yearned for a pure, indigenous 
cultural aesthetic. They believed that it could be found in a “national politi-
cal essence (kokutai),” a “range of ideological virtues that defined what it 
meant to be Japanese, as opposed to the ‘other,’” and thought these com-
munitarian values of the countryside or the distant past could “restore” a 
cultural and spiritual alternative to the foreign-influenced decadence of the 
city and the recent history of modernization and Westernization.7
 There were not only striking parallels but also significant interactions 
between Japanese and German movements to protect and promote indige-
nous dogs. German precedents influenced, and interacted with, Japanese 
government bureaucrats, military officials, zoologists, and dog enthusiasts 
on a number of levels. Many aficionados of “Japanese” dogs admired so-
called German Shepherd dogs, and some were members of groups that pro-
moted the latter breed in Japan. The Shepherd dog was frequently a bench-
mark of comparison for “Japanese” breeds, and some fanciers in Germany 
and Japan considered both Japanese dogs and German Shepards to be 
closely related, and therefore the purest and finest canines in the world. 
















As the historian Boria Sax has written, “The Nazis were constantly invoking 
dogs and wolves for the qualities they wanted to cultivate: loyalty, fierce-
ness, courage, obedience, and sometimes even cruelty.”8
 Although it is hardly a cruel story, the legend of Hachikō provides a 
useful framework for probing the relationship between dogs and fascism 
in Japan. Hachikō was the key figure in the rediscovery and valorization of 
native dogs, long despised as disorderly, savage, and wolf-like. Through the 
joint efforts of a group of private dog enthusiasts and the Ministry of Edu-
cation, the native dog of Meiji times was in the course of the early twentieth 
century transformed into the “Japanese” dog, an icon of purity, loyalty, and 
bravery, superior to both Western dogs and the native canines of Japan’s 
colonies. Indeed, the creation of the “Japanese” dog, with Hachikō as its 
1. A photograph of the “Faithful Dog” Hachikō that appeared on the opening page 
of Kishi Kazutoshi’s Chūken Hachikō monogatari (1934). The photo was probably taken 
in front of the home of Andō Shō, the sculptor who crafted the bronze statue of 
Hachikō that was unveiled outside the Shibuya railway station in central Tokyo in 
1934. Unfortunately, neither Andō nor his statue survived the Second World War. Andō 
died in an American air raid in May 1945, and the previous fall government officials 
toppled Hachikō’s bronze figure because of a shortage of metal needed to prosecute 
the conflict. On August 15, 1945, the three-year anniversary of Japan’s surrender, a 
replica of the original statue by Andō’s son, Takeshi, was dedicated outside of station, 















paragon, was one of the building blocks of a culture of imperial fascism 
that venerated the nation, celebrated purity, esteemed fidelity, and glorified 
violence.
Nationalizing Native Dogs
The association of native dogs with the nation-state in Japan of the 1930s 
was part of a trend that had developed in Europe in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and spread with imperialism and the global diffusion of 
Western modes of dog-keeping and the ideology of animal pure-bloodism. 
Yet given indigenous canines’ recent history, the extolling of native dogs in 
Japan was no small irony. Foreigners and local elites alike from the mid-
nineteenth century had regarded indigenous dogs as primitive, cowardly, 
and of mixed or wild breed. Within a remarkably short space of time, these 
same canines came to be cited as an example of what supposedly made 
Japan superior to the West. For decades rounded up for elimination by dog-
catchers in the government’s employ, “Japanese” dogs had by the early 
1930s became immensely popular, serving as a status symbol for anyone 
with the means to acquire one. Once the target of derision, they were now 
a source of pride.
 The radical reappraisal of native dogs in Japan paralleled, even if it 
slightly trailed temporally, the nationalization of the Shepherd dog in Ger-
many. As with native dogs in Japan, the “Germanization” of the Shepherd 
dog occurred comparatively late and produced a dramatic shift in popular 
attitudes. Until Max von Stephanitz, a Prussian cavalry captain, established 
the Verein für deutsche Schäferhunde (Society for the German Shepherd 
Dog) in 1899, the breed was largely undefined and little valued. Within a de-
cade of its establishment, the group achieved phenomenal success in reg-
istering, breeding, and popularizing what Stephanitz called the “primeval 
Germanic dog.”
 Although there were earlier expressions of pride for native dog breeds 
and dismay at their “mongrelization” in turn-of-the-century Japan, these 
sentiments did not crystallize until several decades later. There were prob-
ably several reasons for the delay. A clientele for canines—that is to say, a 
bourgeois middle class that was interested in and could afford to acquire 
and keep a dog—did not emerge in Japan until the 1920s. It was not until 
such a constituency appeared that the ownership of dogs, and in this case 
the keeping specifically of native dogs, became widespread enough for a 
















an important role in the revaluation of indigenous canines, as well. The iso-
lation from the countryside that is characteristic of citified modernity led in 
many countries to a desire to reconnect with the natural world, albeit in a 
domesticated form—or, as the historian Kathleen Kete has put it, to install 
a “beast in the boudoir.”9
 Shifts in the political and cultural climate during the late 1920s and 
1930s made people more receptive to the promotion of native dogs. Nation-
alism and the veneration of native canine breeds were inseparable. The first 
expressions of concern for indigenous dogs coincided with rising national-
ism at the end of the nineteenth century, and their full manifestation cor-
responded with what the historians Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian 
have called the “Japanese revolt against the West” in the 1930s. During this 
period, ideologues promoted national pride in a pure, indigenous culture 
that was unsullied but supposedly threatened by foreign elements. The rec-
lamation and praise of native dogs was a canine variant of this pervasive 
and powerful political, intellectual, and cultural ground swell of resistance 
against the purported corrosive influences of Western modernity.
 In the realm of dogs, Saitō Hirokichi (who also used the pen name Saitō 
Hiroshi; 1900–64), the founder of the Nihon Ken Hozon Kai (Society for 
the Preservation of the Japanese Dog), led the revolt. Born and raised in 
rural Yamanashi Prefecture in central Japan, Saitō graduated from the pres-
tigious Tokyo Bijutsu Gakkō (Tokyo Fine Arts Academy; now the Tokyo Gei-
jutsu Daigaku) and became a landscape architect. He later played a leading 
role in the design of a garden at the National Museum of Modern Art in 
Tokyo, which opened in 1952. An art lover, Saitō was instrumental in pro-
tecting precious medieval cultural artifacts of the aristocratic Konoe house-
hold from the bombing raids of the Second World War. Saitō’s other love 
was dogs. In 1927, he joined the Eighth Artillery Division but was soon 
discharged because of health problems. Told by his doctor that he needed 
plenty of fresh air, and perhaps feeling in need of a mission, he decided to 
buy a dog and began to search, as he later recalled, for a pure indigenous 
canine like “those depicted in ancient scrolls.”10
 Saitō was unable to find a dog that met his standards in Tokyo, where, 
in his view, Western decadence and foreign blood had spread to the urban 
canine population. Even in the mountainous northern prefecture of Akita, 
soon to be known for a breed of the same name, he found it difficult to 
locate a dog that met his satisfaction. Alarmed that, through interbreeding, 
native dogs were following wolves to what he believed was tantamount to 















the next half-decade traveling to remote highland regions throughout the 
archipelago to locate purebred dogs and to campaign for their protection. 
It was only dogs in these areas that Saitō considered to be free of the legacy 
of Westernization that he believed to have defiled Japan both physically and 
spiritually.
 While returning from one of those trips, Saitō encountered Hachikō 
somewhere in the vicinity of Shibuya station. After this meeting, he featured 
the dog on the pages of a society newsletter in 1929, but several years later, 
Saitō realized that Hachikō had a potentially wider appeal and proposed a 
story about the dog to an Asahi newspaper reporter. The paper prominently 
placed the piece and a large photograph of a forlorn-looking Hachikō in 
its October 4, 1932, morning edition. “The Story of a Lovable Old Dog: A 
Seven-Year Expectant Wait for the Return of a Master Who Is No Longer of 
This World” told of the dog’s unfailing fidelity and portrayed him as a me-
diator of dogfights and a protective patron (oyabun) for smaller canines.11 
The article launched Hachikō’s tremendous popularity, which probably 
escalated to a degree beyond what anyone, including Saitō, anticipated.
 Saitō’s timing could not have been better. There are good, historical rea-
sons why this dog got his day in 1932 and why such an apotheosis occurring 
just a few years earlier is difficult to imagine. The Manchurian Incident, 
which began the previous year, marked the start of what was repeatedly 
proclaimed to be an extended “national emergency (hijōji)” and a time of 
tremendous national anxiety. On September 18, Japanese military officers 
used a staged explosion on a railway in northeastern China as a ploy to 
launch an attack on the troops of the local warlord. By January 1932, the 
entire region was effectively in the hands of the Kwantung Amy, and the 
following month Tokyo established the Japanese puppet state of Manchu-
kuo. The insubordination of military officers in Manchuria and the inability, 
and unwillingness, of civilian authorities to constrain them, coupled with 
“government by assassination” at home, led to an end to party rule by 
mid-1932. After the May 15 killing of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi by a 
group of navy officers and ultra-rightists, top military leaders proceeded to 
dominate “national unity” cabinets. Thus began the country’s descent into 
a long, dark valley of militarism and fascism. The unfolding, sentimental 
tale of Hachikō surely brought release from the uncertainties of the early 
1930s, but its very appeal stemmed from the fact that its underlying mes-
sage subtly reinforced the upsurge in patriotism that sang praises to the 
virtues of Japan’s unique “national polity” and demanded strict allegiance 
to the “imperial way.”
2. Saitō Hirokichi, in traditional hunting attire, while searching for purebred 















 As indicated by the name of his organization—the Society for the Pres-
ervation of the Japanese Dog—Saitō explicitly linked native canines to the 
nation. Just as Stephanitz had “Germanized” the Shepherd dog several de-
cades earlier, Saitō effectively nationalized native dogs on the archipelago 
by declaring them to be “Japanese,” or Nihon inu. This simple linguistic move 
transformed dogs that had previously been considered wild and uncivilized 
into worthy domesticated pets, desirable to the middle class. Some people 
even before the 1930s had used Nihon inu (Japanese dog), which more un-
equivocally tied native dogs to the nation-state, but thanks to Saitō’s efforts, 
it quickly became an almost exclusively used label. By the early 1930s, native 
canines had become a proud symbol of Japan, something unthinkable a few 
decades earlier.
 Saitō did not link native dogs to the nation in name only. “Japanese” 
canines, he claimed, possessed a personality similar to the country’s 
human population because of a long and close association between the ar-
chipelago’s people and dogs. In a radio address in 1937 titled “What Kind 
of a Canine Is a Japanese Dog?” aired by Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK), the 
government-controlled broadcasting company, Saitō made the following 
declaration: “[the] dog’s temperament is strongly influenced by the charac-
ter of its master, but because the Japanese dog has a long history the charac-
ter of the nation has exerted influence on the entire breed. The various traits 
of the Japanese nation—difficulty in getting used to anyone outside its mas-
ter’s family, being intelligent but not adept in expressing emotions as com-
pared to Western dogs, diffidence and stubbornness, and extreme cour-
age—have been ingrained into the personality of Japanese dogs.”12 Here 
and elsewhere, Saitō adeptly used the mass media to spread the message 
that centuries of interaction between Japanese people and native dogs had 
caused the canines to acquire a disposition like their human companions 
and molded them into the dog of the Japanese family-state (kazoku kokka).
 Equally important was Saitō’s success in ensuring that government bu-
reaucrats showed and maintained an interest in dogs. The Ministry of Edu-
cation, at the recommendation of officials in its Bureau of Cultural Affairs, 
sanctioned the nationalization of native dogs by declaring seven different 
breeds as natural treasures worthy of government protection during the 
1930s. The legal instrument through which this feat was accomplished was 
the Law for Preserving Scenery and Historic and Natural Monuments (Shi-
seki meisho tennen kinenbutsu hozon hō), a measure enacted in 1919 and modeled 

















 Although indigenous domesticated dogs were not the first animals to 
be given special status, they were probably the most celebrated. During the 
1930s, the ministry named the Akita, Kai, Kishū, Koshino (soon consid-
ered extinct through interbreeding), Shiba, Shikoku, and Hokkaido breeds 
to be endangered national assets. A declaration of protection stringently 
regulated the sale, breeding, and movement of designated canines, all of 
which continue to this day. The Ministry of Education’s rationale for pre-
serving “Japanese” dogs echoed Saitō’s argument that the character of the 
nation was ingrained in the personality of the country’s canines. When the 
ministry announced its designation of the Shiba breed in 1936, its spokes-
person proclaimed that the dogs were worthy of the honor because they 
“reflect the character of the Japanese people, and compared to foreign dogs 
demonstrate a particular vigor and have all the characteristics of a Japanese 
dog.”13
 As underscored by the ministry’s insistence that the vigor of the Shiba 
breed surpassed that of foreign canines, fans of native dogs were anxious to 
show that their animals were as good as, if not better than, any pureblooded 
Western breed. Claims about the superiority of native dogs vis-à-vis Western 
canines often appeared in articles in the specialized enthusiast and general 
press. The point was even made for young readers by Kishi Kazutoshi, au-
thor of The Story of the Loyal Dog Hachikō. “Mention the ‘Japanese dog,’ and the 
dogs of Japan who in the past have been treated like strays come to mind. 
Mention a dog show, and only Western dogs such as the setter, pointer, and 
terrier come to mind. What the Society for the Preservation of the Japanese 
Dog is making Japanese aware of is that the Japanese dog is by no means 
inferior, but in fact far superior, to Western dogs.”14
 Dog enthusiasts and education bureaucrats asserted that the timeless 
relationship between the archipelago’s canine and human races, especially 
between the dogs and the country’s emperors, made “Japanese” dogs better 
than others. Stephanitz used similar language to recall how in “time im-
memorial . . . the warlike proud German held in high esteem his coura-
geous hunting comrade.”15 Saitō and other commentators insisted that 
native dogs enjoyed a special bond with the people of Japan that had begun 
during the rule of the country’s first (mythical) emperor, Jimmu. Such 
claims, however, depended on the (a)historical connection between native 
dogs and the Japanese throne, both of which were perceived as having pre-
served a constant, untainted bloodline since the dawn of time.
 In addition to calling frequent attention to the alleged connections be-















dog fanciers sought to create similar links in the present. Society officials 
eagerly encouraged the participation of royalty and nobility in its dog shows. 
The first Japanese-dog show was held at the Matsuya department store in 
Ginza in early November 1932 and coincided with a national holiday com-
memorating the birth of the late Meiji emperor.16 The society invited several 
members of the imperial household and presented them and, in absentia, 
the emperor with small statues of Hachikō.
 Hachikō, the embodiment of the pre-eminence of Japan’s newly nation-
alized dogs, attended this and subsequent shows as a special guest. At the 
first exhibition, he appeared together with Koma-go, another Akita dog, 
whom the society had previously given to a relative of the emperor.17 The 
society awarded both dogs special collars to celebrate the event. The broad 
band of leather, stamped with the words “Commemorative Memento as 
Honorary Participant of the First Japanese-Dog Show—The Society for the 
Preservation of the Japanese Dog,” still encircles the stuffed Hachikō in 
the National Science Museum. In death, as in life, Hachikō was collared by 
the nation and tagged as Japanese.
Blood and Breed
The society’s breeding standards and the government’s moves to preserve 
native dogs reflected the complex nature of Japanese attitudes about racial 
identity during the 1930s. These attitudes were represented by two conflict-
ing strains of thought, one of which regarded Japanese as a racially homo-
genous people, and the other of which considered Japanese to be of mixed 
racial origin. Reflecting the former view, the policies and rhetoric of dog en-
thusiasts and government preservationists betrayed a strident concern with 
the maintenance of pure blood. Society officials considered and govern-
ment bureaucrats recognized as “Japanese” only those groups of canines 
whose pedigree had been attested in the archipelago since the beginning of 
(Japanese) time. The primary threat driving “Japanese” dogs to extinction, 
they contended, were canines of Western and mixed breed. Their actions 
and statements mirrored wider societal anxieties about human purity of 
blood, the superiority of the Japanese race, and the specter of miscegena-
tion.
 Reflecting the latter view, enthusiasts and scientists speculated that the 
ancestors of “Japanese” dogs had likely come to the archipelago thousands 
of years earlier from the Asian continent or the South Pacific. In this sense, 
















tage, but had since been isolated from outside influxes of canine blood by 
the islands’ geography. Such an explanation supported the government’s 
efforts to assimilate and exploit the human population of Japan’s formal 
and informal colonies. In this way, fanciers, scientists, and government 
preservationists enlarged the Japanese canine imperium even as Japan’s 
empire expanded making the country’s political rule seem natural and 
organic.
 The most pressing task for Saitō in the late 1920s and early 1930s was to 
determine precisely what a “Japanese” dog was. The defining characteristic 
of the breeds that came to be considered Japanese was that their bloodlines 
were free of foreign adulteration. While recognizing that the archipelago’s 
earliest canines may have arrived with humans from elsewhere thousands 
of years before, Saitō drew a clear distinction between those dogs and 
breeds that appeared on the peninsula more recently, even if their distinc-
tive appearance had been shaped by breeders in Japan.18 As explicated by 
the society’s foreign secretary, Hata Ichirō, the only dogs that were truly 
Japanese were “native dogs” of an “ancient breed that have been living more 
or less in a similar form and shape from the days of our forefathers.”19
 For fanciers, this primordial connection to the archipelago was not the 
only reason that certain indigenous dogs outclassed purebred Western 
dogs. “Japanese” dogs, they claimed, had lived with humans but had not 
been interbred by them, so they remained in a natural and uncorrupted 
state.20 Such language echoed contemporary rhetoric about the unbroken 
and undefiled blood ties of the Japanese nation and the imperial line. It 
also ignored the irony that breeders and eugenicists were now intervening 
to improve and maintain those same Japanese canine and human races that 
they claimed were superior because they had been formed naturally.
 At the same time that Saitō and other society members praised native 
dog breeds for being free of foreign canine blood, they celebrated their re-
semblance to wolves and possible blood links to their lupine cousins. Such 
admiration for the wolf-like nature of native dogs was ironic. Westerners 
and local elites in Japan and other colonizable and colonized areas of the 
world had denigrated certain native dogs for their purported physical and 
behavioral similarities to wolves, and this disparagement led to efforts to 
eliminate indigenous canines—whether street, feral, or wild dogs or the 
wolves themselves.
 During the interwar period, a new respect for wolves and other large 
predators emerged throughout the world, especially in areas where these 















Attitudes toward canines once despised as wolf-like changed, too. Possible 
biological links with wolves and a wolfish appearance and behavior became 
more appealing, particularly in those countries where fascism made the 
deepest inroads. Nowhere was this shift more apparent than in Germany. 
Hitler and other National Socialist leaders continually appropriated wolves 
for symbolic purposes, referring to themselves as wolves and their various 
headquarters as lairs.21 And the Führer and many Nazis admired the Shep-
herd dog because of its supposed wild, wolfish nature. The relationship be-
tween the three—Nazis, lupines, and Shepherd dogs—is aptly captured by 
the name Hitler gave the first “German” Shepherd he owned: Wolf.
 Similar cultural trends were evident in 1930s Japan. Wolves were not de-
ployed in the political sphere so frequently as they were in Germany, but 
the reasons for their extinction and their relationship with native dogs be-
came a much discussed topic. The folklorist Yanagita Kunio speculated in 
the pages of the Society for the Preservation of the Japanese Dog’s maga-
zine that wolves may not have completely vanished from the archipelago 
at all, and even if they had, they probably interbred with dogs, so that wolf 
blood could still be found in native canines.22 While Saitō and others re-
jected Yanagita’s explanation of lupine extinction and his theory of a recent 
biological link between wolves and native breeds, they celebrated the idea 
of the wolf-like nature of “Japanese” dogs, which made local varieties seem 
more natural, pure, and fearsome than their foreign cousins.
 Although there were striking parallels with Germany in discussions of 
canine blood and breed, there were also marked differences. Specifically, 
because of Japan’s relatively shallow experience with animal husbandry, 
discussions about breeding neither preoccupied fanciers nor wielded the 
influence that they did elsewhere. In many Western countries, “breeding” 
animals and humans for superiority was important, as highlighted by the 
widespread popularity of eugenics, but nowhere did such thinking become 
policy as under the Third Reich. In early-twentieth-century Germany, a 
number of advocates of eugenics and Aryan supremacy had backgrounds in 
zootechny or referenced animal breeding in their arguments for artificially 
improving human heredity. Stephanitz and National Socialist educators, 
for example, used dog breeds to explain in readily understandable terms 
ethnogeny, the supremacy of the Aryan race, and the dangers of miscegena-
tion. In Japan, however, animal breeding had less impact on racial poli-
cies. Crossover between animal breeders and the relatively weak eugenics 
movement in Japan was much rarer, and any concern with human purity in 
















said, the rhetoric of Japanese dog enthusiasts clearly fed into wider societal 
concerns about racial identity, just as canine terminology helped to shape 
larger discussions of race.
 In broader terms, as well, the politics of race and empire in Japan dif-
fered significantly from that in Germany. Because Western notions of race 
were intertwined with a belief in the superiority of white races, many Japa-
nese were uncomfortable with eugenic and racial thought. Japanese nation-
alism, as the historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki has pointed out, was generally 
centered on the idea of Volk, or “national people (minzoku),” rather than 
“race ( jinshu).”23 One current of nationalism depicted Japanese as a racially 
homogenous people literally descended from a common bloodline whose 
uppermost branch was the Imperial Family. The competing mixed-blood 
view emerged only later, in the late nineteenth century, but grew rapidly 
along with imperial expansion. Japan’s acquisition of an empire popu-
lated by ethnically similar peoples living in relatively close proximity to 
the metropole led some people to emphasize that Japanese were of diverse 
racial origins and to identify this hybridity as a source of national strength 
and imperial power.
 Such political realities were reflected in and supported by popular and 
scientific discourses about dogs. During the 1930s, Saitō increasingly em-
braced theories that extended the Japanese canine realm even as the coun-
try’s political empire grew. With the assistance of colleagues, he investi-
gated canines in the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and the 
South Seas. In colonial Korea, he gained the cooperation of Mori Tamezō, 
a professor of zoology at Keijō Imperial University (present-day Seoul Uni-
versity). In early 1937, an Asahi journalist reported that Saitō and Mori had 
discovered on Chindō, an island off the southwestern coast of Korea, what 
the article labeled “Japanese dogs raised in Korea,” sporting pricked-up 
ears and curled tails. Saitō speculated that the dogs had originated either in 
the Japanese home islands (naichi) or in the northern part of the continent.24 
As a result of Saitō’s and Mori’s research, alongside the seven breeds that 
the Ministry of Education designated “Japanese” national treasures during 
in the 1930s, Japanese colonial authorities in Korea granted similar “Japa-
nese” status to the Chindō and one other peninsular breed, the Bunsan, in 
the late 1930s. This bureaucratic canonization surely did not arise out of 
pure concern for the canines themselves, much less the Korean populace. 
Rather, like other facets of colonial modernity, such as industrialization 
















 Whether with regard to dogs he deemed “Japanese” on the archipelago 
or on the Korean peninsula, Saitō repeatedly emphasized two physical 
traits. All “Japanese” canines, as he declared in his radio speech in 1937, 
had to have “small, triangular ears that stand erect” and a “large and power-
ful curled tail.”25 Any animal that did not show these features was immedi-
ately regarded as suspect. Some people suggested, based on this standard, 
that Hachikō was not purebred because his tail slumped down when he 
walked and, even more noticeable, because his left ear drooped. Then, 
and repeatedly over the years, Saitō emphatically defended the integrity of 
Hachikō’s bloodline. He argued that the tail dropped and the ear flopped 
as a result of skin disease and not because of foreign contamination of the 
dog’s pedigree.26 Fortunately for Saitō, and indeed because of his influence, 
taxidermists at the National Science Museum mounted Hachikō with his 
tail curled and both ears standing erect, so that he emerged looking like a 
young, healthy, purebred “Japanese” dog.
Unflagging Fidelity
Preservationists were not the only bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education 
who were concerned about native dogs. Educators within the ministry, too, 
realized that native dogs like Hachikō—and other dogs in the service of 
the empire—could be elevated as icons of loyalty in imperial and wartime 
Japan. From the 1890s, the inculcation of the Confucian virtue of loyalty 
(chū) had been central to the mission of the national school system. Gov-
ernment officials and private spokespeople labored to instill in imperial 
subjects a strong sense of obligation and veneration for elders, teachers, 
superiors, the state, and, most of all, the emperor. Schoolteachers taught 
their pupils that they were part of a unique family-state, with the emperor 
at its head. Hachikō and other supposedly devoted dogs provided perfect 
pedagogical models for authorities to suffuse people, both young and old, 
with messages about duty to and sacrifice for the nation.
 Many cultures have celebrated the faithfulness of dogs to humans. Per-
haps nowhere, though, were faithful dogs deployed so prominently as sym-
bols as in the fascist rhetoric of the 1930s. In Germany, proto-Nazi and 
National Socialist commentators and educators often venerated canines as 
paragons of fidelity. It was precisely this supposed devout dedication that 
endeared the German Shepard breed to Nazi officials.27
 If the deployment of dogs to spread ideas about race in Japan paled in 
















canines to foster loyalty was probably unrivaled. Such discourses extended 
to military dogs of Western breed in the employ of the army, especially Shep-
herd dogs. However, “Japanese” dogs were singled out even more often for 
their unconditional devotion. Commentators repeatedly asserted that the 
fidelity of native dogs was unique among canines in that it was directed 
exclusively and unendingly to a single master. More than once, the faith-
fulness of Hachikō and other “Japanese” dogs was compared to the bushidō 
ethos that supposedly bound a samurai warrior to his lord and the alle-
giance that people felt for the emperor.
 In addition to ideological motivations, a desire for economic profit buoyed 
Hachikō’s rise to fame. In 1934, businesspeople took advantage of the zodiac 
in the Year of the Dog, and the following year they capitalized on Hachikō’s 
death to cash in on the canine celebrity. Merchants manipulated the “Loyal 
Dog” to sell everything from toys to kimonos, postcards to kitchenware, 
phonographs to books. The commercial exploitation of Hachikō continued 
throughout the 1930s and persists to some degree to this day. Annual events, 
most prominently a memorial service in March and a festival in April, honor 
the dog, and until 2006 (when the space was taken over by the global chain 
store, The Body Shop) any number of Hachikō trinkets could be purchased 
throughout the year at a store called the Hachikō Shop located just outside 
the officially named Hachikō Exit of Shibuya station.
 The Society for the Preservation of the Japanese Dog and its allies in 
the Ministry of Education reveled in the attention that Hachikō was gen-
erating but by the same token fiercely sought to maintain control over the 
manner in which dog was portrayed. In late 1933, for example, anticipat-
ing even greater publicity during the upcoming Year of the Dog, a group 
of private entrepreneurs announced its intention to construct a wooden 
statue of Hachikō. Angered by this attempt by outsiders to literally shape 
Hachikō’s image and profit from it, Saitō and his influential backers swiftly 
launched a campaign in early 1934 to raise money to build their own statue. 
The committee asked Andō Shō to take on the task of sculpting, with but 
one condition. Andō had already created a plaster model of Hachikō the 
previous fall for an annual show at the Imperial Gallery of Art and in that 
work faithfully depicted Hachikō with a floppy left ear.28 Such a design, 
the committee decided—at Saitō’s insistence—would not do: Andō must 
depict the dog with both ears erect. Saitō’s wish went unfulfilled, however, 
when the exigency of quickly completing the statue forced the sculptor to 
use his original model for the cast, and for perpetuity Hachikō was cast in 
bronze as a dog with a suspect ear.
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 The statue was dedicated in an elaborate hour-long ceremony on April 
21, 1934. Arrayed in white and red ribbons but beginning to show his age, 
Hachikō was the guest of honor. After speeches by dignitaries who included 
Saitō; the chief of the Ministry of Education’s Social Education Bureau; and 
Kishi, the author of The Story of the Loyal Dog Hachikō, Ueno’s niece Sakano Hi-
sako unveiled the statue. A poem written by Yamamoto Teijirō—who served 
as a Diet member, a minister of agriculture and forestry, and, from 1935 
on, the leader of the reactionary Kokutai Meichō Undō (Movement for the 
Clarification of the National Polity)—praised “The Conduct of the Loyal 
Dog (Chūken kō)” and was inscribed on the statue’s base. In a melancholy 
tone, Yamamoto’s poem lauded the faithfulness of Hachikō and lamented 
the fickle nature of humans.29
 Although Saitō gave birth to the Hachikō story and the business commu-
nity cashed in on it, Ministry of Education bureaucrats largely dictated its 
3. The original bronze Hachikō outside the Shibuya railway station on the day of its 
dedication, April 21, 1934. The adult figure standing in front of the statue appears to 
be Saitō Hirokichi, who was primarily responsible for popularizing the dog. Notice 
the many children surrounding the statue, an indication of Hachikō’s appeal to 
















interpretation and dissemination to a national, colonial, and even world-
wide audience. Initially, ministry bureaucrats used Kishi’s Story of the Faithful 
Dog Hachikō to spread their tailored message. Ministry officials promoted 
the book in classrooms by way of an army of teachers. One man half-joked 
years later that his teacher encouraged students so enthusiastically to buy 
the book that he wondered if the instructor was getting a percentage of the 
income.30 Moral suasion, rather than financial profit, was a more likely mo-
tive. A newspaper advertisement proclaimed that the book was an “ethics 
primer that must reach every mountain and seaside village of the archi-
pelago.” Reading it, the ad declared, caused children to “feel the righteous 
heart of Hachikō, who embodies the Japanese spirit” and braced them to 
defy a “world gone decadent, where people wallow in luxury and idleness, 
and humanity has become thinner than paper.”31
 Official and popular media, artists, and performers joined forces with 
the ministry to celebrate the virtue of loyalty as embodied by Hachikō. Just 
weeks before the dedication ceremony, the Society for the Preservation of 
the Japanese Dog, the Ministry’s Social Education Bureau, and the Kōkoku 
Seishin Kai (Imperial Spirit Society) sponsored a benefit concert of skits, 
songs, and comic acts that attracted more than three thousand people 
to the Japan Young People’s Auditorium in the outer garden area of Meiji 
Shrine. NHK transmitted the story of Hachikō as part of its children’s radio 
programming. Countless poems, books, and songs hailed the inexhaustible 
fidelity of Hachikō. A dance group performed a number called “The March-
ing Song of Hachikō”; one poem equated Hachikō with Mount Fuji, cherry 
blossoms, and the Rising Sun flag as a “national treasure” that “taught 
people never to forget their debts of gratitude”; another verse by the poet 
Noguchi Ujō likened the dog to the famous forty-seven samurai of Akō, 
who in the early seventeenth century demonstrated their devotion to their 
late lord by avenging his ritual suicide, and to samurai and soldiers from 
Nitta Yoshisada (1301–38) to General Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), who 
showed their allegiance to emperors in life and death.32
 The campaign was a rousing ideological and financial success. Although 
the committee secured large contributions from businesspeople, the fund-
raising drive was primarily aimed at schoolchildren and enjoyed the full 
cooperation of the Education Ministry, school officials, and teachers. Even 
in the midst of a lingering economic depression, many children throughout 
the empire apparently responded. The committee raised about 1,864 yen 
(the average yearly salary of a prefectural employee was 737 yen in 1934), 















cators, adoration for Hachikō’s loyalty appeared to capture the minds of 
many people.
 Ministry intervention ensured that the focus of the story would be loy-
alty rather than some other virtue or cause. Animal-welfare activists, such 
as those in the Japanese branch of the Humane Society, attempted to mobi-
lize the dog to improve the plight of Tokyo’s stray-dog population, among 
whose ranks Hachikō sometimes wandered, and to promote more compas-
sionate conditions in the city’s notorious dog pounds.33 The Humane So-
ciety made Hachikō an honorary member of its Pochi Kurabu (Pooch Club), 
and its constituents called for better treatment of canines through news-
paper articles and letters to the editor. The group also attached an ornament 
adorned with the club’s name to Hachikō’s collar, which still dangles from 
the museum mannequin today. The message stressed by animal-welfare 
activists, however, was largely overwhelmed by official and private voices 
praising the dog’s devotion.
 In the same month that ministry officials helped raise the dog’s bronze 
likeness outside Shibuya station, they incorporated Hachikō further into the 
school curriculum by including his story in a new national ethics (shūshin) 
textbook for second-year students issued in 1934. The painter Ishii Haku-
tei provided an illustration for the story, depicting Hachikō with both ears 
erect—much to Saitō’s relief, no doubt—waiting vainly but alertly outside 
of Shibuya station. The tale “On o wasureru na (Don’t Forget Your Debts of 
Gratitude)” was rendered in the following manner:
Hachikō was a cute dog. Soon after he was born, a person far away adopted 
Hachikō and cared tenderly for him just as if he were his own child. As 
a result, his weak body became very strong. Every day when Hachikō’s 
master departed for work, the dog would see him off at the train station, 
and every evening when he would return, Hachikō was there waiting to 
greet him at the station. Then one day, Hachikō’s master died. The dog, 
because he did not understand, searched for him daily. Hachikō would 
look for his master among all the people who got off at the station each 
time a train arrived. Many months passed in this manner.
 Even though one, two, three, ten years passed, Hachikō—grown 
old searching for his master—can be seen in front of the station every 
day.34
On the surface, the story appeared innocuous. But its title and its context 
















did not capture the content of the story; rather, it didactically admonished 
children, “Don’t Forget Your Debts of Gratitude.” Other stories in the same 
reader exhorted youngsters to strengthen their bodies, to honor their an-
cestors and emperors past and present, and to be obedient.
 Hints of how the text may have been taught can be gleaned from articles 
about the story in instructors’ manuals and educational magazines. The 
author of one such column, Kobayashi Gen, asserted that although the 
episode was true, teachers should teach it as a fable and not explore the 
tale’s veracity in the classroom. “Second-year students are meek,” Koba-
yashi wrote, “and will meekly accept what you tell them.” He challenged 
teachers to instill in youngsters a sense of their indebtedness because, “for 
children not to forget their debts, they must first feel them.” The debts that 
Kobayashi had in mind were made clear in the following paragraph. He 
suggested that the story be read in class on March 6, the birthday of the 
Meiji empress. This day, he recommended, should be dedicated to the im-
portant task of encouraging children to “contemplate the magnanimity of 
the splendid virtues of the imperial throne and to nourish hearts that will 
repay this supreme debt.”35
 The use of Hachikō to foster devotion to authority in youngsters likely 
had its intended effect. Although measuring accurately how people re-
spond to ideology is problematic, if not impossible, essays by second-
year primary-school students living in the Shibuya area and preserved in 
the station’s archive suggest that Hachikō did inspire in some children a 
desire to emulate his purported fidelity. Many students reported making a 
special visit to the statue, seeing huge numbers of bouquets and wreaths, 
and feeling grief at his passing. A number of the compositions mouthed 
set phrases—describing Hachikō waiting vainly in rainy, hot, and snowy 
weather—from a poem that appeared in Kishi’s Story of the Loyal Dog Hachikō, 
and a few children linked Hachikō with other paragons of loyalty who ap-
peared in their textbooks.36
 Stories of dogs were ideal material for the government’s efforts to in-
culcate the entire population with messages about duty to and sacrifice for 
the nation. More than anything, what made the Hachikō story so effective 
was that the protagonist was a dog, a seemingly benign, non-ideological, 
commonplace companion that nearly everyone could relate to. Because the 
heroes of the Hachikō narrative and other stories were canines, they were 
appealing to children as well as adults.















without its complications or its detractors, even within the Society for the 
Preservation of the Japanese Dog. Saitō’s fellow society member and canine 
researcher Hiraiwa Yonekichi harshly criticized the projection of human 
motivations onto Hachikō. In the April 1935 edition of Kodomo no shi kenkyū 
(Research on Children’s Poetry), a magazine he founded and edited, Hi-
raiwa wrote that the “devotion of dogs does not stem from a sense of obli-
gation for kindness received, but is based entirely on pure love.” Despite the 
“dumbfounding” fuss over his alleged commitment to his master, Hiraiwa 
noted, Hachikō was still an unhappy dog who had lost his master. What 
Hiraiwa objected to most sharply was the use of Hachikō for the edification 
of children:
There have been many people who one after another appear to manipu-
late even Hachikō’s name in a variety of ways. Now he is even being used 
as material to teach people’s children. This is because from the stand-
point of human morality, everyday occurrences in the world of dogs are 
seen as extraordinary acts of good that demonstrate immeasurable in-
tegrity. They clamor “Don’t Forget Your Debts of Gratitude.” However, 
because there are no debts of gratitude in the world of dogs, there can 
be no forgetfulness. It is pathetic that only now, “man”—that ingrate 
animal—is kneeling down to worship and plead for guidance from the 
law of dogs.37
 Saitō, for his part, did not see the deployment of the story as troubling. 
Referring to Hiraiwa’s criticism years later, he countered that the “greatest 
result . . . was that children throughout the country became very fond of 
dogs.”38 Saitō’s statement may have been true, but if so, it also bolsters the 
possibility that educators could make use of children’s affinity for dogs to 
foster allegiance to the state and to the emperor.
 Some observers outside the dog-fancying community found the fasci-
nation with Hachikō to be troubling, as well. Perhaps the most prominent 
voice to speak out was the liberal critic Hasegawa Nyozekan. In the April 
1935 issue of the literary magazine Bungei shunjū, Hasegawa criticized the 
uproar as sentimentalism gone awry. The public, he argued, influenced by 
a swirl of “rumor, sensational media reports, and theories,” had entered a 
“self-hypnotic, collective psychotic” trance that allowed them to believe 
things that they had not experienced and that they could not rationally ex-
plain. This tendency, Hasegawa worried, might result in similar delusions 
















quences than those created by the fervor over Hachikō. In his view, poli-
ticians, educators, and journalists had the responsibility to restrain this 
“national inclination” rather than take advantage of it. The nation’s leaders, 
Hasegawa warned, were not doing so but instead manipulating popular 
energies for their own benefit. During the recent years of politics by as-
sassination, he noted, elites had fallen into the dangerous habit of either 
condoning forces from below with their inaction or obliquely encouraging 
them through pardons or drastically reduced sentences.39
 Without using the word, Hasegawa was all but describing the culture of 
fascism. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, he openly argued that Japan was 
becoming fascist, the culmination of which process he saw in the Man-
churian Incident. Hasegawa, however, became less inclined to use the term 
after his book Nihon fashizumu hihan (Criticism of Japanese Fascism; 1932) 
was banned and then reissued after being strongly censored, and following 
a brief arrest in 1933 for allegedly making a contribution to the Japan Com-
munist Party. In his criticism of the Hachikō affair, Hasegawa appeared to 
affirm his earlier position that Japan had become fascist without expressly 
employing the term.
 While Saitō rationalized the objections of Hiraiwa, he dismissed off-
handedly the criticisms of intellectuals such as Hasegawa and the “mis-
understandings” that they created.40 Because loyalty, like purity, was so 
central to Hachikō’s public persona, Saitō and his allies strongly contested 
any doubts expressed about the dog’s devotion and subtly expressed reser-
vations about the “Japaneseness” of those who questioned the dog’s mo-
tives. Inflated claims of Hachikō’s fidelity, however, could not help but in-
vite criticism, if not cynicism, in certain quarters. A number of observers 
ventured that the dog was not waiting for his master at all. On the contrary, 
they deduced, the dog was merely hanging around the station and its sur-
rounding shops waiting to be fed. Hachikō, it was rumored, was especially 
fond of chicken kebabs, or yakitori. Saitō and others, however, rejected 
any notion that Hachikō was a mere stray loitering in search of handouts. 
Even in death—or, perhaps, especially because of the circumstances of his 
death—the controversy about the actual motivations of Hachikō persisted. 
The official story is that Hachikō died due to the effects of filariasis and 
old age. However, according to a widely circulated rumor attributed to the 
attending taxidermist, several yakitori skewers were discovered in the dog’s 
















Dogs Fit for Empire
In addition to purity and loyalty, “Japanese” dogs were often esteemed as 
being endowed with vigor and bravery. During the 1930s, they and some 
other breeds were militarized and, regardless of their biological sex, figura-
tively masculinized. Stephanitz and other National Socialists made similar 
attempts materially and metaphorically to mobilize “German” Shepherds. 
It was probably no coincidence that the breeds Saitō defined and the Minis-
try of Education recognized as “Japanese” were all powerful hunting dogs. 
They seemed to embody loyalty, martial strength, and courage, qualities 
in great demand, especially among males, as enthusiasm for imperialism 
and war pervaded the country. Is it any surprise that from the early 1930s 
ownership of “Japanese” dogs—as well as breeds frequently deployed by 
the military, such as the “German” Shepherd—became wildly popular?
 Saitō stipulated that physical power and ferocity were defining elements 
of the “Japanese” dog. The official breeding criteria of the Society for the 
Preservation of the Japanese Dog specified that the “nature and expression” 
of “Japanese” dogs—whether of the large, medium, or small category—
was “sharp and fierce.”42 Elsewhere, Saitō elaborated on what that standard 
meant. In a prominently positioned article in the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1929, he 
boasted that the incomparable courage and bravery of native dogs comple-
mented their muscular build and was the source of a distinctive “masculine 
beauty.”43 As has been mentioned, Saitō and other commentators boasted 
that “Japanese” dogs were instilled with bushidō, the spirit of the samurai, 
and that ancient blood ties to wolves made “Japanese” dogs more fearless 
and fearsome than other canines.
 In the second half of the 1930s, fears about imminent disappearance 
were replaced by anxieties about the proper role for “Japanese” dogs as it 
became clear that they had been successfully preserved. The question be-
came all the more pressing as the conflict on the continent widened and 
military demand for canines increased in the mid-1930s. Imperial military 
authorities preferred three Western dog breeds—Shepherds, Doberman 
Pinschers, and Airedale terriers, in that order—but probably 90 percent of 
all army dogs were “German” Shepherds.44 Many government and private 
dog trainers considered native dogs unfit for military and police work be-
cause of their relatively small size (except for the Akita) and because of 
their difficulty in obeying the commands of anyone other than the person 
who had trained them. Not surprisingly, fans of the dogs, including the 
















to the task. Araki, Saitō, and other fanciers repeatedly urged the military 
to conduct more research and training and to mobilize “Japanese” dogs 
more widely.45 Although few native dogs were actually conscripted, trained, 
and activated until the desperate final years of the war, this did not prevent 
authors from metaphorically militarizing them in popular children’s litera-
ture and other media.
 In a largely unresolved irony, just as Hachikō’s floppy left ear and his 
appetite for kebabs undermined pronouncements about his purported purity 
and the breed’s unrivaled fidelity, his temperament weakened claims about 
“Japanese” dogs’ incomparable martial spirit and bravery. As was related in 
The Story of the Loyal Dog Hachikō, but subsequently went unmentioned, the ca-
nine who was touted as the model “Japanese” dog seems in fact to have been 
quite fainthearted. While taking walks, Hachikō was apparently unnerved 
by gunfire resounding from military exercises at the nearby army base in 
Yoyogi and was even rattled by children shooting toy guns.46
Conclusion
The creation of the “Japanese” dog sheds light on the relationship between 
animals and the formation of national and racial identities in the early twen-
tieth century. This history exposes the interconnections among humans, 
canines, environmental protection, animal breeding, national education, 
and identity formation. It is clear that “fascism’s furry friends” were not re-
stricted to the Japanese archipelago. Parallels with the German experience, 
in particular, are conspicuous. One reason for such historical contiguities 
is that both countries emulated the late-nineteenth-century nationaliza-
tion of dog breeds elsewhere. Another reason for the commonalities is that 
Saitō and other enthusiasts sought inspiration in Stephanitz’s efforts to 
promote the “German” Shepherd. A final similarity is that both countries 
were pervaded by the culture of fascism, which radicalized and intensified 
nationalism and racism and that explicitly glorified the loyalty and violence 
that were implicit in earlier civilizationist discourses.
 One may be tempted to see Saitō and other fanciers of “Japanese” dogs 
as intellectuals schooled in European science and culture who retreated to 
the apolitical pursuit of launching a kennel club and passively adapted to 
the political climate of the 1930s. This may have been the case. They may 
simply have liked dogs. However, Saitō’s and his colleagues’ search for 
and creation of a pure “Japanese” dog untainted by and superior to foreign 















ness shown by Hachikō and other native dogs, suggests that their hobby was 
anything but a withdrawal from politics. The Western ideas that they drew 
on—of purebred dogs as representatives of nations—harbored underlying 
assumptions of racism and nationalism that could not easily be erased; nor 
did Saitō and his colleagues attempt to do so. Instead, Saitō and his allies 
combined these ideas with a notion of Japanese uniqueness, obsessions 
with purity, and an admiration for loyalty and bravery to produce what on 
the surface were mere dog-breeding standards and a heart-warming story 
of a faithful dog. A closer look, though, indicates that the story of Hachikō 
and the movement to preserve “Japanese” dogs contributed, perhaps unin-
tentionally but nevertheless powerfully, to the construction of an imperial 
fascist culture that would breed the destruction of human and animal life 
on an unprecedented scale, both within and beyond Japan’s borders.
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Narrating the Nation-ality of a Cinema:  
The Case of Japanese Prewar Film
When Walker Conner posed the important question, “When is 
a nation?” he was not simply reasserting the historicity of a concept that, 
almost by definition, has often feigned amnesia about its historical produc-
tion,1 he was reminding us that national consciousness is fundamentally a 
mass phenomenon that cannot simply be studied through written artifacts 
mostly created by social elites. The nation may be, as Benedict Anderson 
says, an imagined community, but even in Anderson’s scheme what is cru-
cial is not simply the form of that imagining, but its material extent. That is 
one reason Anderson closely ties the emergence of the nation with the de-
velopment of print capitalism, to him a means of spreading and standard-
izing the vernacular and enabling the simultaneous imaginings of commu-
nity by mass populations.2 Ernest Gellner similarly makes industrialization 
and modernization a condition for nationalism, although his emphasis is 
on the development of an exchangeable labor population rendered non-
exchangeable with those of other nations by a language and knowledge 
shaped by nationwide education systems.3
 This only underlines the necessity of a double-pronged approach to ana-






















as “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permu-
tations is a palingenetic form of popular ultra-nationalism.”4 Fascism’s 
aestheticization of politics, stressed by Walter Benjamin,5 does, as Andrew 
Hewitt emphasizes, actually function “on the basis of one of the most radi-
cal reaffirmations of the autonomy of the aesthetic—l’art pour l’art” because 
it renders politics—as well as the ultimate pursuit of politics, war—a dis-
interested object of contemplation.6 Yet that subsuming of politics to the 
cultural realm does not deny the fact that Susan Sontag’s mass spectacles 
of “fascinating fascism,”7 or the processes of “internal colonization” that 
Mabel Berezin sees as essential in the creation of fascist identities,8 require 
national forms of material organization and mobilization to be realized. 
Just as cultural analysis is essential in understanding the phenomenon of 
fascism, so must we delineate the sociopolitical enactment of that cul-
ture, the extent of a hyper-nationalism usually predicated as “popular” and 
“mass.”
 I will use this two-pronged approach to focus on the question of fas-
cist cinema, concentrating more specifically on the degree to which film in 
Japan achieved a degree of nation-ality—the state of being a national phe-
nomenon—in an age of ultranationalism.9 In alignment with Anderson and 
Homi Bhabha,10 much work on national cinema has focused on the relation 
of nation-state and film in terms of intertextual imaginings of community. 
Including problems of intertextuality in the study of national cinema has 
allowed scholars to work against the ideological tendency of reinforcing the 
nation through film (studies) and instead reveal the contradictory dynamics 
of the national cinema enterprise. The recent focus on deconstructing the 
conceptual category of national cinema can itself, however, occasionally 
lead to a dead end. A scholar of British cinema such as Andrew Higson, for 
instance, can offer many reasons for how the concept of national cinema is 
problematic (e.g., it emphasizes unity over diversity, home over homeless-
ness, and presumes imagined communities are bordered and national not 
diasporic),11 but his ultimate “deconstruction” of the idea leaves us with 
little room to understand either the historical conditions behind the emer-
gence of the concept of national cinema or the material struggles over time 
in the realms of production, distribution, and exhibition to create or tear 
down national borders in the motion picture world.
 In the field of Japanese film studies, Darrell Davis’s Picturing Japaneseness 
has offered an important contribution to the study of wartime militarist 
cinema but one that is similarly hampered by its historical blinkers.12 His 






















42) powerfully describes the film’s aesthetic sacramentalization of the na-
tion through what Davis calls the “monumental style”—a style that could 
be termed fascistic if only because of Mizoguchi’s contemporary written 
praise for Goebbels’s cultural policies.13 He also argues that the film’s Japa-
neseness—its status as the epitome of a national film (kokumin eiga)—is 
a product of its textual appropriation of traditional aesthetic forms, its 
ideological project of expanding bushidō into the realm of women,14 as well 
as, importantly, its efforts to teach spectators to perceive in a more purely 
Japanese way. Here national cinema is not simply a set of textual or con-
ceptual features but a practice of spectatorship. Unlike Noël Burch, who 
assumes that the film embodies age-old Heian aesthetics even in wartime 
Japan,15 Davis historicizes to the degree he recognizes the film as a con-
scious product of the state’s effort to reconstruct Japaneseness during the 
war. Nevertheless, Davis never fully addresses either the material or the dis-
cursive implications of the fact that this most “Japanese” of films was not 
only a box-office failure, but was also cited by some critics as a specific ex-
ample of what should not represent the nation.16 The problem is not simply 
Davis’s failure to address mass consciousness, but his tendency to make 
assumptions about what is Japanese—in this case, Mizoguchi’s version of 
Genroku aesthetics—and thus about the nation-ality of a cinema, when it 
was precisely these issues that, as I will show, were still subject to intense 
debate and struggle on various planes even during the war. Such inadequacy 
in delineating the enabling environments for a national cinematic textuality 
prompt us to join Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano in her call for more specificity 
in accounting for the relation between modern mass culture and national-
ism.17
 This essay will adumbrate these struggles and conflicts over the form 
and meaning of a Japanese cinema from the arrival of motion pictures in 
Japan in 1896 through the Second World War. My intention is to specify 
and historicize the conditions that (dis)enable a national cinema in Japan 
and thus clarify how these varied antagonisms were a definitive aspect of 
the national-ization of film in the period. Not only were conceptions of na-
tional cinema torn between such opposites as the Western eye and national 
tradition or high culture and mass entertainment, practical issues such as 
the national-ization of the film industry and the “training” of spectators 
hampered the national cinema enterprise. Such a picture should complicate 
any attempt to term wartime Japanese film a fascist cinema both by relocat-
ing the texts in larger conditions of production and reception and by re-











modernity, the local and the national, and the Japanese and the Western. In 
the end, I will argue, it is the very gap—as well as interactions—between a 
cultural aesthetics and its material conditions that define the question of a 
fascist cinema in Japan; the difficulty, even impossibility, of nation-alizing 
film during the war was in many ways the condition for the (im)possibility 
of a fascist cinema, rendering a fascist cinema less an aesthetic than a pro-
cess attempting to overcome the hybrid contradictions that were at the 
source of such futility, and realize through force the ideal of a total, mass, 
and hyper-national cinema.
Stealing the Western Cinematic Gaze
In some senses, the cinema was from its beginning an international 
medium, albeit one clearly centered in Europe and the United States. Films 
traveled the globe, and no nation indisputably dominated their domestic 
market. Where a movie came from was not yet important: until around 1910 
in Japan, film magazines would often report on the newest films without 
even mentioning where they had been made (despite the fact that in those 
days the vast majority were from abroad). National difference only became 
discursively significant in Japan around 1910, when intellectual reformers 
began targeting the domestic cinema for critique, arguing that its use of 
theatrical acting, onnagata, and immobile, long-shot, long takes, in addition 
to its reliance on the benshi (lecturers who explained every film shown dur-
ing the silent era) for narrative enunciation, was inherently uncinematic. 
These “pure film” reformers called for a form of cinematic modernization 
that would rid Japanese cinema of these impurities. Just as the conception 
of film as a problem to be solved (given its perceived pernicious effects) 
helped distinguish between the filmic and the non-filmic and formulate 
a unique meaning for the term cinema, the boundaries of nations aided 
the mapping of the limits of cinema (and vice versa).18 These are discur-
sive structures that would shape the national-ization of Japanese cinema 
through the Second World War. Japanese cinema thus appears on the map 
through discourses differentiating exciting, liberating foreign films from 
the lackadaisical, seemingly uncinematic Japanese output, a map with the 
legend note: Japan equals non-cinema.
 The state of Japanese film was taken by many to be a source of national 
shame, so much so that one senses Japanese cinema being articulated as 
subject to a gaze that was not just Japanese. This was not unique to film: 






















the other, one conscious of potential embarrassment yet intended to earn 
the recognition of that foreign spectator. Given such a discursive context, it 
is not surprising that most reformers proposed exporting Japanese cinema. 
Acceptance in the eyes of foreign audiences became the sign of cinematic 
achievement; in the words of one writer, “Only when Japanese-made films 
are exported abroad as commodities can we say that they have for the first 
time reached the stage of completion.”19
 The aggressive calls for export largely coincided with the rise of 
American- and European-made films featuring stories centered on Japanese 
characters and situations (performed by Caucasians or, in the case of films 
by Thomas Ince, by Japanese-born actors such as Sessue Hayakawa). Many 
considered this proof that well-made Japanese films could succeed abroad 
and chastised producers for wasting a good business opportunity. Yet the 
stereotypes and racism evident in such works provided reasons for many 
to prevent importation or, at least, censor them. With such films gaining 
worldwide popularity, there was an almost national urgency to the project 
of producing and exporting more accurate films on Japan. The following 
words by Kaeriyama Norimasa, the polemical leader of the reformers and 
later a director in his own right, indicate how complex these burgeoning 
national feelings toward the cinema were:
Look! Has not the U.S. Kay-Bee Company created a six-reel epic on the 
eruption of our Sakurajima Island, using immigrant Japanese actors and 
boldly selling the film on the market?20 Did not the Pathé cameraman 
Meneaux [?] photograph the volcanoes of Japan, braving in particular the 
dangers at the time of Sakurajima’s eruption to boldly shoot an excellent 
film that Japanese cameramen were incapable of making? . . . Although 
Japanese producers possess this unique and splendid land called Japan, 
they do not make a single film aimed for overseas. Isn’t it a colossal loss 
that they let it be stolen from them by the hands of foreigners?21
It is interesting that Kaeriyama’s discourse renders Japan not only a com-
modity to be traded on the world market, but also the object of theft. This 
recalls, but puts a different spin on, Slavoj Žižek’s discussion of the nation 
in terms of “theft of enjoyment.” To Žižek, what is at stake in national or 
ethnic oppositions is “possession of the national Thing. We always impute 
to the ‘other’ an excessive enjoyment; s/he wants to steal our enjoyment (by 
ruining our way of life) and/or has access to some secret, perverse enjoy-
ment.”22 Kaeriyama’s comments make a public issue of this theft of the na-











that Japanese neither appreciate nor know they have. As such, the nation 
involved less “our Thing”—“something ‘they,’ the others cannot grasp”—
than something that was easily taken because it was unacknowledged. It is 
this ability to take what technically is theft-proof that underlines a differ-
ence between Japan and Žižek’s situation. Žižek considers the West’s cur-
rent fascination with Eastern Europe, wherein Eastern Europe’s gaze func-
tions as the means by which the powerful West fantasizes its superiority in 
the eyes of others. Japan’s West, like the West’s Eastern Europe, is in some 
ways Japan’s ego ideal, cited to urge Japanese filmmakers to be more con-
scious of their own territory. But the bearer of the gaze here, unlike Eastern 
Europe, is in a position of geopolitical superiority; the West in many ways 
also functions as Japan’s superego. The thieving gaze of Western cinema is 
more threatening, taking what is normally not its own with the backing of 
a colonialist world system; its vision is more parental, as Japanese (often 
rendered childlike in reformist discourse) strive to gain the recognition 
of the Law (of the Father, of cinema). The Western gaze can also objectify 
Japan, making it impossible for it to assume the gaze as a full-fledged sub-
ject (unless it adopts that same gaze itself ). It is here that shame before the 
Western gaze enters the national cinema picture.
 This is first reflected in what was ultimately an ambiguous attitude 
toward foreign-made “Japanese” pictures. While roundly criticized for their 
inaccuracies, they were still termed more “cinematic” than Japanese-made 
films and thus were also an object of admiration. Any effort to teach for-
eigners about the truth of Japan was imbricated with—or even undermined 
by—the simultaneous quest to earn their approval, both as the other that 
constitutes the self and as the producers of this more cinematic cinema. 
The success of the export policy always depended on acceptance on the 
part of foreign spectators. “If we can just make films even foreigners can 
understand,” said Kinema rēkodo (Kinema Record), “then we should be able 
to export our works abroad for a long time.”23 Here the quest for a Japanese 
cinema (to truly represent Japan) closely intersected with the desire for a 
cinematic cinema. For a vision of Japan to be recognized abroad, it had to 
be represented in a supposedly universal language comprehensible on its 
own to other spectators, one that, to reformers, necessitated eliminating 
such uncinematic markers of Japanese uniqueness as the benshi. Japanese 
cinema was to be particular to the degree it first assumed the universal 
form of the exchangeable commodity. Reformers in effect emphasized that 
a pure film was a necessary condition for a purely Japanese film: Japan was 






















is partially a product of cinema). The inherent paradox of Japanese cinema 
was that for it to become different, it first had to negate its cultural distinct-
ness; for it to become a national cinema, it was required initially to become 
the “translation” of foreign film style.24
 Žižek notes that “what we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft 
of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly 
stolen from us,”25 but in Kaeriyama’s discourse, the traumatic lack of owner-
ship is ultimately disavowed less by accusing foreign cameramen of stealing 
images of beautiful Japan than by putting the ultimate blame on Japanese 
film producers who failed to take them themselves. That which reformers 
wanted “back” in Japan, then, were not the images of landscape themselves 
but the way they were filmed, the attitude toward cinema itself. In a per-
verse way, the stolen object that must be “returned” was that which prop-
erly belonged to the other in the first place: the film style of Hollywood and 
Europe. (If this was to found a Japanese cinema, then perhaps the origin 
of Japanese cinema lies more in Thomas Ince than in Kabuki.) Resentment 
over the theft of mere images of Japan thus masked a desire to possess the 
stylistic means by which those images were turned into cinema. The theft 
of enjoyment was (or was to be) actually committed by Japan and not the 
other. Perhaps we can say that guilt over this crime helped construct much 
of future Japanese cinema.
 Such guilt was quickly displaced away from reformers advocating “trans-
lation” of Western cinema and onto the body of Japanese film itself. Domes-
tic motion pictures were made the source of shame that seemingly necessi-
tated the transgression of stealing film style from the other. The blame for 
this crime was also directed at those audiences—often composed of lower-
class workers, women, or children—who were seen to favor such Japanese 
fare. The justification of modernization through discourses labeling these 
audiences vulgar and ignorant reveals how class divisions were essential 
to constructing a more cinematic Japanese film—a national cinema. This 
perception of the vulgarity of Japanese movie fare and its audience was in 
many ways a confirmation of how the West would supposedly view current 
Japanese movies. The quest for pure film reform, pitting a true Japanese 
film against the socially vulgar fare, then, marked the internalization of the 
other into the Japanese self, the adoption of the foreign mode of looking 
as the mirror image of the national cinema. If we just substitute “national 
cinema” for “national identity,” the following statement by Yoshioka Hiro-
shi would fit well the case of Japanese film: “the very core of the national 












This equation of the Japanese with the uncinematic, the internalization 
of the cinematic gaze of the West, the adoption of its so-called universal 
cinematic language to obtain recognition of Japanese national cinema, 
and the class-based division of the universal and modernized versus the 
local and backward were all discursive moves that gave significance to the 
term Japanese in Japanese cinema. Yet this linguistic shaping of the coun-
try’s motion-picture output by intellectuals was not sufficient to mold a 
national film industry. Reformers were painfully aware that their revolution 
in criticism—to be followed by practical efforts like those of Kaeriyama—
was hampered by the current mode of production of Japanese motion pic-
tures. In spite of the potential of this mechanical means of reproduction, 
Japanese film producers throughout the 1910s were mostly making only one 
print of every film produced.27 To reformers, this ignorance of the poten-
tial of the medium proved that contemporary producers were hopelessly 
unable to vie for the foreign market and right the mistaken views of Japan 
circulating abroad. Worse yet, they were failing to use cinema as a repro-
ductive medium capable of unifying the nation. Cinematic texts in Japan 
of the 1910s were more local than national since they were shown only in 
one place at one time, accompanied by a benshi and other elements in an 
exhibition space, which produced meaning deeply rooted in local experi-
ence. In the end, exhibitors and their theaters were more powerful in the 
industry, both economically and semiotically. Since no film possessed sig-
nificance that transcended those local differences, cinema in Japan was far 
from being the kind of medium Anderson imagines bolstering the shared 
imaginations of a national community. Critics were profoundly aware that 
industrial reform was necessary for the cinema to be national. This con-
tributed to what would be a long-running discourse on “modernizing” the 
industry in line with Fordist rationality. Eliminating such practices as de-
veloping a sole print was part of a larger effort to institute a clear division of 
labor in the industry, separating production, distribution, and exhibition, 
and to centralize both power and signification in the space of production. 
Kaeriyama Norimasa’s model for the film industry was the publishing busi-
ness, where publishers/studios would create the product that was distrib-
uted to the readers/spectators, leaving it such that “exhibitors are [like] 
retail book stores.”28
 A post-1918 history of Japanese cinema could paint a picture of this mod-






















films, Sei no kagayaki (The Glow of Life) and Miyama no otome (Maid of the Deep 
Mountains)—both made in 1918 and released in 1919)—are often credited 
in orthodox movie histories as the first cinematic Japanese films, ones that 
began to adopt the motion-picture techniques of Hollywood. This trend in 
reform was accelerated in 1920 by the formation of two studios, Taikatsu 
and Shōchiku, both of which claimed as one of their goals the export of 
Japanese films, in part through a film style (they brought in Japanese film-
making talent who had worked in Hollywood) and a studio structure that 
emulated the Hollywood example (Shōchiku officials, for instance, traveled 
to California to inspect that industry’s layout). The number of films per 
print increased, and a burgeoning national film press helped to assert uni-
versal meanings for individual texts. As Hase Masato has argued, early cen-
sorship also targeted local, “live performance” aspects of exhibition (espe-
cially the benshi) to facilitate a film text that would have the same meaning 
in the theater as it did in the sterile censorship room—and thus in any other 
locality.29 Nationalization of censorship by the Home Ministry in 1925 in 
effect assumed that local differences no longer mattered in the regulation 
of the motion pictures. The coming of sound in the early and mid-1930s also 
encouraged, as Fujii Jinshi has argued, both a concentration of capital that 
enabled a shift from craft to Fordist production and the articulation of film 
as medium, molding the film work as a standardized product founded in a 
naturalized style that hides technique.30 It was as if cinema was being well 
prepared for its role as the bearer of the nation during the war.
 Quite a number of factors complicate this linear narrative of national-
ization, however. First, industrially, studios would continue to produce a 
small number of prints into the late 1930s, opting, as their predecessors did 
in the 1910s, for increased production of films over multiple reproduction 
of prints. Studios were mostly capital poor, protracting their reliance on 
powerful local exhibitors to keep afloat. Thus, even though Fujii’s example 
of a capital-rich studio like Tōhō (backed by Kobayashi Ichizō) presented 
one model of respectable modernization in the industry, other studios such 
as Daito were headed by figures tied to Yakuza and exhibition bosses, who 
churned out films cheaply without rationalized management practices. 
While companies like Shōchiku could present, as Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano 
argues, a “light” vision of urban modernity that ideologically accommo-
dated traditional national identity,31 that image was always contrasted with 
a “vulgar” entertainment that critics still decried as a national disgrace. 
Such hybridity, in which different modes of production and conceptions 











cinema—industry, style, reception, discourse, and so on—were all sites 
for struggle over the meanings of cinema, the nation, and the modern.
 Much had changed since the 1910s, but hybridity hampered the imag-
ining of a homogeneous national cinema. Even as late as 1941, well into 
the state’s total mobilization for war, the critic Imamura Taihei could ex-
press in writing his deep worries over the possibility of a Japanese national 
cinema, a concern directed less at textual than at material problems. Ac-
cording to the statistics Imamura cited, as of July 1940 only 10 percent of 
the cities, towns, or villages in Japan had cinemas, which meant that, while 
a country such as the Soviet Union had a population of 4,362 people per 
cinema, Japan had 29,625. Japan could boast 400 million admissions to 
movie theaters in 1939 (about four times a year per capita), but most were 
concentrated in the city.32 Clearly, most Japanese did not attend movies 
often, and when they did, they were confronted with an extremely divided 
industry, with ten feature-film companies producing a total of about five 
hundred pictures a year—second in the world. Even if a splendid cinematic 
aestheticization of the nation like The Loyal 47 Ronin was produced, it would 
be drowned out in the flood of movies and become a kokumin eiga unseen 
by most of the kokumin (national citizenry). Given these conditions, in the 
words of the film director Kurata Bunjin, “The majority of Japanese films 
could not develop and grow as national films either in name or in reality.”33 
The argument of Imamura and Kurata was in effect that cinema was not the 
kind of shared medium envisioned by Anderson and thus could not (to their 
chagrin) contribute to the formation of common Japanese imaginaries, fas-
cist or not, or to the effective aesthetic expression of the nation.
 This problem was not lost on authorities. Wartime film policy never 
simply pursued the utilization of an existing tool for the propaganda pur-
poses of war and nation; it always involved a reformation of the medium to 
make it more capable of representing or even constructing the nation. If a 
national cinema was industrially problematic, given the number of studios, 
the excess of films, and problems in distribution, bureaucrats used their 
powers under the 1939 Film Law to consolidate the industry in several 
stages (reducing, for instance, the number of feature-film companies from 
ten to three), regulate the use of film stock and shorten program length 
(thus reducing the number of films made while increasing the number of 
prints produced), and, finally, in the waning days of the war, to streamline 
distribution so that audiences effectively had only two films to choose from 
a week. Given the lack of resources, the construction of extra theaters was 






















films in rural locations. These measures did effectuate state influence over 
the industry, but they also put into practice longstanding proposals on how, 
through material reform, to improve the films, rationalize and modernize 
the industry, and, it was hoped, enforce the true national-ization of Japa-
nese cinema.
An Un-Japanese Cinema
Limitations on material resources in part prevented the realization of the 
ideal of a nationwide film industry. Film theaters, for instance, would be 
scarce until well after the end of the war. One could argue that such material 
restrictions were particular to film; that the inability of cinema to national-
ize signifies little about the condition of fascist nationalism in Japan. It 
is my argument, however, that what complicated the national-ization of 
cinema involved discourses extending beyond cinema into the core of the 
nation itself. To consider this, I would like to discuss two other factors that 
hampered efforts to perfect a national film industry: the issue of spectator-
ship and contradictions inherent in the discourse on film and nation. I will 
consider the latter first.
 Longstanding arguments by critics about the deficiencies of Japanese 
film laid the foundation for government-led reforms, again providing evi-
dence of the role that speaking about cinema historically has played in the 
construction of both the textuality and the industrial conditions of Japanese 
film. It was inevitable, then, that policies on kokumin eiga suffered from 
the same contradictions that had been borne by discourses on national 
cinema since the 1910s. One such contradiction was the fact that cinema 
was still predominantly conceived as a problem—that its definition in part 
depended on it being a social dilemma. While leading government bureau-
crats had been conscious of the propaganda potential of the medium since 
the 1920s, this was always coupled with a concern for—and, one could say, 
fear of—its deleterious effects, the unknown impact of these flickering 
shadows in dark theaters surrounded by neon (the less rational side of its 
modernity). Cultural elites remained ambivalent toward film’s capacity to 
express “nation-ality.” The government may have encouraged roving pro-
jection units, but the low number of theaters in the country was partially 
the result of longstanding efforts by the police to curb theater construc-
tion. And even though government agencies were recommending films to 
be seen by the entire nation, the majority of schools, fearing the ill effects of 











prohibiting students from seeing movies without adult accompaniment.34 
Young Japanese were being told simultaneously that they had to see certain 
films and that movies as whole were bad for them.
 This is one reason the nation was inherently difficult to represent in film: 
to many, cinema was too alien a medium to be entrusted with construct-
ing the nation. Consider, for instance, the image of the emperor, himself 
represented in propaganda as the father of the family state, the embodi-
ment of the kokutai. While films, especially newsreels and bunka eiga, were 
encouraged to represent the nation, the emperor was a problematic symbol. 
Censorship regulations, designed in part to protect the emperor from this 
fearful medium, strictly curtailed cinematic representations of his figure. 
When he did appear on film, it was usually in extreme long shots, in a car, 
or through metonymic emblems such as the imperial crest. There was thus 
a contradiction between the need to represent the kokutai through the em-
peror and the need to deny cinematic representation of the emperor (so as 
not to sully his divine status), a situation that produced an endless deferral 
of signification as the kokutai was represented by the emperor who was 
represented by the crest and so on. The paradox was that the sign meant to 
represent the nation in film was itself unrepresentable in cinema.
 Much of this reflects continued ambivalence over the modernity film did 
or could represent, ambivalence perhaps inevitable in an Asian culture con-
fronting modernity. But it also relates to lingering conflicts over the shap-
ing of a modern Japan. A central contradiction complicating the national-
ization of film was the fact that Japanese cinema could only be constructed 
on the basis of the equation Japan equals non-cinema. Even after the pure 
film reform of the late 1910s and early 1920s, and the appearance of such 
widely praised directors as Itō Daisuke, Ozu Yasujirō, Mizoguchi Kenji, 
Yamanaka Sadao, Itami Mansaku, Uchida Tomu, and Tasaka Tomotaka, 
the majority of Japanese film critics still held the domestic output in low 
esteem. The liberal critic Hazumi Tsuneo, for instance, began an essay en-
titled “The Tradition of Japanese Cinema” (1941) with the bold declaration 
that Japan was below even the second rung of national cinemas in quality.35 
This attitude, however, became less tenable as official policy came to frown 
on the foreign films (eventually banning their exhibition after Pearl Harbor) 
and to put the stamp of approval on certain domestic films. This prompted 
a sort of tenkō (apostasy) in film critics who had to reevaluate the standards 
by which they judged motion pictures. Hazumi, for instance, speaks of this 
change in opinion when he compares the anger he felt around 1920 toward 






















eventual appreciation of the reason for their laughter—the absurdity that 
the Japanese on screen were mere copies of Westerners. The founding 
premise of Japanese cinema—that it was to be a translation of Western 
film—was now under question, as was the assumption of a universal lan-
guage essential to cinema. Hazumi came to reject the statement that there 
is a tempo inherent in cinema and instead asserted a national difference in 
tempo—and thus, cinema. He, like other critics around him, now had to 
conceptualize the difference of Japanese cinema—for example, a slower, 
more leisurely tempo—not as a violation of cinematic essence or quality, 
but as an authentic expression of a unique culture. They had to renegoti-
ate the relationships not only between the universal and the particular, the 
Western and the Japanese, and the cinematic and the uncinematic, but also 
between modernity and tradition, as Japanese cinema’s uniqueness was 
often tied to the legacy of ancient arts.
 This renegotiation, however, was rarely without problems. While rec-
ognizing the slower tempo of Japanese films as an expression of Japanese 
life, Hazumi nonetheless openly admitted his desire for Japanese society to 
speed up; he could not completely free himself of the suspicion that slow 
Japanese films were simply not good cinema. Almost by definition, their 
conception of cinema’s universalist modernity could not totally allow for 
Asian alterity. One thus sees such figures as Imamura Taihei, who, while de-
voting considerable amounts of his writing to the relation between cinema 
and Japanese traditional arts, sought in these arts not an explanation for 
the national cinema’s difference but, instead, the markers of universal cine-
maticity.36 Hazumi’s somewhat confused solution to the contradiction be-
tween cinema’s universality and its particular nationality was to resort to a 
humanism in which belonging to a nation was itself the universal human 
essence.37 To him, rootless (nenashigusa) films devoid of national identity 
were based neither in human life nor in cinema, a charge he often leveled 
against contemporary Japanese cinema.
 What these discursive conflicts between universality and particularity, 
modernity and tradition, and Japan and the West reveal is a fundamental 
uncertainty over the definition of the nation Japan to which cinema is sup-
posed to be attributed. This is reflected in Hazumi’s hope that Japan itself 
would speed up, a future he believed might come true, since “cinematic tra-
ditions cannot but have some sort of influence over everyday sentiment.”38 
It is also, I would argue, expressed in a basic indeterminacy in the articu-
lation of kokumin eiga. Peter B. High has documented the seemingly end-











revolving around such poles as education versus entertainment and propa-
ganda versus pleasure, debates, he correctly notes, that never reached a con-
clusion.39 Hana Washitani takes these same debates as the intertext for the 
contradictions that are textually evident in a kokusaku (national policy) films 
such as Makino Masahiro’s Ahen Sensō (The Opium War; 1943), which incred-
ibly was both a critique of Western imperialism and a celebratory imitation 
of the Hollywood musical.40 Such conflicts over the cinematic articulation 
of the nation reveal that the struggle in wartime Japan was not simply over 
how to use the cinema to represent the nation, but over what nation the 
cinema should represent and how to place Japan in the oppositions between 
universal and particular, East and West, and tradition and modernity.
Training Imperial Spectators
The fact that many Japanese spectators stayed away from kokumin eiga 
such as The Loyal 47 Ronin indicates how they, too, were involved in con-
flicts over the definitions of both cinema and nation. Their participation, 
however, also made them one of the primary problems in articulating a 
national cinema, for while various regulatory forces could promote films 
representing the kokutai, there was no guarantee that audiences would cor-
rectly read the meaning inscribed in such works.41 Especially given that the 
picture of a Japanese cinema catering to vulgar tastes was still vivid into the 
wartime, many felt that not only the films, but also the spectators, had to be 
improved to facilitate national consciousness through film. In the words of 
the director Itami Mansaku, “Half of what determines the quality of cinema 
is the people who make it, but the other half is the society that makes them 
make it. Therefore, the true meaning of improving cinema must involve 
upgrading not only the films, but at the same time, the culture of regular 
spectators who are the foundation of those films.”42 Spectators were ac-
knowledged as a power capable of “changing, revolutionizing, and moving 
the cinema,”43 and this is in part why those in charge of film regulation, 
like the Information Bureau’s Fuwa Suketoshi, spoke of “training (kunren)” 
spectators.44 A consciousness of the need to more actively construct “cor-
rect spectators”45—or, at least, to direct them in their viewing—had been 
evident since the early 1920s. I have written about how censors conceived of 
the benshi as a potential educator and censor, responsible for instructing 
spectators about the film at the same time that they checked on the pro-
priety of their reactions. Benshi were articulated as the force in the theater 






















absorption of national meaning and the internalization of self-regulatory 
functions. Parents and educators were also envisioned as substitute ben-
shi who would watch over their children as they viewed movies and ensure 
that they received the proper meaning.46 Such trained viewers would pre-
sumably read films as imperial subjects within a cultural milieu defined by 
the fascist “political ideal that denies the separation of the public and the 
private self.”47
 Some argued that Japanese spectators in fact were already well trained 
by wartime. In a fascinating article dating from 1941, the critic Mizumachi 
Seiji, pointing to cinema audiences who dutifully stood in line awaiting 
the film, argued that “they line up without even being conscious of order, 
and that itself creates a splendid order.” His example implies spectators as 
imperial subjects who had so internalized the regulation of meaning that 
they established their own “correct order of entertainment,” even when Mi-
zumachi thought the film was a poor one. Assuming a different position 
from those who stressed that films, as weapons in the “film war (eigasen),” 
must not be “unexploded bombs ( fuhatsudan),” he highlighted the specta-
tor’s own service to the state:
For better of worse, films must be made. But in the case of cinema, an 
“unexploded bomb” can be impossible depending on the beliefs of the 
people. As long as a film exists here, we spectators can have the reso-
lution to follow it as a splendid piece of entertainment. As long as we 
follow it, it cannot be an unexploded bomb, since we conceive that fol-
lowing a film can render our daily life an element in our service to the 
state. It is when film spectators do not think of it as a service that they 
become dangerous.48
True imperial subjects thus render any film imperial. In this case, propa-
ganda is less a rhetorical means of convincing the unconvinced than an 
occasion to answer the hail of the state and confirm one’s place in the 
imaginary community, this time by completing films for the country as part 
of one’s “service.”
 The last sentence of the quote, however, expresses both the potential 
threat of misreadings and the continual necessity to “train” spectators. If 
one of the conditions articulating the formation of a national cinema was 
spectatorship, one of the problems confronting wartime film bureaucrats 
was that, to have a cinema that was truly nationwide, it had to show to 
audiences who were not yet “trained” to confirm the ideology of a film. 











be trained, but Japanese cinema was too imbricated in class differences 
to allow equality among viewers: if Japanese film was always a problem, 
so were some of its spectators. Consider, for instance, the liberal theorist 
Hasegawa Nyozekan’s writings on film. When most professional film crit-
ics were still extolling the superiority of foreign film, Hasegawa valorized 
a difference in Japanese cinema that he located in a certain relaxed tempo, 
an atmospheric line ( jōchō no sen). Hasegawa found this tone in everything 
from contemporary film (his example is Tsuchi to heitai [Mud and Soldiers], dir. 
Tasaka Tomotaka, 1939) to Noh drama and everyday speech, thus consider-
ing it less an artistic creation than an ethic, “The condition of the heart and 
form of Japanese everyday life.” Yet despite attributing this slow atmosphere 
to “the Japanese,” he nonetheless points to a different Japanese: “in drama, 
it is the speech of servants that is curt, contracted, and suddenly quickens. 
Their line of movement is poor in atmosphere, becoming extremely con-
stricted spatially and temporally. This symbolizes the fact that they are of 
a morally low class.”49 What is supposedly representative of the nation is 
seemingly lost on some of “the people” (here represented on stage), classes 
who logically must be less Japanese than those of higher status. Hasegawa 
reproduces this structure with regard to Japanese cinema as he criticizes 
the fast-tempo jidaigeki films popular at the time (usually with lower-class 
audiences) for “lacking the morality that constitutes the internal condition 
of Japanese aesthetic sense,” a lack that is “impossible for a Japanese art.” 
By drawing borders within Japanese cinema that are mapped onto a social 
hierarchy, he denies the Japaneseness of much of Japanese cinema and cre-
ates the necessity for filmmakers both to train in the proper form of Japa-
nese cinema and to “cultivate Japanese life.”50
 While such divisions in morality and Japaneseness, backed by assertions 
of necessity, serve to legitimize an ethical social hierarchy—which we can 
call the emperor system—they also create an imperative to work at being a 
good Japanese (film), to submit to training. That the end of this training is 
none other than the internalization of the emperor system implies that to 
become Japanese is always predicated on an inadequacy of being Japanese.51 
The same is true of Japanese cinema: to be a national cinema, Japanese film 
must always fall short of being Japanese and thus must always be subject to 
state authority to be more Japanese. The Japaneseness that spectators help 
articulate in a film is thus perpetually deferred, as those audiences them-
selves are continually working at being Japanese while always being one 






















Confronting the Other Gaze
The problem of spectatorship was exacerbated when, with the creation of 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, new imperial subjects who had 
never before viewed Japanese films were compelled to watch them.52 Export, 
of course, had been one of the defining myths of prewar cinema, yet despite 
fitful attempts in the 1920s and 1930s, it remained just a myth. The Second 
World War, then, was the first time Japanese cinema was actually being 
viewed by non-Japanese on a mass scale, an occasion that sparked immense 
interest and concern on the part of the industry, bureaucrats, and the press 
in how other spectators were viewing these films.53 While a central question 
was what films were appropriate for representing the nation to its new sub-
jects, the issue frequently shifted into a consideration of how Asian specta-
tors would read these texts. Audiences in China, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and elsewhere became the objects of dozens of magazine reports. 
On the basis of these, some, like Kawakita Nagamasa, who became the 
head of occupied Shanghai’s film industry, argued that local spectators did 
not possess the tools to read Japanese films and thus that, at least at the 
start, local staff should produce films under the direction of Japanese.54 
Other commentators contended that Japanese-made films could speak to 
other Asians but only if they used the universal language of cinema.
 Washitani surveys these debates and argues that they were inconclusive. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that in many cases, the dream of export from the 
1910s, now backed by wartime necessity, was again called forth to regulate 
the domestic industry and further prompt reform. As one commentator 
argued, “The problem of exporting films to Southeast Asia is, simply, the 
problem of domestic cinema.”55 Mori Iwao, the head of Tōhō’s studio, pro-
posed as a means of correcting what to him was a mistaken trend in Japa-
nese cinema:
I worry that at this rate, Japanese film will progressively take up forms of 
expression that not only Japanese but also people of other nations will 
find difficult to adapt to. There wouldn’t be a need to worry if the forms 
of expression of Japanese film were only more straightforward and dis-
tinct in form, polishing an American film technique understood by any-
one; that is, if it had the simple charm of old silent movies.56
To Mori, this Americanization of Japanese film style was in part necessary 











to expel both Western colonialists and their cinema from Asia, Japan had to 
adopt the film technology of the colonialists.
 As occurred with film discourse in the 1910s, the strategy of spreading 
Japan abroad through its cinema called into question the Japaneseness of 
its cinema. Many like Mori complained of the slow tempo, wordiness, and 
excessive use of allusion in contemporary Japanese film—qualities that 
some critics like Hasegawa were identifying as the defining characteristics 
of Japanese cinema. Speaking from his own experience in Southeast Asia, 
a former military press officer argued for replacing the “Japanese charac-
teristic” of suggestiveness with a more visual and concrete language and 
proceeded to cite Mizoguchi’s The Loyal 47 Ronin as the prime example of 
which films not to send abroad.57 It was again necessary for Japan to be-
come cinema before its cinema could be consumed. In the words of the 
film critic Tsugawa Shūichi, “To capture the interest of [all the peoples of 
the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere], who have not yet experienced 
familiarity with the customs, traditions, and ways of thought of the Japa-
nese people, one can only depend at first on the technological superiority of 
cinema itself.”58 After some time, many from the field were reporting that 
Asians in occupied territories were watching and understanding Japanese 
films—works such as The Opium War, Shina no yoru (China Night, dir. Fushimi 
Osamu, 1940) and Hawai marē oki kaisen (The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malay-
sia, dir. Yamamoto Kajirō, 1942) were particular hits—as long as they were 
good cinema.
 In contrast to the Western gaze postulated in the 1910s, other Asian spec-
tators could serve as Žižek’s form of ego ideal for the Japanese nation, con-
firming the superiority of its cinema. Their position as subjects to Japanese 
rule helped articulate this role, but the problem was when, as with Mori, 
they were simultaneously recruited to solve the errors of Japanese cinema, 
a fact that complicated the power relationship. Such audiences were often 
pictured as simple peoples in need of Japanese leadership, but their gaze 
was nonetheless essential to improve Japanese film, as if behind their mask 
of ignorance lay a superior knowledge of cinema. One writer spoke of Man-
churian spectators viewing an inferior Japanese product in the following, 
suggestive terms:
When we Japanese stare at the eyes of the young Manchurian crowd de-
vouring the screen, an indescribable shame runs through our bodies if 
the film is something worthless. . . . In the faces of those Manchurians 






















disgrace to the nation—rises a strangely wry smile impossible to ex-
plain. When they chance to exchange glances with a Japanese, they im-
mediately return to a stern, expressionless visage reminiscent of a mud 
snail. Most of them will in no way speak what is really on their mind. . . . 
They are critics (hyōronka) who neither speak nor debate. But their eyes 
are as merciless as a snake’s and their critical spirit refuses all forms of 
compromise.59
One sees here the same shame for the national cinema evident in the 1910s, 
the same idealization of a foreign spectator with a masterly cinematic eye, 
but with a difference: Japanese are now supposed to be the “leading nation 
(shidō minzoku)” and the foreigners (Manchurians), the followers. Cinema 
clearly upsets this hierarchy and leads to an almost paranoid surveillance 
of the Asian spectator. Film, it seems, threatens to both belie Japanese pre-
tensions (that it is the leading Asian nation; that it is a modern nation) and 
expose the reality of Japan (such as its class differences—the poverty the 
commentator said should never be shown in film to Manchurians). Remem-
ber that many Asian spectators were skilled in the Hollywood cinematic 
code—a fact often stressed in the film press—and thus could compare 
Japanese cinema to the Western film it first hoped to emulate. The paranoia 
is that the quiet, mud-snail-like faces of Manchurian spectators conceal, if 
not the “secret, perverse enjoyment” that exceeds that of the self, at least 
the perception that Japan—and its cinema—is a poor copy of the West, or, 
perhaps more precisely, a facade of nation-ality covering over the lack of 
nation-ality. Perhaps behind the wry smile of these Manchurian viewers 
is the realization of the irony of Japan’s stealing the cinema of the West in 
order to steal Asia for its own.
 Not only these spectators, but also those working-class audiences of dis-
tricts such as Asakusa who mystified film intellectuals just as much, seem-
ingly withheld the proper judgment on the national film product. Andrew 
Higson has rightly asked, “What is a national cinema if it doesn’t have a 
national audience?”60 but in the Japanese context, a factor complicating 
the construction of a national cinema during the war was the simultaneous 
need for two different audiences: one defined as imperial subjects capable 
of completing the construction of a national film; the other, inexperienced 
in Japanese film, who could recognize Japanese national essence when ad-
dressed in a language clean of the marks of nationality. This contradiction 
between the internal and the external definition of the nation could be 











the inside and the outside of the state and who was an imperial subject and 
who was not, and it expressed one of the fundamental incongruities cutting 
through the often contradictory ideologies of nation and colonialism in the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.61
Conclusion: Enforcing a Fascist Cinema
A growing amount of research emphasizes that national cinemas are never 
unified or distinctly national, that they are always subject to hybridity and 
contamination.62 My research in many ways confirms this, underlining the 
contradictions evident in the notions both of film and of the nation that 
complicate any account of a monolithic fascist cinema in Japan.63 Yet this is 
not the crucial issue; what matters is how cinema responded to these con-
ditions. I argue that fascist cinema in Japan attempts to overcome hybridity 
as much as it politically enforces a given national aesthetic.
 Certainly, there was a discursive framework for the production of stylis-
tically fascistic texts. In one essay in 1941, Imamura Taihei defined koku-
min eiga as the “aesthetic expression in cinema of the entire nation (koku-
min sōryoku no eiga geijutsutekina hyōgen),”64 a conception that all too closely 
echoes Walter Benjamin’s view of fascism as the aestheticization of politics. 
Here national film is defined less by referential content (the representation 
of national things or ideas) than with textual processes, rendering national 
cinema a primarily textual—or intertextual—issue. Yet we have seen that 
the conditions surrounding Imamura’s statement render it confused, if not 
contradictory. “Aesthetic” was torn between notions of the entertaining 
and the educational, the traditional and the modern, the Western and the 
Eastern, all the while implying divisions between low and high culture that 
obviated any aesthetic for the “entire nation.” “Expression” itself focused 
attention on cultural production, but never to the extent of hiding the per-
petual crisis in the nation-ality of the both the creators and the readers of 
those expressions. “Cinema” was intersected by various forces that, on the 
one hand, internationalized filmic expression at the same time as indus-
trially limiting its extent, and, on the other, aimed to elevate a spectacle 
of nationhood at a time when film remained to many an object of distrust. 
Finally, the “nation,” attempting to encompass intellectuals bearing the 
Western gaze and lower classes eternally less than Japanese, or a Western-
ized modernity and Asian colonialism, could only turn to media like the 






















 If these were the conditions that complicated the formation of a fascist 
cinema—some unique to Japanese cinema, some incumbent on the con-
cept of the nation and national cinema—it is not surprising to see that 
wartime Japanese cinema was materially different from Nazi cinema. The 
industry was never nationalized, as it was in Germany, in part because 
Japanese bureaucrats largely frowned on nationalization, but also because 
cinema never enjoyed the wholehearted favor of government officials as it 
did with Goebbels. The case of Japanese national cinema also lends a cau-
tionary note to the narration of the modern Japanese nation-state. While it 
is certain that many of the intellectual and government apparatuses of the 
nation were in place by the late Meiji period, my contention is that mass 
entertainment was not easily recruited into these apparatuses until much 
later. At least in the case of the nation-ality of cinema, history appears to 
be multilayered, with numerous, often conflicting strata operating in dif-
ferent temporalities. Disjunctions between different layers can constitute 
forms of hybridity and enable opportunities for struggle and opposition. 
While I am hesitant to declare a manifestation of “resistance” in certain 
forms of prewar Japanese culture, it is clear that conflicts existed not only 
between elites, but also between sectors of the industry and audiences over 
the meanings of cinema, modernity, and the nation.
 Citing these and other problems, I deny neither the pertinence of the 
concept of fascism to wartime Japanese cinema nor the reality of the nation, 
in effect deconstructing both into oblivion. I have not taken the framework 
of national cinema as a given (so as to show how cinema constructed the 
nation), but rather focused on the historical operations, pursued by forces 
often conscious of the contradictions I have shown, which attempted to 
create the conditions to enable a national cinema itself. The fact they did not 
really “succeed” does deny the effect of these operations, or the oppression 
they often created. It is these processes of creating nations and national 
cinemas that, I believe, reveal much more historically than an account of 
their conclusions. One can argue that any fascistic element to Japanese 
cinema lies less in the vision of the nation represented or the cinematic 
aesthetic itself than in the process involved creating a national cinema.
 Hase Masato’s study of the film critic Tsumura Hideo proves instruc-
tive in this regard. Hase’s central question is how Tsumura, who in the 
1930s was a champion of the director’s artistic freedom from commercial 
constraints, could become one of the primary mouthpieces for the gov-











of the engines of Tsumura’s tenkō is provocative. To Hase, the effects of 
capitalism and industrial technology on the purity of cinematic expression 
produced an anxiety ( fuan) in Tsumura and others that, since they were not 
willing to accept such impurities, “called on totalitarianism when they tried 
to overcome that anxiety through strong ‘will-power’ and a ‘struggle of 
the spirit’”65—the buzzwords of Tsumura’s articulation of national spirit. 
The problem is that the sources of this anxiety were, at least at the time, 
nearly insurmountable, a fact that demanded the intervention of even more 
power—total mobilization of the nation itself. Hase’s framework suggests 
to us that fascism in the wartime Japanese cinema world is less an aesthetic 
of the national spirit in film, than the total reliance on power to surmount 
the contradictions and obstacles I have described here and construct a pure 
national cinema. Tsumura actually relied on such power as means to “cor-
rect” Asian spectators who showed an inability to understand Japanese 
film. To him that power involved forced dissemination of the Japanese lan-
guage and things Japanese,66 but we can add that it also involved the power 
of cinema, using the “technological superiority of cinema itself ”67—the 
cinema as war machine—to overwhelm the spectator.68 It thus is no sur-
prise that wartime Japanese cinema made tremendous advances in the 
fields of special effects (e.g., The War at Sea from Hawaii to Malaysia), ani-
mation (e.g., Momotaro no umiwashi [Momotaro’s Sea Eagles, dir. Seo Mitsuyo, 
1943]), and spectacle (The Opium War).
 Hase’s mention of the problem of purity is telling, because it reminds 
us that historically the notion of purity in Japanese film has always called 
for the intervention of power. It was the pure film reformers who, from the 
1910s on, looked to the power of capital (marketing films abroad), the in-
dependent artist (not catering to the common denominator), the cinematic 
text (unmoved by extra-cinematic intertexts and spectator play), the gov-
ernment censor (ridding the industry of riffraff ), and especially the power 
of the gaze of the West and the Westernized intellectual to purge the cinema 
of uncinematic elements, ensure the clear transmission of cinematic mean-
ing, rationalize the industry, cleanse the medium of lower-class influences, 
and create a national cinema. The fact that these projects never quite suc-
ceeded—in fact, some could not possibly succeed—and that the Japanese 
cinema world remained hybrid into the war only accelerated calls for even 
more power. In this sense, fascism is a process in wartime Japanese cinema, 
less a state; one that finds its roots in the 1910s but gained its form in the 






















nese prewar film. That many of these contradictions and impurities were 
inevitable—were, in fact, the product of the very same desire for purity—
means that the fascist ideal of a pure, controlled cinema was based on its 
own impossibility.
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All Beautiful Fascists?:  
Axis Film Culture in Imperial Japan
Amakasu said, “What a miserable race this is [Italians]. If we don’t make 
our move now then we’ll have to suffer through three weeks of sightseeing 
in Italy. Let’s put them in their place here and now.” Amakasu walked right 
up to Mussolini stopping abruptly in front of him. The small 5'3" man on the 
one side of the room faced the 6'1" giant on the other. For an instant, the two 
glared at each other. Amakasu faced Mussolini in silent protest, “Don’t mess 
with the Japanese! Manchuria doesn’t just belong to a bunch of Chinamen.” 
Mussolini smiled a wordless reply as if to say “My apologies.”
—Muto Tomio, Manshūkoku no danmen
Muto Tomio, a former high-ranking Japanese civil servant in 
the Manchukuo government, was part of the economic delegation in atten-
dance at the meeting in Rome in 1936 between Amakasu Masahiko, future 
head of the Manchurian Motion Picture Company Studio, and the fascist 
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Written exactly twenty years after the 
event, Muto’s musings on what the two men may have been thinking raises 
more questions than it answers regarding the motivations for interaction 
among Axis member nations. If Axis solidarity was based, as historians 
suggest, mainly on political, economic, or military needs, then what if any 
room existed for possible cultural exchange and interaction that was not 
simply superficial or negligible?1 What common ideologies could be em-
ployed to legitimize a basis for cultural exchange? Fundamental ethnic dif-
ferences and outright racism, clearly present in the preceding quote, ques-
tion the very possibility for meaningful cultural exchange between Imperial 
Japan and its Axis allies, and they support assumptions that such divisions 
made Hitler’s regime “embarrassed by [its] alliance with one of the Unter-
menschen and led the Japanese to either ignore or express contempt for their 
























 Although interactions among the Axis nations might have been, they 
were far more than just empty ceremonies. They underscored a common 
need among allies to recognize one another’s national sovereignty, thereby 
legitimizing their prestige as both regimes and empires. Increasingly from 
the 1930s onward, Axis nations showed an almost absolute faith in the ideo-
logical power of film that, like stockpiled weapons, had “no other reason 
for existence than to be brandished and quantified in public [as] active ele-
ments of ideological conquest.”3 Axis film cultures had ideological goals 
in common, including an obsession with the discourse of racial purity and 
imperialist expansionism, as well as a belief in the ability of the medium of 
film to create (or destroy) national prestige on a mass level.4 The interactions 
among Axis film cultures were imperfect and sometimes failed, but they 
help us understand the impulses to attempt to create an Axis film culture.
 This essay examines the role of Imperial Japan in Axis film interaction 
on government, industrial, and commercial levels to understand the con-
siderably comprehensive cultural interaction among the Axis powers across 
a variety of sociopolitical spheres. Imperial Japan proactively cooperated 
with fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as an active member of the Axis, with 
widespread official and unofficial interaction on nearly every level. While 
such interactions did not lead to the successful creation of a collective “fas-
cist” identity, examining cultural cooperation among these regimes broad-
ens our understanding of the politics of culture at the time, discernible in 
the interaction between film and government, ideology and entertainment, 
and nation and empire.5 This essay investigates this interaction through 
film legislation and censorship, distribution and exhibition practices, and 
production and critical reception.
 Interaction on the government level was evident in the Imperial Japanese 
government’s study of German and Italian film legislation, which formed 
the basis of Japan’s first comprehensive Film Law in 1939. Early attempts 
to articulate a collective Axis identity were manifest in the creation of anti-
Anglo-American “film blocs” that censored or banned films offensive to 
Axis nations in response to economic and ideological threats from the 
United States and Great Britain.
 Secondly, the distribution and marketing of Axis films fostered inter-
action in which the programming and exhibiting of Axis films at such spe-
cialized venues as the Venice International Film Festival attempted to cre-
ate new distribution routes and markets to compensate for those to which 
Hollywood denied the film industries of the Axis access. Amid rising anti-













Japan had to find a way for audiences to distinguish between friendly Axis 
nations and “dangerous” Western nations such as Britain and the United 
States. Paradoxically, they chose to emphasize Japan’s shared colonial iden-
tity with its Axis allies.
 Finally, interaction can be seen through the short and troubled history of 
the production and reception of the Japanese–German co-production Atara-
shiki tsuchi (The New Earth; 1936), which revealed the common ideologies and 
basic fissures between Japan and Germany and the backlash by Japanese 
film journalists against German misrepresentations of their culture. The 
critical failure of the film brought to the surface culturally exclusivist atti-
tudes, with each criticizing the other side. However, these attitudes were 
not the result of any East–West split, as critics then argued. Rather, they 
indicated the broader impossibility of mediating ideological differences 
within the Axis, to which the failed Italian–German co-production Condot-
tieri attests.
In the Service of the State: Legislation,  
Film Blocs, Cooperative Censorship
Japan’s 1939 Film Law placed nearly every aspect of film production under 
the scrutiny of the Japanese government. The law was partly inspired by 
Nazi film legislation, but the impetus can be traced back to years before the 
Japan–Germany Cultural Pact (1938) and even the Tripartite Pact (1940).6 
Factions within the Japanese government and the Japanese film industry 
studied official film policies from Great Britain, France, fascist Italy, and 
particularly Nazi Germany for ways to consolidate and modernize Japan’s 
film industry into an export-driven international enterprise.7 The earliest 
studies of national film legislation in Japan reveal that Japanese policy-
makers were chiefly concerned with two issues: the possible adverse effects 
that representations of foreign customs may have had on the Japanese 
populace (especially women and children), and the possibility of “incor-
rect” interpretations of Japan in foreign films that might damage the na-
tional dignity of the Japanese empire.8
 In 1933, the Proposal Concerning a National Policy for Films was pre-
sented at the Sixty-Fourth House Assembly to enable greater government 
control of the Japanese film industry and remove “various obstacles that 
interfere with its development.” Passed within one week after its introduc-
tion, this proposal became the impetus for the creation the following year 













fairs Yamamoto Tatsuo. The council was formed just two weeks after Nazi 
Germany implemented the Lichtspielgesetz, or Film Law, and its mission was 
to “regulate film and legislate other important issues relating to film.” 
Concerned that Japan would be left behind other industrial nations such 
as Germany, council members and politicians intently scrutinized German 
film legislation to enact a series of film-related laws that eventually would 
become incorporated into Japan’s first comprehensive cultural law, the Film 
Law.9
 Much broader in scope than its German counterpart, the Japanese Film 
Law was created with an international perspective. The implementation 
of strict rules for the import and export of films, measures for pre- and 
post-production censorship, and the compulsory registration of all film-
industry personnel reveals the extent to which the government was aware 
of its power to articulate a domestic national identity as well as the need 
to officially regulate representations of other nations in Japan. The Japa-
nese Film Law was directly responsible for motivating the stipulation that 
all film personnel were subject to mandatory examinations to qualify for 
licenses to work in the industry. Some examination questions had little or 
nothing to do with the applicant’s technical expertise; they were designed 
to gauge the individual’s ideological leanings. Applicants were evaluated 
in the following five areas: knowledge of standard Japanese, knowledge of 
national history, level of “national common sense (kokumin jōshiki),” general 
knowledge of film, and personality. Anyone who failed to answer any of the 
questions satisfactorily was denied a license and effectively shut out of the 
industry.10
 Japan’s Film Law imported the German Film Law’s anti-Semitic rhetoric 
and the notion of a “Jewish Problem.” It may seem odd to find a discussion 
of a “Jewish Problem” in a nation with a negligible Jewish population, but 
this rhetoric, in combination with the examination system component of 
the Japanese Film Law, clearly functioned as a useful mechanism by which 
the government could—and did—effectively exclude undesirable elements 
from the film industry. Postwar Japanese film critics have argued that gov-
ernment and film-industry leaders had to adapt the notion of a “Jewish 
Problem” to apply to what were called “ideological Jews” within the culture 
industry. These “Jews” were said to pose a threat to the nation and thus 
needed to be ferreted out for either re-education or eradication.11
 The Japanese Film law was also influenced by Italian legislation. The Ital-
ian law was established in 1934, the same year that Germany’s Lichtspielgesetz 













law was a comprehensive cultural law that regulated every form of Italian 
media, including publishing, theater, and film. The film critic Yamada Eiki-
chi wrote in 1940, “The Italian Fascists treat film as a vital organ by which 
national policy is achieved and there is much that we can learn from the 
solid results that they have been accumulating.” Particularly appealing to 
Yamada was the model of a state-run film industry such as Italy’s L’Unione 
Cinematografica Educativa (LUCE), which he identified as a veritable 
model of successful symbiosis between the needs of the state and private 
industry. LUCE’s structure resembled a combination of Hollywood-style 
vertical integration with Japanese “national policy corporations,” such as 
the Japanese-run Manchurian Motion Picture Studios (Man’ei).12
 All of the film laws discussed here shared the strong desire to legislate 
the right of the government to censor or ban any films deemed to be offen-
sive to the national dignity. This could be, and was, extended to include the 
protection of the national dignity of one’s own ideological allies and their 
territories. Censorship policies proliferated after the advent of sound film, 
but it is important to recall that silent film also was a source of great multi-
lateral concern for the world’s film-producing nations and often incurred 
diplomatic protests that resulted in the altering or shelving of problematic 
films.
 One example was Cecil B. DeMille’s The Cheat (1915). Its protagonist was 
a Japanese exporter who was represented as a misanthropic slaver. After 
the Japanese government lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. govern-
ment against the negative representation of the Japanese, the film was with-
drawn. By the time it was reissued in 1916, Japan had become America’s ally 
in the First World War, and political pressure convinced Paramount Studios 
to change both the name and nationality of the protagonist to avoid any 
possible political friction. Thus, the Japanese character Torii became a Bur-
mese named Arakau, and a precedent was established: governments would 
not leave national images to private enterprise.13
 Exchanges such as this were not isolated, and nations regularly used 
whatever political clout they possessed to attempt to control the reception 
of their national image abroad. After the First World War “Hun” film cycle 
and throughout the 1930s, the political ramifications of being a nation “out 
of favor” with any or most of the major film-producing nations had seri-
ous consequences. Hollywood, as the largest producer and distributor of 
films internationally, wielded great influence over which races would be 
portrayed as “villains” to its global audience. America’s adversary nations 













being negatively represented as “bad guys” in American films (and to keep 
from being shut out of lucrative markets). Alliances like these articulated a 
practice that I call cooperative film censorship, developed to counteract the 
totalizing influence of Hollywood by seeking a way to exist outside it.14
 U.S. consular and trade reports of the time reveal that Japan actively 
offered support to, and received support from, other Axis nations to censor 
damaging film representations of its national images. At a time that the 
national borders of the Axis nations were rapidly expanding, political alli-
ances shifted with startling fluidity and sometimes resulted in diplomati-
cally tricky situations. One such example occurred one year before the Nazi 
occupation of France in early 1939, when the French Embassy in Japan re-
quested that the Japanese government ban a German film titled The Accursed 
Ship. Japan replied that it would “exercise great caution” in censoring the 
film but stopped short of an all-out ban to avoid offending its Nazi allies. 
The Japanese government only granted the request out of “consideration for 
the French action in cutting anti-Japanese propaganda out of Chinese films 
shown in France.”15
 Official promotion of intra-Axis cultural ties was established in 1937, 
with the Japan–German Cultural Film Exchange Agreement. Thereafter, 
Japanese officials found even more reason to honor requests from their Axis 
allies to censor or ban negative representations.16 A string of such requests 
was indeed submitted by the Nazis to the Japanese government, leading to 
the banning of La Grande illusion (1937, France), Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939, 
U.S.), and The Great Dictator (1940, U.S.).17 Nor were feature films the only 
target of cooperative censorship requests. Newsreels were a primary target. 
William Randolph Hearst’s March of Time series appears with the highest 
frequency in Japanese film censorship records. The following is a partial 
list of official actions taken by Japanese film censors with regard to various 
installments of March of Time from 1936 to 1937:
March of Time, No. 16 (RKO-Radio). Total rejection. Part deals with as-
sassination of a Japanese minister, and Japanese censor objects to 
anything dealing with political assassination or murder.
March of Time, No. 21 (RKO-Radio). Relating to students at Princeton 
claiming bonus [as Veterans of Future Wars]. Delete subtitle “Cannon 
fodder”; delete word “nuts”—Rewritten title to read: “At Princeton 
University three undergraduates generate an idea.”














As these records clearly indicate, Japanese censors consciously excised 
scenes or entirely banned problematic representations of Imperial Japan 
as well as those of fascist Italy. The Japanese also made requests of other 
nations such as Lithuania and the Philippines for similar consideration. 
Lithuania appeared anxious to oblige Japan by promptly banning the Soviet-
produced The Days of Volotsayev (1939), which represented the Japanese pres-
ence in Asia as “aggression.”19 Apparently most offensive to the Japanese 
were unauthorized representations of Japan’s war in China. Perhaps out of 
deference to the substantial local Japanese population, film censors in the 
Philippines aggressively removed scenes of Japanese soldiers cruelly shoot-
ing Chinese civilians in the backs from the feature films Thunder in the Orient 
(1939) and Fight for Peace (1939, U.K.) five years before the Japanese military 
occupation of the islands.20
 Japan’s requests were respected by industrialized and developing nations 
alike, and its power to influence the production and dissemination of cul-
tural products worldwide cannot be underestimated. As both a leading in-
dustrialized film-producing nation and an Axis member nation, Japan could 
not be entirely ignored even by Hollywood, which was known for its un-
fair representations of other cultures. Producers in Hollywood were afraid 
not only of diplomatic pressure, but also of the possible loss of lucrative 
foreign markets. In September 1937, their worst nightmares were realized 
when Japan placed a comprehensive embargo on the importation of all U.S. 
feature films and froze all of U.S. assets throughout its rapidly expanding 
empire.21 This was a serious blow to Hollywood’s hegemony in Asia, and 
contemporary American film journalists were swift to place Japan’s action 
within the larger context of the Axis alliance:
Up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, some 35% of the films 
shown in Japan were from Hollywood. However, Hollywood began to 
lose ground with the enactment of the German–Italian–Japanese “cul-
tural” and economic pact, and eventually all Hollywood imports were 
barred. Control of the motion picture in Japan now completes control 
by and in the tri-cornered German–Italian–Japanese Alliance. The Nazis 
effected control several years ago, and Italy established a Government 
film monopoly on January 1.22
But cutting Hollywood out of Asia did not result in the complete disappear-
ance of Western faces on Asian screens. European films would begin to 
replace American ones as Imperial Japan turned to its Axis allies to supple-













Marketing Axis Solidarity: Film Festivals and Exhibition Practices
Finding themselves shut out of many of the largest film markets, govern-
ment and film-industry leaders in the Axis nations proactively searched 
for new markets and new venues in which to market their films while pro-
moting their ideologies. The idea of exploiting nascent colonial film markets 
appealed in principle to government ideologues but in reality these markets 
often lacked infrastructures and offered the promise of only minimal finan-
cial return. Axis-sponsored film festivals, which included the Venice Inter-
national Film Festival from 1934 to 1944, promised greater visibility for 
high profile films and possible new film markets.
 Japanese filmmakers were enamored with the idea of Japan becoming 
an export film nation from at least the 1910s; many believed this was nec-
essary to raise the level of the Japanese film industry, as well as that of 
the nation, to an international standard. Kawakita Nagamasa, president 
of Towa Studios and a major distributor of European films in Japan, was 
one of the most vocal exponents of such “internationalization” policies. 
Kawakita was one of very few Japanese with a practical working knowledge 
of the European film industry. The Axis alliance facilitated opportunities 
to use his extensive connections in the German film industry to help Japan 
break into the international market.
 Kawakita proceeded to make his mark in production through a series 
of co-productions based on several successful European “multi-language 
version” films in the early 1930s in Europe. Kawakita was encouraged by 
the international success of the German producer Erich Pommer and made 
his first project the Japanese–German co-production The New Earth.23 The 
film was meant to publicize Japan’s “New Asia” to the world at a time when 
few outside the Axis formally recognized it. Ultimately the film’s failure 
to pioneer an international market or start a new genre of Japanese export 
films led Kawakita to search for other strategies, such as the exploitation 
of Japanese films on the nascent international film festival circuit.24
 The Venice International Film Festival was established in 1932 by General-
Secretary Luciano De Feo of the Educational Cinema Institute to introduce 
the Italian people to films from around the world, publicize Italian films 
abroad, and spur tourism in Italy. From the festival’s inception, its orga-
nizers wanted it to remain politically and artistically independent and con-
sciously programmed artistically important films regardless of their country 
of production. Just two years later, in 1934, with the implementation of Il 













trol over the festival required that considerations of a film’s political ideology 
take precedence over its artistic merit in the selection process, which natu-
rally led to the preferential treatment of those films produced in Axis nations 
(especially Hitler’s Germany and Franco’s Spain). Yet preferential treatment 
did not necessary translate into winning the festival’s highest honors.
 Kawakita entered two Japanese feature films in the competition of 1937: 
Kaze no naka no Kodomotachi (Children in the Wind; 1937) and Kōjō no tsuki (Moon 
over the Ruins; 1937).25 Although the Japanese entries received unprecedented 
international critical acclaim, Japan’s status as an Axis nation alone was not 
enough to ensure victory; both films lost to Julien Duvivier’s Un carnet de bal 
(1937, France). Undaunted, Kawakita returned the next year in 1938 and 
entered Gonin no Sekkohei (Five Scouts), a war film set in China that glorified 
the Japanese military presence there. Contrary to all expectations, Five Scouts 
won the Popular Culture Prize, becoming the first Japanese film to win a 
major award at a prestigious international film festival (a full thirteen years 
before journalists would make the very same claim for Kurosawa Akira’s 
Rashomon).26
 Recognition at Venice, however, did not necessarily lead to greater Axis 
cultural interaction. Despite the fact that all of the Japanese film entries 
were favorably reviewed in the Italian film press, there is no record of 
whether they were ever distributed or shown outside the main urban cen-
ters in Italy.27 However, that same year, the German film Olympia (1938) 
and the Italian film Luciano Serra Pilota (1938), jointly awarded the Musso-
lini Prize, were widely released in Japan to great commercial and critical 
success. Japanese film critics particularly praised Olympia for its outstand-
ing camerawork and rhythmic editing. The film’s enthusiastic reception in 
Japan can be explained in part by its being feted at Venice as well as by its 
having been produced by Leni Riefenstahl, whose Triumph of the Will (1934) 
was also well received in Japan.
 That Benito Mussolini’s son Vittorio was also director of Luciano Serra 
Pilota drew Japanese audiences, but equally appealing was the man-as-
machine imagery associated with the film, as well as its connections to the 
Italian Futurist Movement. Mechanical and technological themes appear to 
have more generally resonated with an obsession over similar representa-
tions of Imperial Japan’s own empire-building activities in Asia. Moreover, 
Italy’s Ethiopia was an exotic colonial setting that represented a worldview 
with which many Imperial Japanese subjects could relate.28 Italian imperial 
epics were familiar to older Japanese filmgoers, who remembered early 













poused expansionist rhetoric and idealized the Roman Empire. Those films 
laid the foundation for the box-office success of Italian colonial epics of 
the 1930s like Condottieri (1936, Italy–Germany), Scipione l’africano (1938), and 
Abuna Messias (1939), which revisited the myth of empire at the same time 
that contemporary films like Luciano Serra Pilota rearticulated the notion 
of impero, or a hereditary birthright to imperial expansionism, in a mod-
ern context.29 Within this context, Italy’s colonial films did not represent 
grand imperial adventures, as Alexander Korda’s British colonial epics did. 
Rather, they revealed what one historian has called the natural expression 
of Italy’s “imperialistic nature” grounded in its traditions inexorably linked 
to the Roman Empire.30
 The colonial film as a shared genre linked Axis film cultures in the 
common assumption that in the New Order, certain nations were rulers 
by birthright and others were to be ruled. Japanese distributors chose to 
market Italian colonial films in the Japanese film market because they were 
aware of a pre-existing taste among the audience for such popular genre 
films with exotic settings and characters, which had been in great demand 
worldwide since the silent era. Colonial films produced in Axis nations also 
shared narrative and stylistic links with the Foreign Legion film (or desert 
film) genre that similarly presented a worldview from the point of view of 
the colonizer. Japanese film critics of the 1930s were keenly aware of the 
differences among colonial regimes, often comparing and contrasting the 
colonial worldviews represented in such films as Beau Geste (1926, U.S.), 
Morocco (1930, U.S.), or Le grande jeu (1933, France) with those of Imperial 
Japan.31 Such comparisons led film critics such as Shibata Yoshio to the 
uncomfortable conclusion that, despite its moral superiority, the Japanese 
empire had not seduced the imaginations of Japanese youth as effectively 
or completely as foreign colonial films:
Japanese often debate whether or not Foreign Legion films, marked by 
Feyder’s human experiments or Duvivier’s excessive atmosphere, are 
dreams or reality. When you think of it, urban Japanese know more 
about the Foreign Legion in Morocco than they do about their own bor-
der patrol guards in Manchuria. Japanese urbanites are a sad lot. Im-
perialist capitalist expansionists may scoff at Manchuria’s Kingly way, 
but how do those nations justify their Foreign Legions terrorizing local 
people at gunpoint?32
The process of naturalizing the expansion into and seizure of foreign lands 













the common experience of empire building as a trope of modernity to 
which most urban Japanese could relate.33 It may come as no surprise, then, 
that in the wake of the embargo of Hollywood films and within the context 
of mutually exclusive Axis doctrines of racial and cultural purity, Japanese 
distributors were left with little else to exploit other than the shared experi-
ence of possessing empire.
 Japanese film distributors manufactured a resonance between Japanese 
audiences and imported Axis films through the creation of film titles that 
could universalize, naturalize, and ultimately popularize the concept of ex-
pansion. The Japanese release title for Luciano Serra Pilota was Sora Yukaba, 
or “Should We Go to the Skies,” a direct reference to the popular early-
twentieth-century war song “Umi Yukaba,” or “Should We Go to Sea.”34 
Japanese distributors marketed this film about fascist Italian pilots fight-
ing a colonial war in Africa by aesthetically linking Italian fascism and the 
Japanese martial spirit. This provided domestic audiences with a readily 
understandable metaphor that did not destabilize Japanese ideology.35 The 
careful selection of film titles was not just an ideological ploy. It made good 
business sense, as well.
 Even in the early 1940s when Japanese Pan-Asianist rhetoric was at its 
xenophobic height in denouncing Western colonialism, the lure of cine-
matic colonial modernity in foreign colonial films remained firmly en-
trenched—neither audiences nor distributors turned away from the genre. 
The enduring appeal of the colonial film genre with audiences might lie in 
the ambivalence inherent in its narratives, which could be reappropriated 
across cultures and political regimes for entirely different purposes.36
 For example, the genre functioned to instruct Japanese film audiences 
about their Axis allies. The Japanese film critic Tsumura Hideo found the 
film style and narrative of Italian colonial films inferior to those of Ger-
many, France, or even America. Nevertheless, he argued, “They let those 
of us in a corner of East Asia, far from Southern Europe, imagine what 
the conditions in the film culture of our Axis Allies were like,” and they 
provided viewers with insights into Italian politics and social conditions. 
Tsumura thought that in these films one could measure the pulse of a na-
tion—even if they were not accurate reflections of that nation. Tsumura 
also found even in these imperfect films a model that domestic production 
of nationalistic (kokkashugiteki) documentary films could productively adapt 
for the representation of Japan’s “development” of the neo-colonial space 
of Manchuria.37













1941), and Carl Peters (1941) were imported into Japan but marketed in a sig-
nificantly different manner from Italian films such as Luciano Serra Pilota.38 
The Japanese marketing of the film Uncle Krüger is an illustrative example. 
Co-scripted by Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, Uncle Krüger was 
to have been the definitive German exposé of “British–Jewish imperialism” 
in South Africa. The film stylishly retells the history of the Boer War through 
a mixture of historical fact, fiction, and highly anti-British caricature. The 
veteran film and stage actor Emil Jannings played an idealized version of 
Krüger as a solitary hero who stands up to the British and the Jews. In 
opposition to the film’s representation of Cecil Rhodes as a “Golden Calf 
of Africa,” Krüger is portrayed as the ideal melding of “Boer, citizen, and 
patriarch.” By emphasizing Krüger’s Prussian ancestry (i.e., Mark Branden-
burg), his usefulness as a model for wartime Nazi Germans becomes even 
more potent, and the Afrikaner State under Krüger appears as a precursor 
to the order and efficiency of the Nazi regime. Krüger’s loss of power is 
highlighted in the film by representing him as an increasingly passive figure 
whose vigor dwindles away before viewers’ eyes.
 In Japan, distributors advertised the film as a warning of the horrors of 
British imperialism in an advertising tag line that could have been written 
for the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere:
THIS!! is the real British Empire that hides behind a mask of chivalry. 
Judge for yourselves this page in the history of British imperial aggres-
sion painted red with the blood of women and children slaughtered in 
the name of Queen Victoria in a corner of South Africa!!
Stills from the film accompanying this advertisement show prison camps en-
circled with barbed wire, filled with Boar refugees. The camps looked eerily 
similar to Nazi concentration camps. The film’s themes of anti-capitalism 
and anti-Semitism are driven home by projecting onto the British enemy 
precisely the same sort of ethnic prejudices behind the Nazis’ violence prac-
ticed against the Jews in Germany.39
 As with Luciano Serra Pilota, Japanese film critics discussed Uncle Krüger 
less for its intrinsic value as entertainment than for its ideological merit. 
Ozuka Kyoichi suggested that Japanese filmmakers and, by extension, Japa-
nese audiences should watch the film to learn valuable lessons from the 
Nazis. In an article published in 1944 in the leading Japanese film journal 
Eiga Hyoron, titled “What I Expect from Films That Encourage Hate for the 














Uncle Krüger’s crude tone and extremely obvious mode of expression has 
a certain kind of appeal, a filmic beauty, as a German anti-enemy film, 
which I believe is one of its strengths. There is more to its filmic expres-
siveness than simply the richness of the actors. While I do not advocate 
that every Japanese film encourage hatred for the enemy in that way, it 
does seem only natural that explicit anti-enemy films should overflow 
with raw energy.40
This was a restrained review. Many of the same critics who only a few years 
earlier had lavished praise on Jannings’s performances in Varieté, Faust, Der 
Blaue Angel, or The Last Command were now cool to his work in Ohm Krüger; 
some even calling his acting “overblown.”41 What becomes clear from the 
preceding example is a realization that simply tailoring foreign films to 
suit the tastes of Japanese audiences was not enough. Producers such as 
Kawakita Nagamasa and Nagata Masaichi concluded that true multilateral 
understanding and cooperation had to be created through international 
co-productions. Kawakita was the first to move into this area with a big-
budget, high-profile German–Japanese co-production on Japanese agricul-
tural colonies in Manchuria.
Empires of a Kind? The Ideological Limits of Co-Productions
Well before the Anti-Comintern Pact was ratified in 1936, Imperial Japan, 
Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were anxious to prove that their impending 
alliance was based on real solidarity and motivated by more than mere mili-
tary, political, and economic expediency. This flurry of high-profile official 
and unofficial cultural exchanges resulted in some particularly intriguing 
film projects. In Germany, Leni Riefenstahl directed and edited the film 
coverage of the 1936 Olympics, which prominently featured the participa-
tion of the German, Italian, and Japanese athletic teams and would become 
a highly acclaimed international success when it was released two years 
later. In Italy in 1936, the film director Giacomo Gentilomo and the German 
film director Luis Trenker gathered together a German and Italian crew to 
shoot the super-production Condottieri on location with a cast of thousands. 
Condottieri told the story of the rebellion of Giovanni di Medici’s knights 
against Ceasar Borgia during a bid to unify Renaissance-era Italy. The prob-
lems surrounding the production of Condottieri and disagreements between 
the film’s directors led to separate releases of the Italian and German ver-













dottieri was pulled from German theaters only one week after its release, 
when censors lodged formal complaints regarding the film’s representa-
tion of religion.
 In Japan, this was the same year that the producer Kawakita Nagamasa 
invited the German filmmaker Arnold Fanck and his cameraman Richard 
Angst to Tokyo to begin production on The New Earth. Fanck, who had 
achieved international fame for directing a series of critically acclaimed berg, 
or mountain, films and for his discovery of a young actress-turned-director 
named Leni Riefenstahl, began writing the script for what he claimed would 
be the first film to “capture the true essence” of Japan. Kawakita explained 
in an interview with Japan’s largest film journal that the title of the film 
referred to more than Manchuria. “We have named this film The New Earth, 
and it certainly is new earth both for ourselves and for the Japanese film 
industry,” he said. “We pray that this new earth will be fertile soil that gives 
rise to many different forms of plants and will eventually bear magnificent 
fruit.”42 Fanck said that he wanted to make a film that would satisfy the 
expectations of Western audiences, an approach that seemed entirely con-
sistent with Kawakita’s desire to create a new type of Japanese export film 
for international distribution.
 In The New Earth, a young Japanese university student, Teruo, who returns 
to Japan after several years studying modern agriculture in Germany sup-
ported by his wealthy Japanese stepfather. While in Germany, Teruo falls in 
love with Gelda, with whom he returns to Japan. Gelda hopes to convince 
Teruo’s stepfather (played by the screen legend Hayakawa Sessue) to re-
lease Teruo from his betrothal to his stepsister Mitsuko. Aboard a steam-
ship headed home, claustrophobically decorated with Nazi and Japanese 
flags, cherry blossom branches, and Japanese lanterns, Teruo seems reluc-
tant to marry his stepsister Mitsuko. Teruo’s apprehension is never repre-
sented as being much more than a flirtation with the West; gradually he dis-
covers himself through his conversations with Gelda and comes to believe 
in the possibility of farming his own land in Manchuria. In the following 
sequence, Teruo and Gelda are physically positioned at opposite sides of a 
globe map as they discuss the creation of this new empire. Teruo says:
I’m Japanese and want to live for Japan. Manchuria is twice the size of 
Germany and Japan with an abundance of land more than enough to 
support a large population . . . that is, if it is properly cultivated. But 
first we must bring order and peace to the land. That is Japan’s intention. 













struction of a nation not only requires real men, but also real women. We 
don’t need any who have been raised as spoiled dolls.
Japan’s new earth of Manchuria would be settled by a new breed of im-
perial subject—one that is a hybrid of both rural and urban, epitomized by 
Teruo. Teruo’s return to Japan is presented as a dilemma and expressed by 
his seeming reluctance to make a decisive choice between the traditional 
and the modern. Initially, his temptation comes less from an infatuation 
with the West, as his ambiguous feelings for Gelda might indicate, than 
from a general desire for urban, modern life itself. Teruo’s confusion is 
visualized most dramatically in a sequence set in a modern Tokyo nightclub 
where, flanked by a loud jazz band, he is served sake by a Japanese hostess 
and red wine by a Caucasian. He first drinks the wine, but when he drinks 
the sake, the blaring jazz soundtrack is instantly replaced by a pastoral sym-
phony, and Teruo nods approvingly to the Japanese hostess. When Teruo 
looks at the Caucasian, viewers see a montage of images of dancing and 
drinking set to an increasingly faint jazz melody. Unable to find his roots 
in the urban decadence of either Berlin or Tokyo, Teruo returns to his par-
ents’ farm, where he experiences an epiphany. He plunges his hands deep 
into the rice paddies and intently smells the handfuls of earth as his father 
smiles approvingly and says, “It’s good earth but . . . it’s become very old.” 
Teruo decides to remain in Japan and marry Mitsuko, and Gelda returns to 
Germany. In the final scene, Teruo and Mitsuko and their baby son have 
immigrated to Manchuria, where Teruo happily farms the “new earth” with 
a new tractor under the protective gaze of an Imperial Japanese soldier.
 Almost immediately after his arrival in Japan, Fanck personally selected 
Itami Mansaku, father of the late film director Itami Juzo, to co-script the 
film and serve as a consultant based on the strength of his work in the 
period-film genre. Ironically, Itami’s films until then had humorously criti-
cized precisely those sorts of government ideologies that Fanck wanted 
to propagate, and he was determined to prevent the film from becoming 
either an Orientalist travelogue or outright Nazi propaganda.43 Itami’s fears 
proved to be well founded, as it soon became clear that Fanck’s vision of 
the “true” Japan bore very little resemblance to the one in which most Japa-
nese lived.44 Fanck’s obsession with exterior shots of the natural beauty of 
Japan’s countryside contrasted with his slipshod and uneven representa-
tion of the urban metropolises of Tokyo and Osaka. Similarly, Fanck’s treat-
ment of his actors—in particular, that of sixteen-year-old Hara Setsuko in 













would later be accused. In a lecture to the Japan Motion Picture Founda-
tion, Fanck stated that he had Hara speak her lines in German “in her own 
style,” which he suggested was grammatically incorrect but produced an 
“inexpressible charm for us [Germans] when we heard her pronouncing the 
German language with a foreign accent. In other words, she made a better 
impression than if she had spoken German fluently.”45
 Increasing creative differences between Fanck and the Japanese staff 
were the result of this sort of attitude, which many felt was symptomatic 
of a larger problem having to do with stereotypical Western interpreta-
tions of Japan and eventually led the Japanese producer to demand that the 
film be re-shot in two separate release versions: a “German version” shot 
and edited by Fanck and an “international version” edited and partially re-
shot by Itami. This only complicated matters. Some critics complained that 
Itami’s version was not “Japanese” enough, while others argued that it was 
more “inconsistent, conceptual, and unfocused” but still felt like a Japa-
nese film, whereas Fanck’s definitely did not.46
 Japanese film critics were particularly disturbed by Fanck’s apparently 
indiscriminate application of Nazi ideologies (particularly those of blood 
and earth) to the Japanese case. At first glance, Fanck’s representation of 
the Japanese soil as almost divine seemed an apt interpretation of the im-
portance of land to Japan’s farmers, who were then struggling with crop 
failure and crushing poverty. This was a familiar topic in Japanese left-wing 
“tendency film” filmmakers of the late 1920s and 1930s. Within two years, 
Uchida Tomu would begin filming Earth, which was based on Nagatsuka 
Takashi’s novel about the destitute lives of Meiji-era farmers, and after that 
Toyoda Shiro would produce Ohinata-mura, a film about the mass immigra-
tion of a Japanese agricultural colony to Manchuria.47 It is not difficult to 
see how Fanck and his crew might have linked Manchuria, and the emo-
tional investment in land that it represented, with the Nazi aesthetic of soil. 
But the implication that Nazi aesthetics were interchangeable with Japa-
nese aesthetics profoundly disturbed the Japanese press:
The scenery that appeared on screen was definitely Japanese, but the way 
it was shown was Western (batakusai), exhibitionist, and queer. Holding 
up a Buddhist manji to resemble a Nazi swastika, he portrayed temples 
as if they were the sole repository of the Japanese spirit. Great Buddhist 
statues were treated as if they wielded an absolute power. He applied 
the Nazi spirit of self-sacrifice indiscriminately to the Yamato spirit. . . . 













German spirit. He openly recognized Manchuria, but it is Germany that 
is requiring this New Order.48
The New Earth looked like a German film from its opening sequence, which 
recalled the opening of Triumph of the Will, with its camera moving through 
the mists of ages, gradually revealing the mythic islands of Japan through 
the clouds. Fanck’s use of graphic matches between Nazi swastika and 
Buddhist manji, which was roundly criticized in the Japanese press, was an 
attempt to apply his visual style to Japanese material in order to articulate 
a fascist aesthetics linking Nazi and Japanese iconography. Ironically, it 
was precisely the exterior shots of the countryside of Japan for which Japa-
nese critics reserved their greatest praise and criticism. They praised their 
technical beauty but were disappointed at Fanck’s inability to see Japan’s 
“true essence” as being anything more than picturesque representations 
of cherry blossoms and Mount Fuji. Certainly, Orientalist film representa-
tions of Japan were nothing new. Japanese audiences had endured similarly 
exotic images produced by filmmakers in Hollywood and Germany for de-
cades.49 But as this film was meant to foster Japanese–German goodwill, 
it seemed to raise the question of the very possibility of finding any mutual 
understanding among Axis nations.50
 Iwasaki Akira, a leading Japanese film critic, suggested that the fault may 
not entirely lie with either Fanck or his crew: “It is almost an impossible 
task for anybody to describe proportionally and properly a complex coun-
try like Japan, which contains all of the complications and contradictions 
that result from the juxtaposition and harmony of the past and the present, 
East and West, nature and modern science.” Understood in this context, 
Fanck’s inability was symptomatic of a universal problem facing any “for-
eigner, however understanding and sympathetic,” who similarly attempted 
to represent Japan.51 Iwasaki’s language may be diplomatic, but his critique 
is clear: the film was a failure not because of any insurmountable cultural 
divisions between “East and West” but, rather, because of the impossibility 
of Germans’ understanding the Japanese experience of modernity. The 
same argument might have been made about the production of Condottieri, 
which was plagued with similarly fatal intercultural misunderstandings but 
in which no East–West division could be blamed for the breakdown among 
Axis allies.
 Such exclusivist attitudes must be understood within the context of a 
history of indignity over what many Japanese felt were repeatedly patron-













also at this time that the Japanese film industry was similarly Orientaliz-
ing other Asian races under the auspices of building a “new order” in East 
Asia, to be led by the Japanese and ruled with mutual understanding and 
“goodwill.” Japanese representations of bilateral goodwill toward Japan’s 
“Asian brothers” were no more legitimate than Fanck’s vision of a “pure” 
Japan.52
 Despite debate in the Japanese film press over German misrepresenta-
tions of contemporary Japan in The New Earth, the subplot of Manchuria as 
Japan’s “new earth” was almost ignored. Critics were far more upset by mis-
takes in continuity, such as Fanck’s inexplicably editing shots of Osaka’s 
Hankyu Department Store with shots of downtown Tokyo, than they were 
by the theme of a Japanese return to a nativist past not in the Japanese 
countryside but, instead, in the semi-colonial space of Manchuria.53 Only 
the critic and screenwriter Sawamura Tsutomu speculated on the possible 
political effects of setting the story in Manchuria on the film’s marketability 
in non-Axis territories:
At the end of the film Teruo and Mitsuko leave the narrow rice fields of 
Japan to go to Manchuria where, under the protection and peace guar-
anteed by the Japanese army, they joyously plough the earth of a new 
continent with a tractor. This is one of the most important themes of 
the film. But won’t showing this be a problem in countries that do not 
officially recognize Manchuria?54
Ultimately, the film never created any of the political problems anticipated 
by Sawamura, but it did spark a boom of interest in Nazi cultural policy 
and filmmaking in Japan. It also led to numerous translations of articles 
and monographs, such as the director Karl Ritter’s “Theory of Nazi Film 
Aesthetics,” and to the publication of original essays by influential film crit-
ics offering detailed discussions of how the German system might best be 
adapted for use in Japan.55 The New Earth was not a box-office failure in Japan 
or Germany, but after failing to live up to expectations, its international 
marketing campaigns (the most ambitious ever planned for a Japanese film 
until then) had to be drastically scaled down.56 Given the large production 
budget, the high-profile cast, and official backing by both governments, it 
would have been difficult, if not impossible, for The New Earth ever to have 














Axis co-productions produced no masterpieces of lasting value and re-
ceived scant critical acclaim even in their time. But to read intra-Axis film 
exchange as a failure, an empty symbol of a unity that never existed, is to 
miss the point. The significance of intra-Axis collaboration lies not in its 
success, but in the very fact of these nations having attempted to collabo-
rate and in their concern for how they were represented. Unlike the endur-
ing images of an Axis united in power and purpose churned out by wartime 
Allied propagandists, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy were 
not all cut from the same political or cultural cloth; nor did any single entity 
ever truly dominate over another. In fact, Hollywood may have had more 
responsibility for uniting these nations into a film bloc than did any single 
ideology. The U.S. government’s “film follows the flag” policy endowed 
Hollywood with a nearly totalitarian power of which other film-producing 
nations could only dream. The need to respond to that power through such 
means as cooperative censorship and film embargos ultimately created a 
fluid but useful common bond that Axis rhetoric built on but could never 
have produced itself.
 In this context, film legislation and government communiqués circu-
lated like the films themselves, traversing borders and influencing a broad 
range of people and institutions on official and unofficial levels. Looking 
at any one level exclusively presents a skewed picture of the partnership. 
Examining film culture in Imperial Japan from the relatively conventional 
point of view of official film policy would suggest that the influence of Nazi 
Germany in Japan dwarfed that of Italy. However, as the example of the 
Venice International Film Festival would seem to suggest, by shifting one’s 
perspective to include distribution and exhibition venues, the opposite ap-
pears to be true. This shift in perspective is not simply an intellectual con-
ceit. Much of the postwar scholarship on Japanese film history is grounded 
on the assumption that the era of Japanese film as an international industry 
started at the 1951 Venice International Film Festival and with Kurosawa’s 
Rashomon.57 But even if the history linking Japanese film to fascism and im-
perialism is obscured, it can never totally be forgotten, as director Kitano 
Takeshi demonstrated in 1997 after winning the Grand Prix for Hana-bi at 
Venice. He quipped to the Italian media, “Why don’t we team up again and 
declare war on some country?” Kitano’s “joke” can only be understood 
within the context of a history that has been evacuated by mainstream film 













rary mass audiences are both able and willing to make relevant links be-
tween film, Axis solidarity, and Japan’s imperial past.
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Architecture for Mass-Mobilization:  
The Chūreitō Memorial Construction  
Movement, 1939–1945
Since antiquity, war memorials, such as the triumphal arches 
of the Roman Empire, have celebrated empires, commemorated victorious 
battles, venerated heroes, and glorified leaders. In the modern era, espe-
cially from the latter half of the nineteenth century, memorials have prolif-
erated in Europe—under the French New Republic and the Second German 
Empire in particular—to celebrate new regimes and reinforce their new 
national identities. During and immediately after the First World War, the 
common European soldier came to be recognized in memorial structures, 
leading to the construction of prominent monuments such as the tombs 
of unknown soldiers in London and Paris, as well as less known structures 
in town squares and on street corners. These added a new function to war 
memorials: a place to memorialize and mourn the death of individuals on 
a personal level. Whether built to commemorate an individual or a group, 
these structures gave physical form to the collective or national memory 
that needed to be created, maintained, or sometimes even reshaped follow-
ing a military conflict.1
 In Japan, just as in most other countries that experienced modern wars, 

























soldiers, and civilians. Political and military leaders constructed Yasukuni 
Shrine in 1869 to centrally, collectively, and continuously memorialize the 
fallen members of the Imperial Army. The practice of memorial building for 
the common soldier started at the local level with the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904–1905, during which almost every town and village suffered losses. 
Local memorial building for military deaths was further popularized during 
the Pacific War (1931–45),2 and many continue to be built even today for 
military and civilian deaths.
 Until 1945, war memorials in modern Japan had an important function 
in addition to honoring and preserving the memory of the dead: they were 
tools for motivating young men to fight in war with little concern for their 
lives. Children were taught from a young age that death in battle as a mem-
ber of the emperor’s army was the most honorable deed a man could ac-
complish. This notion was epitomized at Yasukuni Shrine, where military 
dead were enshrined as gods to protect the nation (gokokushin) and on occa-
sion received tribute from the emperor himself.3 At the local level, as well, 
war death in the family was transformed from a tragedy to be mourned 
into an honor to be celebrated. Memorial services for war dead became 
public events that took place in school yards and town halls and included 
many new features not conducted during traditional funeral rites, such as 
a chorus by schoolchildren, a memorial address by a dignitary, and the dis-
play of a photograph of the deceased.4 Local war memorials, too, came to 
symbolize honor. Since the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the government 
had required local groups to seek permission when building war memori-
als; consequently, enshrinement in those memorials came to be considered 
a privilege.5 It can be argued, then, that Japanese war memorials played a 
more politically influential role during the war than after. In the case of the 
set of memorials I examine here, it was not only their actual presence but 
the very act of their planning and the community’s involvement that con-
tributed to wartime mass-mobilization.
 Chūreitō, which translates literally as “towers to the loyal spirits,” were 
constructed throughout Japan from 1939 to 1945.6 Typically made of stone 
or concrete, these memorials were built in a range of scales (their height 
varying from five feet to over one hundred feet) and situated in diverse 
sites, from large plots of land dedicated exclusively to the memorial to a 
corner of a schoolyard.7 Most chūreitō memorials are identical in design: 
a simple, slender tower, inscribed with three characters that stand for the 
word chūreitō, rises from a rectangular base. On most memorials, the base 






















The rectangular base has a function distinct to chūreitō: it is an ossuary for 
stowing the ashes of the war dead—or, in cases where the body was never 
recovered, the clippings of hair and nails that soldiers heading off to the 
battlefield left behind. Also unlike most other memorials, chūreitō were 
built by the hands of local people in a nationwide construction movement.
 Chūreitō memorials have not received adequate scholarly attention be-
cause their design, which Japanese architects of the 1930s likened to a typi-
cal Japanese tombstone, has been considered mundane. This lack of inter-
est has been compounded by the inability of historians of modern Japanese 
architecture to view architecture as a tool to propagate national ideology in 
wartime Japan.8 They have compared what little was built in Japan in the last 
years of the Asia-Pacific War with contemporary projects in Germany and 
Italy and have used differences in style and quantity as proof that Japanese 
architecture of the time was not political.9 To focus exclusively on style, 
however, does not sufficiently appreciate the political significance of cul-
tural works.
 The relationship of style to politics is complicated. There is no fixed one-
to-one relationship between political regimes and styles of cultural pro-
duction; nor is there stylistic consistency among cultural products created 
under one political regime. In her study of the relationship between politics 
and architecture in Germany between 1918 and 1945, the historian Barbara 
Miller Lane argues that stylistic consistency never emerged in German ar-
chitecture during this period.10 In Italy, where most architects were ardent 
fascists in the 1930s, scholars have noted Mussolini’s reluctance to desig-
nate a specific architectural style to represent his regime.11 And according 
to the architectural historian Francesco Dal Co, it is not even possible to 
identify a consistent trait in the works of a single architect for the same 
client during a short period of time, including those designed by the Nazi 
state architect Albert Speer.12
 However, similarities in architectural styles have been recognized across 
diverse political systems. For example, while stripped neoclassicism has 
often been associated with Nazi Germany, a similar style can be found in 
the democratic state architecture of Washington, D.C., and elsewhere in 
the United States. The architect Giuseppe Terragni, when designing the 
Casa del Fascio in Como, Italy—perhaps the most famous piece of Italian 
fascist architecture—is known to have taken design inspiration from both 
the competition entry by Hannes Meyer for the headquarters of the League 
of Nations and that of Le Corbusier for the Palace of Soviets. Since simi-













communism, it can be argued that, regardless of the nature of the political 
regime, architectural styles meant to convey political messages can have 
shared characteristics that make them, theoretically, more alike than not.
 Since the style of cultural production is not the Rosetta Stone of ide-
ology, many scholars, particularly those who specialize in fascist cultural 
production in Europe, have pushed beyond style in their attempts to clas-
sify the aesthetic qualities of politically persuasive cultural works. In cases 
where it is possible to identify an artist or author who created a specific 
work of art, a biographical approach examining the political commitments 
of the artist or a thematic approach focusing on particular features of an 
artist’s thought has been helpful in understanding the politics behind the 
object.13 The chūreitō project, however, because it was not created by a 
single artist figure but (according to media reports) by people of all ages 
from across the country, requires a different sort of examination to un-
cover its political force in successfully mobilizing the nation. The chūreitō 
functioned like an icon in the civic religion of fascism, which, according to 
George Mosse, draws “its strength from an already present consensus.”14 
Mosse’s argument is confined to the visual expressions of fascist culture; 
the chūreitō project, however, helped create political consensus through 
its process of creation even more so than through its actual appearance. 
That consensus, fostered through education and mass culture, placed ulti-
mate value on one’s sacrifice through death to the emperor and was dem-
onstrated not by the physical appearance of the memorials, but by individu-
als working throughout the process of design and construction. A concept 
of sacrifice was aestheticized not so much visually as through people’s ac-
tions—actions that were coerced yet understood as voluntary only because 
a consensus already had been created.
 The process of chūreitō memorial construction became a movement that 
functioned as a powerful propaganda tool for the promotion of national-
ism in wartime Japan. It engaged people from Tokyo and regional cities, as 
well as small towns and rural villages, in a project to build monuments that 
represented the unparalleled significance placed on military death. Each 
monument was to be an icon that symbolized sacrifice by the war dead and 
by those who participated in the memorial construction. The nature of the 
project, which included a design competition and extensive campaigns for 
donations of money, material, and labor for construction, created the im-
pression that it was being undertaken voluntarily by the will of the people 
when it had, in fact, been initiated by the military and enforced by the re-






















nism to prevent unpatriotic thoughts and actions.15 More important, most 
who participated by submitting design entries or donating money, labor, 
and material had been led to believe that they were acting on their own 
initiative. For those conditioned to believe that sacrifice for the emperor 
was the finest deed possible for a Japanese citizen, contributions to the con-
struction of the memorials dedicated to the war dead, who were regarded as 
having committed sacrifices of the highest order, came naturally.
 The memorial design—mundane as it may seem—had its significance, 
as well. Its tombstone-like design, representing death and mourning, pos-
sessed what the historian Daniel Sherman, discussing the war memorials 
of interwar France, has described as the “power of familiarity”: it was a 
universal type that enabled people from varied social, cultural, and educa-
tional backgrounds to easily comprehend its symbolism.16 The use of famil-
iar or religious symbols associated with war, death, and mourning has been 
a common technique used for memorial design in Europe since the First 
World War, where memorials often used the Pietà composition, with the 
fallen soldier in the arms of a female figure or a comrade. Such familiar reli-
gious images possessed the power of “kitsch,” so central to the aesthetics 
of fascism, which Clement Greenberg has defined as a predigested form of 
art that enables easy appreciation by the masses.17
 The chūreitō memorials were the outcome of a nationwide construction 
movement of the late 1930s that took place amid an all-out war against 
China that was resulting in an unprecedented number of Japanese casu-
alties.18 This movement, initiated by the Dai-Nihon Chūrei Kenshō-kai 
(Greater Japan Committee to Exalt the Loyal War Dead)—a group com-
posed of representatives from Interior, Army, Navy, Education, and Welfare 
ministries—aimed to construct a monument in every Japanese city, town, 
and village, as well as at major battlefields and occupied cities in China and 
Manchuria. The prototypes for monument designs of varying scales were 
selected through a competition co-sponsored by the committee and the 
Asahi Shimbun. The construction of the memorials was to be undertaken with 
the money, material, and labor of the local residents.
 The design competition for the chūreitō memorials took place in late 
1939. Ten major newspapers announced the “Official Regulations for the 
Chūreitō Design Competition,” which called for three design prototypes: 
type one to be built on overseas battlefields; type two to be built in six major 
Japanese cities; and type three, consisting of three ranks—large, medium, 
and small—for Japanese cities, towns, and villages. Specific guidelines out-













types were to incorporate an ossuary, and the design was to be “simple and 
plain in principle and symbolize the spirits of the fallen heroes in a grand 
and solemn manner.”19 The jury consisted of five established architects, 
five members of the military, and Masaki Naohiko, president of the Tokyo 
School of Art. The deadline for the submissions of competition entries was 
set for November 30 of the same year, and the Asahi Corporation was to 
provide the prize money for the winners.
 The mass media, including major newspapers as well as state-sponsored 
and mass-market magazines, played a major role in the promotion of the 
chūreitō project. Even before the official announcement of the competition 
was made, newspapers started to feature chūreitō-related articles. Archi-
tects shared their thoughts on memorial design and encouraged readers 
to submit entries.20 In early August, a three-part article in Asahi Shimbun 
chronicled the history of war memorials in Manchuria, Europe, and Japan.21 
The Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shimbun published a series of eleven articles titled 
“Chūreitō tales (Chūreitō monogatari),” with contents ranging from the his-
torical background behind the establishment of the committee and surveys 
of Japanese war memorials in China to various anecdotes regarding fund-
raising and volunteer work.22
 Following the announcement of the competition, the media’s focus 
shifted to design entries submitted to the committee. Rather than on well-
executed entries by professional architects, most articles focused on sub-
missions by amateurs, as they provided good subject matter for the “tales 
of virtue (bidan)” being published to inspire readers to participate in the 
project. It did not matter to the reporters or the readers that most of the 
amateur entries had been rejected by the committee. For example, the Asahi 
Shimbun reported on an entry by a very young boy drawn on a piece of con-
struction paper. The article noted that the drawing “demonstrated his 
young dedication to honor the loyal heroes,” but added that, unfortunately, 
the entry needed to be “respectfully sent back, because it did not meet the 
requirements.”23 The Asahi also published a photograph of a fifteen-year-
old boy’s perspective drawing. The boy had spent months of hard work on 
his design of a tower featuring a realist representation of a wounded soldier 
struggling to advance with the help of his comrades. This entry did not meet 
the competition requirements, either, but the committee announced that it 
planned to display it along with the winners.24 Another media favorite was 
the submission sent from the front by an active soldier through the branch 
office of the Asahi Shimbun. Readers were told that the soldier had drawn 






















by attaching a pencil to a needle and thread and a ruler made from a piece 
of sharpened bamboo. The Asahi reported that the impressed committee 
members were in the process of retrieving the tools used by the soldier.25
 Fund-raising to construct the memorials began even before the competi-
tion’s winners were announced. Newspapers spilled a considerable amount 
of ink over the names of contributors and the amount of money donated. 
The committee generated public donations with the slogan ichinichi senshi 
(literally, “war dead for a day”). The slogan persuaded every civilian and 
soldier to donate one day’s wage to express gratitude to the fallen heroes by 
imagining for one day that they had died in war.26 To demonstrate the slo-
gan, the Army and Navy announced their plan to deduct a day’s wage from 
the salary of all their troops.27 Soliciting donations was crucial, as the con-
struction of the memorials depended primarily on them, and here again the 
mass media capitalized on “tales of virtue.” A young man donated 2 yen that 
he had received from the police as a reward for saving a drowning child.28 
An impoverished orphan who had no money donated coins from the Tenpō 
era (1830–43) that he had inherited from his parents.29 According to media 
reports, even prison inmates, the handicapped, and very young children 
donated their hard-earned money.
 Not all design submissions and donations were voluntary. Many schools 
incorporated chūreitō design into their curricula, compelling students to 
draw war memorials during art classes.30 Architecture firms and university 
design instructors were encouraged to adjust their work schedules so that 
employees and students might submit design entries.31 Families were pres-
sured to restrain from constructing individual tombstones for fallen family 
members and instead donate their savings to the chūreitō fund.32 One Kyoto 
high school collected as much as 500 yen by forbidding the students from 
spending money on snacks and leisure and the faculty from buying tobacco 
and alcohol. A village in Toyama Prefecture took advantage of the nation-
wide reduction in land tax by collecting the original amount from its resi-
dents and using the difference for chūreitō construction.33 These episodes, 
however, were framed as tales of virtue in media publications, creating the 
impression that they were undertaken voluntarily and willingly.
 Media publicity for the chūreitō project proved successful. In Tokyo 
alone, donations reached 700,000 yen by early October 1939.34 According 
to the announcement of winners published in major newspapers in January 
1940, competition entries from 1,679 people had been received by the com-
mittee. (By way of comparison, typical architectural design competitions at 













 The media promotion of the memorial project was part of a larger phe-
nomenon of competitions sponsored by newspapers and mass-market 
magazines in Japan of the 1930s.35 Particularly during the war, newspapers 
and magazines held numerous competitions to promote patriotism through 
mass participation by soliciting war-themed slogans, songs, and essays. 
Like many of these contests, the chūreitō competition was sponsored by 
a newspaper and ostensibly did not require special qualifications for par-
ticipants. But the drawing requirements imply that the competition was 
seeking entries from professional architects. Each entry was to consist of a 
series of drawings that included a site plan, a floor plan, three elevations, 
one or more sections, and a perspective. Drawings were to be done in ink, 
with shading applied to the elevations and colors to the perspective. Fur-
ther instructions designated lettering, labeling, and other details. News-
paper articles reveal that many non-professionals submitted entries only 
to be rejected because they did not fulfill the requirements. Although pro-
fessionals were solicited, the organizers actively solicited non-professional 
entries to engage a much larger population. The selection of a design from 
a competition that encouraged all Japanese to participate and the mass 
media’s emphasis on submissions from amateurs created the impression 
that the entire nation took part in the design process.
 However, we cannot get a full view of the chūreitō project from mass-
market media targeting the general audience, as the project involved a de-
sign competition aimed at professional and aspiring architects, as well. At 
the time the chūreitō competition took place, architecture competitions 
had long been a source of contention between generations of architects. 
Younger architects who championed European-inspired modernist designs 
struggled for acceptance by the jury, which was composed of older archi-
tects who preferred more traditional styles often referred to as Nihon shumi 
(Japanese taste), characterized by the formulaic use of traditional Japanese 
roofs capping buildings of neoclassical design.36 In most of the competi-
tions for public architecture, such as those for city and town halls and mu-
seums that took place in the 1920s and 1930s, a Nihon shumi–style entry 
had been selected as the winner. Weary of the typical outcome, many young 
modernists had begun to boycott architecture competitions. In the case of 
the chūreitō competition, however, many of these modernists had partici-
pated, including the young elites who would come to represent postwar 
Japanese architecture—in part from patriotism and in response to the over-
whelming publicity. These young modernists’ entries typically incorporated 






















signs. As a stark contrast, the first prize for the type-three design, which 
became the model for most of the memorials built in Japan, was a simple 
design featuring a tall, slender tower rising from a pedestal that also func-
tioned as an ossuary.
 For the young elites, the outcome of the competition was truly disap-
pointing, as none of their modernist entries was selected. The unsuccessful 
entrants used professional architecture journals to voice their disdain. Nu-
merous journals championed the modernist entries by dedicating gener-
ous numbers of glossy pages to their photographs. At the same time, these 
articles disparaged the winning entries, criticized the competition as futile, 
and called for another competition. For example, an editorial in the archi-
tecture journal Gendai kenchiku (Contemporary Architecture) expressed con-
cern over the “banality and lack of skill in the winning designs” and com-
mented that the fallen heroes deserved better.37 One architect described 
his experience viewing the exhibition of winning entries as “irritating” and 
“extremely unpleasant” and wondered “how in the world such abysmal de-
signs were selected as winners.” In a bitter tone, he proposed that the com-
petition be considered a trial run and that the process be repeated.38 The 
disgruntled architects mockingly labeled the winning designs “tombstone” 
style for the resemblance of their compositions—several lower layers of 
base structure topped with a high-rising monolith—to common Japanese 
tombstones.
 It has been argued that these elite architects were detached from politics 
in wartime Japan and that the competition was rigged by the military, whose 
members had pre-selected the winning entries before the other jury mem-
bers had a chance to examine all the entries, thereby completely dismiss-
ing the architectural significance of the winning designs.39 But from news-
paper articles and diary entries of one of the jury members, I have found 
that, while the competition indeed took a two-step process, the first round 
of selections was completed by a sub-jury composed of four senior archi-
tects.40 In other words, it was the architect sub-jury, rather than the mem-
bers of the military, who had selected the “tombstone”-style entries. These 
senior architects had typically served as jury members for competitions for 
public architecture, which usually called for designs that expressed Japa-
neseness while using floor plans, material, and technology imported from 
European architecture. In the previous contests, they had always favored 
entries that employed Nihon shumi designs, because the conspicuous Japa-
nese tiled roof, even when used with otherwise Western-style building de-













this competition, then, were no different from those of the previous com-
petitions. Trained before the advent of high modernism in Japanese archi-
tectural culture, these senior architects were capable of acknowledging the 
power of kitsch: they understood that just as the Nihon shumi style was easily 
recognizable as Japanese in public architecture, the “tombstone” style most 
effectively communicated death in war memorials.
 The military, then, had little input in the selection of a design. In fact, 
the military had little interest in the project itself. A series of documents 
distributed by the military and the police in the early stages of the project 
indicates that their interest in supporting the chūreitō project had dimin-
ished considerably during the first year. In fact, by November 1939 the rec-
ommended budget for the construction of the local memorials had been 
drastically reduced to an amount that made their construction unfeasible.
 Not that the military had always been uninvolved. Before the founding 
of the Greater Japan Committee to Exalt the Loyal Dead in May 1939, repre-
sentatives from the Interior, Army, Navy, Welfare, and Education ministries 
had met on January 18 of the same year to discuss a nationwide project for 
the construction of war memorials.41 This was in response to a growing 
demand from people living far from Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo for a local 
memorial that they could call their own and visit daily.42 The outcome of the 
meeting was distributed to governors throughout Japan on February 2, 1939, 
in the document “Matters Regarding Memorial Building Associated with 
the China Incident,” which outlined the basic principles of local memorial 
building.43 The Army initially showed strong enthusiasm for the chūreitō 
construction movement by promising financial assistance and offering 
to provide land for the memorials in military cemeteries.44 By November, 
however, its stance had changed dramatically. The Army’s public notice 
“On the Construction of Structures Associated with the China Incident,” 
issued in November, stated that the memorials would be built only when 
financially feasible. The notice further downsized the scope of the project 
at the local level by discouraging the establishment of new committees for 
memorial construction and recommending the use of military cemeteries 
instead of constructing new memorials. The recommended budget was cut 
drastically from the amounts originally noted at the announcement of the 
design competition (50,000 yen for cities, 20,000 yen for towns, and 5,000 
yen for villages), to a minimal amount of 200 yen to 300 yen, which effec-
tively made it impossible to build them.45 The last item on the document 
warned, “Prepare cautiously for construction with the above items in mind. 






















note indicating the main objective of the project was to build memorials 
on “the major battlefields of the Imperial Army,” and several items that all 
but discouraged the construction of chūreitō, it might be safely concluded 
that, even before the deadline of the competition, the committee no longer 
intended to support the actual construction at regional levels—a drastic 
change from the enthusiastic support that the Army showed in its internal 
memo of February 1939. Nevertheless, by engaging in the broad public dis-
cussion of memorial building, the military was taking part in the mainte-
nance of a political consensus focused on the memorial project.
 In fact, the Army already had plans to construct chūreitō memorials 
in each garrison city throughout Japan prior to the establishment of the 
Greater Japan Committee to Exalt the Loyal Dead. The blueprint to be used 
for these memorials had already been completed by the Army Ministry long 
before the design competition was announced in August 1939. In Waka-
yama City, for example, local newspapers announced on February 2, 1939, 
the Army’s plans to build a memorial inside the local military cemetery, and 
on April 8, 1939, it announced that the local Army troop had received the set 
of drawings issued by the Army Ministry.46 For a year, the Wakayama edition 
of the Asahi Shimbun followed the memorial project with a focus on fund-
raising and the voluntary labor of local residents. Since the ongoing Waka-
yama chūreitō project design would have conflicted with the outcome of 
the competition, those in charge of the Wakayama project quietly replaced 
their design with the competition result. On April 20, 1940, the Asahi, with-
out reference to its earlier announcement of the completion of chūreitō 
design, noted once again that the military had just completed its design for 
the memorial (figure 1).47
 The project to construct memorials in small towns and villages was, 
then, not a priority for the military and the state. The chūreitō construc-
tion movement had developed as a solution to popular demands for local 
memorials. By establishing the Greater Japan Committee to Exalt the Loyal 
War Dead, which organized an open competition for memorial design as 
well as fund drives for memorial construction, the military and the state 
successfully reassured people of the viability of the project by creating the 
impression that they were responding to the demands of the competition 
while, in fact, they expended little on it.
 Despite the military’s lack of interest, the project, boosted by media 
publicity, developed into a mass movement that resulted in the actual com-
pletion of a number of memorials in various areas throughout Japan. Even 













local enthusiasm for memorial building. By February 1941, when four-
teen memorials following the type-three prototype designed by Hoshino 
Shōichi were completed, it had become impossible to secure the steel and 
iron required to construct the structures according to the original plan. One 
valiant effort to work against these conditions was Satō Kōichi’s revision 
of the prototype to allow it to be built without the unavailable materials.48 
The blueprint for the modified memorial was distributed on request to local 
committees that had received approval for construction.49 But due to lack of 
time and resources, the goal to construct chūreitō memorials in every city, 
town, and village was not achieved before the end of the war. As of Octo-
ber 1, 1942, only 124 chūreitō memorials had been completed; 140 were 
near completion; and 1,500 cities, towns, and villages had plans to build 
one, though they never did (figures 2 and 3).50
 Despite this lack of actualization, the ideological work of the competi-
tion had been done. The effect of the project did not depend on its actual exe-
cution. Even in regions that were not able to complete a chūreitō memorial 
before the end of the war, the project enabled the residents to act together 
and to sacrifice for something national that they could call their own. For 
many, simply taking part in the project was a way to mourn a loss. The mass 
media aestheticized all sacrifices that contributed to chūreitō construction 
as noble deeds that honored those who had given up their lives for the coun-
try. By selecting a design from a competition that encouraged all Japanese 
1. Chūreitō memorial, Wakayama City, Wakayama Prefecture, 1941. Photograph by the 
author.
2. One example of a 
chūreitō memorial 
completed before the 
end of the Asia-Pacific 
War, Atsugi City, 
Kanagawa Prefecture 
(formerly Echi Village), 
1943. Photograph by the 
author.
3. Immediately after the 
end of the Occupation, 
many towns and villages 
resumed their effort 
to construct chūreitō 
memorials. Chūreitō 
memorial, Koayu Village, 
Kanagawa Prefecture, 














to participate, rather than limiting participation to professional architects, 
the project created the impression that the entire nation took part in the 
design process. Each resulting memorial, then, was easily recognizable by 
the general public as a chūreitō.
 If the physical presence of these memorials symbolized the sacrifice of 
men who lost their lives in battle, their process of creation demonstrated 
a different type of sacrifice: the donation of money and labor by the home-
front civilians who were instructed to endure their sacrifices by imagining 
for a single day that they had lost their lives in battle. Through this commu-
nal effort invested in a state-organized project, personal memories of loss 
and sacrifice were transformed into a collective memory of the community 
tied to the state and its imperialist endeavors. Feelings of grief and mourn-
ing were channeled into a collective aspiration to succeed in the war effort. 
The memorialization of deceased family members in these monuments was 
also recognized as the highest honor bestowed on the common man. It was 
meant to both console those left behind and encourage young men to fol-
low in the footsteps of those memorialized. With the collaboration of the 
mass media, which followed every step of the projects’ development at the 
national and local levels, the chūreitō movement functioned as a power-
ful political tool for mobilizing home-front communities through the later 
years of the Asia-Pacific War.
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Japan’s Imperial Diet Building  
in the Debate over Construction  
of a National Identity
During the 1930s a new monument slowly emerged on the 
Tokyo skyline. The Imperial Diet Building commanded a prominent site on 
a hill rising to the southwest of the Imperial Palace grounds. Even before 
Japan’s national legislature occupied the structure, the government seized 
on it as a banner for national unity and promoted images of it abroad as 
proof of the nation’s democratic government. This was an especially dif-
ficult claim for this particular government to make, and the Diet was an 
unlikely centerpiece for such a propaganda campaign. The Diet itself was a 
comparatively weak organ of the state, and the repressive civilian govern-
ment teetered on the brink of destruction. The government for nearly a de-
cade had been engaged in the brutal suppression of communists and other 
dissidents. Japan had for five years been fending off international criticism 
for its seizure of Manchuria and the installation of a puppet regime there. 
Only a few months before the building opened, a group of army officers 
staged an abortive coup and stationed troops at the Diet and other sites 
throughout central Tokyo. The following year, the military launched its full-



































uct of prolonged negotiations and was incapable of presenting a compel-
ling visual argument capable of transcending the problematic institution 
that it housed. In the end, the building was unable to meet the unrealis-
tic demands placed on it. The Diet building emerged from the war as an 
unhappy reminder of failed military adventurism and ineffectual political 
leadership.
 From the earliest planning stages in the 1880s, people recognized the 
future Diet Building’s potential to represent a vision of Japanese national 
identity both domestically and internationally. Yet no consensus was ever 
reached on how the Diet could most effectively fulfill that role. The pro-
tracted debates over the Diet’s design testify to the complex cultural contra-
dictions generated by the process of appropriation of Western ideas as part 
of an ambitious project of modernization.
 In 1881, the Meiji emperor (r. 1867–1912) promised to provide a consti-
tution and establish a parliament within ten years. After careful study of 
several European models, especially that of Germany, the emperor promul-
gated a constitution in 1889.1 The new bicameral legislature, the Imperial 
Diet, met for the first time the following year. The Japanese leadership chose 
to form a parliament along Western lines to solidify a sense of national 
unity and defuse pressure from the emerging people’s rights movement. At 
a time when there was also deep concern about the image of the Japanese 
government in the West, the formation of a parliament, it was thought, 
might help to convince Western powers that Japan was ready to deal with 
them on equal terms.2
 However, the Meiji oligarchs did not intend to surrender their power to 
this new institution. The constitution affirmed the emperor’s sovereignty 
and included many safeguards to ensure that the oligarchs would retain 
actual control over the government through their dominance of the Privy 
Council. The Diet was formed as a consultative body. Nonetheless, the Diet 
attained some measure of autonomy as the first generation of Meiji leaders 
began to pass from the scene and as political parties working within the 
Diet solidified their position. This culminated in the formation of the first 
party cabinet in 1918. Despite the Diet’s growing role, it was by no means 
the most respected institution in Japanese public life. The very process of 
party politics that brought the Diet newfound influence was widely per-
ceived as corrupt and ineffectual. As a result, until the end of the war there 
was little enthusiasm for party politics, and the Diet as an institution was 
















tentative status. For the first forty-seven years of its existence, the Diet met 
in a series of temporary structures as politicians and architects debated 
over the design for a more permanent building.
 The Imperial Diet Building was only one component of a much broader 
program of government-sponsored public construction during the Meiji 
period. When the Meiji government came to power in 1868, it was deeply 
committed to transforming Japan into a modern nation. Architecture 
played an important role in that effort. The government needed modern 
office buildings to house a burgeoning bureaucracy and looked to the West 
for practical solutions. The Meiji leaders also embraced Western architec-
tural styles, not to deny their Japanese cultural identity but, rather, to assert 
that their identity now needed to be firmly rooted in modernity. Western 
styles projected a contemporary yet dignified image and were tangible ex-
pressions of these aspirations.
 The first plans for a building to house the new Diet began to take shape 
at a time of transition for the architectural profession in Japan. Japanese ar-
chitects trained in the government’s own architecture program within the 
newly established College of Engineering were beginning to take on signifi-
cant public commissions, but government leaders still looked to Western 
advisers for certain critical commissions. As a result, the earliest designs 
for the Diet, a building intended to embody the spirit of national unity, were 
produced by foreign architects.
 A government commission under the leadership of the pro-Western for-
eign minister, Inoue Kaoru, invited the German architectural firm of Ende 
and Böckmann to develop a government complex at the Hibiya Parade 
Grounds directly south of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. The choice of a Ger-
man firm is not surprising, given the pro-German sentiments in Inoue’s 
circle at this time.4 Wilhelm Böckmann spent several months in Japan in 
1886, and his partner Hermann Ende visited in 1887. The architects pro-
posed a sweeping transformation of a large portion of central Tokyo. In its 
final form, their plan called for a large central ring of government minis-
tries linked by broad avenues radiating out to the palace, other government 
buildings, and a main train station. An elevated site to the southwest of the 
palace was reserved for the future Diet Building. Parliament Avenue would 
have offered a grand vista down to the palace moat and the ministries. Ende 
and Böckmann also worked up detailed plans for several of the individual 
buildings that were to fit into this grand scheme, including the Diet, the 
Ministry of Justice, and the High Court of Appeals.
 The German firm produced two plans for the Diet Building. The first 
1. Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Böckmann, proposed design for the Japan Imperial 
Diet Building, version 1, 1887. Archives of the Architectural Institute of Japan.
2. Hermann Ende and Wilhelm Böckmann, proposed design for the Japan Imperial 
















proposed design, developed by Böckmann, would have been a masonry 
structure measuring 180 by 70 meters. The facade was bilaterally symmet-
ric with a grand entrance set in a central pavilion capped by a dome, and 
with flanking wings for the two houses of parliament. The dome, mansard 
roofs, attached columns, pedimented windows, and other architectural 
details placed the design squarely within the framework of contemporary 
European practice. In fact, many specific characteristics of the design can 
be traced to the architects’ own entries in architectural competitions for the 
German Reichstag in 1872 and 1882.5 There was no effort to accommodate 
the architectural style to its Japanese context.
 Ende produced an alternative version of the design. The overall dispo-
sition of the second proposal was similar to the first; however, there were 
some significant alterations. The architectural details that had so clearly 
marked the first design as “Western” were replaced by architectural fea-
tures intended to allude to Japan’s architectural past. Groups of engaged 
columns that had punctuated the main facade became buttresses of rusti-
cated masonry surmounted by tiled gables. The two pairs of small towers 
that flanked the legislative wings lost their neo-baroque oculi and mansard 
roofs and were replaced by upswept tiled roofs. The roofs over the legis-
lative halls became hipped-and-gabled tiled roofs characteristic of monu-
mental architecture in premodern Japan. The Roman arched main entrance 
of the central pavilion in the original design was now marked by a bow-
shaped gable (karahafu) and above that by a triangular gable (chidorihafu). The 
stately dome above the central pavilion was transformed into a multistory 
tower with spired pinnacles and more triangular gables. Ende also created 
Japanese-style designs for the Tokyo Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the 
Navy Ministry.
 The chameleon-like substitution of architectural ornament had prece-
dent in contemporary European practice. One might speculate that Ende 
hoped to introduce a Japanese style that could be integrated into modern 
architectural practice in Japan along with imported Gothic or Renaissance 
styles. The exotic hybrid of Western planning and building methods with 
Japanese architectural ornament is also analogous to efforts by Japanese 
builders to combine Western and Japanese ornament using indigenous ma-
terials and construction techniques.6 What is distinctive about this design 
is that it was for such a prominent government building and was produced 
by formally trained Western architects working under the auspices of the 
government.




















Japanese forms. Undoubtedly, at some level Ende wished to reflect his 
admiration for Japanese architecture, an admiration that was cultivated 
through extensive tours of great monuments in Japan’s architectural heri-
tage.7 Ende and Böckmann came to Japan at a time when resident Western-
ers such as Gottfried Wagener, the German consultant to Japan’s ceramics 
industry, and the American philosopher Ernest Fenollosa found themselves 
in the ironic position of advocating traditional Japanese culture in the midst 
of Japan’s Westernization. Although there is no evidence that Ende met 
Wagener or Fenollosa, Böckmann did, and it is likely that both architects 
would have been aware of the other men’s ideas. Ende and Böckmann also 
knew Josiah Conder, who avidly studied Japanese culture and sought to pre-
serve what he thought of as Oriental architectural elements in contempo-
rary practice.8 These contacts may have encouraged Ende to acclimate his 
Diet design by adding the gables and tiled roofs.
 The German architects were aware of mounting resistance to the pro-
Western policies forwarded by Foreign Minister Inoue and others. A passage 
in Böckmann’s account of his visit to Japan describes a shift in the political 
winds in the short period between his visit in 1886 and Ende’s trip in 1887. 
Böckmann mentions criticism of Inoue’s decision to leave the enormous 
government building project solely in the hands of foreigners as being con-
trary to national interests.9 As the architectural historian Horiuchi Masaaki 
has suggested, Ende may have presented the alternative designs for the Diet 
and other government structures in part to deflect this mounting hostility.10 
Ende may have thought that “Japanicizing” the proposals would minimize 
the foreignness of the project as a whole, thus reducing nationalist objec-
tions. Inoue himself was receptive to Ende’s second plan, possibly hoping 
that it would mitigate further opposition to German participation in the 
building project, as well as to his other policies.11
 In the end, only a small portion of Ende’s and Böckmann’s government 
complex was built.12 One important obstacle to the realization of the am-
bitious project was money. There were also concerns that it might not be 
possible to manufacture sufficient brick and other modern building ma-
terials to meet the project’s demands, and the soil in critical sections of 
the proposed building site was too marshy to support large-scale masonry 
construction.13 It is also likely that a lack of consensus concerning both the 
role of foreign architects and the problem of architectural style contrib-
uted to the demise of the proposals. These plans were being formulated at 
a turning point in cultural politics among the Japanese elite. While there 
















modernization, the voices insisting on a degree of cultural independence 
from the West would grow stronger from the late 1880s onward.
 Ende’s and Böckmann’s second Diet design was not the last effort by 
Western architects to offer an Orientalized design for the Diet to the Japa-
nese government. Ralph Adams Cram, an American architect best known 
for Gothic revival designs, was contacted by a Unitarian minister based 
in Japan named Arthur May Knapp. Both “deplored the very terrible new 
architecture then being perpetrated under third-rate German influence.” 
One wonders whether their concern was motivated more by the loss of a 
tradition or by American chauvinism about the German role in the new de-
signs. Knapp convinced Cram to execute a design for the Diet Building that 
would “be based on the indigenous architecture of the Ashikaga and Fuji-
wara periods, but sufficiently adapted to modern conditions.”14 In 1898, 
Cram traveled to Japan with his design and through Knapp’s offices was 
able to secure an interview with Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi. According 
to Cram, Itō was impressed and indicated that the government would be 
willing to pay Cram to draw up plans; however, his cabinet had fallen by the 
time Cram had returned to the United States. Cram did not pursue the Diet 
design any further.15
 Cram referred to the project as an “Oriental dream,” and the rendering 
of the design by Cram’s colleague Bertram G. Goodhue does indeed have 
an oneiric quality. The perspective drawing is very delicately rendered, with 
the trees, shrubs, and Japanese lanterns of the garden setting contributing 
to his “Oriental” atmosphere. A man and woman in Japanese dress pause 
on a stone bridge over a river.
 Cram’s scheme, like both of the Ende and Böckmann designs, had a 
central pavilion and two wings for the houses of the Diet. However, Cram 
was more insistent about incorporating “Japanese” features into the de-
sign. His Diet was to be surrounded by a huge enclosure of walls and gates, 
perhaps following the precedent of the palace compounds of earlier Japa-
nese capitals. Again we see bow-shaped gables, plover gables, and multi-
storied tiled roofs that were intended to mark the design as Japanese. This 
Orientalist fantasy was far removed from the realities of urban Tokyo in the 
1890s. Cram’s Oriental dream was a Western nostalgic mission to restore 
an unambiguously “Japanese” Japan through a self-conscious construc-
tion of Japanese tradition. Cram was anxiously attempting to re-sharpen 
the increasingly blurred distinctions between East and West threatened by 
Japan’s modernization. In the years to come, such efforts would be carried 
out by Japanese architects.
3. Ralph Adams Cram with B. G. Goodhue, “A Proposal for the Parliament Houses in 
Tokyo,” 1898. From Ralph Adams Cram, My Life in Architecture (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1936).
4. Adolph Stegmueller with Yoshii Shigenori, First Imperial Diet Building, Main 
















 In 1888, as the deadline for the opening of the Diet approached, work 
began on a temporary structure to house the future Diet. Adolph Stegmueller, 
who had come to Japan as an architect from Ende’s and Böckmann’s firm, 
was the principal designer. He was assisted by Yoshii Shigenori, a graduate 
of the Imperial Engineering College who served as an architect from the 
Home Ministry. The building was completed in November 1890 in time for 
the first session of the Diet.16 Since this new Diet was designed primarily by 
a German architect in Western style, it could have raised some of the same 
objections the earlier designs had, but perhaps because it was temporary 
and cost considerably less than the earlier proposals, the government was 
able to move forward with the construction.
 The two-story wood clapboard building was a much more modest af-
fair than Ende’s and Böckmann’s stately designs. It was constructed not on 
the elevated site that Ende and Böckmann had designated but to the south 
of the Hibiya Parade Grounds. The plan was close to the earlier designs, 
with a central entry and wings for each of the two legislative chambers. The 
pavilions rising over each chamber were lit with Roman-arched windows 
and covered with simple gabled roofs. There was a minimum of ornamen-
tation.
 This building burned down as a result of an electrical fire in January 
1891, just two months after it was completed. A replacement designed by 
Yoshii and another Ende and Böckmann associate, Oscar Tietze, was com-
pleted by October of the same year. The second Diet Building closely fol-
lowed the first except that it was somewhat larger and used exposed half-
timber rather than clapboarding. This large but undistinguished temporary 
building housed the national legislature until it, too, was destroyed by fire 
in 1925.
 With the completion of a temporary Diet Building, the government and 
the architectural community had time to debate more permanent solutions. 
The Home Ministry formed a series of commissions to study the issue. In 
1899, one of these groups recommended that a competition be organized 
to select a design for the future Diet Building. Reflecting growing cultural 
nationalism, the commission proposed that the competition be limited to 
Japanese architects. In response to doubts about the maturity of the Japa-
nese architectural profession, the commission indicated that it might be 
necessary to open the competition to non-Japanese if the Japanese entries 
were inadequate. The winning design would be chosen by a jury of five for-
eigners. The commission adjourned without further progress in 1901.17
 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 tabled further consideration of the 
5. Kobayashi Kiyochika, “Burning of the Japanese Diet Building,” 1891. Woodblock 
print, Tokyo Metropolitan Central Library Special Collections Room.
6. Yoshii Shigenori and Oscar Tietze, Second Imperial Diet Building, Main Facade, 
Tokyo, 1891. Archives of the Architectural Institute of Japan.
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Diet Building for several years. After the war, the Treasury Ministry sought 
to wrest control of this important public project from the Home Ministry. 
Members of the Treasury Ministry and representatives of both houses of 
the Diet went to Europe and the United States in 1908 to study Western 
legislative buildings, considered appropriate models for the Diet. In 1910, 
the Treasury formed its own commission on the Diet Building, with Prime 
Minister Katsura Tarō as chair.18 This commission considered the Italian 
Renaissance style to be the most appropriate for the Diet, a recommenda-
tion that was immediately attacked in the architectural press. One anony-
mous author insisted that the “national spirit and the spirit of the age must 
be manifested through the architectural style of the building. . . . [A]fter 
all, one would not expect to manifest the spirit of sixteenth century Italy in 
Japan’s Meiji-period Diet Building.” The author called for a style that more 
accurately reflected contemporary “Japanese national spirit.” This article 
was just one reflection of the intense debate within the architectural com-
munity over the issue of style.19
 The ongoing study of the design for the Diet Building offered an excel-
lent opportunity to explore this thorny problem. In May 1910, the Kenchiku 
Gakkai (Architectural Institute) sponsored a panel discussion on an ap-
propriate future architectural style for the nation. Although the panel dis-
cussion was couched in general terms, the timing was such that the style 
of the future Diet was on the minds of all participants. Opinions varied 
dramatically. One participant advocated a purely Western style as the most 
appropriate choice for a modern nation. Another took a more traditionalist 
position. Several panelists proposed forging a new style that would draw on 
both Western and earlier Japanese architectural forms.20 Speakers agreed 
that the choice of style mattered, since Japan’s future public architecture 
would communicate something about its national ideals. The panelists 
could not agree, however, on a single, clear vision of Japan’s community 
identity.
 The Treasury Ministry created yet another commission, in 1918, to orga-
nize an architectural competition to select a design for the Diet Building. 
Initially, 118 entries were submitted, and of these, twenty designs were 
selected for the second stage of the competition. The finalists’ designs were 
then put on public display. The commission awarded first prize to Watanabe 
Fukuzō of the Imperial Household Ministry. Watanabe’s entry followed the 
same basic arrangement that Ende and Böckmann had introduced, with 
a central entry pavilion and two flanking wings. A pedimented portico 




















the center of the structure. The roofline was flat, and the ornamentation was 
more subdued than its German predecessors.
 The architect Shimoda Kikutarō had entered a design in the competition 
of 1918, but it was not included in the second round, and he was not satis-
fied with the designs of the finalists. He submitted a petition and design 
directly to the Diet. Shimoda argued that contemporary Japanese architects 
had lost touch with the “sublime poetic beauty that had characterized Japa-
nese architecture since ancient times.” He proposed combining European 
classicism with “pure Japanese style” in a new style that he called the “Im-
perial crown synthesis style (teikan heigō shiki).”21 Shimoda illustrated his 
ideas with a design close to Watanabe’s first-prize neoclassical work up 
to the cornice line. On top of this neoclassical structure, Shimoda placed 
pavilions with hipped-and-gabled roofs. The pavilions over the legislative 
chambers even sported bow-shaped gables and plover gables. The combina-
tion of a modern masonry structure and Japanese architectural details was 
nothing new, but Shimoda’s brash juxtaposition of neoclassical forms and 
Japanese elements was striking. Shimoda pressed his case unsuccessfully 
for several years.
 So much was at stake in the choice of styles for this important building 
that Shimoda was vigorously attacked by many of his colleagues. Curiously, 
Itō Chūta, who advocated incorporating elements from Japan’s architec-
tural past into contemporary practice, was one of Shimoda’s harshest crit-
ics. Itō’s critique is clearly reflected in an unfinished manuscript of 1921 in 
which he argued that Shimoda’s work violated the structural logic of build-
ing materials and undermined the spirit of both the European classical and 
Japanese styles. He went so far as to declare Shimoda’s design a “national 
disgrace.”22
 Members of the Treasury commission were not entirely satisfied with 
any of the competition designs. They settled on a compromise plan follow-
ing negotiations with representatives of the Diet, and construction began 
soon thereafter.23 This was an enormous undertaking that required a total 
of sixteen years between the groundbreaking in 1920 and the opening of the 
first session in the completed structure in December 1936.
 The new Diet was constructed with a steel and reinforced concrete 
frame faced with gray granite. Its overall disposition is strikingly similar 
to Watanabe’s competition entry, and it is likely that the commission drew 
heavily from that design in the development of its own.24 The Diet has a 
stouter tower than Watanabe’s, and it is capped with a stepped pyramidal 
roof rather than a dome. The commission may have borrowed this distinc-
7. Watanabe Fukuzō, proposal for the Imperial Diet Building, first-prize design for the 
Imperial Diet Competition of 1918–19. From Kenchiku sekai no. 134 (1919).
8. Shimoda Kikutarō, proposal for the Imperial Diet Building, design for the Imperial 
Diet Competition of 1918–19. From Shimoda Kikutarō, Shisō kenchiku, self published, 
1928.
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tive feature from the third-place entry by Takeuchi Shinshichi.25 Recently, 
Suzuki Hiroyuki has argued that this architectural form was associated with 
the Meiji oligarch Itō Hirobumi and that the building might at one level be 
interpreted as a memorial to this longtime advocate for the Meiji constitu-
tion and the Diet.26 The massing of the building is vaguely neoclassical in 
feel but lacks the extensive neoclassical detailing that characterized Wata-
nabe’s work.
 At the time of completion, sources described the building as “modern 
style (kinseishiki).” It is likely that the designers arrived at this modern style 
through a process of suppressing potentially problematic European and 
Japanese historicizing detail rather than through a positive affirmation of 
simplified form in line with contemporary modernist thought.
 How did the form of the new Diet Building, which was consonant with 
international architectural practice, address the concerns that this symbol 
of national unity be Japanese? By the 1920s one bone of contention—the 
nationality of the designer—did not present the problem it had in the 1880s. 
One frequently proposed strategy for situating the building culturally had 
been to appropriate historicizing detail from Japan’s past. The design does 
include such Japanese decorative motifs as the phoenixes (a symbol closely 
associated with imperial rule) carved in shallow relief over the main en-
trance to the Diet and the chrysanthemums (the imperial crest) carved into 
the woodwork in the legislative chambers, but these represent a relatively 
minor aspect of the building design as a whole. The divisive issue of Japa-
neseness was also addressed by a requirement that all building materials be 
from Japan, a fact emphasized in contemporary government publications.27 
A headline in an Asahi Shimbun article covering the ceremonies celebrating 
the completion of the building read “The Crystallization of the People’s 
Twenty Years of Effort: The Dignity of This Great Architecture Constructed 
Purely from Domestic Products.”28
 The Diet was described as a “modern” building produced by means of 
the latest technology. One government publication documented at great 
length the dimensions of the structure and offered a chart comparing them 
with those of other great structures in Japan and elsewhere, including the 
Great Buddha Hall at Tōdaiji, the Egyptian Pyramids, and the airship Graf 
Zeppelin.29 This was clearly an appeal to national identity through pride in 
Japan’s technological accomplishments. Instead of asserting national iden-
tity by distinguishing Japan from other cultures, this was a claim for including 
Japan among the great builders of the world. This interpretation of national 
9. Special Diet Architecture Office, Treasury Ministry, Imperial Diet Building, Main 
Facade, Tokyo, 1936. Archives of the Architectural Institute of Japan.
10. Paper model of the Imperial Diet Building made by Nakamura Seika, published by 




















identity was much more in line with such Meiji modernizers as Inoue who 
first began the search for a Diet design.
 It should be noted that even as the new Diet took shape in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, the battle continued to rage over the issue of style and 
national identity in architecture. The competitions for the Kanagawa Pre-
fectural Offices (1926), Nagoya City Hall (1930), Tokyo Imperial Household 
Museum (1931), and other prominent public buildings specifically called 
for entries reflecting what was termed “Japanese taste” and awarded com-
missions to architects who provided designs that incorporated hipped-and-
gabled tiled roofs or other easily identifiable Japanese architectural features 
into their designs. In these cases, the decorative programs were better inte-
grated than in Shimoda’s Diet design, but the basic strategy for Japaniciz-
ing these buildings was the same.30
 As the Diet Building neared completion, there were many efforts to 
promote it as a national symbol. The newspapers included articles on vari-
ous stages of the new Diet’s debut. In December 1935, the young people’s 
magazine Shōnen kurabu (Youth Club), which regularly sent do-it-yourself 
projects to its members, issued an elaborate paper model of the Diet for 
them to build.31 That same year, one could purchase a marble commemo-
rative mantle clock in the shape of the Diet Building.32 The Diet Building 
even entered the realm of mass advertising. The soy sauce manufacturer 
Kikkoman placed an advertisement in Asahi Shimbun a few days before the 
ceremony marking the completion of the Diet that showed a striking black 
silhouette of the building’s tower overlapped at one corner by the company 
logo. Through this image, Kikkoman expressed its public spirit and pro-
moted its products at one stroke.33
 There was also an effort to draw international attention to the new monu-
ment. As early as 1935, the English language annual Japan Illustrated featured 
a photograph of the building shot at a distance, with the caption “The Im-
perial moat and the new Diet towering in the background.”34 In 1938, the 
Western-language publication Nippon, which published in multiple lan-
guages, though privately produced, enjoyed official support, included the 
Diet as one of the featured stops on a hypothetical bus tour of Tokyo tai-
lored to foreign tourists.35 The International Tourist Bureau of the Railroad 
Ministry commissioned several photomontages of Japan, including one 
for the International Exposition in Paris (1937) with layered images of the 
Diet Building, the Great Buddha at Kamakura, Himeji Castle, modern steel 
bridges, Mount Fuji, downhill skiers, and a profusion of cherry trees.36 The 
















modernized Japan—as represented, in part, by the new Diet—enhanced by 
carefully selected signs of the nation’s exotic traditions.
 The opening of the new Diet received some attention in the architec-
tural press. There was a special issue devoted to it in the profession’s long-
est established journal, Kenchiku Zasshi, and a few short articles appeared 
in other venues, as well. As Yamaguchi Hiroshi has pointed out, however, 
the coverage was surprisingly thin given the size of the project and the ex-
traordinary energy that architects had poured into it. Yamaguchi explains 
this lukewarm reception by arguing that the final design did not resolve 
longstanding conflicts over style within the profession and that architects 
felt some measure of responsibility for that failure.37
Conclusion
The Diet Building is the product of a process of design by committee—or, 
rather, a long series of committees. It is a compromise—a neoclassical de-
sign denuded of much of its neoclassical detail—created for a time and 
place in which any fully articulated architectural style would have generated 
opposition from one camp or another. When it was first completed, the Diet 
Building attracted attention because of its novelty and scale. Yet despite 
the publicity surrounding it at home and abroad, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the building ever achieved the status of a national symbol that 
resonated with the Japanese public.
 Since the Meiji Restoration, many architects had advocated the adoption 
of certain Western styles for public buildings because they were believed to 
be transnational or “universal.” Others willingly employed modern build-
ing methods but sought to apply them in designs perceived to be uniquely 
local.38 This tension was present in the history of the Diet Building from the 
moment designers and politicians first began to speculate about the struc-
ture in 1880s. Both camps laid their claim on the final result. The building 
was branded with imperial crests, and newspapers defensively hailed the 
domestic materials that went into the construction. On balance, however, 
the current building represents a victory of the “universal” over the particu-
lar—the simplified classicism of the Diet Building allowed it to function, 
if equivocally, as a symbol of modern governance legible both at home and 
abroad.
 When discussing the political message conveyed through the construc-
tion of Japanese government buildings in the late 1920s and 1930s, com-




















an architectural style emerge during this period that can be clearly and un-
ambiguously linked to the regime? To what degree did the Diet Building 
become an emblem of the repressive policies of the Japanese state? Even 
in Germany, it is difficult to isolate a single “Nazi style.” The classicism 
of Speer’s monumental Zepplinfeld in Nuremberg would have to compete 
for that title with the steeply pitched roofs of the “Heimat style” employed 
in housing, schools, and other publicly sponsored construction under the 
Nazis. And if the effort to locate a national style under the Nazis is com-
plicated, the prospect is just as challenging in Japan. The Japanese govern-
ment not only sponsored the bland classicism of the Diet but also promoted 
structures designed in the so-called Japanese taste, such as the Imperial 
Household Museum, and constructed some of the best high-modern de-
sign of the prewar and wartime period, such as the central post offices of 
Tokyo (1931) and Osaka (1938). No one political message is communicated 
by such diverse designs. The government did not have a single planning 
agency forwarding an official style: the committee under the Treasury Min-
istry that developed the plans for the Diet operated apart from the Imperial 
Household Ministry as it built its new museum building. The Communica-
tions Ministry often chose modernist designs for its post offices, telegraph 
offices, and schools with relative autonomy. And in each of these cases, the 
responsible government agency answered to different political constituen-
cies and designed for different target audiences.
 The Diet Building’s stripped classicism and intimidating scale can be 
equated with the work of the Nazi architect Albert Speer. Yet it shares these 
characteristics with significant examples of public architecture of the 1930s 
in the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries with widely di-
vergent political systems. It would be difficult to argue that there is one 
clear meaning embedded in this generalized architectural style. It is not 
capable of expressing a political ideology with great precision. Rather, it is 
more helpful to interpret the popularity of this style as a more generalized 
response to the crisis facing many modern nation-states. As Barbara Miller 
Lane has argued in her discussion of this “stripped classicism,” “Each gov-
ernment felt the need to assure its citizens of its strength and durability, 
and each wanted a building style which was both modern and somehow 
old.”39 It is only at this much more amorphous level that the Diet Building 
was able to communicate effectively.
 Throughout the 1930s, the Japanese government faced mounting criti-
cism for its repressive policies at home and its expansionism abroad. In 
















completed legislature to venues around the world. The Diet Building rather 
than the Imperial Household Museum was selected to anchor photomon-
tages in Japanese pavilions in Chicago and Paris. Both the constitution and 
the Diet originally had been formed, in part, to assuage the concerns of for-
eign governments. One is tempted to conclude that whether this effort was 
successful or not, the Diet Building was chosen to represent Japan not as an 
intimidating assertion of military ambitions and authoritarian will, but as a 
reassuring symbol of stability, modernity, and constitutional governance.
 Even in the first years after its completion, the building never entirely 
transcended the associations attached to the institution that it housed, an 
institution that before and during the war was neither powerful nor popu-
lar. That ambivalence is vividly expressed, for example, in Matsumoto Shun-
suke’s gloomy image of the Diet painting during the dark days at the end of 
the war in 1944.40 After the war, the Diet’s role in the national government 
expanded considerably, but as a result, the Diet Building became the site 
of bitter political struggles and a ready target of the public’s frustrations 
when it failed to meet their needs.41 In the 1954 science-fiction film clas-
sic, the charismatic monster Godzilla attacks Tokyo at night. During his 
rampage through the city, he melts electrical towers and crushes the Waco 
Department Store and the Japan Theater. Godzilla looms threateningly over 
the Diet Building, then trudges through the structure, which crumbles in 
his wake. Despite desperate efforts to stop Godzilla, the government is 
powerless in the face of this awesome phenomenon.42 The famous aerial 
photographs of massive demonstrations in front of the Diet protesting the 
renewal of the U.S.–Japan security treaty in 1960 are just as vivid and dis-
turbing as the scenes in Godzilla, although they are, perhaps, less cathartic. 
The impression of the Diet emerging from these pictures is of a stony and 
aloof fortress protecting high-handed politicians from an angry citizenry. 
The Meiji leaders’ dream of a unifying and transcendent symbol of national 
identity was inevitably lost to the bureaucratic process and the realities of 
political life in a diverse society.
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Expo Fascism?:  
Ideology, Representation, Economy
If one wanted to look for fascism in Japan in the 1930s, ex-
hibitions would be a good place to start. Mass spectacle, it is clear, was 
a political priority in fascist Italy.1 The repeated commemorations of the 
March on Rome, the monumental staging of the 1932 Exhibition of the 
Fascist Revolution, the mass kinaesthetics of 18 BL in the same year (an 
experimental theatrical performance celebrating and starring the first truck 
mass-produced by Fiat), and the plans for the Esposizione Universale di 
Roma (EUR) in 1942 were all state projects. They were designed to ensure 
that their audience would identify with the nation, in the person of Musso-
lini, and so produce a new fascist subject, which the revolution had prom-
ised and on which the regime would be based. In each case, an architec-
tural sanctum enabled a processional sacrament. By rehearsing in material 
form the ideological tropes and revolutionary narrative of the movement 
through which the regime had come to power, they promised to transform 
the spectator into willing participant, both actor within the spectacle itself 
and acted on by their viewing of the event. The epiphanic abolition of the 
usual distance between viewer and viewed would produce an ecstatic union 























recognize the potential of such events. Nuremberg rallies and Berlin Olym-
pics, not least in Leni Riefenstahl’s filmic representations, have long been 
recognized as one key to understanding that regime.
 Fascists were not alone in their enthusiasm for spectacle, however; nor 
were Italy and Germany the only countries to show signs of fascism. Great 
exhibitions had long been used by states to mediate the shock of the new, 
whose iteration and amplitude following the First World War were fast be-
coming insufferable. As Harry Harootunian has noted, the interwar crisis 
of capitalism was a global one, fracturing everyday convention and tradi-
tional certainties throughout the world. Fascism therefore took its place 
among a number of proposed solutions that promised “capitalism with-
out capitalism”—that is, the liberating modernity that capitalism enabled 
without the corrosive externalities that it had also produced. Envisioning 
this alternative was the work of culture, which could conjure a foundation 
upon which to re-establish the sense of identity and community that had 
been set adrift. Fascist culture shared many of its own panaceas with other 
visionaries. Given the anxieties of the time, it is not surprising to find a re-
curring and general preference for community over individual, nature over 
history, and form over content, or to discover Japanese thinkers among 
those who sought indigenous solutions to the global crisis.2
 In conjuring up mythic pasts or possible futures for popular consump-
tion, however, cultural producers everywhere had to confront the present 
absence of the desired alternative. The imagined community could not be 
assumed but had to be represented; spectacle promised to do so in style. 
The French and the Americans were quick to turn again to exhibitions after 
the First World War, while Los Angeles in 1932 provided the blueprint for a 
modern Olympics, which Hitler sought to build four years later in Berlin.3 
The fascist regimes in Germany and Italy were innovators, overcoming the 
inherently diffuse nature of mass spectacle by disciplining the narrative, 
regimenting the audience, and animating the display, as noted earlier. But 
the benefits of such total environments were obvious and quickly sought 
elsewhere. The World’s Fair in New York in 1939–40 sought to produce a 
world of tomorrow, nowhere more than in the Futurama exhibit by General 
Motors, in which its audience was rapt by a panorama of the automobilized 
future. Fifteen years later, fair and pavilion inspired the creation of Disney-
land, wherein imagined worlds were enclosed for good. No less than fascist 
mass spectacle, the capitalist version sought to incorporate spectators in a 
world from which uncertainty had been banished. Abolishing the distance 













eties of the present, but also encouraged him or her to buy the trademarked 
future on display.4
 Generalized anxiety, common solutions, and the use of spectacle were 
not by themselves enough to make the icons of American corporate cul-
ture fascist. Emphasizing commonalities and genealogies in this way sug-
gests only the extent to which the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy 
shared their context, preoccupations, and some procedures with others at 
the time. Put differently, fascism did not arise beyond the modern pale; 
the potential for fascism was not limited to the countries that would later 
become an Axis or to the 1930s. Only in Italy and Germany, however, did 
fascism progress from potential to proclivity, ideology, movement, and 
finally regime. Analyzing fascism requires that we acknowledge the poten-
tial but also mark the differences that characterized the progression. Here, 
too, spectacle is useful. On the one hand, fascist culture inflected familiar 
themes in distinctive ways, emphasizing particular solutions to the com-
mon problems of the present. Nature, community, and nation were to be 
restored by a rupture with the immediate, degenerate past; the recovery of 
a founding national endowment; the identification of the nation with its 
heroic leader; and an ongoing militarization through which a new national 
subject might be forged.5 On the other, fascist regimes, as noted earlier, 
were distinguished by the extent to which the production of culture became 
the work of the state, rehearsing these tropes in an attempt to yoke subject 
to regime.6 Spectacle is therefore one point at which to connect fascist cul-
ture to fascist politics.
 It is hard to find such a spectacle in Japan, however. In what follows, 
I will use the small story of an exhibition that did not take place to mark 
the difference between Italian and German solutions to the interwar crisis 
and what was happening in Japan in the 1930s. The Japan World Exhibition 
to commemorate the 2,600th year of the Imperial Era (Kigen 2600 nen ki-
nen Nihon bankoku hakurankai; hereafter, Banpaku) was planned for 1940, to 
take place on a couple of reclaimed islands in Tokyo Bay. Together with the 
Olympics, it was to be the centerpiece of a range of events commemorating 
the anniversary of the putative ascension of Jimmu, the first emperor, to 
the chrysanthemum throne in 660 B.C.E. (hereafter, Kigen 2600). Banpaku 
and the Olympics were both cancelled in the summer of 1938 in the wake 
of the invasion of China, but until then the exhibition had fit easily enough 
with the rhetoric and initiatives that affirmed Japan’s increasingly strident 











enough to fold it into a familiar narrative about the dark valley of early 
Shōwa Japan. Banpaku, like most of the decade, can be seen to have led to 
war, Axis, and inevitable defeat. The teleology is tempting, collapsing the 
exhibition and the decade as a whole into the tale of an omnipotent state 
exploiting the fascist potential in a society under economic siege in order 
to build an authoritarian, if never quite fascist, regime.8 But it is wrong.
 A close analysis reveals that this exhibition attracted interest and in-
vestment not because it promised to forge a fascist subject, but because it 
could seem, albeit with some effort, to be all things to all people. That is, 
the exhibition was one of many ways in which Imperial Japan, almost until 
its end, could provide a sufficiently inclusive imaginary space, inscribed on 
an appropriately expansive physical area, to accommodate radically diverse, 
even ideologically opposed, interests. As such, it may also suggest some 
broader conclusions for our understanding of Japan in the 1930s and of the 
place of fascism within it. Japan certainly shared in the general anxieties 
of the time, but for solutions it was able for the most part to draw on older 
configurations of ideology, institutions, and initiative. It may be that these 
were enough, in the end, to achieve similar results to those achieved by fas-
cist regimes: the mobilization that was possible under conditions of total 
war and the uses that were eventually made of the anniversary both suggest 
affinities between Japan and its Axis allies.9 The differences in the process 
by which they arrived at these solutions, however, as well as similarities 
between Axis and Allied representation and practice, suggest that we need 
to widen the frame and place at least this exhibition, but also Japan—and 
even, perhaps, fascism itself—within a more general, if no less troubling, 
history of modern political economy, as well as mass spectacle.
Origins Narratives and Imperial Destiny
The theme of the exhibition was a predictable one. As summarized in the 
official prospectus, the exhibition promised to “humbly commemorate the 
2,600th year of the imperial era by gathering and displaying the flower of 
industry from home and abroad, and so contribute to the fusion of cultures 
east and west, the development of global industry, and the advance of inter-
national peace.”10 This was elaborated elsewhere in the promotional litera-
ture to reaffirm a set of relationships between ancient national history, re-
cent modern accomplishments, the contemporary international situation, 













served to underwrite an evolutionary account of national destiny, but one 
that sought to banish the possibility of change over time and so confirm the 
self-identity of the Japanese nation and its historical mission.11
 The starting point was Jimmu’s accession to the “imperial” throne. The 
mythical first monarch had thus planted the “seed” not only of the Japanese 
people (ikkun banmin) and their “unsurpassed” national spirit, but also of 
Japan’s successful recent modernization.12 The present was thus the “au-
tumn,” industrial development and international standing the fall crop of 
Jimmu’s initial planting, the inevitable fruit of the original spiritual en-
dowment, guaranteed by the unbroken imperial line (bansei ikkei).13 Finally, 
the organic unfolding of the national genetic code would itself bring about 
international harmony (bankoku kyōwa)—sometimes glossed as the in-
famous “eight corners of the world under one roof (hakkō ichiu)”—which 
was both the spiritual core of the founding (chōkoku no seishin) and there-
fore the national faith (kokumin no shinnen).14 All that was required, and the 
goal of the exhibition, was to reaffirm the basic principles of their national 
destiny to the Japanese people and to reveal the true meaning and pacific 
nature of that destiny to the world at large.15
 The theme was susceptible to any number of variations. One of the most 
elaborate was the lyrics of the official exhibition march, published in March 
1938:
At the dawn of a young Asia,
A new Japan with bright life.
Look! Piercing the ages
The essence of Japanese spirit
   Gorgeously unfolds today.
   The Japan International Exhibition.
Three more stanzas elaborated the lesson, invoking familiar symbols (“pure 
Yamato cherry,” “graceful Fuji”) to anchor the “pure history” and “great 
mission” of a nonetheless “young Japan.”16 Again, an unfolding but un-
changing essence, buttressed by nature and seasonal metaphors, served to 
anchor Japan’s place at the center of Asia and modernity.
 Much of the rhetorical content here was shared with the slightly later 
promotion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Rather than re-
hearse the iterations of Japan’s imperial destiny, however, and damn the ex-
hibition by rhetorical association, it seems more useful to unpick the thor-
oughly generic form—the very model of a modern national narrative—that 











by assuming a point of (divine) origin freed from the contingencies of the 
historical environment. This assumption of autopoesis allows subsequent 
historical experience to be rewritten as the inevitable self-realization of 
a genetically programmed destiny: one studies the past to anticipate the 
future.17 Temporal and spatial distinctions are collapsed: the articulation 
of organism and its environment and the resulting change over time are 
characterized as the extension across time and space of the unchanging, 
self-same code and so the heroic yet effortless creation of a world by the 
organism. Thus the exhibition’s president, Ushitsuka Kotarō, could note 
that the absorption of Western science and civilization since the beginning 
of Japan’s rapid modernization in the Meiji period (1868–1912) was in fact 
the realization of the essence of Japan’s own spirit and culture.18 The ori-
gins narrative, sustained often by a metaphor of seasonal transformation, 
subsumes difference, both within and without, under Japan, naturalized as 
the world. Modern Japanese development is not understood as the outcome 
of an intricate pattern of interaction with the contemporary world; rather, 
a world of international harmony will result from the natural development 
of the Japanese empire.
 Such an origins narrative was hardly unique to Japan. It differed little 
from the autobiographies of almost all imperial powers, in which the imag-
ined distinction of the modern nation authorized manifest destiny and civi-
lizing mission. Nationalism imagined a unitary identity (a spiritual essence, 
great culture, pure history) not only as a means of defence in a competitive 
international system, but also to transcend the differentiated interest of a 
pluralist, capitalist society. International competition and capitalist inter-
est, however, both ensured that identity and system were expansive. The 
universal pretensions of a civilizing mission prescribed what was profitable 
for some as good, if not yet to be implemented, for all. Here was one differ-
ence with the distinctive posture of fascist rhetoric. Where the latter began 
with rupture (from both past and world), demanded personification, ex-
pelled difference, and generalized violence, imperial nationalism asserted 
continuity, abstracted personality, incorporated difference, and tended, at 
least in rhetoric, to peace.19 This is not to argue that either set of attributes 
should be read as the truth of their respective regimes. But it is to claim that 
the ideological means toward their acquisitive ends were distinctive.
 It also suggests that both rhetoric and exhibition need to be understood 
within a longer history. Nowhere were the projections and evasions of mod-
ern nationalism on more obvious display than the international exhibi-













patriotism and imperial destiny were their stock in trade. The Philadelphia 
Centennial Exhibition of 1876, the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1889, 
and the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893 all sought to tie universal aspirations 
to national commemoration. Nor had Japan been slow to explore the pos-
sibilities of their newly invented imperial tradition. Unrealized plans for an 
international exhibition in 1890 had also exploited the putative ascension 
of the first emperor, although in that case the anniversary had been the 
2,550th. Late Victorian bombast and national origins were less obvious by 
the interwar period, but both the United States and France continued to 
insist on their imperial birthright and civilizing influence, even as the focus 
shifted to tomorrow’s worlds and modern art.20 In other words, the con-
structed and contradictory nature of such narratives may have been more 
apparent in Japan in the 1930s, but the latter still relied on the conventions 
of the form.
Material Form and Commemorative Space
In the linear prose of public relations and official statements, exhibition 
organizers and supporters could have recourse to time-honored tropes and 
a familiar rhetorical structure. Origins narratives provided a simple solution 
for bridging particular and universal by collapsing distinctions, absorbing 
contradiction, and so freeing the thereby imagined community from any 
temporal or spatial specificity. It is not surprising that problems came when 
the rhetoric was obliged to take specific material form, as two-dimensional 
graphics or three-dimensional architecture. The rhetorical sleight of hand 
afforded by narrative—reading modern science as ancient destiny, for ex-
ample—could not be sustained in more stable media, wherein signifiers 
were valuable precisely for the specificity of their historical and cultural 
reference. The contradictions inherent in reconciling Japan and the world, 
the effort required to do so, and the ambivalence of the final result were 
apparent at every stage of the process.
 The basic outlines of the problem were apparent in the jury responsible 
for choosing the official exhibition posters. Its discussion of the submis-
sions was bedeviled by an uncertainty as to whether the design chosen 
should express the “spirit of the age,” emphasizing the exhibition’s inter-
national dimensions, or the “spirit of the founding,” highlighting its com-
memorative nature. A degree of interaction with the outside world, coded as 
“Westernization,” seemed unavoidable: many of the posters copied foreign 











ambiguously modern. In the end, the jury was saved by being able to reward 
and recommend the dissemination of several posters. The winners were 
united in suggesting that they had sought to produce something uniquely 
Japanese (“Nihon-teki toiu koto,” “Nihon dokuji no kanji o dashitai”), although 
their designs ran the gamut. At one end, a decidedly futurist dove carried a 
globe in a sling of national flags, emblazoned with “2600.” At the other, a 
white Mount Fuji floated on a red ground, while a bird flew across its face. 
The first prize must have seemed a safe bet, finally going to a portrayal of an 
ancient Japanese warrior standing, facing out over an expansive plain. Even 
here, however, one of the jurors suggested that there was no way of knowing 
whether or not he was standing in Japan or, perhaps, the whole universe.21
 The poster competition revealed a simple version of the problem that 
was by now wracking design in general, architecture above all, and that 
caught the exhibition authorities in a multiple bind. On the one hand, the 
ascent of international modernism had rejected cultural specificity in favor 
of universal form. On the other, rising nationalism, not least among the bu-
reaucrats responsible for overseeing architectural competitions, demanded 
a more identifiably Japanese architecture, especially on those occasions 
when Japan itself was on display. Fascist architects in Germany and Italy 
resolved a similar dilemma by framing the functional imperatives of mod-
ernism within the dictates of neoclassical style. Japanese architecture in the 
1930s also saw an updating of tradition, known as Nihon shumi (Japanese 
taste), which involved the use of traditional Japanese elements to ornament 
modern building construction. But where fascists could pass off their ata-
vism as the heir of earlier developments, and therefore an embodiment of 
genuine modernity, the Japanese reversion to type marked itself as a throw-
back to tradition defined against the modern, an embrace of the particular 
against the universal.22 The problem was particularly acute given this par-
ticular context. The anniversary demanded a visual rubric that was clearly 
Japanese, but an international exhibition had to incorporate the world.
 The solution came in two parts, combining architectural style and site 
planning. First, the authorities determined that a Memorial Hall should 
anchor the site as a whole. The regulations for the prize competition stipu-
lated that the hall was the “main sign” of the exhibition and therefore its 
style should be “sublime and majestic, symbolizing the Japanese spirit.”23 
After ruminations as tortured as those of the poster committee, the judges 
finally picked a design by Takanashi Katsushige, who explained his entry 
as “pure Japanese architecture,” an attempt to modernize the Sumiyoshi 













tecture. Sano Toshikata, the chairman of the judges, noted that the archi-
tects’ task had been a difficult one, the traces of the struggle visible in the 
variety of submissions, which had mimicked castles and temples, as well 
as shrines. The simplicity of the latter model had carried the day, however. 
The great staircase, pillars, and roof combined elegance and dignity.24 In-
side the hall, frescoes would re-create the scene at the accession of Jimmu 
and the subsequent development of the Japanese people from ancient times 
to the present.25
 Where the Memorial Hall could solve the puzzle by divorcing steel-frame 
structure and throwback style, the site plan had to resort to disaggrega-
tion. Early plans had the exhibition occupying four reclaimed islands at the 
mouth of the Sumida River, but the final site comprised only two (present-
day Toyosu and Harumi), together with a small subsidiary site devoted to 
marine-related exhibits in Yokohama.26 An artist’s impression with accom-
panying commentary, spread over four pages of the official magazine, sug-
gested the architectural panorama that would unfurl before the visitor. He 
or she would approach the main gate as if visiting a shrine. Beyond it sat 
the Memorial Hall, a modern rendition of the most ancient of Japanese 
architectures. To its right were halls relating to “spirit and culture” (in-
cluding Society, Health and Hygiene, Education, and the Arts); to its left, 
exhibits of industry and natural resources (including Mining, Engineer-
ing, and Communication and Transportation). The island would be unified 
throughout by a “sublime” Japanese architecture before yielding to a mis-
cellany of exhibits and facilities on the second, executed in a “free, modern” 
architectural style and including Agriculture, Chemical and Manufacturing 
Industries, the Foreign Pavilion, various entertainments, and parking. The 
exhibition’s unique synthesis of East and West would further underwrite 
Japan’s claims to possibly global and certainly Asian leadership.27
 The plans as a whole neatly recapitulated the characteristic tropes of ge-
neric exhibition design. International exhibitions had early outgrown the 
original single-building model of the Crystal Palace in 1851. By the late nine-
teenth century, the movement had developed a standard repertoire: central 
axes, spatial symmetry, and officially endorsed, historically pedigreed ar-
chitecture for the most important buildings, as the standard against which 
foreign styles were set off. By the 1930s, architectural style had moved on, 
but the other principles remained. They were ideally suited to accommodate 
the evolutionary and imperial principles that still informed such exhibi-
tions, the spatial embodiment of the narrative structure outlined earlier. 











but quickly moved on to provide a panorama of the world beyond the na-
tion. This was far removed from the national sacrament for which fascist 
architecture was designed. There, the original covenant was reaffirmed by 
creating a sanctum, excluding the world, and choreographing space and 
time as a processional, which would culminate in the ecstatic union of sub-
ject with leader and so the state.28 In Tokyo, by contrast, site plan and archi-
tecture had to incorporate rather than exclude, making space for multiple 
ways of representing the world and, perhaps most important, experiencing 
the exhibition.
 International exhibitions, in other words, were as much about pragmat-
ics as ideology. Nowhere is this clearer than in the discussions of the Site 
Planning Committee, which began meeting in January 1937.29 Later meet-
ings of the committee touched on questions of representation and style, 
but much of this labor could be delegated, or subcontracted, to juried com-
petitions. The committee began with the study of blueprints from Paris and 
Chicago and spent much of its time shuttling backward and forward be-
tween visitor numbers and site plans, tinkering with plans to maximize 
numbers and extrapolating from numbers to address the question of how 
people were going to get to and move around the exhibition.30 The most 
basic imperative in site planning was traffic flow and crowd control, im-
portant enough to spawn a separate transportation committee and to pro-
duce the only permanent legacy from the exhibition, the Kachidoki bridge 
linking Tsukiji on the mainland, southeast of the Imperial Palace, to the 
reclaimed islands on which the exhibition would be staged.31 This con-
straint also meant that the artist’s impression would remain just that. There 
were multiple possible entrances to the exhibition, including one that led 
straight into the amusement zone on the second island. After this, and the 
novelties of the foreign exhibits, the unique architectural synthesis of the 
first island may perhaps have seemed merely antiquarian, its orchestrating 
symmetry didactic and dry.
 At the most general level, in other words, planning for the exhibition 
betrayed the awareness that an exhibition had to work to attract people, 
that attractions at an exhibition therefore had to be adequately differenti-
ated, and that its audience had to be accounted for. There could not be only 
one route around the exhibition, and there would certainly not be only one 
kind of visitor. As ideology and representation confronted the lessons of 














Interest Aggregation and Numbers Games
What is most striking about this and other exhibitions in Japan during the 
1930s, as well as the initial plans for the imperial anniversary, is that they 
were not state projects. In the 1870s, the early Meiji state had embraced 
exhibitions as a central initiative in its efforts to promote industry, but its 
initiatives at home had been quickly supplemented and soon replaced. By 
the turn of the century, municipal governments had turned to exhibitions 
for urban development and renewal, while the emerging consumer industry 
seized on them following the First World War as a powerful medium for 
commercial expansion.32 This combination of local government, business 
interest, and an emerging exhibition industry was the context for the origi-
nal plans for 1940. In 1926, a consortium of local politicians, industrialists, 
and exhibition promoters came together to form an Exhibition Club. Three 
years later, it was this group that first proposed an international exhibition, 
to be held in 1935, as a way to attract exhibitors, visitors, and above all capi-
tal to a local economy still reeling from the aftershocks of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake of 1923. The initial discussions ran aground in 1931, but the ini-
tiative re-emerged the following year as the locally organized centerpiece of 
a government-supervised celebration of the imperial anniversary. The lead 
advocate was Sakatani Yoshiō, a former minister of finance and mayor of 
Tokyo, and with his energetic promotion and extensive connections the 
proposal took off.33
 The imperial anniversary provided an ideal opportunity for such an 
event. As suggested earlier, national commemoration had long proved a 
profitable rationale for international exhibitions, precisely because of its 
ability to satisfy diverse imperatives: national prestige and international re-
spectability; local development and business opportunity; foreign tourism 
and popular entertainment. On the one hand, given this particular occa-
sion, it is no surprise that the exhibition employed much of the rhetoric 
through which the population was mobilized for empire and, eventually, 
war. On the other, the capacious structure of that vocabulary, suggested 
earlier, could bear multiple investments, by private entrepreneurs as well as 
state ideologues.34 The concerns of capital were indifferent to the putative 
content of the brands through which it sought a return on investment, and 
the opportunity of an imperial anniversary promised a higher-than-usual 
rate of return.35 To understand how it did so, however, requires turning 
from words to numbers. In pitching the 1940 event, it was the latter that 











audiences. At the national level, organizers explained how the exhibition 
would benefit the national balance of payments, generating at least half as 
much foreign currency as textiles, Japan’s leading export, but at twice the 
profit rate.36 To regional audiences, however, they emphasized the influx 
of capital to the Kanto economy, relying on the example of Paris in 1889 
to suggest that the exhibition would generate twenty-seven times its own 
budget for local businesses.37
 At the same time, the fact that the brand was an imperial one, and the 
possibility of monopolizing its value, guaranteed that the battle for market-
ing rights was a keen one. Sakatani and the federation were not alone in pro-
ducing visions of Kigen 2600. As early as October 1933, there were reports 
of plans by the Home, Education, Army, and Navy ministries for a “great 
national festival” commemorating the anniversary as a way of “overcoming 
the emergency.”38 The Home Ministry, in particular, was a persistent critic 
of any aspect of the exhibition that might detract from the solemnity it 
believed appropriate to the commemoration of the nation’s founding. The 
advance guard of these concerns was the Nihon Bunka Renmei (Japan Cul-
ture Association), which had been formed in 1933 by Matsumoto Manabu, 
a Home Ministry bureaucrat, and which soon sought to promote an alter-
native vision of the anniversary. In January 1936, the association proposed 
a survey of Japanese culture together with four other projects, and a year 
later it published a comprehensive “Outline of Publicity Policy for Kigen 
2600.”39 However, despite the organization’s efforts, only the survey, of 
the five projects, was taken up by the government, its authorized budget 
of 1 million yen only a third of that initially proposed, and dwarfed by the 
expected 50 million yen cost of the exhibition. Although the Ministry of 
Education did subsidize the Japan Culture Association, the association re-
mained on the periphery of the official plans for Kigen 2600, for which the 
exposition and the Olympics remained the centerpiece.
 The Home Ministry and its allies were able to gain more leverage, though 
never the upper hand, by translating their concerns into the budgetary lan-
guage of the exhibition’s promoters. Financing an exhibition was never 
easy. Other decisions could be made in-house, but an international exhibi-
tion always required government funding, implying trade-offs with other 
bureaucratic interests and so providing an opening for possible compro-
mise. In his proposal in 1932, Sakatani had emphasized that the success 
of earlier international exhibitions, notably at Paris in 1900, had rested in 
large part on advance ticket sales, which could finance the substantial ex-













to buy tickets in advance, however, there had to be some incentive. A lottery 
seemed ideal.40 Over time, however, this proposal ran into problems, with 
the Home Ministry leading the charge against the damage that speculation 
would do to the national spirit.41 The association counterattacked, using 
the pages of the official magazine to claim that the exhibition itself was 
Jimmu’s dying wish. The rhetoric was eye-catching, but the Home Ministry 
was fighting a rearguard action. In the cabinet and government commit-
tees, the lottery had been accepted as a fait accompli, with the point at 
issue being how far in advance the tickets should be sold and the financial 
value of the prizes. The debate rumbled on for another year, but all parties 
finally and predictably agreed to meet somewhere in the middle, the Diet 
passing the necessary law in August 1937. In March 1938, the first one mil-
lion advance tickets were sold, many seemingly swept up in the dreaded 
speculative “fever,” and in May the prize winners were announced. Among 
the ten first-prize winners, each of whom received 2,000 yen, was Sakatani, 
who immediately assured reporters that he would donate his prize to the 
Celebration Committee.42
 The lottery was not the only issue on which entertainment and industry 
had to compromise with commemoration. In February 1938, the president 
of the exhibition spoke to the Tokyo City Council. He began by noting that 
while previous exhibitions had always had an aristocrat or bureaucrat as 
their president, the government had realized that this exhibition required 
the experience of the private sector. He then turned to numbers, citing the 
economic impact of the Chicago fair in 1933. His audience could expect 
the same of Banpaku. Given the war in China, they predicted only half the 
normal number of foreign visitors, but nonetheless the exhibition could be 
expected to generate 355 million yen in demand for the region. The num-
ber might be even higher if the exhibition could do what it wanted: spe-
cial theme days and a slew of entertainments would certainly attract the 
crowds. But given the solemn significance of Kigen 2600, it would be diffi-
cult to make the exhibition as lively as one might want. Entertainment had 
to be kept within limits, and so, perhaps, the exhibition’s attraction would 
be limited. Still, he promised, it would be a success.43
Conclusion
In the end, of course, national concerns trumped global outreach. On July 
15, 1938, the cabinet announced that the exhibition, together with the 











essence proved incompatible with international affairs: material and mean-
ing were restricted, devoted to the prosecution of the war. But while the 
exhibition was eventually swept away by the Japanese invasion of China, it 
is important not to subsume it within a narrative governed by that aggres-
sion. Until then, Kigen 2600 imposed limits, but it was not yet enough to 
overwhelm or even transform the exhibition itself. The latter, I have argued, 
needs to be understood not primarily in terms of a state mobilizing a nation 
for war, but in terms of a local economy seeking investment and recovery 
through the proven medium of international exhibition. From the late nine-
teenth century on, exhibitions had been adept at reconciling private, local, 
and state interests, putting national history and imperial destiny alongside 
modern industry and popular attraction. Like the origins narratives and 
capitalist economies of the empires in which they took shape, exhibitions 
could accommodate any number of players, providing some basic rules but 
requiring only a sufficiently expansive area within which to resolve the in-
evitable contradictions. The exhibition planned for Tokyo in 1940 was no 
different.44
 In this light, the planning for the exhibition also suggests some broader 
conclusions for our understanding of Japan in the 1930s. Fascism may help 
us identify certain features of cultural production during that time, the 
clarity of whose constellation in Italy and Germany reveal both their utility 
in covering the fractured nature of contemporary experience and the eager-
ness with which they were also adopted elsewhere. Fascist culture, how-
ever, differs in key particulars from the emphases evident in the rhetoric 
surrounding at least the initial plans for the imperial anniversary. Moreover, 
analyses of fascist culture alone cannot explain how and why aesthetics and 
ideology could become regime. Spectacle suggests one way in which fas-
cist culture was linked to politics but again marks the difference between 
contemporary developments in Japan and the countries that would later 
become its allies. Rather than using fascism to mark Japan as exceptional, 
therefore, and so confine it to an Axis that was yet to appear, it may be more 
useful to emphasize the extent to which developments in Japanese political 
economy, society, and culture during the 1930s were similar to those else-
where in the world.
 Two patterns seem significant here. The first dates to the late nineteenth-
century world of industry and empire, of which international exhibitions 
were one self-congratulatory expression. Here, origin narratives justified 
hierarchy as the consequence of progress, rather than conflict and con-













singular histories. As imperial commemoration, then, Banpaku echoed 
familiar themes, providing grandiose justification for municipal initiative 
and business interest. Japan in the 1930s, by this account, was a particular 
blend of a familiar brew of capitalist economy, differentiated society, and 
imperial polity, with its distinctive notes of nationalist bombast and excep-
tionalism. At the same time, however, a second pattern was emerging, born 
in large part of the consequences of the first. Globally, colonial nationalism 
was beginning to throw the rules of the imperial club into question, while 
socialism refused to accept the distributions of capital. Domestically, eco-
nomic dislocation and social unrest provided the incentive and 1929 the 
opportunity for massive, unprecedented state intervention in the economy, 
ranging from Stalinist planning through Rooseveltian New Deal to fascist 
corporatism. This second pattern is also faintly visible in the planning of the 
exhibition as a local response to the dilemmas of uneven development.
 Here, however, Banpaku points for the most part past 1945. Given the 
economy’s relative resilience in the early 1930s and subsequent subordina-
tion to the unproductive demands of total war, the full-blown emergence 
of the developmentalist state had to wait until after the war, unlike its wel-
fare counterparts in Europe and the United States.45 When it did arrive, 
however, exhibitions were again part of the arsenal of development, milled 
by the bureaucrats of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The 
early postwar reiterated the prewar pattern, the state concentrating its 
efforts overseas through the newly minted Japan External Trade Organiza-
tion and municipalities and newspapers seizing on exhibitions as a catalyst 
for recovery. By the 1960s, however, in the wake of liberalization, the gov-
ernment had to supplement export promotion with domestic demand. Big 
events became the means of choice not only to prime the economic pump, 
but also to provide the social capital with which to plan development and 
so even out the concentrations and distortions of unprecedented economic 
growth.46
 In this sense, Tokyo’s plans for 1940 came to fruition in the 1964 Olym-
pics and the 1970 Osaka Expo. Given the innovations in mass spectacle 
during the 1930s and ’40s, it was no surprise that the Olympics took prece-
dence. But while the Olympics transformed the capital, it was the Osaka 
Expo that got people onto the new bullet trains, leading to a national cam-
paign to “Discover Japan” and a boom in domestic and international tour-
ism.47 The 64,218,770 visitors to the Senri Hills in the summer of 1970, 15 
billion yen in profit, and estimated 1.244 billion yen the expo generated in 











track in the 1930s.48 Prewar nationalism and imperial bombast may have 
been absent, but broader continuities remained. An evolutionary theme, 
“Progress and Harmony for Mankind,” together with an expansive site, still 
proved able to accommodate not only the diverse interests of national and 
corporate exhibitors but even the Cold War rivalry of the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Expo ’70 may not have been an exact replica of its pre-
decessor, but anyone who still had his or her tickets from the Tokyo event 
was welcome to use them in Osaka, thirty years after the fact. Given the 
similarities between the two events, it was perhaps only appropriate that 
the backers of development should see some return on their investment.
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The Work of Sacrifice in the  
Age of Mechanical Reproduction:  
Bride Dolls and Ritual Appropriation  
at Yasukuni Shrine
Yasukuni Shrine and its companion, the Yūshūkan Museum 
of Military History, located immediately north of the Imperial Palace in 
Tokyo’s Kudan district, are among postwar Japan’s most controversial sites. 
Within Yasukuni are enshrined the souls of approximately 2.5 million per-
sons who have died in service to Japanese military since 1868, including 
fourteen Class A war criminals executed by the victorious Allies in the wake 
of the Second World War. Visits to the shrine by leading Japanese politi-
cians, including the prime minister, inevitably unleash a firestorm of criti-
cism across East Asia, especially in China and Korea. Critics of Japan’s con-
duct during the war are no less outraged by the contents of the Yūshūkan 
Museum, which celebrates Japan’s modern military history and pointedly 
denies any ethical wrongdoing by the Imperial Army or Navy during the 
1931–45 conflicts in Asia and the Pacific.
 To what extent may these two institutions be understood as coherent 
ideological and aesthetic undertakings? To their critics in mainland East 
Asia and among the Japanese left, these institutions exemplify unrepen-
tant rightist nationalism. They are often denounced as anachronistic in-






























nese populace is encouraged to absolve their nation and their leaders of 
accountability for mass atrocities during the 1931–45 Asia-Pacific War. In 
turn, the defenders of the shrine and the museum present the complex as 
unambiguously dedicated to the principles of “peace,” venerating the apo-
theosized souls of those who died in military service so that Japan may 
enjoy the postwar blessings of security and prosperity. In this essay, I will 
complicate these now familiar arguments by closely examining one specific 
development in the modern history of Yasukuni. Since the 1980s, about one 
hundred fifty bride dolls (hanayome ningyō) have been dedicated at Yasukuni 
by bereaved families to the souls of soldiers and sailors who died before 
marriage. Although senior priests at the shrine were initially reluctant to 
accept the dolls, the figurines are now displayed in the shrine’s receptions 
halls and are viewed by the many hundreds of thousands of worshippers 
who come each year to pay their respects to the war dead. Six of these dolls 
were incorporated into the penultimate gallery of the Yūshūkan Museum 
during its renovation in 2002 and now occupy a place of honor within the 
museum.
 The bride dolls pose several puzzles. To begin with, for most of its his-
tory Yasukuni (and its forerunner institution, the Shōkonsha) was dedicated 
to the principle that people who died in military service to the emperor were 
swiftly elevated to the status of national-level divinities (mikoto or kamigami) 
and were in effect separated from their prior domestic and familial identi-
ties. During the war, bereaved families were actively chastised by Yasukuni 
priests for addressing the dead by name; instead, they were instructed to 
pray collectively to all of the sacralized national war heroes.1 Individuated 
prayers, it was argued, carried popular Buddhistic associations, unbecom-
ing to State Shintō practice. Yet each modern bride doll at Yasukuni is em-
phatically dedicated to a specific dead man and often bears the names of 
specific bereaved relations. What is more, the postwar practice of bride-
doll dedication was developed in popular Buddhist institutions and initially 
carried antimilitarist associations. In popular Buddhist establishments in 
northeastern Japan, the beauty of the bride dolls is widely understood as 
an offering to the unquiet dead, a propitiatory intervention aimed at lost 
souls (muenbotoke) whose tortured spirits would otherwise wander restlessly 
between this world and the other world.
 Yet Yasukuni’s supporters resolutely maintain that all the war dead, by 
virtue of their death in service to the emperor, have been transformed into 
divinities and are in no sense wandering or unquiet spirits. Why, then, have 

















shrine and museum complex? In this chapter, I will argue that the growing 
popularity of the bride dolls at Yasukuni alerts us to important ambiguities 
and tensions in the shrine’s contemporary ideological and aesthetic dynam-
ics. Like national-level institutions the world over, Yasukuni has long cele-
brated the triumph of the state over the level of the domestic and kinship-
based units of affiliation. Through shedding blood in national service, the 
military war dead symbolically help re-constitute the nation as a mystical 
community that transcends the conventional consanguinal and affinal ties 
of the family. Yasukuni powerfully functions as a grand theater of nation-
alist communion, incorporating its living and dead players into a cyclical 
state-centered drama of death and collective regeneration that echoes other 
fascist aesthetic projects in Japan and elsewhere.
 Yet although Yasukuni Shrine and the Yūshūkan Museum unquestion-
ably draw extensively on the broad repertoire of fascist aesthetics, the in-
stitutions’ mass appeal to a sizable section of the Japanese populace is not 
entirely reducible to the drawing power of fascist aesthetics or fascist ideol-
ogy. The shrine has unexpectedly emerged as a kind of alternative stage on 
which its lay visitors have projected more personalized dramas of family and 
kinship. The bride dolls in effect are suspended between competing moral 
and aesthetic registers, partially encompassed within Yasukuni’s dominant 
symbolic and political narrative while also affording the possibility of alter-
native, unresolved stories of family loss and trauma. In important respects, 
I will argue, many of the laypeople who worship at Yasukuni have produced 
partially alternative and idiosyncratic sites of family grief that stand at odds 
with the homogenizing force of the shrine’s dominant fascist aesthetic.
Political Aesthetics, Kitsch, and the “Optical  
Unconscious” in the Yūshūkan Museum
Through successive incarnations over the years, most display strategies in 
the Yūshūkan Museum have profoundly resonated with general principles 
of fascist aesthetics. The principles may be fruitfully approached through 
Walter Benjamin’s classic discussion of modern experiences of the image, 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Benjamin ar-
gues that modern technologies of mass image reproduction, especially 
photography, have deprived objects and artworks of their original “aura” of 
authenticity and of their seeming, primary anchoring in lived experience. 
Into this void has stepped fascism, which renders politics aesthetic, a pro-














F. T. Marinetti’s Futurist Manifesto, written in support of Italy’s invasion of 
Ethiopia in the first decade of the twentieth century:
War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the 
human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow 
with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it com-
bines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents of putre-
faction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new archi-
tecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the 
smoke spirals of burning villages.
Remarks Benjamin, “Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of con-
templation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation 
has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an 
aesthetic pleasure of the first order.”2
 Photographic and film technologies, for Benjamin, operate to produce 
what he termed an optical unconscious, holding great potential for both libera-
tion and oppression. In the modern world, photographs, of course, do have 
an aura, although of a rather different kind than that once possessed by sin-
gular premodern “irreproducible” works of art. Even Benjamin, who saw 
photography as undercutting the ritual functions of the image, acknowl-
edges that early portrait photographs had uncanny, numinous qualities, 
survivals of archaic ancestral cults. He observes, “The cult of remembrance 
of loved ones, absent or dead, offers a last refuge for the cult value of the 
picture. For the last time the aura emanates from the early photographs in 
the fleeting expression of the human face.”3
 Benjamin’s insights are consistent with the more recent literature on 
kitsch as a privileged form of fascist aesthetics. For the sake of convenience, 
let us define kitsch as aesthetic representations (often mass reproduced 
through industrial techniques) organized according to the lowest common 
denominations of accepted beauty, fabricated to elicit singular and uncom-
plicated emotional responses. In Nazi artistic and aesthetic projects, some 
scholars have argued, kitsch suppresses or neutralizes the profoundly dis-
turbing and disruptive features of death, “turning them into sentimental 
idyll.”4 The reliance on clichéd, stereotypical imagery; the avoidance of 
subtle or ambiguous evocations of pain; and the redundant emphasis on 
familiar conventions of representation all serve to render death seemingly 
knowable and comprehensible within the framework of sentimental pi-
eties.

















viewer that the nation, on whose behalf the honored dead have sacrificed 
themselves, will triumph and live eternally. The standardized qualities of 
kitschy memorial objects are thus highly conducive to nationalist projects. 
As Susan Sontag argues, kitsch intimately links “beauty” to a kind of time-
less death forever associated with youth and outside the normal process of 
aging and the conventional human community.5 Familiar, sentimentalized 
works of art in effect proclaim: who among us cannot feel the same emo-
tional response to the spectacle of duty and noble sacrifice? This inferred 
common, populist emotional response is simultaneously representative 
and constitutive of the dreamed-of homogenous national imagined com-
munity that is exemplified by fascism, and that appears to some extent in 
all modern societies.
 In many respects, the renovated Yūshūkan Museum celebrates the 
merger of flesh and metal, body and machine, image and spirit dreamed 
of by futurist and fascist aestheticians. Visitors initially pass by a great 
Manchukuo-era locomotive and fighter plane in the entrance foyer be-
fore ascending to the second floor to view a long, elaborate film celebrat-
ing the living spirits of the heroic war dead. Numerous black-and-white 
photographs of martyred soldiers and sailors, especially the tokkōtai (Spe-
cial Attack Forces, known in the West as kamikaze), are superimposed over 
cinematic pans of contemporary Japanese men and women. The narrator 
explains that all living Japanese are protected by the supreme sacrifice of 
the war dead, who continue to “look after and defend the living and all of 
Japan (Nihon o mamoru tameni).” In looking at the kamikaze, the film in effect 
argues, “we” see a transmuted, reflected vision of ourselves.
 In this respect, the film replicates the standard experience of prayer 
at Yasukuni in the shrine building immediately adjacent to the museum. 
Worshippers are brought to the highest level of the shrine to offer their 
respects to the deified soldiers. There they look into a great mirror, much 
larger and much lower than in other shrines. As they look into the inner 
sanctuary of the main shrine (honden), where the deified dead are believed to 
reside, visitors are immediately confronted by their own reflections staring 
back at them. This implicit transposition between shrine and museum is 
intensified halfway through the museum, as visitors enter a darkened room 
that is centered on an elaborate model of Yasukuni as it appeared at night 
during the Asia-Pacific War, from 1931 to 1945. In the background plays 
an audiotape of the State Shintō ceremony of enshrinement (shōkonsha) 














through which the souls of dead soldiers were raised to the status of divini-
ties (mikoto). Delicate laser-filament technology replicates the nocturnal 
procession of lit lanterns through the shrine precincts, from the “Shoka” 
garden in the northwestern shrine precincts to the inner sanctuary itself. 
Visitors are encouraged, in effect, to participate vicariously in this animated 
simulacrum of the invisible deification of the honored dead. The final gal-
leries of the museum again emphasize the enduring, uncanny presence of 
the kamikaze, hovering between their preserved visible images and subtle 
evocations of their invisible presence. Hundreds of photographs of the 
dead heroes, specifically identified as divinities (kamigami), line the walls 
of several rooms; beautifully arranged cases display personal objects left 
behind by the kamikaze, tangible evidence of their absence. One especially 
popular case displays a mirror case (to which I will return later) given to 
the Navy pilot Lieutenant Sumida Tetsuo by his mother instead of a photo-
graph.6 Accompanying text asserts that his mother told him that because 
he looked like her, he would see her each time he looked into the mirror.
 The museum’s final hall, which was largely unaltered during the mu-
seum’s most recent (2002) renovations, is a particularly pointed illustra-
tion of fascist aesthetics as characterized by Benjamin. Here, the instru-
ments of self-willed death and destruction used by kamikaze, including the 
“cherry-blossom” gliders (okha) and human torpedoes (kaiten), are lovingly 
displayed. Death in the service of the nation, especially death classified as 
voluntary and freely chosen, is unambiguously glorified. Celebrating syn-
theses of flesh and metal, of spirit and technology, these installations in-
vite the visitor to participate vicariously in the martyrdom and apotheosis 
of the kamikaze. Self-destruction is indeed presented as supreme aesthetic 
pleasure. Visitors are invited, in effect, to imagine themselves inside these 
vehicles on their final missions of no return. At the end of hall is displayed a 
popular panoramic painting depicting the Kaigun Jinrai Butai (Navy Divine 
Thunder Squadron) heading across the sea near Okinawa into the rosy 
rising sun on its final attack run toward American naval targets. The pilots, 
a caption proclaims, vowed to meet one another beneath a special cherry 
tree on the grounds surrounding Yasukuni. The tree still stands, marked 
with a sign, to be visited by museum-goers after they have toured the exhi-
bition. In this manner, the symbolic identification between dead kamikaze 
and living Japanese visitors is further reinforced. Like a pilgrim honoring 


















Dolls, War, and Memorialization in Japan
Before considering how the bride dolls have been situated over the past 
two decades within this rightist landscape of military memorialization, it 
is helpful to review the broader ritual functions of doll figurines in Japa-
nese culture and history. For centuries, perhaps millennia, dolls and human 
figurines in Japan have been understood as prophylactic guardians of living 
persons, warding off and absorbing dangerous influences that would other-
wise have polluted or injured their human charges. These practices are a fea-
ture of the long history of substitute or vicarious (migawari) image making 
in Japan, in which images have been apprehended as semi-animate sub-
stitutes of divinities or persons. These mimetic forms are believed to ease 
people through personal and cosmological transitions.7 The dolls displayed 
by Japanese families on the March 3 festival of Girls’ Day (hina matsuri), for 
example, are transformations of ritual paper or straw dolls (kata shiro and 
nagashibina) that, having absorbed people’s sins and illnesses, were placed 
in rivers or other bodies of running water during an important purification 
ceremony on the third day of the third lunar month. To this day, families 
express gratitude to the children’s dolls, which have in effect soaked up the 
pollution, disease, and dangers to which the young have been exposed. Doll 
symbolism was modified following the Meiji Restoration in 1868 as the doll 
market was increasingly rationalized and industrialized, as dolls became 
metonymic of “Japaneseness” in an internationalist framework, and as the 
Imperial Family (increasingly represented in doll forms) was presented as 
the idealized model for all Japanese families.
 During the Meiji period (1868–1910) and Taishō period (1910–24), Euro-
pean techniques were incorporated by Japanese doll artisans to produce the 
forerunners of the modern kimono-clad bride doll, developed initially for 
overseas and tourist markets. Dolls took on increasingly militarist asso-
ciations in the early decades of the twentieth century. From the early 1930s 
onward, schoolgirls and female relatives of Imperial Army soldiers were 
encouraged to make small cloth dolls, known variously as care dolls (imon 
ningyō) or mascot dolls (masukotto), for serving military personnel. For most 
of the war period, these figurines functioned as protective talismans, in a 
manner similar to amulets (omamori). But in the war’s final months, these 
dolls were increasingly sent to kamikaze fighters to serve as ritual “com-
panions” on their missions of no return. In some instances, unmarried 














(hanayome ningyō),” as symbolic wives in the other world.8 Significantly, 
these objects were often termed “migawari ningyō (vicarious or substitute 
dolls).” The figurines, it was often said, would allow their makers to ac-
company the pilots in their final missions while absorbing the pain and 
suffering of the martyrs’ lonely deaths.
 At times, dolls took on explicit memorial functions for recently deceased 
pilots; in some cases they were dropped from the air by comrades over the 
sites where dead pilots were believed to have crashed. Letters written by 
military personnel late in the war sometimes hint at the dolls’ capacity to 
mediate relations between the worlds of the dead and of the living. For ex-
ample, an elementary-school girl, Shizue, who had made a doll and sent it 
to her brother, Kiyoshi Oishi, a kamikaze pilot, received this letter from one 
of his comrades:
Miss Shizue Oishi, I suppose you are surprised at the sudden letter from 
a stranger. I am a soldier who is in charge of Corporal Oishi’s plane. 
Corporal made a sortie splendidly today. Before he takes off, he left this 
letter. I send it to you. Corporal used to cherish a doll you had made for 
him very much. He always carried the small doll on the back of his cloth. 
Other pilots all hang dolls from their waists or from their parachutes’ 
belts, but Corporal carried the doll on his back as if he was giving it a 
piggyback. He said that he would pity the doll if it gets scared when his 
plane is about to attack. When everyone was running toward the planes 
to get on, I could easily notice Corporal at a glance, because the doll was 
swinging as if it was clinging to him. I suppose Corporal always felt as 
if he was with you, Shizue-chan. To go together—this is a word of Bud-
dha. Whenever you feel pain, or you feel lonely, you are not alone. There 
is always Buddha right beside you, cheering you up. I suppose Corpo-
ral’s Buddha was you. But from today, Corporal will be your “Buddha” 
and always will watch over you. Corporal bravely crashed on an enemy 
carrier. I hope that you, Shizue-chan, would cheer up and study hard so 
you can be as your great brother. Goodbye.9
 The letter presents a fascinating transposition. The doll initially evoked 
the presence of the young sister; the pilot even carried the doll on his back 
like a young child. Yet after her brother’s death, the doll seemed to help the 
brother’s spirit return to his sister, and she is exhorted to become “like” 
her brother: “A doll functions as a kind of switch-point between living and 

















who died 26 October 1944 in the Philippines. The letter is addressed to his 
daughter, ‘The toy doll you had as a child I took with me in my airplane as a 
good-luck charm—this way you are always with me. I tell you this because 
I think it would be wrong for you not to know’.”10 The pilot added a post-
script: “I want to see you grow up to be a splendid bride. . . . When you get 
older and want to see me, come to Kudan [i.e., to Yasukuni] and pray with 
all your heart and my face will appear before you. . . . You resemble me very 
much. When people see you, they often say how much you look like me.”11 
The dolls in these instances appear to have functioned not simply as pro-
tective talismans or as comforting companions but as complex ritual opera-
tors, linking the kamikaze, who were themselves liminal beings suspended 
between the domains of life and death, to the living and to the dead. The 
doll made by the little girl Shizue allowed her older brother to feel, while he 
was alive, that she was always with him. Once he died, it enabled the living 
sister to feel that her dead brother was always with her. Similarly, the sec-
ond writer carries his daughter’s doll in his airplane to sense her presence. 
After death, he reassures her, she will be able to see his face at Yasukuni.
 The contemporary ritual power of the bride dolls at Yasukuni partially 
derives, as well, from the postwar usages of the mascot dolls that survived 
the war, which took on memorial functions for dead. Many mascot dolls are 
preserved in museum displays dedicated to the kamikaze; one such doll is 
even featured in one of the final galleries of the Yūshūkan Museum, along 
with the letter that a kamikaze pilot wrote as he returned the doll and other 
objects to a mother and daughter who had given them to him. A Yasukuni 
publication shows a photograph of a pilot (who died in May 1945) in front 
of his plane, holding a large doll. In turn, a shrine video displays a photo-
graph of a group of kamikaze holding up their mascot dolls, in a curious 
evocation of children’s play. An often reproduced photograph shows a pilot 
holding a puppy, with a kimono-clad doll tucked into his parachute belt. The 
photograph was the basis of a painting by a war veteran, exhibited on the 
shrine grounds during a recent summer festival. Suggestively, this painting 
was displayed near a painting of a group of kamikaze moments after their 
fatal impact as they are raised into the sky under the protective aura of a 
heavenly maiden. The implicit symbolic logic may be, at least in retrospect, 
that the beautiful doll that the pilot carries with him as he journeys out of 
this world anticipates the beautiful female companion that will welcome 
him after he has crossed over to the other world. In effect, the doll bridges 















Dolls and Postwar Memorialization
The decades that followed the Second World War saw an intensifying af-
finity between dolls and memorial practices throughout Japan. Over the 
course of the 1970s and 1980s, dolls of all sorts were increasingly subjected 
to elaborate memorialization rites at major national shrines and temples. 
Doll-store owners and some priests have increasingly asserted that all dolls 
are repositories of “spirit (tamashii)” and therefore entitled to formal rites 
of spirit separation before being discarded. The growing popularity of doll 
memorialization and bride-doll spirit marriage during this period was 
largely conditioned by the emerging “memorialization boom (kuyō būmu)” 
that characterized the bubble-economy period and its immediate after-
math. Today, dolls that loyally served their human charges are respectfully 
disposed of in elaborate doll memorialization rites (ningyō kuyō), which 
are said to separate the dolls’ “souls” from their “bodies.” At such venues 
as Meiji Jingu and Kiyomizu-dera Temple in Tokyo, Hōkyōji (also known 
as Ningyō-dera) in Kyoto, and Awashima shrine in Wakayama, dolls are 
burned, sent out to sea, or otherwise removed from normal human con-
texts. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, bereaved family members in 
northeastern Japan (Tohoku) began to dedicate bride dolls to relatives who 
died during the war in the service of the Imperial Army and Navy.12
 A transformation of older northern Japanese and mainland East Asian 
rites of spirit marriage, the practice of bride-doll (hanayome ningyō) dedi-
cation is usually characterized as Buddhist memorialization (kuyō) for 
souls who might otherwise wander forever in the void between the worlds. 
Numerous informants have told me that this practice developed because 
mothers and sisters of the military war dead were not fully satisfied with 
the forms of veneration performed at Yasukuni or at the related “Defense of 
the Nation” official Shintō shrines located around the country. The practice 
of bride-doll dedication was quickly extended from military casualties to 
memorialize postwar civilian victims of illness or of road accidents who had 
died before marriage. To this day, in several Tendai and Shingon Buddhist 
establishments in northern Tōhoku, rituals of doll consecration are still 
undertaken to ease the fraught cosmological predicament of young people 
who have died before marriage, who are considered to be lost souls (muen-
botoke).
 The dedicated dolls are nearly always kimono-clad bride dolls (or groom 
dolls) encased in glass boxes, of the sort sold to tourists and sometimes pre-

















tice of bride-doll dedication is deeply embedded in the veneration of the 
Boddhisattva Jizō and popular forms of female spirit mediumship. Speak-
ing through mediums, the dead child may plead with his parents to “buy 
me a bride” for comfort in the great void between the worlds. Within the 
glass boxes holding the dolls (which are the opposite sex of the deceased 
youth) family members place a photograph of the deceased, a paper giving 
the Buddhist memorial name (kaimyō), and various offerings to the dead, 
such as toys, cigarettes, beer, or underwear.13 The dolls, informants em-
phasize, must not become too attached to the homes of the living relatives 
who have dedicated them. The night before a doll is taken to the temple it 
may be brought home to be placed on the family’s Buddhist domestic altar 
(butsudan). Throughout this time, the doll remains blindfolded so that it will 
not be able to “find its way back” to the house. In contrast to the wartime 
militarist deployment of dolls, strongly associated with State Shintō prac-
tice, these Tohoku rituals of doll dedication are usually glossed by my local 
informants within an explicitly Buddhist, pacifist, and antimilitarist frame. 
Informants emphasize the sorrow and futility of war and often discuss their 
hope that comfort given the dead by the opposite-sex doll will still the anx-
ious wanderings of the displaced soul. In time, the companionship given 
by the doll spouse may allow the dead soul to attain Buddha-hood or re-
incarnation. In the late Shōwa period (c. 1970–89), bride-doll marriage al-
lowed local family members, especially women, to grant their lost relatives 
a measure of peace in distinctly alternative, if not explicitly critical or oppo-
sitional, registers that stood outside prevailing neo-nationalist narratives. 
As noted earlier, the beauty of the dolls’ faces and clothing is said to “calm” 
and “pacify” the rage and anguish of those who died without knowing the 
joys of married adulthood and without posterity.
The Dolls at Yasukuni
Given this historical background, it is perhaps not surprising that Yasu-
kuni priests were initially uneasy when a woman from Hokkaido first re-
quested permission to dedicate a bride doll in 1982. Sato Nami was the 
mother of the late Lieutenant Sato Takeichi, an infantryman who died in the 
battle of Okinawa in 1945. Her relatives recall that for nearly four decades 
she had refused to accept her son’s death and held out hope that he would 
return. But as she approached her final years, she decided she needed to 
take steps to “take care of him” in the other world. She thus made a siz-
able monetary donation to the shrine. The following year, she dedicated the 














from Hokkaido, including tourist sculptures on the parent–child theme of 
a mare and foal as well as an adult bear and a bear cub. She also presented a 
letter she had written to her son and to the bride doll, which she had named 
“Sakurako (Cherry Blossom Child)” in which she explained that she had 
always dreamed of her son’s marrying.
 Sato Nami’s surviving relatives insist that she had not been aware of 
the practice of bride-doll dedication at Buddhist establishments in Tohoku; 
nor had she known about the wartime practice of presenting bride dolls 
to kamikaze pilots. Rather, they state, she and her sister-in-law had been 
motivated solely by “a mother’s feeling” in deciding that a bride doll would 
be the most appropriate memorial gift for the late soldier. After this un-
usual gift was highlighted in the shrine’s newsletter, several other fami-
lies were inspired by her example and gave bride dolls, as well, in some 
cases accompanied by letters or poems written to their dead relatives. The 
fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end in 1995 saw a marked increase in doll 
dedications, including by some prominent members of the Nihon Izoku-
kai (War Bereaved Families Association). In 1999, the Yūshūkan Museum 
put up a temporary display of some of the dedicated dolls, which attracted 
more public attention. As of this writing, in 2005, approximately one hun-
dred fifty dolls are visible in the reception rooms of Yasukuni’s main shrine 
building. After considerable internal discussion, the shrine’s priests have 
developed a policy of rotating the dolls through these rooms each three 
months, so that during the season in which a given soldier died, his doll will 
be closest to the shrine’s inner sanctuary, the Honden, in which the spirits 
of the dead are believed to reside. All the priests with whom I have spoken 
insist the doll dedications are not instances of spirit marriage (shiryōkekkon) 
as such and cannot be considered Buddhist memorialization (kuyō). They 
are simply offerings by bereaved families to the deified dead soldiers.
 During the extensive renovation of the Yūshūkan Museum in 2002, six 
bride dolls were selected for inclusion in the museum’s penultimate gal-
lery, viewed by visitors just before they enter the great hall containing the 
airplanes and submersibles of the Special Attack Forces, or kamikaze. Two 
walls of this room are adorned with photographs of the military war dead, 
primarily kamikaze. An entire wall is devoted to the first doll, dedicated 
by Sato Nami. A large glass case contains photographs of the dead soldier 
and of his mother, the doll clad in a white kimono, the sculptures of the 
parent–child pairs of bears and horses, and Nami’s letter to her son and his 
doll bride.

















many bride-doll cases next door within the Yasukuni shrine reception halls, 
these dolls are displayed not with photographs inside their glass boxes or 
with letters by family members, but only with tiny glasses of pure water 
and simple labels identifying the deceased soldier and the dedicating family 
members.
Propitiating the Dead
Why has the practice of bride-doll dedication, which emerged in partial 
contrast (perhaps even in opposition) to forms of memorialization asso-
ciated with nationalist State Shintō, been so extensively grafted into Yasu-
kuni ritual practice and into the new Yūshūkan Museum? Why have over 
one hundred fifty bereaved families chosen to dedicate bride-doll boxes at 
Yasukuni over the past two decades, and why is there deep public fascina-
tion with the practice? Why, in short, in spite of their rather divergent his-
tories have bride dolls and neo-nationalist Shintō proved to be such a good 
fit in recent years? And how has a ritual practice previously embedded in a 
popular, antimilitarist aesthetic been so extensively incorporated into an 
overarching fascistic aesthetic?14
 I suggest that in a curious fashion the growing practice of bride-doll 
dedication at Yasukuni marks an implicit, unacknowledged return to the 
shrine’s largely repressed origins. In an insightful essay, Klaus Antoni pro-
poses that Yasukuni does not simply glorify the war dead. It also, in a subtle 
sense, seeks to propitiate the unquiet spirits of those who died untimely 
or unusually violent deaths. The tortured souls of those who have died in 
unnatural fashion (goryō) have long been believed to haunt the living, espe-
cially the living relations of the dead. Those who died unmarried or experi-
enced a “bad death” will become dangerous, wandering spirits. An Imperial 
Rescript presented by Emperor Meiji at the founding of Shōkonsha Shrine 
(Shrine for Calling the Spirits of the Dead) in 1869, the forerunner of Yasu-
kuni Shrine, specifically sought to sooth and pacify the dead. Hence, pro-
poses Antoni, “The country becomes a yasukuni, a peaceful land, because 
the warriors as ‘bad dead’ are no longer a threat and danger to it.” He writes, 
“[The] country is protected from, instead of being protected by the spirits of 
fallen warriors.”15
 Antoni observes that Yasukuni and neo-nationalist Shintō have not been 
entirely successful in the initial cosmological project of propitiating the 
restless dead. In emphasizing the collective unified aspects of the apotheo-
sized soldiers, these ritual complexes have not given sufficient attention to 














(goryō) who each had specific, unresolved rage and hostility toward living 
people. Although Antoni does not precisely put it in these terms, a fascist 
aesthetic that seeks to appropriate the dead into the totalizing and homoge-
nizing will of the state has proved incapable of addressing the specific ap-
prehensions of individual families and of all those who sense that the mili-
tary dead are potentially unruly and dangerous.
 The adoption of bride-doll-marriage symbolism at Yasukuni over the 
past two decades, I suggest, has offered a ritual solution to these endur-
ing cosmological challenges of soothing the unsettled dead and redress-
ing proximate crises in kinship and family organization. Although official 
ritual action at Yasukuni is nearly entirely practiced by male priests, it has 
long fallen in Japan to women, especially to mothers, to tend to the unquiet 
spirits of children who died before their time. It is in this light that we 
may appreciate the leading role played by mothers and sisters in dedicating 
dolls at Yasukuni and the prominent symbolism of mother–child relations 
in these displays. The assertions in the shrine’s publications notwithstand-
ing, the bride dolls are not mere “symbols” honoring the dead; rather, these 
offerings would appear to console those who were deprived of the joys of 
marriage and of earthly posterity. Through these offerings, parents, sib-
lings, descendants, and collateral relations are able to comfort specific dead 
people and protect themselves and their family members from potential 
spiritual retribution in a way that conventional neo-nationalist Shintō prac-
tice cannot. Shrine officials may continue to insist that Yasukuni exists only 
to exalt and honor the enshrined gods of the martyred souls that protect 
the nation. Yet the recent proliferation of bride dolls in the shrine and in 
the Yūshūkan Museum suggests otherwise. In an era of seemingly unend-
ing economic crisis, amid the emergence of ever more troubling questions 
about the conduct and legacies of the Asia-Pacific War, thousands, perhaps 
millions, long to propitiate these potentially dangerous beings and to pro-
tect themselves from the traumatic memories that they embody.
Death and the Problem of Kitsch: Sameness and Specificity
To a considerable extent, this cosmological project of propitiating the 
potentially unquiet dead is served by the kitschy, mass-reproduced qualities 
of the bride dolls. Dolls also feature in the veterans’ paintings of kamikaze 
(often exhibited on the grounds of Yasukuni during festivals), which are 
themselves rather kitschy productions, usually representing the sacrificed 

















or socialize with fellow soldiers. Like the often painted moment of death, 
these moments of acute collective anxiety demand repeated representations 
of already well-known photographic images. The naive, inexpert quality 
of these paintings by veterans, reproducing extremely familiar, mass-
reproduced propaganda images, underscores the fact that each image is a 
sincere offering to the spirits of fellow soldiers, exemplifying the survivors’ 
dedicated and reassuring service to the divinities.
 The general tendency of kitsch everywhere to ease or neutralize the com-
plexities of trauma and loss takes on particular force in Japan. This is true 
in part, I suggest, because of the psychodynamics of amaeru, an interper-
sonal emotional exchange that is usually glossed as “indulgence” or “de-
pendence.” The psychoanalyst Doi Takeo has argued that, in large measure, 
social relations of interdependence in Japanese society are constituted 
through the expanding exchange of amaeru between social actors, mod-
eled on the formative exchanges of indulgence between mother and child. 
Schoolmates, workmates, and friends of all sorts continue to give and re-
ceive amae throughout their lives. These enactments of moments of uncon-
ditional indulgence return actors to the pure solidarity of early childhood 
experience while constituting ever more complex forms of interdependent 
sociality.
 Doi notes that for mature actors, the longing for amae is sublimated 
through increasingly elaborate and aestheticized media, especially beau-
tiful objects or forms that stress the inevitably transient nature of emo-
tional fulfillment. To produce, view, or give a beautiful thing is to become, 
momentarily, one with that thing and, by extension, to become one with 
the recipient.16 By dedicating beautiful bride dolls to the deceased relatives, 
the living are allowed to indulge (amaeru) the dead, giving them that which 
they most long for. The bride doll, a simultaneously maternal and erotic 
companion, is emphatically not a work of high art associated with special-
ized skill or restricted connoisseurship. The dolls, of the kind that are often 
given to actual brides, are suffused with eminently familiar sentimental and 
domestic associations. Clad in kimono, developed in the prewar era for the 
tourist trade, they are supremely knowable, conventional, and mundane 
and are coded as “typically Japanese.” What better gift to ease the souls of 
those who died in unspeakable torment, far from home, in the service of a 
war whose origin and purposes most would prefer not to dwell on?
 Memorial kitsch, after all, tends to be homogenous, to smooth out the 
complex specificities of actual lost lives, enduring pain, and broken fami-














ances, in effect, for the standardizing fascist aesthetic of Yasukuni, which 
attempts to reduce all loss to a normative narrative of heroic self-sacrifice. 
Yet at the same time, the dolls offered by families to Yasukuni pose some 
challenges for a totalizing narrative frame. They are usually accompanied 
by photographs of the lost young man and sometimes contain haunting 
letters and poems to the dead. In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Yūshūkan Museum’s curators decided to display five dolls that lacked 
photographs or accompanying documents. The accompanying caption 
explains that the dolls have been given to comfort all military personnel 
who died unmarried. The attempted effect, then, is to dull or neutralize the 
specificities of the original gifts and to recast the dolls as generic offerings 
to the collective assembly of the honored dead.
Alternate Narratives: Pain, Kinship, and the Uncanny
Nonetheless, the visceral impact of the dolls often transcends such at-
tempts to appropriate them into a conventional fascist aesthetic scheme. 
In many conversations with Japanese visitors to the museum, I have been 
struck that the bride dolls elicit thoughtful mediations on the specific and 
unresolved conditions of their family’s pain in a manner that seems deeply 
at odds with the museum’s overarching triumphalist narrative and its cele-
bration of wartime fascist culture. For example, in July 2002, as I stood con-
templating the bride dolls in the Yūshūkan Museum’s penultimate gallery, 
I was approached by an elderly Japanese gentleman, Abo Seichi, who asked 
if he might speak with me in German. Once he ascertained that I spoke 
Japanese, Abo explained that his brother had been a kamikaze pilot who 
had died in Okinawa in May 1945. He had occupied the second seat of a 
three man Tenzan (Heaven-Mountain) bomber. His brother’s photograph, 
he showed me as he visibly shook with emotion, was hanging on the adja-
cent wall. When I asked Abo to explain the meaning of the bride dolls, he 
said, “It was hardest for the mothers; they were the ones who really suffered 
terribly.” He talked of his own late mother’s inconsolable pain and said that 
he had been considering dedicating a bride doll in his brother’s memory 
at Yasukuni Shrine. Such an act, he speculated, would not only help his 
brother’s soul, but it might also grant a measure of peace to their mother 
in the Other World.
 Many of those who have dedicated dolls at Yasukuni similarly frame their 
action in terms of specific domestic obligations to their close kin. Consider, 

















who in 1997 dedicated one of the bride dolls displayed in the Yūshūkan gal-
lery in memory of their elder brother, who died as an infantryman on the 
Eniwetok Atoll on the Marshall Islands. They specifically refer to the doll 
as an instance of Buddhist memorialization (kuyō); over the decades, they 
have undertaken numerous memorial pilgrimages to the Marshall Islands, 
taking their brother’s favorite foods and other offerings to the location 
where they believed he died. Neither sister, it should be noted, ever mar-
ried; they have devoted their postwar lives to caring for one another and for 
their dead brother, who was to have been the head of the family. In marry-
ing the doll to their brother, they emphasized, they were simultaneously 
honoring and comforting their late parents, who had not been able to leave 
behind a conventional family line.
 Complex and highly specific kinship dynamics are also poignantly 
evoked by one of the most striking doll assemblages in Yasukuni: an elabo-
rate, large glass box contains two “cherry blossom” dolls, of a weeping 
mother and a weeping small girl who holds on to her mother’s shoulder. 
The dolls were made by Sumida Yuko, the younger sister of Lieutenant Su-
mida Tetsuo, who died on a kamikaze mission in April 1945 and whose 
mirror case (given by his mother) is preserved in one of the Yūshūkan Mu-
seum’s final galleries.
 When I spoke to Sumida Yuko, she explained that the dolls took a year 
of intense effort to make. She, too, referred to them as kuyō for her dead 
brother, specifically using the Buddhist term for memorialization (a term 
that would, of course, never be used by the Shintō priests at Yasukuni, who 
insist that the dolls are merely offerings to the apotheosized military dead). 
Noting that her brother, a student at Tokyo’s elite Rikkyo University, had 
been an accomplished amateur photographer and draftsman, Yuko ex-
plained that in part because her brother was an artist she in turn had a spe-
cial obligation to create a work of beauty in his memory.
 Tetsuo and Yuko, it should be noted, were their parents’ only children, 
and Tetsuo’s death left Yuko responsible for caring for her parents and for 
the butsudan, the family’s domestic Buddhist altar, which remains in her 
home. When she finally married, at the relatively late age of thirty-nine, she 
married an “adopted husband” who took on her family’s name so that her 
natal line would endure.
 Sumida Yuko’s assemblage may be considered in light of Melanie Klein’s 
discussion of mourning as a re-enactment of the process of weaning. The 
artist appears to re-enact the loss of her brother, and her own loss of child-














mother, yet not fully embraced by her. Here the toys of childhood, tran-
sitional objects that in normal childhood would have eased the trauma of 
weaning and separation from the mother, sit abandoned, tangible evidence 
of the loss of the brother and of the sister’s own vanished childhood. One 
might even interpret this piece as an attempt by the artist to reclaim her 
mother’s attention, so long directed toward the son (to whom she had, after 
all, given a mirror in lieu of her own photograph). In the void of his absence, 
paradoxically, the son is an ever stronger presence, displacing the daughter, 
who seeks in this haunting piece to return to a full maternal embrace even 
as she signals the impossibility of such return.
 When I first viewed these dolls, I assumed that they straightforwardly 
represented Sumida Yuko’s mother and Yuko herself embracing after learn-
ing of Tetsuo’s death. But in our conversation, Yuko adamantly resisted such 
a specific reading, saying only that she felt that making the dolls was an im-
portant act of kuyō for her late brother. She did tell me that the seated doll 
of the adult woman was emphatically “not a bride doll,” since as Tetsuo’s 
sister she could not properly offer him a wife. She also recalled that she had 
initially only made the seated adult female figure and had added the stand-
ing girl only after her doll-making teacher suggested that a second figure 
would be appropriate.
 It is striking in this regard that the little girl depicted is much younger 
than Yuko was in 1945 when Tetsuo died. The ambiguities here, I think, 
are significant. Yuko and Tetsuo were extraordinarily close, and his death 
was devastating for her. She did not marry until age thirty-nine, seventeen 
years after his death. When she did marry, she married an adopted husband, 
who took on the name and ancestors of the Sumida house and family line. 
The dolls thus carry multiple associations for her; they evoke Yuko and her 
mother but also Yuko as an adult, as well as her memories of herself as a 
young child. And although Yuko insists that the female doll is not a “bride 
doll,” she did donate it to Yasukuni in a context in which it joined scores 
of marked bride dolls. The net effect is that the two dolls would appear to 
evoke a great range of identities and relationships, confounding mother–
daughter, brother–sister, and husband–wife relations. Perhaps because of 
these ambiguous and uncanny associations, shrine official and curators 
chose not to include Yuko’s dolls in the renovated gallery in the Yūshūkan 
Museum. Yet for many visitors with whom I have spoken to over the years, 
her dolls remain the most poignant and compelling of all the displayed 
offerings in the shrine complex. Although most viewers do not know the 

















blage emerges out of a specific, unique history of pain that cannot be sub-
sumed with the conventional pieties of nationalist sacrifice.
Conclusion: The Ambiguous Aesthetics of Yasukuni
For some, the bride dolls displayed in Yasukuni and the Yūshūkan might 
seem a minor sideshow to the shrine. Yet the figurines cast an interesting 
light on the extraordinary tenacity of the shrine’s mass appeal in Japan, a 
popularity that continues to baffle and infuriate Japan’s neighbors as well 
as its progressive intelligentsia. Although shrine priests were initially re-
luctant to accept these highly personalized offerings, the dolls over time 
largely have come to resonate with the overall aesthetic project at the shrine, 
including its many fascist and neo-nationalist elements, through which 
potentially complex meditations on war and accountability are re-cast into 
standardized, sentimental emotional responses. The dolls help to establish 
a reassuring distance from the pain of personal and collective loss, holding 
out the promise of conjugal comfort for the military war dead. The eternally 
young faces of the bride dolls unquestionably evoke, for some, an image of 
the eternal, unblemished youth of the sacrificed soldiers, forever frozen in 
a tableau of noble sacrifice. In this respect, we might say, the shrine has 
incorporated extensive elements of kitsch and fascist aesthetic principles in 
keeping with the nationalist imperative to reanimate the “beautiful” youth-
ful war dead.
 Yet over the past several decades, Yasukuni has also in effect been do-
mesticated by local, individually oriented, and feminized forms of memo-
rialization that are somewhat at odds with the overall ideological and aes-
thetic tenor of postwar neo-nationalism and neo-fascism. The bride dolls 
cut across a broad spectrum, incorporating kitschy qualities as well as 
their antithesis, evoking both sentimental and uncanny responses to mass 
death in warfare. While the dolls’ deployments are largely consistent with 
the neo-nationalist agenda of the shrine’s leadership, the figurines have 
also enabled creative, idiosyncratic acts of memorialization by individual 
family members, directed more toward the ritual resolution of highly spe-
cific domestic-based problems of memory work than toward homogeniz-
ing fascist and militarist memorial undertakings. The Tanaka sisters, for 
example, understand their decision to dedicate a doll at Yasukuni as simply 
one component of their lifelong commitment to easing the predicament 
of their late brother’s soul, as well as the souls of their parents, and deny 














anticipates that dedicating a bride doll to his brother would, first and fore-
most, ease the pain of his late mother.
 For Benjamin, photographic and mass-reproduced forms hover between 
diverse social and cultural projects. They may be easily co-opted by rightist 
and fascist enterprises that offer simulated, dangerous compensations for 
the loss of the authentic “aura” under conditions of alienated modernity. 
Yet the faces of the deceased in photographs, he writes, can simultaneously 
summon up archaic cults of the ancestors that are grounded in deeply 
meaningful premodern structures of kinship, the family, and community. 
New optical technologies of mass reproduction, he insists, thus carry de-
structive and libratory potential. Recall, in this light, the facial symbolism 
of Sumida Yuko’s memorial assemblage for her dead brother, who carried 
to his death the mirror in which he saw himself and his mother conjoined. 
Regardless of whether the seated adult woman is his mother, his sister, his 
unrealized bride, or some combination of all three, enormous care went 
into the making of her face, which entrances the viewer. Significantly, the 
face of the little girl, which may be Yuko’s remembered childhood self, is 
turned from our view and remains forever enigmatic. In some respects, 
these memorial figurines may have enabled their makers to move beyond 
the immediate pain of trauma toward productive acts of mourning and so-
cial reproduction; significantly, Yuko made the doll assemblage just before 
she married an adopted husband, thus structurally replacing her long-lost 
brother so that she could carry on their family name. For Yuko, dedicating 
the doll at Yasukuni can scarcely be reduced to an act of neo-nationalist 
obeisance but was, rather, first and foremost, a meaningful act of symbolic 
action within the context of her specific domestic responsibilities to the 
dead and to the living.
 Like other popular commentaries about the bride dolls, Yuko’s insistence 
that her dolls were offered to Yasukuni solely as acts of Buddhist memori-
alization (kuyō)—as personalized, heartfelt expressions of family feeling—
should alert us to a significant undercurrent of popular engagement with 
the shrine. Rather than speaking of a singular aesthetic at Yasukuni, fascist 
or otherwise, we should instead understand that the institution emerged as 
a staging ground for overlapping, partially inconsistent aesthetic projects. 
To be sure, the family domain is powerfully encompassed with a resurgent 
nationalist framework at Yasukuni and related political and religious enter-
prises. Yet at the same time, the signifying practices of the postwar state 
are partly encompassed within the aesthetic sensibilities of the domestic 

















nese military war dead, I suggest, should pay careful attention to these 
unresolved dialectics between the fascist, sacrificial, and standardized de-
mands of the nation-state and the private, specific obligations of kinship. 
Each public youthful visage of an unmarried male martyr, sacrificed in ser-
vice to the vanished empire, remains obscurely bound to the less visible 
faces of his mother, sisters, and hoped-for bride. These reflected faces and 
the paradoxes they embody pose enduring puzzles for Yasukuni’s defenders 
and detractors alike, as they confront the unresolved legacies of war, trau-
matic loss, and truncated family lines.
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Fascist Aesthetics and  
the Politics of Representation  
in Kawabata Yasunari
Kawabata Yasunari (1899–1972) was the first Japanese writer to 
win the Nobel Prize for Literature, which was awarded to him in 1968. He 
was renowned for his deep concern with “the beautiful,” or aesthetics, as 
the title of his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, “Utsukushii Nihon no wata-
kushi (Japan, the Beautiful, and Myself ),” suggests.1 According to Ueda 
Makoto, Kawabata “repeatedly made the same point in his critical essays. 
. . . [H]e suggested that literature recorded nothing but . . . encounters with 
beauty.”2 Tachihara Masaaki put it this way: “Kawabata was always looking 
for beauty everywhere. When he discerned a beautiful object he relentlessly 
laid it bare in an attempt to get close to its true essence. His eyes were 
trained toward (nozomi) immortality and turned away from things of the 
earth.”3 As a matter of fact, Kawabata’s literature is beautiful, but that is not 
the end of my discussion. Rather, it is where it begins.
 This focus on aesthetics in so many secondary sources on Kawabata 
overwhelmingly ignores or denies the impact of any political ideology, as 
Tachihara also intimates by claiming Kawabata was “turned away from 
things of the earth.” In a nutshell, Kawabata has been read as an aesthete 























a personal, artistic, and cultural trauma.4 This essay, to the contrary, at-
tempts to reintegrate his aesthetics with the political context in which they 
arose—in particular, with fascist ideology. I ask: What are the politics of 
representation underlying Kawabata’s literary aesthetics, and how do those 
politics of representation compare with those of fascist aesthetics in gen-
eral? I will argue that many attributes of his aesthetic indeed colluded with 
fascist ideology and that those attributes came to dominate his aesthetics at 
the same time that Japan was becoming politically fascist. Moreover, against 
the reevaluation of their wartime ideology by most writers and artists in the 
postwar, Kawabata instead became more aestheticist in the manner that I 
believe, and hope to show here, is a system of representation collusive with 
fascist ideology.
 However, let me also state up front what this essay is not attempting: 
to claim that Kawabata, as an individual, was a card-carrying fascist who 
enthusiastically and uncritically supported the fascist-imperialist actions 
of Japan’s military in the Second World War. But I do believe that it was 
his very (celebrated) aesthetics—or what I will be calling a nationalized, 
acculturating aestheticentrism—that made possible his (largely disavowed) 
enthusiasm for Japanese imperialism and colonialism, an enthusiasm re-
vealed in some of his wartime writings and convincingly argued by Charles 
Cabell.5 I would go so far as to argue that, even if there were no texts by 
Kawabata that literally voiced support for Japan’s “mission” in Asia, the 
theoretical analysis of the signifying system that underpins Kawabata’s aes-
thetics, which I pursue here, will reveal aspects shared by the various and 
different political forms of fascism.
 Because the word fascism means different things to different people, I 
devote a fair percentage of this essay to a discussion of how I understand 
and am using the term. I begin with the problematic of the term; follow 
with an equally general description of Kawabata’s aesthetics; and conclude 
by integrating the two.
On Fascism
First, I do not want to limit the term fascism to, as some have espoused, the 
geophysical and temporal specificities of European fascism beginning in 
the 1920s and ending in 1945. Instead, I agree with Mark Neocleous, who 
argued (following Walter Benjamin) that such a conception of (European) 
























particular set of philosophical debates rather than in a coherently organized 
political party or movement.”6 As Peter Osborne wrote:
As an object of reflection and inquiry, “fascism” is notoriously resistant 
to conventional forms of political and ideological analysis. Herein, in 
part, lies its significance: fascism problematizes “the political,” while 
presenting itself as its truth. As such, it opens itself up to philosophical 
forms of interpretation and analysis which, while based on its history as 
a political movement, nonetheless of necessity exceed its bounds. From 
this perspective, fascism is no merely political form—one among a series 
of alternatives to be listed in the catalogues of comparative politics as 
competing forms of organization or rule—but a manifestation of deep-
rooted historical, or even metaphysical, tendencies or possibilities of 
the age.7
 Borrowing from Osborne the characterization of fascism as “no merely 
political form,” and in the spirit of Roger Griffin and others, in this essay 
I am interested in an analysis of the aesthetics of fascism as a signifying 
system that bears certain common markers across its otherwise variously 
particular historical manifestations, including Nazi Germany, fascist Italy 
and France, as well as Japan.8 I understand fascism to be a historical de-
velopment specific to the massification of society in relation to the rise 
of modern, industrial capitalism that attempts to solve the problem of 
class struggle ideologically rather than economically. I also understand 
fascism as a signifying system that employs a specific typology of images, 
sentiments, and slogans (although the content of these may vary) to enlist 
the masses in a nationalist, collective, vitalist movement. As a reactionary 
modernism, fascism has a specific politics of time—or, as Griffin puts it, it 
is palingenetic, moving forward toward “regeneration” as it looks nostal-
gically backward toward a mythic past.9 And, of course, at its core fascism 
is dependent on nationalism. To quote Neocleous at greater length:
Fascism is a politics implicit in modern capitalism, involving mass mo-
bilization for nationalist and counter-revolutionary aims, militarized 
activism and a drive for an elitist, authoritarian, and repressive state 
apparatus, articulated through a nebulous vitalist philosophy of nature 
and the will.
 [Fascism is] a counter-revolutionary phenomenon engaged in the 
prevention of communism, but which seeks none the less to provide an 












mobilizing them through an aggressive nationalism. . . . [I]t is a form of 
reactionary modernism: responding to the alienation and exploitation 
of modern society but unwilling to lay down any serious challenge to the 
structure of private property central to modern capitalism, fascism can 
only set its compass by the light of reaction, a mythic past to be recap-
tured within the radically altered conditions of modernity.10
 Second, as already suggested, although fascism can certainly be ap-
proached (and, of course, has often been so approached) by concentrating 
on its more concrete manifestations in political and military institutions 
and activities, here I am concerned with the aspect of fascist ideology that 
makes itself known as “aesthetics” and “culture” (but that is “political” in 
effect), which, as Benjamin insisted, are equally integral to fascism. In their 
introduction to Fascist Visions: Art and Ideology in France and Italy, Matthew 
Affron and Mark Antliff explain,
As Walter Benjamin argues in his seminal essay, “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), fascism can be seen as a form 
of aestheticized politics in which aesthetic issues permeated all aspects 
of society; and the political, economic, and cultural realms should not 
be considered separately when discussing fascism. Rather than dismiss-
ing fascist ideology as a form of “false consciousness” as [Robert] Soucy 
does, one should recognize the very real role of cultural production in the formation 
of groups and constituencies favorable to fascism.11
In Benjamin’s own words:
The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing for-
mation of masses are two aspects of the same process. Fascism attempts 
to organize the newly created proletarian masses without affecting the 
property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees 
its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance 
to express themselves. . . . The logical result of Fascism is the introduc-
tion of aesthetics into politics. . . . Communism responds by politicizing 
art.12
Although it might appear at first glance that Benjamin sees fascism as 
a conflation of domains, it is actually the opposite. Andrew Hewitt has 
written that here Benjamin “is arguing not simply that fascism somehow 
confuses aesthetics and politics but rather that maintaining a traditional 
























art, be it literary, filmic, or visual, is always produced and received or con-
sumed in a political circumstance with its attendant ideological context. 
The commingling of politics with aesthetics can produce a potentially 
murderous disinterest. War can be perceived as beautiful, and death may 
be divested of affect. More simply still, it can also be taken to suggest that 
there is no artistic stance or production that is purely objective or freed 
from interest of any sort. Fascism is the potential, final culmination of the 
purification of domains that lies at the heart of art for the sake of art, or 
the attempt to ignore the sociopolitical and historical context of artistic 
production.
 Third, it is also important to acknowledge what Susan Sontag called the 
beauty of fascism,14 or what Rey Chow termed fascism’s positivism and 
positivity:
The most important sentiment involved in fascism is not a negative but 
a positive one: rather than hatefulness and destructiveness, fascism is 
about love and idealism. Most of all it is a search for an idealized self-
image through a heartfelt surrender to something higher and more 
beautiful. Like the Nazi officer who killed to purify his race, the Japanese 
soldier raped and slaughtered in total devotion to [his] emperor and in 
the name of achieving the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” 
Like the Nazi concentration camp official who was genuinely capable 
of being moved to tears by a Beethoven sonata being played by Jewish 
prisoners, the Japanese officer, we may surmise, was probably also genu-
inely capable of being moved by the delicate feelings inscribed in cul-
tured practices such as haiku poetry, calligraphy, or the tea ceremony. 
In each case, what sustains the aesthetics of monstrosity is something 
eminently positive and decent.15
 Fourth, I understand fascism to be about a crisis in representation at 
perhaps its “deepest” level—or about the anxiety over the potential slip-
page between reality and how that “real” is represented, in image, slogan, 
or text. This anxiety is, of course, first and foremost the anxiety and sense of 
alienation over the radical social, political, economic, and other shifts that 
marked the entry into modernity (and capitalism). As Harry Harootunian 
explains:
What modernist discourse in Japan, and elsewhere, confronted was the 
crisis of modernity over the stability and reliability of forms of repre-












ing world . . . in Japan it was inflected in discussions over the form best 
suited to represent lived experience in social circumstances dominated 
by the ever new in the ever same . . . the auratic endowment of culture-
memory . . . and the experience of the communal body. . . . This crisis, 
then, was over the forms most capable of relaying and communicating 
the lived experience—the experience of genuine difference—and secur-
ing accessibility to a memory that was being shattered into splinters by 
speed, shock, and sensation. . . .
 [In Japan] the crisis was inflected into claims of cultural authenticity 
and diverse efforts to recall the eternal forms of community outside of 
history (and thus immune to the social abstractions of capitalism). Yet 
this particular inflection of the crisis of representation invariably worked 
to yoke modernism (seeking to resolve the question of representation) 
to fascism (aiming to resolve the problem of political representation), 
combining ideologemes the state subsequently but selectively appropri-
ated for national mobilization and war in the late 1930s.16
 Moreover, as many have argued, fascism masquerades as that which it is 
not—it is narcissistically invested in its own representation for the sake of 
representation.17 Within the fascist order, “signification” itself (meaning) 
and “true” subjectivity founded on self-recognition through the radical dif-
ference of the other is replaced with a performative identification with the 
other (refusal of difference). Hence, meaning itself is “evacuated.” In semi-
otic terms, this evacuated subjectivity mirrors the evacuation of “content” 
in fascist slogans and images.
 The fascist solution to the anxiety caused by radical alterity (the Other) 
constitutes a wholesale rejection of dialogue for a combination of images 
of sublation (the shared mission and communalism of the Volk, or the Japa-
nese equivalent of minzoku, that functions to elide class distinctions) and 
annihilation strategies (the Jews, communists). Permitted, then, is only 
the (“false”) image of the same. This is, in other words, a sort of short-
circuiting of the constitutive instability of the sign in an attempt at fixing 
signification. However, fascism itself remains “unrepresentable”: “if fas-
cism somehow defies representation, it has nevertheless been represented 
with obsessive frequency at any number of discursive levels—not least of 
all as a marker (if not a representation) of the historical dilemma of unrep-
resentability.”18
 Finally, I want to note a distinction between what I am calling fascist aes-
























I am conceiving of fascist aesthetics to the following sections, I will simply 
state here that by fascist aesthetics, I mean the ideals of beauty that work well 
within fascist systems but that are certainly not limited to regimes that are 
politically fascist. With this distinction in mind, I will argue that Kawa-
bata’s literary aesthetics grew more, not less, fascist in the postwar era.
Kawabata’s Aesthetics
Kawabata’s expository writings on literature and many of his narratives—
both the earliest and some of his last—were decidedly “modernist,” influ-
enced by Western modernist stream-of-consciousness writers such as James 
Joyce and Marcel Proust.19 It is curious, then, that he insisted that it was the 
Japanese classics alone that inspired him. Kawabata fiercely distinguished 
his ideal associative narrative from the Western avant-garde because they, 
Kawabata felt, reveled in psychological depravity and neglected the “real,” 
so-called natural world.20 However, by “natural” Kawabata meant some-
thing quite specific: Japanese classical poetics, insisted Kawabata, were 
rooted in mediated impressions of the material—rather than purely psy-
chic—world and were thus superior to Western modernism (which reveled 
in mental unbalance). From the 1920s forward, Kawabata sought a “new 
mode of Japanese literature” inspired by Japanese literary conventions. In 
1934, he insisted:
I believe that the classics of the East, especially the Buddhist scriptures, 
are the supreme works of literature of the world. I revere the sutras not 
for their religious teachings but as literary visions. I have had in mind 
for the last fifteen years the plan for a work to be entitled “The Song of 
the East,” which I would like to make my own swan song. In it I will 
sing, in my fashion, a vision of the classics of the East. I may die before 
I can write it, but I should like it at least to be understood that I wanted 
to write it. I have received the baptism of modern literature and I have 
myself imitated it, but basically I am an oriental, and for fifteen years I 
have never lost sight of my bearings.21
 Such a rejection of things “Western” and valorization of things “East-
ern” in the arts and literature was by no means uncommon for Kawabata’s 
generation. As did many of his contemporaries, against the perception of 
excessive Westernization, Kawabata sought to find in Japanese tradition 












“spiritual” superiority to offset perceptions of Japanese technological in-
feriority.22
 For Kawabata, this Japanese inspiration began with formal concerns (al-
though it did not end there). Throughout his corpus are woven citations of, 
references to, and other markers of Japanese literary and art forms from 
the Heian period (794–1185) through the Edo period (1600–1868) that in 
the modern era have been canonized as signifiers of Japanese convention. 
For example, the separate poetic episodes and images that together make 
one text—most notably, perhaps, in Yukiguni (Snow Country; 1948), begun 
in 1935, added to over the years, and then rewritten many times—are not 
necessarily cumulative; each is intricately related to the words and imagery 
immediately surrounding it but not bound to the overall shape of the nar-
rative. Thus, Kawabata’s writing has been likened to renga (long sequences 
of multi-authored linked verse originating around the twelfth century).23 
Kawabata’s writing is highly referential to the classic Heian-period mono-
gatari (tale fiction) tradition, as attention is lavished on decorative details—
the scent of perfectly brewed tea or the crane pattern adorning a kimono.24 
Causal or plotted elements are subordinated to descriptive aspects. This is 
the sort of “fetishization of the trivial” that also informed so much classical 
monogatari, such as the famous The Tale of Genji.25 From Kawabata’s Senbazuru 
(Thousand Cranes; 1949): “when a red oleander floods into bloom, the red 
against the thick green leaves is like the blaze of the summer sky; but when 
the blossoms are white, the effect is richly cool. The white clusters swayed 
gently, and enveloped Fumiko.”26 Kawabata’s episodic brevity and reliance 
on contrastive images are believed born of early modern Japanese poetics 
such as the haiku. Edward Seidensticker wrote,
Kawabata has been put, I think rightly, in a literary line that can be traced 
back to seventeenth-century haiku masters. Haiku are tiny seventeen-
syllable poems that seek to convey a sudden awareness of beauty by 
a mating of opposite or incongruous terms. Thus the classical haiku 
characteristically fuses motion and stillness. Similarly Kawabata relies 
heavily on a mingling of the senses.27
An English translation of Snow Country was illustrated by the contempo-
rary Japanese artist Kuwamoto Tadaaki with stark, bold, abstract shapes in 
red, white, and black.28 Kuwamoto’s visual interpretation of the text sug-
gests that Snow Country indeed uses a prose narrative to explore the play of 
contrasts, colors, and shapes, and not simply to tell a story. In this sense 
























narrative textualities, such as visual, aural, or figural elements, is clear.29 
Yet I believe that Kuwamoto’s rejection of illustrations representative of 
traditional art forms in favor of modern abstract art was brilliant. What 
Kuwamoto appears to have understood is that Kawabata’s references to 
convention are never recapitulations of the same but thoroughly modern-
ist in their redeployment of signifiers of tradition in innovative and non-
traditional contexts.
 Accordingly, characterizations of Kawabata as continuous with tradition 
must, I believe (as do many others who have written about Kawabata), be 
countered with the fact that Kawabata was also affected by contemporary 
literary issues and debates. The indeterminate, or overdetermined, nature of 
Kawabata’s fragmentary mining of Japanese literary and artistic convention 
is, of course, clearly modern and even modernist.30 This fact did not escape 
all Kawabata commentary. Kosai Shinji mused:
As I lay down my pen, now, I think, maybe, Kawabata Yasunari’s sym-
bolist aesthetics are, however, after all, dependent upon a tradition of 
“Japanese verse (Yamato uta)” that permeates throughout the Kokinshū, 
the Shinkokinshū, Basho’s haikai [renga]. Nonetheless, that fact that I 
think the passage in Snow Country looks like Mallarmé’s symbolism, The 
Lake assimilates George Bataille’s eroticism, and moreover House of the 
Sleeping Beauties even seems like it is a sort of Platonism [means that] 
this “essence” of our Heian aesthetics is imbued throughout with the 
essence of French symbolism.31
 It is well known that prior to the war, Kawabata was affiliated with the 
Neo-Perceptionalist literary coterie (Shin kankaku ha, sometimes translated 
as Neo-Sensualist or New Senses School) during its formative stages in the 
1920s. The coterie rejected the then dominant naturalist literature that fol-
lowed the principles of scientific observation and reportage. Kawabata’s 
narratives emerge as influenced by, yet distinct from, the group. In his 
“Shinshin sakka no shinkeikō kaisetsu (On the New Directions of Up and 
Coming Writers),” Kawabata elucidated his belief that foregrounding sen-
sory perception in the writing of literature would originate a new mode of 
Japanese literary expression.32 Faithful to his own literary ideals as influ-
enced by the Neo-Perceptionalists, Kawabata’s narratives access the world 
through the varied perceptual senses. Accordingly, his characterizations are 
vibrantly tactile, auditory, and visual: a woman is described by the contrasts 
of black hair and white skin, the sound of her voice, or the touch of her 












where: stillness is offset by sudden movement, sadness by a moment of joy, 
the brightness of red against black, purity against the soiled:
Shimamura glanced up at her, and immediately lowered his head. The 
white in the depths of the mirror was the snow, and floating in the 
middle of it were the woman’s bright red cheeks. There was an inde-
scribably fresh beauty in the contrast.
 Was the sun already up? The brightness of the snow was more in-
tense, it seemed to be burning icily. Against it, the woman’s hair became 
a clearer black, touched with a purple sheen.33
At the end of his life, Kawabata returned to an abbreviated form of im-
pressionistic writing that he had experimented with toward the beginning 
of his writing career—short, descriptive, and often surrealist vignettes he 
called “palm of the hand stories (tanagokoro no shōsetsu).” Hence, one can 
easily characterize Kawabata’s literary project as one that moved forward 
while gazing backward—or one that incorporated and combined signifiers 
of premodernity in a quest for innovation and originality—yet was one that 
he troped as a return to tradition.
 This incorporation or combination of references to or signifiers of now 
canonized conventions is perhaps most overt in his Nobel Prize acceptance 
speech, which wound its way through references to one traditional Japa-
nese art form after another, including poetry, landscape painting, and the 
tea ceremony; art forms that range over time from Heian to Edo and even 
into the twentieth century. “‘The ancients arranged flowers and pursued 
enlightenment.’ Here we see an awakening to the heart of the Japanese 
spirit, under the influence of Zen”; two pages later, on the topic of Heian-
period tale fiction (monogatari) written by women, Kawabata holds: “so was 
established a tradition which influenced and even controlled Japanese lit-
erature for eight hundred years.”34 In between a discussion of the Buddhists 
Ryōkan (1758–1831) and Ikkyū (1394–1481) he quotes the twentieth-century 
writer Akutagawa Ryūnosuke: “nature is for me more beautiful than it has 
ever been before. I have no doubt that you will laugh at the contradiction, 
for here I love nature even when I am contemplating suicide. But nature is 
beautiful because it comes to my eyes in their last extremity.”35 On the tea 
ceremony he wrote:
The snow, the moon, the blossoms, words expressive of the seasons as 
they move one into another, include in the Japanese tradition the beauty 
























festations of nature, of human feelings as well. That spirit, that feeling 
for one’s comrades in the snow, the moonlight, under the blossoms, is 
also basic to the tea ceremony.36
 These different arts and personages are linked as continuous in signifi-
cation over history, in large part, because of the dominance of the “natu-
ral” or “nature” as a conceit or inspiration. Elsewhere Kawabata put it: “To 
be natural, to be true to nature—this has been the basic principle pervad-
ing all the arts in Japan, both past and present.”37 Thousand Cranes laments 
the deterioration of the (traditional art of the) tea ceremony in contempo-
rary, modern, declining Japan; the mountainside to which the protagonist 
Shimamura travels in Snow Country is facilely interpreted as symbolic of pre-
industrialized Japan—a quest reiterated within the text in Shimamura’s (un-
fulfilled) desire to find Chijimi linen—purported to still be snow-bleached 
in the preindustrial manner. Snow Country, written before and during the 
war, valorizes a preindustrial, pre-mass Japan in which nature dominates, 
albeit neatly transposed into the periphery of a modern bourgeois context.
 Kawabata’s insistence that his literature, and that of the canon, is about 
“nature” notwithstanding—as he himself may have intuited, given his de-
scription, that classical Japanese literature celebrated mediated impressions 
of the material world—premodern Japanese literature was less about “na-
ture” itself than about a cultured notion of “nature.”38 For example, Andrew 
Feenberg has noted: “Haiku . . . are often said to be concerned with the 
experience of nature. But in fact they articulate the natural world poetically 
in all its rich emotional and historical associations without distinguishing 
a purely material content from the contributions of culture and the sub-
ject.”39
 The aesthetic rendering of the natural world in Kawabata’s writings like-
wise celebrates a nature anchored in a cultural specificity—and his accul-
turated apprehension and representation of nature has at its core a Zen 
Buddhist sensibility. Throughout his Nobel Prize speech, Kawabata quoted 
poems about Zen written by Zen monks connecting them to a putative 
timeless essence of “the deep quiet of the Japanese spirit,” “the emotions 
of old Japan, and the heart of a religious faith.” Claiming that the premod-
ern “Ikkyū of Zen comes home to me with great immediacy,” Kawabata 
concluded the speech with the following:
Here we have the emptiness, the nothingness, of the Orient. My own 
works have been described as works of emptiness, but it is not to be 












to be quite different. Dōgen entitled his poem about the seasons “Innate 
Reality,” and even as he sang of the beauty of the seasons he was deeply 
immersed in Zen.40
Kawabata’s rendering of Zen as the aesthetic sentiment of Japan throughout 
the ages is, however, a modern construct.
 Let me digress for a moment. From the Meiji period onward, Western 
theories on aesthetics and other philosophic inquiry poured into Japan 
(alongside Western novels; texts on science and technology and on health 
and hygiene; and other discursive and material imports), with aesthetics be-
coming a field within the university by 1881.41 However, the high academic 
discourses tended toward explications of Western aesthetic theory; there 
were apparently only limited philosophical treatments exclusively dedicated 
to inquiry into so-called traditional Japanese aesthetics. Among these were 
several essays, and later a thick study by the philosopher Onishi Yoshinori 
attempting to apply logical rationalism to, and integrate with Western aes-
thetical discourses, the three categories he identified as the core of Japa-
nese aesthetics: yūgen (mysterious depth), aware (strong emotive sense of 
the sad and beautiful transience of all things), and sabi (restrained melan-
choly or loneliness). Ueda Makoto notes that his studies were met with hos-
tility. There was no need to dissect these categories, held one reviewer, and, 
moreover, was not everything that Onishi discovered in this contorted logi-
cal approach already self-evident to all Japanese?42 The point I want to make 
with this short digression is not that Japanese aesthetics were unimportant 
to Japanese of the time. Rather, the objection to the separation of aesthet-
ics from discourses on ontology and culture, I think, pinpoints an impor-
tant aspect of how aesthetics were then conceived in a rapidly modernizing 
Japan. That is, it shows the prewar naturalization of an environmentally and 
ethnically particular “sensibility” as a constitutive component of Japanese 
being.
 Aesthetics was of paramount importance; it was inseparable from (Japa-
nese) being itself in a manner not unlike that of the (in)famous National 
Socialist philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose analysis of temporality in 
Being and Time Peter Osborne has summarized as “an aestheticization of 
ontology or ontologization of transcendental aesthetics.”43 In the works of 
eminent modern Japanese philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō, Miki Kiyo-
shi, and Watsuji Tetsurō, Japanese being is not only aestheticized, but it is 
also conceived as intertwined with an experiential aesthetic immediacy.44
























convincingly argued, Zen Buddhism in particular signified something quite 
different from what it had before the twentieth century and had, in fact, be-
come the favored vessel for this aesthetic-ontic constellation. With moder-
nity, Zen had become commingled with Japanese being in a newly individu-
alized formulation well suited to the modern subject. The result was that, 
unlike in premodern Zen Buddhism, the “heart” of modern Zen now lay “in 
a private, veridical, often momentary ‘state of consciousness.’”45 But this 
private “state of consciousness” is simultaneously communal and national 
because it is perceived to be (potentially) shared by all Japanese. In other 
words, with Japan’s modernity, the meaning of Zen shifted from an insti-
tutionalized religious practice by a dominant aristocratic-military minority 
to a subjectively individual, yet culturally communal, ontology available to 
the masses and linked to nationalism. In short, Zen Buddhism had been 
re-conceptualized as “the ground of Japanese aesthetic and ethical sen-
sibilities. Virtually all of the major Japanese artistic traditions are reinter-
preted as expressions of the Zen experience, rendering Zen the metaphysi-
cal ground of Japanese culture itself.”46 Because the various arts are now all 
linked to Zen, and Zen is linked to Japanese being, both Zen and being are 
at once aestheticized, nationalized, and bound to a type of contemplative 
experientialism.
 Kawabata’s Nobel Prize speech expressed this sentiment as follows:
Seeing the moon, he [the poet Myōe (1173–1232)] becomes the moon, 
the moon seen by him becomes him. He sinks into nature, becomes one 
with nature. The light of the “clear heart” of the priest, seated in the 
meditation hall in the darkness before the dawn, becomes for the dawn 
moon its own light.47
Kawabata gestures toward defining this aesthetic as “Pan-Asian” when he 
includes references to Chinese poets and substitutes the word “Oriental” 
for Japanese here and there.48 But this gesture toward a common Asia must 
be recognized as an imaginary (mythic) Asia, not only because by 1968 
China had become the People’s Republic of China, but also simply because 
Ch’an Buddhism (the progenitor of Japanese Zen, originated in the early 
seventh century) and Buddhism in general in China had overwhelmingly 
yielded to the philosophic dominance of Neo-Confucianism by the four-
teenth century.49 Kawabata’s “Asia” that is (still) unified through a Zen 
sentiment is therefore a thoroughly Orientalized Asia—frozen in its an-
tiquity, completely aestheticized, stunningly a-historical, and originating 












tices that Kawabata discovers everywhere as he meanders (discursively, of 
course) through China and Japan, from Japan’s earliest recorded writings 
to the present day, are all read as signifying homogeneity. The speech—in 
its modern interpretation of Zen—disavows the radical differences that 
history would discover in the various places, periods, and poets, let alone 
the differing meaning and practice of Zen itself over time and regime. (One 
might also argue that this Pan-Asianism has an ominous undercurrent 
when one remembers how the mission of unifying all of Asia under Japan 
during the Second World War made use of similar notions of an “Asian” 
spiritualism.)
 It is, then, as a particularity unique to being Japanese that Kawabata 
drew inspiration from Zen in the form of an individualized (yet nationally 
communal), subjective sensory experience of contrast, transience, internal 
negation (or the dialectic of self-negation described by Nishida in which the 
temporal-[human]-historical self comes into being in relation to its simul-
taneous negation in space, and vice versa).50 This aesthetic-ontic construct 
is, moreover, grafted onto a culturally particularized nature and manifested 
in the mythicized Japanese (Pan-Asian) past—but a past that can be, and 
should be, reborn in the present and future. As Nishida put it during the 
war, “The return of the past in our nation has always been the character 
of a renewal. It has never been a mere return to the past but always a step 
forward as the self-determination of the eternal present. . . . In this history 
of our country, there was always a return to the Imperial Throne, a return 
to the past. This has never meant a return to the systems and culture of 
antiquity but has involved taking a step ahead in the direction of a new 
world.”51
Fascist Aesthetics
The question remains, however, as to how this avowedly peaceful, compas-
sionate, and contemplative core of Kawabata’s mobilization of signifiers 
of convention—from an acculturated nature to Zen—might be particularly 
amenable to a fascist agenda. First, I will recall Walter Benjamin’s claim 
that fascism relies on an aestheticization of politics. As Andrew Hewitt ex-
plains,
The “aestheticization of politics,” which seems to entail a confusion of 
discourses, actually functions on the basis of one of the most radical 
























when Benjamin recommends “politicizing art,” he is arguing not simply 
that fascism somehow confuses aesthetics and politics but rather that 
maintaining a traditional differentiation between the two is itself poten-
tially fascistic.52
Hence, it is an epistemological structure of purification of domains, in-
cluding aesthetics as aesthetics, that Benjamin identifies at the base of both 
fascism and modernism. This is not to facilely and inaccurately claim no 
distinction between fascism and modernism (fascism is, of course, a re-
actionary modernism).53 The critic Karatani Kōjin coined the phrase “aes-
theticentrism,” to describe the inflexible purification (or bracketing off ) of 
aesthetics as a domain (that also undergirds Orientalist fascination with 
an aestheticized Asia) and that helps distinguish modernism proper from 
fascism. While modernism relies on a bracketing off, or purification of do-
mains, the “aestheticentrist” naturalizes, and fixes that purification:
The aesthetic stance is established by bracketing other elements, but 
one should always be prepared to remove the brackets. . . . However, 
the characteristic of aestheticentrists is that they forget to remove the 
brackets. They confuse the reality of the other with what is achieved by 
bracketing. Or they confuse their respect for beauty with respect for the 
other. . . . Furthermore, aestheticentrism is at the core of fascism. Ap-
pearing to be anticapitalist, it attempts to aesthetically sublimate the 
contradictions of the capitalist economy.54
Because the act of bracketing, or the purification of domains, depends on 
the isolation of certain attributes for appreciation or investigation, the ob-
ject that emerges from that bracketing is of necessity partial. As Karatani 
points out, while this bracketing is essential for the advancement of many 
fields (such as science or mathematics), it is also essential that the brack-
eting be flexible, and that such bracketing must be conscious and perhaps 
deliberate. Otherwise, the partial object of purification may be confused 
with the object in its totality and context. Kawabata, I think, was an aes-
theticentrist in this sense. As such, he refused to unbracket his rendering of 
Japanese traditional culture. Or, as Benjamin might have put it, he refused 
to politicize art—that is, he refused to refuse the de-politicization of what 
is already always political—but held steadfastly to the decadence of art for 
art’s sake.
 Second, if fascism is understood to be a nationalistic reactionary mod-












brought on by modern mass society; a reactionary modernism that mobi-
lizes those masses toward a new future that is overtly nostalgic for the past, 
moreover, one that attempts to unite the masses and obscure class struggle 
through an ideology (propagated by images) of national homogeneity and 
superiority against an encroaching pollution threatened by modernity, then 
Kawabata’s mobilization of tradition can be easily understood as amenable 
to appropriation by fascist agendas or, more simply, as complicit with fas-
cist aesthetics.
 Let me be more specific. I have characterized Kawabata’s relationship 
with premodern literature as one that looks backward as it moves forward 
and as replete with a host of canonized signifiers of Japanese tradition in 
its quest for innovation. Roger Griffin has argued that at the mythic core 
of fascism lies its “lowest common denominator”—“a palingenetic form 
of populist ultranationalism.”55 Griffin uses the term palingenetic to refer 
to “the sense of a new start or of regeneration after a phase of crisis or 
decline which can be associated just as much with mystical . . . as secular 
realities.”56 Palingenetic, then, connotes “a backward-looking nostalgia for 
a restoration of the past (in the sense of rebirth)” that “refers to the future 
as much as the past . . . while appearing to be a reactionary turn to the past, 
in fact constitutes an orientation to the future.”57 Hence, fascism calls for a 
new order with terms such as restoration, or regeneration; this restoration, 
of course, is to a purer time of “national” glory.58
 In this sense, fascism also counters the progressive temporality of the 
modern with a “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous” (and vice versa; i.e., 
the non-simultaneity of the simultaneous).59 Peter Osborne has argued that 
this is a “politics of time” that underpins both conservative revolutions and 
reactionary modernism.60 As Jeffrey Herf has pointed out, the apparently 
paradoxical nature of this politics of time stems from an awareness that 
what conservative revolutions and reactionary modernist political move-
ments mobilize to revitalize is believed to be something already lost but 
may in fact never have existed as more than a possibility.61 Hence, Osborne 
paraphrases Herf to postulate that reactionary modernism seeks “to realize 
this ‘past’ for the first time.”62 Moreover, it is this politics of time in reaction-
ary modernism that leads Osborne to claim:
Reactionary modernism may be understood as a bad modernism; not (or 
not primarily) in a moral or political sense, but in terms of the contra-
diction internal to its temporal structure. This structure—the structure 
























dictory, since one of the things it aims to reverse is the production of the 
very temporality to which it is itself subject. Radical reaction cannot but 
reproduce, and thereby performatively affirm, the temporal form of the 
very thing against which it is pitted (modernity). Hence the necessity 
for it to misrepresent its temporal structure to itself as some kind of 
“recovery” or “return.”63
 That this politics of time requires, at its core, a sense of loss should 
be obvious. Griffin stresses the importance of a perception of decay, deca-
dence, and corruption of the present moment as integral to the develop-
ment of palingenetic myth.64 Benjamin has suggested that the experience 
of loss in the First World War—and the attempt to represent that loss—was 
an integral element fertilizing the growth of German fascism.65 Rephras-
ing Benjamin, Hewitt terms this the “ontologization of a (historical) loss” 
whereby,
in the reconstruction of a (national) identity, the very concept of “loss” 
is already recuperative: implying something that has been lost, it posits 
lack as the absence of a historical and ontological (or national) presence. 
More than this, however, the ontologization of loss ensures that loss can 
never be lost, since it becomes the very condition of national identity.66
 Quite unlike Germany, Japan entered the Second World War the mili-
tary victor of its recent wars (in Russia and China). But Japan was in the 
midst of a cultural crisis that was widely experienced as loss. From the Meiji 
era through the early 1920s, Japan had eagerly and enthusiastically em-
braced modernity and the Westernization with which it was inextricably 
intertwined. But by the late 1920s and early 1930s, the mood had radically 
changed. Tetsuo Najita and Harry Harootunian write, “It was precisely be-
cause Japanese saw the urgency of keeping their culture uncontaminated 
and hence preserving its essence against the threatened external pollu-
tion that many felt justified using militant forms of political and cultural 
action.”67 It is important to add that this urgency felt toward protecting 
cultural purity was the result of a perception of loss that had already happened, 
as the writer Tanizaki Jun’ichirō’s words from 1933 perhaps best describe:
What losses we have suffered, in comparison with the Westerner. The West-
erner has been able to move forward in ordered steps, while we have met 
superior civilization and have had to surrender to it, and we have had to 












 In recent years the pace of progress has been so precipitous that 
conditions in our own country go somewhat beyond the ordinary. The 
changes that have taken place since the Restoration of 1867 must be at 
least as great as those of the preceding three and a half centuries.68
 In Kawabata’s fiction, this sense of loss is communicated primarily 
through a melancholic mood—a sense of loss and decay—rather than in 
blunt, straightforward statements lamenting loss. Kawabata’s Yama no oto 
(Sound of the Mountain; 1949) explores the decline toward old age and 
impending death of the protagonist. Or, for example, from Snow Country:
He spent much of his time watching insects in their death agonies.
 Each day, as the autumn grew colder, insects died on the floor of his 
room. Stiff-winged insects fell on their backs and were unable to get to 
their feet again. A bee walked a little and collapsed, walked a little and 
collapsed, It was a quiet death.69
Or in the concluding pages of Thousand Cranes, when the daughter of a tea-
ceremony master breaks an antique tea bowl:
The broken Shino lay on the stepping stone before the stone basin.
 He put together four large pieces to form a bowl. A piece large enough 
to admit his forefinger was missing from the rim.
 Wondering if it might be somewhere on the ground, he started look-
ing among the stones. Immediately he stopped.
 He raised his eyes. A large star was shining through the trees to the 
east.
 . . .
 It seemed dreary in contrast to the fresh glimmer of the star, to be 
hunting a broken bowl and trying to put it together.
 He threw the pieces down again.
 The evening before, Fumiko had flung the Shino against the basin 
before he could stop her.
 He had cried out.70
 This sentiment of loss and an encroaching doom, hinted at in the dark-
ening mood of much of Kawabata’s fiction, took many different manifesta-
tions throughout Japanese society—philosophic, political, literary, to name 
a few—which collectively expressed the anxiety that something that must 
be retrieved had been lost to Japanese culture with the precipitous process 
























a portion of the ideological groundwork for the support of the Asia-Pacific 
War by many intellectuals and politicians. In his short article on the Pan-
Asianism of the Western-educated liberal politician Nagai Ryūtarō, Peter 
Duus places this perception of cultural loss at the matrix of Nagai’s (sur-
prising) support of the Asia-Pacific War. Nagai called for a unified Asia 
against white imperialism because,
Like others of his generation, Nagai did not regard the “successes of 
Meiji” as a source of undiluted pride as a Japanese. . . .
 Success in war did not necessarily establish the nation’s cultural 
worth. To Nagai, it seemed that although Japan had been a military and 
diplomatic victor, she remained a cultural loser. . . . [T]he defeat of China 
and Russia made Japan a great power, but not a great civilization.71
In this sense, one might adapt Hewitt’s argument and claim that the Japa-
nese nation-state ontologized that cultural loss—that is, positioned loss as 
intrinsic to current Japanese being. Hence, loss became a sort of “presence” 
that “stood in” for that which was absent (i.e., traditional culture itself ) as 
the Asia-Pacific War began.
 Moreover, the link between the perception of cultural loss and the sanc-
tification of nature in Japan (which, it must be reiterated, is “second” na-
ture, or acculturated nature, not nature itself ) could not be more clear: as 
modernity/Westernization had irrevocably altered the relation of human 
to nature, Japanese traditional culture, which supposedly resided still in 
remote, preindustrialized provinces like that of Snow Country, was imagined 
to be a potential source for a new age of Eastern sensibility. Against the 
“divisiveness of modern political and social relations” from Meiji through 
the 1930s, nationalist activists such as Kita Ikki and the fundamentalist 
agrarianists Gondō Seikei, Inoue Nisshō, and Tachibana Kōsaburō called 
for a new “return” to an agrarian and communalist Asia in which the people 
were bound naturally to the Japanese emperor (at the same time that Kawa-
bata was celebrating such locales in his fiction).72 The more radical of the 
agrarianists advocated violent means to achieve these ends, but even for 
those who sought peaceful change,
The people were seen as an embodiment of a common essence that de-
rived from the local land and the tutelary shrines that defined all within 
a marked-off space as “brothers” under the divine protection of spiritual 
entities. Far from the corrupt cities and the sites of industrial capitalism, 












tinued to exist as an accessible reality, even though in recent times it had been at-
tacked by the forces of modernity.73
Maruyama Masao wrote that Tachibana Kōsaburō, a leading fascist ideo-
logue, praised “the life bound to the soil in the following words”:
Man’s world will be eternal so long as the bright sun is over his head and 
his feet are planted on the ground. . . . What is tilling the soil if not the 
very basis of human life? . . . Only by agrarianism can a country become 
eternal, and this is especially the case with Japan. Japan never could, and 
never can, be herself if she is separated from the soil.74
 As in Nazi Germany, the “naturalization” of culture by the prewar Japa-
nese agrarian-communalism did not halt at landscape but endeavored to 
conceive of the nation itself as a “natural entity rather than an imagined 
community.”75 Modernity is believed to have “polluted” nature, while
focusing on the natural allows fascism to highlight the issue of land 
and its importance to the people and the nation. The Nazi “blood and 
soil” doctrine, for example, is suggestive of an intimate connection be-
tween the blood of the people (nation) and the soil of the land (nature), 
expressing the unity of a racial people and its land. . . . [I]deologically 
fascism does not merely “respect” nature: it sanctifies and spiritualizes 
it. For fascism the philosophical distinction between man and nature is 
an artificial product of rationalist philosophy and science.76
Moreover, a naturalized connection between the land of Japan and its 
ethnic populace was being made in philosophical discourses. The most fa-
mous example is that of Watsuji Tetsurō, whose Fūdo (Climate and Cul-
ture; 1935) linked natural environment to national character.77 The Kyoto 
school Buddhists attempted a similar naturalization of nation and support 
of (ultra)nationalism, “explicitly connecting ‘blood and soil’ with the Japa-
nese state.”78 In these renderings, nature becomes the hallmark of the spiri-
tual in a manner that I think is quite similar to how nature is configured 
in Kawabata’s valorization of Zen as the “natural essence” of the Orien-
tal sensibility. (And, of course, fascist ideology valorizes vitalism and faith 
over rational doctrine in a way that is not unlike religions, including Zen.)79 
While Zen itself was not, of course, intrinsically fascist, it met fascist ideol-
ogy’s need to sanctify nature and the nation:
The sanctification of nature is simultaneously the sanctification of the 
























idea of a national spirit and the spiritual concept of nature focuses atten-
tion on this nature, that is, the land of this nation, and the role it plays in 
shaping national character and identity. A geographically specific nature 
forms the mediating link between the sanctification of nature and the 
nationalist impulse. . . .
 To mobilize the masses in an anti-communist fashion, fascism 
“nationalizes” the masses, that is, reconstitutes the working class as 
part of the nation, presenting the struggle of the nation in terms of a 
mysticism of nature; the nation in motion fulfils its historic role by real-
izing its natural spirit—the will to power.80
The “natural” in Kawabata’s texts, however, is nowhere wild and rampant; 
it is the cultured garden, tamed by the human hand, or the mountains made 
docile in poetry. Objects (and women) seen in mirrors or through glass, for 
example, are transformed into what they “should” or “could” be, which 
surpasses what they are. Snow Country opens on Shimamura aboard a train 
traversing a snowy countryside. He sees a woman, Yoko, reflected over the 
passing scenery in the train window. A light projected from the mountains, 
shining in the reflection of Yoko’s face, is to Shimamura “inexpressible 
beauty.”81 As the modern train travels the old country, the shape and con-
tours of the landscape and Yoko’s face, the play of changing light, the sen-
sations of coldness and steam, the high pitch of Yoko’s voice in the dark 
night, and the flow of time and space are all given equal narrative attention. 
A sample passage yields:
In the depths of the mirror the evening landscape moved by, the mir-
ror and the reflected figures like motion pictures superimposed one on 
the other. The figures and the background were unrelated, and yet the 
figures, transparent and intangible, and the background, dim in the 
gathering darkness, melted together into a sort of symbolic world not 
of this world. Particularly when a light out of the mountains shone in the 
center of the girl’s face, Shimamura felt his chest rise at the inexpress-
ible beauty of it.
 The mountain sky still carried traces of evening red. Individual shapes 
were clear far into the distance, but the monotonous mountain land-
scape, undistinguished for mile after mile, seemed all the more undis-
tinguished for having lost its last traces of color. There was nothing to 
catch the eye and it seemed to flow along in a wide, unformed emotion. 
That was of course because the girl’s face floated over it. Cut off by the 












face too seemed transparent—but was it really transparent? Shimamura 
had the illusion that the evening landscape was actually passing over the 
face, and the flow did not stop to let him be sure it was not.82
This mediated nature, to reiterate, is particularized as “naturally” Japanese. 
Representation repeatedly surpasses reality, hence again recalling fascist 
politics of representation in a short-circuiting of the sign and the fixing of 
signifiers.
 A reactionary politics of time (looking backward while moving forward 
and a simultaneity of the non-simultaneous), aestheticentrism (or inflexible 
purification of domain), and spiritualized nature are clearly present in the 
mythic re-conceptualization of Zen as the “ground” of Japanese culture evi-
dent in Kawabata’s Nobel Prize speech. The speech sanctifies a specifically 
Japanized acculturation of nature as well as aestheticizes Japanese being (or 
ontologizes transcendental aesthetics). So do his essays that call for (and 
literature that attempts to formulate) a new mode of Japanese literature in-
spired by the canon. This reactionary politics of time, aestheticentrism, and 
spiritualized nature are also evident in his ontologization of loss, and in his 
disavowal of Western modernist influences. In addition, it can be argued 
that the form of Zen embraced by Kawabata also has a “politics of time” 
that postulates a simultaneity of the non-simultaneous.83 It is no stretch to 
postulate that against precipitous modernization that was in Japan essen-
tially intertwined with Westernization, and a growing proletarian move-
ment in the 1920s through the early 1930s, Kawabata proposed a reaction-
ary modernism. In place of political praxis, Kawabata retreated into the 
purified domain of a culturally exceptionalized and essentialized aesthetic 
of the past to be regenerated in the present and guard the future against the 
pollution of modernity and rationalism.
 The myth at the core of Kawabata’s reactionary modernism—that in-
vents a non-changing over time, culturally particular, Japanese past imbued 
with a nature bound to the Zen aesthetic and thus takes the place of his-
tory—much like that of National Socialism, is the notion of the past glory 
of harmony between nature and human that becomes fixed in the notion 
of the Volk.84 Indeed, Neocleous argues that this is endemic to fascist ideol-
ogy: “having emptied reality of history, fascist myth fills it with nature.”85 
The varied class violences of the empowered aristocracy of the Heian, the 
warring factions of Muromachi- Kamakura (which included religious wars 
between the various sects in the battle for power), and the centralized feu-
























divested of history: class struggle and the brutality of the samurai class; 
the dehumanization of the outcastes; the abuses of the various temples; the 
starving peasants and the rice riots—all disappear alongside the contempo-
raneous march toward fascism. As Kawabata retreated into an aestheticized 
past imaginary, the current moment and its modernity were simultaneously 
disavowed. Kawabata’s mission, so to speak, was precisely to realize this 
past in the present—in terms of representation. One can also describe this as 
a tension in which the real, or material reality (history), is disavowed and 
replaced with an aestheticized, acculturated, mediated, and subjective rep-
resentation of the real (myth).
 Of course, the aesthetics and politics of representation that I am de-
scribing, although they may well share much structurally and even themati-
cally with those of fascist systems, might not seem particularly sinister in 
the absence of a fascist movement. But these aesthetics become potentially 
monstrous when they are used to justify brutality. Here one should remem-
ber that at the same time that Kawabata resolutely turned rhetorically to the 
Japanese past, the Japanese nation-state was resolutely marching toward 
fascism. In 1934, Kawabata was appointed a member of the Literary Dis-
cussion Group, a group organized by the Public Security Division of the 
Japanese Home Ministry to ensure literary cooperation with ever tighten-
ing government control of literature in its fascist-imperialist interests. His 
aestheticentrism was at the very least not viewed as threatening to fascist 
interests, and more unsettling is the fact that an early version of Snow Coun-
try was awarded the third annual literary prize by this same (fascist) Literary 
Discussion Group in 1937.86 In fact, Kawabata, like so many others of his 
generation, supported the war: “Kawabata indicated that now as the ‘Japa-
nese race’ which had situated the emperor at its center, there was nothing 
to be done but participate in the war.”87
 Importantly, Kawabata fiercely sharpened his insistence that the essence 
of his own writing was grounded in the tradition of “Japanese verse” during 
the Second World War.88 Many of Kawabata’s wartime publications, such as 
Bokka (Pastoral Song; 1937–38) and Tōkaidō (The Tokaido Highway; 1943), 
seek peace and solace in a mythic past that is nationalized in a search to 
revitalize premodern Japan. These narratives did reference (as did Kōgen 
[Heights; 1943–45]), and even appeared to lament (through the voices of 
various characters), the context of Japan at war, encouraging some critics, 
including Kobayashi Yoshihito, to argue that alongside the wartime turn 
toward Japaneseness and nature, Pastoral Song in particular made an “anti-












nese nature should now be understood as in itself complicit with fascist 
ideology. Moreover, on closer consideration, it turns out that what look 
like “references to the war” in these wartime narratives are not exactly ref-
erences to the existing war. Rather, as Hatori Tetsuya wrote:
In order to make the contemporaneous war accommodate his notion 
of the spirit of Japanese culture, the war [that Kawabata wrote about in 
these narratives] could not be one in service to Japanese supremacy and 
the domination of another ethnic group (minzoku) by the Japanese race 
(minzoku). To the contrary, it would have to be a war in which the [Japa-
nese] self perishes and dissolves into the other, or one could equate it 
with a war of sublation in which the self is fused with the other. This 
notion is there in both Pastoral Song and Heights, and in The Tokaido High-
way, I think, you can see it [the notion of this spirit] in [Kawabata’s] 
attempt to introduce it as a solid foundation in the archaic basis of Japa-
nese cultural tradition.
 Kawabata could not oppose the war during the war. He had to accept 
it like one accepts fate. But while accepting the war, he hoped it would 
not be a war [fought] to promote the ego[ism] of the Japanese race (min-
zoku), but instead be a war that took the form of dissolving Japan into the 
world. However, because there was a gap between his hope and his ideal 
and the real war, Kawabata never finished writing (chūzetsu) Tōkaidō or 
Bokka—[texts] that, at least to some degree, tried to deal honestly with 
the age and the war. In the end, caught up in the flow of history that no 
single individual had power over, Kawabata could only fix his gaze on the 
sadness of individual (hitotsu hitotsu) lives that were tossed about in that 
flow.90
Hatori Tetsuya’s description of how Kawabata substituted his “ideal” war 
for depictions of the actual war is part of his attempt to exonerate Kawa-
bata from complicity with Japan’s imperialism and militarism in the Sec-
ond World War. However, in the context of my argument about fascist aes-
thetics, this very substitution indicates precisely a fascist aesthetic. This 
is structurally similar to substituting “myth” for “history,” or “image” for 
“depth narrative”—a purposeful transformation of even current militarism 
and its events with idealized images of subject–object sublation. Even those 
texts such as Pastoral Song that (originally) resisted a complete “bracketing” 
outside the sociopolitical context (as Snow Country did) merely turned the 
actual war into a fictitious one after Kawabata’s personal preference. What 
























ment of the “real” war with an imaginary one. Against the background of 
soldiers being called into service and deployed, Suda, the protagonist in 
Heights, sinks into reverie, imagining a world peopled with biracial (mixed-
blood) children, inspiring Hatori Kazuei to dub this (in katakana) “cosmo-
politanism.”91 The imaginary war of Pastoral Song and Heights disavows Japa-
nese “egoism” and in its place proposes a deflection away from the real, or 
material, political reality and toward a mediated, imaginary transforma-
tion of this real (world). As Hirakawa Sukehiro has argued, it was during 
the war that Kawabata’s aesthetic sensibility was sharpened, to the point 
that, “like waving a magic wand, his pen and eyes totally transformed the 
ugly, or that which one expects to be filthy, into something beautiful and 
pure,”92 The aestheticization of war in some of his narratives is, I believe, 
ominous, given the context of actual war in which he wrote and published 
those texts. Thematically, or contextually, this short-lived gesture toward 
writing the “war” (which must be understood as I have described it and 
not confused with any attempt at historicization) is thus in Kawabata con-
stitutively paired with a reactionary modernism. Increasingly his protago-
nists sought solace in mythic representations of Japan’s past and an aes-
theticization of war. The real war of “egoism” and tyranny is transformed 
into a more acceptable, even “pure,” war of self-depreciation and apparent 
cosmopolitanism (dare I say, a beautiful war?), and death becomes one of 
Kawabata’s favorite occasions for the celebration of beauty.93
 In contrast to the harsh postwar self-reevaluation undertaken by the 
majority of Japanese intellectuals, artists, and writers, Tsuji Kunio quotes 
Kawabata as fortifying this positioning after the loss of the war: “from now 
on I will probably tend toward Japanese style traditionalism and classi-
cism.”94 In his Nobel speech, he spoke of a friend for whom “there is no art 
superior to death . . . to die is to live.”95
 But where, one might ask, are the “real” politics in this acculturation of 
nature and aestheticization of death and war? (Kobayashi, after all, finds 
this aestheticization and retreat into nature to constitute a resistance to 
the war.)96 It helps to remember that fascist propaganda largely downplays 
economic and political issues in favor of foregrounding feelings and affects 
and aims to incite the masses by using images, intuition, and sentiment.97 
The aesthetic construct at the core of Kawabata’s politics of representa-
tion encompasses many elements that this essay, following such theorists 
as Benjamin, Chow, Griffin, Hewitt, Neocleous, and Sontag, has analyzed 
as integral and endemic to fascist ideology, aesthetics, and propaganda: a 












trism (that also aestheticizes death), the dissolution of self into commu-
nity, an ontologization of cultural loss, and more.
 I will conclude this essay with a brief comparison of the depictions of 
two young women in Kawabata’s Snow Country and his much later Nemu-
reru bijo (House of the Sleeping Beauties; 1960–61), an account of protago-
nist Eguchi’s visits to a unique brothel where elderly, impotent men fondle 
drugged, unconscious virgin girls. In the last pages of House of the Sleeping 
Beauties, Eguchi is put together with two drugged girls: one is pure, fair, and 
beautiful; the other is described as a dark, oily girl. She sweats; her body 
and breath exude an unpleasant odor; and, Eguchi imagines, she is tough 
and wild:
She seemed to be lying with her legs spread wide. She lay face up, her 
arms flung out. The nipples were large and had a purplish cast. It was not 
a beautiful color in the light from the crimson velvet curtains. Nor could 
the skin of the neck and breasts be called beautiful. She had a dark glow. 
There seemed to be a faint odor at the armpits.
 “Life itself,” muttered Eguchi.
 The oily skin of the dark girl was unpleasant behind him. It was cold 
and slippery.98
 She cannot be Japanese, he surmises. After passing much of the night alter-
nately touching the two girls and lapsing into one troubled memory-dream 
state after another, Eguchi awakens to discover that the dark girl lies dead 
beside him.99 There is nothing beautiful or erotic in her death. “Old Eguchi 
awoke with a groan. He shook his head, but he was still in a daze. He was 
facing the dark girl. Her body was cold. He started up. She was not breath-
ing. He felt her breast. There was no pulse. He leaped up. He staggered and 
fell. Trembling violently, he went into the next room.”100
 The “foreign” oily girl’s terrifying and revolting death makes a vibrant 
contrast with that of Yoko, the perfectly aesthetic and thoroughly Japanese 
beauty of Snow Country. Yoko’s death in a burning warehouse is conversely 
the stunning vehicle for oneness with the “universal.” Hastening toward the 
fire, Shimamura is distracted by the skies above:
The Milky Way. Shimamura too looked up, and he felt himself floating 
into the Milky Way. Its radiance was so near that it seemed to take him 
up into it. Was this the bright vastness the poet Bashō saw when he wrote of the 
Milky Way arched over a stormy sea? The Milky Way came down just over 
























voluptuousness about it. Shimamura fancied that his own small shadow 
was being cast up against it from the earth. Each individual star stood 
apart from the rest, and even the particles of silver dust in the luminous 
clouds could be picked out, so clear was the night. The limitless depth of 
the Milky Way pulled his gaze up into it.101
On his way to witness Yoko’s apparent death, the limitless depth of the Milky 
Way literally “sucks up” Shimamura’s gaze (shisen o suikonde itta).102 Shima-
mura begins to disintegrate into a vast “nature”: “and the Milky Way, like 
a great aurora, flowed through his body to stand at the edges of the earth. 
There was a quiet, chilly loneliness in it, and a sort of voluptuous astonish-
ment.”103 The motif of the Milky Way that carries through these final pas-
sages is introduced as an experience related by the canonized, revered, medi-
eval poet, Matsuo Bashō (1644–94). Great, universal nature—the heavens 
themselves—flow down into Shimamura in much the same way that Bashō 
experienced the stars. The coming together of human and nature is cultural-
ized, particularized, and de-historicized and requires the ultimate disinter-
estedness of an aestheticized, (Japanese) female corpse. Successfully aes-
theticized in Snow Country (looked at disinterestedly, or “bracketed”), Yoko’s 
death facilitates Shimamura’s communal, nationalized, spiritual diffusion. 
Unsuccessfully aestheticized, the oily, non-Japanese girl of House of the Sleep-
ing Beauties functions as the repository for Eguchi’s objects of abjection. Al-
though the aesthetic annihilation of the other (as in Yoko’s death) is easily 
understood as a fascist aesthetic, the other side of this configuration, or 
the diffusion of the self into a fiercely mediated reality, can also be a fascist 
aesthetic when at its foundation it requires a reconfiguration of the real (in 
the Lacanian sense) into this same “reality”104—that is, reconfigured into a 
culturally particularized and communal “reality qua second nature,” or the 
relentless mediation of reality with a mythicized “Japanese convention” in 
a disavowal of historical and individual difference. This is where Emmanuel 
Lévinas calls for invocation: it is an integration of self and other that oblit-
erates the otherness of the other.105 On the level of social discourse, this 
appears as the denial of history and an elevation of myth, the mediation 
(to a degree that it equals annihilation) of “real things” (especially the rep-
resentation of women) with aesthetics and an imaginary Japaneseness. On 
an interpersonal level, it is the sublation of the other and the self but in the 
image of the nationalized-aestheticized subject. It is this process—the spe-
cific manner in which mediation of reality is obsessively attempted through 












cization of ontology) I have described—that I understand to be collusive 
with fascist aesthetics.
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Disciplining the Erotic-Grotesque in  
Edogawa Ranpo’s Demon of the Lonely Isle
In the late 1920s, popular discussions of psychology, sexology, 
and criminology inundated the Japanese discursive field. Interest in these 
topics was closely connected to a highly commercialized formulation of 
modernism known as Erotic Grotesque Nonsense (ero-guro-nansensu), which 
revolved around explorations of the deviant, the bizarre, and the ridiculous. 
Capitalizing on the popularity of this stylishly modernist sensibility was a 
flood of publications, including magazines such as Hentai shiryō (Deviant 
Materials; 1926) and anthologies such as Kindai hanzai kagaku zenshū (An-
thology of Modern Criminal Science; 1929–30). This trend in the publishing 
industry coincided almost exactly with the ascendancy in Japan of authori-
tarian political and social forces that strongly advocated the fascistic ideo-
logical fantasies of cultural harmony, ethnic purity, national power, and 
empire.1 At first sight it might appear that these two trends existed in direct 
opposition to each other, with the decadent and deviant elements of the 
modernist erotic-grotesque sensibility offering a challenge to an increas-
ingly fascistic vision of Japanese culture and society. As I will demonstrate 
in this essay, however, the relationship between these developments cannot 


















cultural products to treat the “bizarre” and the “deviant” in a simultaneously 
celebratory and alarmist manner resulted in a multivalent relationship with 
the fascistic outlook. On the one hand, erotic-grotesque celebrations of 
“deviant” practices and identities defied myths of cultural homogeneity and 
purity. On the other hand, the tendency in erotic-grotesque discourse to 
treat deviance as an unwholesome pathological condition to be cured, iso-
lated, or obliterated mirrored the fascistic compulsion to assimilate, domi-
nate, or destroy outlooks and subjectivities deemed incompatible with na-
tional interests and cultural hegemony.2
 The Erotic Grotesque Nonsense phenomenon is rife with contradic-
tions and inconsistencies. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this 
sensibility is its transgressive quality. Cultural products associated with 
this phenomenon conspicuously differentiated themselves from conven-
tional moral and aesthetic standards. This would explain their appeal to 
urban sophisticates, who constituted their primary audience. For modern 
girls (moga) and modern boys (mobo) on the cutting edge, consumption of 
erotic-grotesque cultural paraphernalia, and the simultaneous rejection of 
“wholesome” values and “productive” behavior implicit in these choices, 
signified their participation in the cosmopolitan, self-consciously mod-
ernist lifestyle known as modern life (modan seikatsu). Adding to the cachet 
of these decadent cultural products was the vague air of science that sur-
rounded them. Replete with pseudoscientific jargon and presented in the 
form of research, erotic-grotesque discourse cannily exploited the mania 
for science that was one of the defining features of modern life.
 Complicating the signification of these consumer spectacles was the 
view, current in Japan during the 1920s and 1930s, that all orders of phe-
nomena adhered to the principles of evolution.3 That is to say, evolution 
was conceived not only as a biological process involving the modification 
of species over successive generations, but it also served as a theoretical 
model for interpreting and evaluating social and cultural phenomena. 
Within this framework, commonly known as Social Darwinism, one could 
distinguish between more evolved and less evolved societies and social 
practices. This tendency to view social distinctions through the prism of 
evolutionary theory shaped to varying degrees prewar disciplines such as 
sexology, eugenics, and criminology, all of which ultimately abetted efforts 
to regulate society and rid it of “undesirable” or “threatening” elements. 
In the specific context of erotic-grotesque cultural production, Social Dar-
winist assumptions revealed a comparable proclivity toward the fascistic 




















deviated from normative standards of respectability, fitness, and morality 
as inferior to, and potentially problematic for, the imaginary community of 
“respectable,” “wholesome” Japanese citizens.
 The complex relationship between erotic-grotesque cultural products 
and fascistic visions of Japan is epitomized in the detective fiction (tantei 
shōsetsu) of Edogawa Ranpo (1894–1965). Ranpo’s work celebrates the 
“bizarre” and the “deviant” aspects of society as it simultaneously articu-
lates the necessity of containing and neutralizing these “dangerous” ele-
ments. One of the distinguishing features of Ranpo’s detective fiction was 
the conspicuous manner in which it incorporated the latest criminological, 
medical, and sexological theories. This practice is most dramatically real-
ized in the novel Kotō no oni (Demon of the Lonely Isle; 1929–30). Consisting 
of fourteen installments, which ran from January 1929 to February 1930 
in the magazine Asahi, Ranpo’s narrative renders an account of adventures 
experienced by a handsome young Tokyoite named Minoura Kinnosuke. 
Mining bits and pieces from contemporaneous discussions of evolution, 
psychology, eugenics, sexology, and criminology, the story involves a child 
assassin, a deranged villain, a gang of medically engineered freaks, a de-
viant sleuth, and a damsel in distress who suffers from an unusual physi-
cal disability. The impact of these various plot devices is further enhanced 
by the accompanying illustrations, created by Takenaka Eitarō.4 A famous 
illustrator who worked with Ranpo on a number of occasions, Takenaka 
contributed otherworldly images that perfectly complemented the atmo-
sphere of Ranpo’s written narrative.
 Although this fare might not appeal to everyone, the unqualified com-
mercial success of Demon of the Lonely Isle leaves little doubt that there was 
among Japanese readers at the time a sizable audience for such material. The 
publication history alone attests to the remarkable popularity of the work. 
A few months after the story concluded its triumphant run in Asahi, the 
publishers at Kaizōsha rushed the novel out in book form. One year later, 
in 1931, the novel was published again as the fifth volume in Heibonsha’s 
Edogawa Ranpo zenshū (The Collected Works of Edogawa Ranpo; 1931–32).
 Clearly, then, there is no denying that conspicuous engagement with 
reigning pseudoscientific theories of the day, a practice that defines Ranpo’s 
prewar oeuvre in general and Demon of the Lonely Isle in particular, resonated 
powerfully with consumers during the 1920s and 1930s. The question that 
arises, however, is why this kind of cultural product exerted such a strong 
hold over audiences. It could be argued that Demon of the Lonely Isle captured 










ethnic purity, cultural homogeneity, military prowess, and imperial expan-
sion. In other words, the account of Minoura’s harrowing encounter with 
deviance and freakishness serves as a kind of fascist heroic narrative, one 
in which the protagonist skillfully marshals the latest advances in science 
to thwart “bizarre” and “deviant” elements that threaten the security and 
sanctity of Japanese culture and national community. In this reading, disci-
plines like eugenics, criminology, and sexology are useful tools that stand 
as a bastion against decadent, contaminating forces detrimental to Japan 
and the Japanese race. At the same time, one could also point to the at-
tention lavished on characters who personify non-normative sexualities, 
psychologies, and physical bodies and argue that Demon of the Lonely Isle is a 
celebration of deviance and freakishness. From this perspective, the focus 
of the text would not be Minoura’s triumph over his adversaries but, rather, 
his interaction with them; he would function as a substitute for the reader, 
undergoing one exhilaratingly “weird” experience after another. In this 
reading, science would serve as nothing more than a transparent legitimiz-
ing device, a means for justifying detailed discussions of otherwise inap-
propriate topics. With its ostentatious display (and implicit acceptance) of 
forces at odds with respectable, wholesome society, Demon of the Lonely Isle 
could be interpreted as a transgressive gesture against fascistic notions of 
timeless morality, pure culture, and natural sexuality.5
 It is my contention, however, that in Demon of the Lonely Isle the produc-
tion of meaning through signs and other symbolic means, or what I refer 
to hereafter as Demon of the Lonely Isle’s signification, is far more compli-
cated than either of these rigid formulae would suggest. Despite the fact 
that the novel plays on fascistic fears that the Japanese race and culture are 
under a state of siege, at risk of being contaminated or weakened by various 
transparent personifications of modern decadence, Demon of the Lonely Isle 
cannot solely be treated as a covert propaganda tool for reactionary nation-
alistic, militaristic, or imperialistic interests. By the same token, the text 
cannot be taken as an unambiguous celebration of difference, sexual ex-
perimentation, and other forms of transgression associated with extreme 
expressions of prewar modernism and urban consumer culture. Emblem-
atic of the text’s complex and unstable ideological position is how it evinces 
faith in repressive disciplines like sexology, eugenics, and criminology as it 
simultaneously conveys unabashed enthusiasm for various forms of sexual, 
physical, and psychological “deviance.”
 Rather than treat Demon of the Lonely Isle as a static crystallization of 




















“freakish” nature of the text itself. My use of this term is influenced by re-
cent theoretical discussions of freak discourse, which define “freakishness” 
as the quality that fascinates and horrifies by “blurring identities (sexual, 
corporeal, personal)” and by “travers[ing] the very boundaries that secure 
the normal subject in its given identity and sexuality.”6 In other words, the 
distinguishing characteristic of Demon of the Lonely Isle is its resistance to 
easy categorization. Echoing the symbolic position inhabited by “freaks” 
of various stripes, including individuals who exhibit an extraordinary body, 
a “deviant” sexuality, or an “exotic” cultural identity, Demon of the Lonely Isle 
occupies an unstable position that blurs boundaries relied on to separate 
different discursive, literary, and ideological positions.7 The result is a sig-
nifying field, by which I mean both Ranpo’s written narrative and Take-
naka’s images, that simultaneously enraptures and repels. In this sense, 
then, the text of Demon of the Lonely Isle embodies in its own signification 
the freakish quality associated with its story and characters. It is a veritable 
Frankenstein’s monster, a disturbing conglomeration of formal elements 
and ideological signs that have been removed from their familiar context 
and then stitched together in unexpected patterns.
Demon of the Lonely Isle
Emerging from the same cultural milieu as Deviant Materials and Anthology 
of Modern Criminal Science, Ranpo’s Demon of the Lonely Isle also capitalized on 
the popularity of pseudoscientific erotic-grotesque discourse. Despite its 
status as one of the crowning achievements of this vibrant cultural move-
ment, however, the novel has received almost no attention from literary 
critics or scholars.8 The following statement from Ōuchi Shigeo suggests 
why: “No doubt, the novel’s many shortcomings are a consequence of the 
story being serialized in a popular magazine. . . . Ranpo once declared that 
Demon of the Lonely Isle ‘marked the beginning of my degeneration into a lit-
erary hack.’ Elsewhere he commented: ‘In contrast to the scrupulousness 
of my early days as a writer, I had become satisfied with producing mediocre 
work.’”9 Ōuchi clearly perceives Demon of the Lonely Isle to be a step down 
from the more legitimate pieces of detective fiction that Ranpo produced 
as a young writer. Inscribed within this assessment, it turns out, are as-
sumptions borrowed from the standard narrative history of Ranpo’s prewar 
literary career. This master narrative typically charts a decline from intellec-
tual and artistic integrity to crass commercialism. In the years immediately 










short stories. Starting around 1927, he shifted to full-length novels.10 The 
short stories written during the first phase of his career, often described as 
“pure mystery fiction ( jun tantei shōsetsu),” are thought to be Ranpo’s best 
work. The pleasure of these narratives is said to lie in their intricate plots, 
rigorous explorations of the criminal mind, and clever surprise endings.11 
Scholars have treated the novels composed after 1927 with considerably 
less enthusiasm. The main reason behind this disdain is the shared percep-
tion that these novels are excessively vulgar.12 Ranpo’s efforts to extend his 
appeal beyond a core audience of detective-fiction aficionados resulted in 
works of questionable taste and scant intellectual value. The plots became 
too fantastic; the crimes, too horrific; and the characters, too perverted.
 Although a brief plot summary can never fully capture the bizarreness of 
Demon of the Lonely Isle, a basic outline of the narrative will facilitate later dis-
cussions of the text’s signification. The fantastic events of the story are re-
counted in the first person by the novel’s protagonist, Minoura Kinnosuke. 
The first half of the story centers on Minoura’s efforts to solve the murder 
of his fiancée, Kizaki Hatsuyo, whose body is found in a room in which all 
points of entry have been secured from the inside. Minoura initially sus-
pects that the crime was committed by a mysterious acquaintance of his, 
a research physician named Moroto Michio. Moroto is the prime suspect 
mainly because he is a homosexual man who has made no secret of his af-
fection for the attractive Minoura. It turns out, however, that Moroto is not 
the perpetrator. To the contrary, he has been trying to solve the mystery on 
his own. Moroto, in fact, becomes the driving force behind the investiga-
tion, bringing his considerable intellectual faculties to bear on the case. He 
eventually discovers that Hatsuyo was murdered by a trained child assassin 
in the service of an ominous figure known as Ototsan (a variation on the 
word “father”).
 The second half of the story revolves around Minoura’s and Moroto’s 
attempts to bring the mysterious Ototsan to justice. Their determination 
is motivated by three additional factors. First, they are moved by pity after 
they uncover a diary written by a young girl named Hide-chan, who has 
been held prisoner by the evil Ototsan. Her plight is even more pathetic in 
that she is one half of a pair of conjoined twins. Second, Moroto gradually 
becomes aware that Ototsan is none other than his own father, Moroto 
Jgor. Third, the young men ascertain from another piece of evidence that 
a treasure is hidden somewhere on Ototsan’s island. After infiltrating Oto-
tsan’s headquarters, they learn that he, too, is in hot pursuit of the treasure. 




















race of “freaks.” The motivations behind this plot are complicated, but in 
essence Ototsan sees the production of freaks both as a source of profit (he 
ships his victims off to commercial freak shows) and a means for exacting 
revenge on “normal” humanity (as a hunchback, Ototsan has suffered nu-
merous indignities in mainstream society). Due to Moroto’s considerable 
resourcefulness, the two young heroes succeed in foiling Ototsan’s plans 
and capturing the hidden treasure.
 Their investigation also uncovers some critical information about the 
lineage of Hatsuyo, Hide-chan, and Moroto. It turns out that Hatsuyo was 
the rightful heir to the treasure that Ototsan coveted, which explains his 
decision to have her killed. It also becomes apparent that Hide-chan is 
Hatsuyo’s younger sister and that Ototsan had surgically attached her to 
another child in an early experimental effort to create a freak. Finally, Mo-
roto finds out, much to his relief, that he is a foundling and not Ototsan’s 
actual son. Once matters on the island are settled, Hide-chan undergoes 
corrective surgery to separate her from her “twin.” After recovering from 
the operation and claiming her sizable inheritance, she marries Minoura. 
The only remaining loose end in this happy scenario is Moroto, who still 
nurses an unrequited love for Minoura. This problem is resolved when a 
fatal illness claims Moroto’s life.
 The preceding plot outline helps to explain why critics have treated Demon 
of the Lonely Isle as a scandalous deviation from the parameters of “pure” 
detective fiction. Indeed, the defining feature of the novel is the erotic-
grotesque atmosphere that suffuses the entire text. Examination of two 
specific story lines reveals more fully how the erotic-grotesque operates 
in Demon of the Lonely Isle. The first story line involves Moroto’s unrelenting 
desire for Minoura. The text devotes a great deal of attention to this issue. 
The same basic scenario plays itself out on numerous occasions. Moroto 
expresses his desire, only to have his propositions rebuffed by Minoura. 
Significantly, the terminology used to describe Moroto shifts constantly. 
On occasion, he is depicted as an eminently desirable figure. He is referred 
to as “beautiful (utsukushii)” and “alluring (namamekashii).” With equal fre-
quency, though, the text asserts the abnormality of Moroto’s desire by uti-
lizing such pathologizing sexological terms as “pervert (henshitsusha)” and 
“sexual invert (seiteki tsakusha).”
 The characterization of Minoura’s sexuality, as it manifests itself in his 
response to Moroto’s advances, is equally indeterminate. There are times 
when Minoura seems open to the possibility of sexual relations with Mo-










in a startling erotic fantasy: “this might sound weird, but for a moment 
it felt as though I had become a woman . . . and that this beautiful man 
were my husband.”13 Comments like this suggest that even the ostensibly 
“normal” Minoura can appreciate, at least on the level of fantasy, “deviant” 
sexual urges. Most of the time, however, he is simply perplexed by Moroto’s 
feelings. On one occasion he comments, “I could not fathom the feelings 
in Moroto’s heart. But I could tell that he was unable to rid himself of this 
bizarre love. In fact, over the course of time, it only became more intense. 
. . . Is it not difficult to comprehend why he would harbor these feelings for 
me?”14 Here, as Minoura professes complete bafflement when confronted 
by a form of desire supposedly foreign to his own experience, his final rhe-
torical question is especially significant. Through this device, Moroto im-
plicitly signals his inclusion in a larger interpretive community of “normal” 
readers that shares his views about what constitutes “deviance.” That is, he 
emphatically aligns himself with a community of readers not susceptible to 
homoerotic desire. The persuasiveness of this gesture, however, is seriously 
undermined by his tendency to engage in erotic fantasies about Moroto.
 Further militating against any neat interpretation of Minoura’s and Mo-
roto’s relationship are Takenaka’s stunning visualizations. This component 
of the text cannot be overlooked for the simple reason that these illustra-
tions played a vital role in the marketing and consumption of the text as a 
piece of popular fiction. Indeed, the vast majority of popular-fiction texts 
from the 1920s and 1930s were prodigiously illustrated. The publishing in-
dustry realized that securing the services of a talented artist could dramati-
cally heighten the impact of a narrative. Among the many illustrators work-
ing at the time, Takenaka was especially sought after because his images so 
thoroughly enriched the signification of the texts they accompanied. His 
images of Minoura and Moroto underscore the indeterminate nature of 
their relationship.
 Figure 1 accentuates the erotic possibilities of the bond. It depicts the 
comrades as they languish in an underground maze. Not coincidentally, 
this illustration resembles a cinematic close-up, with many aspects of its 
composition recalling images found in still photographs taken from West-
ern romantic films. The relative position of the two faces, for example, 
evokes cinematic conventions for composing the passionate “clinch” shot. 
In this particular image, the more assertive Moroto’s face is on top, with 
the more submissive Minoura’s on the bottom. The representation of their 
expressions is significant, as well. With his clenched teeth and staring eyes, 




















the era. With his slightly open mouth, closed eyes, and the backward tilt 
of his head, Minoura evokes the cinematic heroine, overwhelmed by her 
passionate lover. Comparison with figure 2, a photographic image from a 
1931 series devoted to “erotic-grotesque” love scenes, reveals the degree to 
which Takenaka relied on the visual idiom of contemporary film to eroticize 
this encounter. Figure 3 offers a very different visualization of the two men. 
Specifically, it coincides with the moment when Moroto’s umpteenth dec-
laration of love devolves into an actual physical attack. Although most de-
scriptions of Moroto focus on his physical beauty and sophisticated sense 
of style, this particular passage presents him as a grotesque monster. He is 
variously described as “snake,” “dog,” and “leech.” The terms “beast” and 
“animal” are also applied to him.15 In essence, Moroto is transformed into a 
freakish monstrosity, a chimera consisting of incongruous parts. The impli-
cation of these comparisons is obvious. They offer readers a metaphorical 
1. Minoura and Moroto trapped in an underground maze. Originally published in 
Asahi, vol. 2, no. 1, 1930, 142–43. Reproduced with permission of the National Diet 
Library, Tokyo.
[Duke University Press does not hold electronic rights to this image. 










manifestation of Moroto’s deviant sexuality. Figure 3 duplicates this opera-
tion by presenting Moroto as a terrifying monster. The monstrous nature of 
this incarnation is signaled by such details as Moroto’s demented expres-
sion and his hand clutching at Minoura’s throat. The horror of the moment 
is also conveyed by the image of the hapless Minoura, whose desperate ex-
pression and thrashing limbs suggest the intensity of his efforts to escape. 
The dark background in which images of bats and other ghoulish creatures 
are just discernible further highlights the frightening atmosphere.
 The second erotic-grotesque story line to be examined here revolves 
around the conjoined twins, Hide-chan and Yoshi-chan. This plot device 
2. This still photograph is taken from a pictorial series titled, “Eiga rabu shiin (Movie 
Love Scenes),” which appeared in the publication Gendai ryōki sentan zukan (Images 
from the Cutting Edge of Contemporary Weirdness; 1931). This still comes from the 
German film Ungarische Rhapsodie (Hungarian Rhapsody; 1928), starring Willy Fritsch 
and Lil Dagover. Reproduced with the permission of the Special Collections Division, 
Waseda University Library, Tokyo.
[Duke University Press does not hold electronic rights to this image. 




















is particularly interesting because it offers readers what can be described 
as metacommentary on the exploitative nature inherent in most instances 
of erotic-grotesque cultural production. The narrative describes how Oto-
tsan kidnapped two infants; stitched them together; provided them with 
a catchy moniker, Hideyoshi; and raised them with the intention of send-
ing them to a freak show. The signification of this plot device is especially 
ambiguous because it implicates the erotic-grotesque industry as it simul-
taneously functions as a selling point for the erotic-grotesque commodity 
Demon of the Lonely Isle.
 This complex dynamic is explored further through Minoura’s response 
to Hide-chan and Yoshi-chan. Each twin elicits different reactions from 
Minoura. Hide-chan, the female twin, strikes Minoura as the epitome of 
pathos. With her gentleness and uncanny beauty, she inspires in him feel-
3. Moroto attacking Minoura. Originally published in Asahi, vol. 2, no. 1, 1930, 146–47. 
Reproduced with the permission of the National Diet Library, Tokyo.
[Duke University Press does not hold electronic rights to this image. 










ings of affection. Indeed, he is completely entranced from the first mo-
ment he lays eyes on her. “I blushed and looked away. Stunned by the young 
girl’s strange beauty, my heart pounded.”16 The physicality of his reaction 
(the blushing and the pounding heart) suggests that there is an underlying 
element of erotic desire to his feelings. Intensifying and complicating Mi-
noura’s erotic attraction for Hide-chan are his feelings of pity and conde-
scension. These feelings are mostly in reaction to her pathetic determi-
nation to rise above her miserable circumstances. The narrative contains 
numerous descriptions of Hide-chan as she gamely tries to conform to the 
images of “normal” humanity that she has gleaned from a small cache of 
books and magazines.
 Yoshi-chan, by contrast, elicits feelings of contempt and hatred from 
Minoura. This antipathy is established immediately. “Kit-chan turned his 
dark, ugly face toward me, and glared at me with undisguised hostility. I’ll 
never forget the frightening look on his face. It was a malicious expression, 
conveying his warped, petty character.”17 With just one glimpse, then, Mi-
noura is able to recognize Yoshi-chan as a debased individual. Echoing the 
precedent established by more conventional pieces of erotic-grotesque dis-
course, the definitive marker of Yoshi-chan’s debasement turns out to be 
his “excessive” sexuality; Hide-chan reports that he masturbates on a daily 
basis. Significantly, Yoshi-chan is never given an opportunity to articulate 
his position. This silence is essential, however, if he is to function in the 
narrative as the ultimate cipher upon which Minoura projects his darkest 
fantasies about the freakish denizens of the erotic-grotesque world.
 Demon of the Lonely Isle thus offers a remarkably elaborate enactment of 
the erotic-grotesque spectacle. The text does not simply reify widely ac-
cepted categories, such as normal or freakish. Rather, it vitiates these cate-
gories as it cannily exploits their notoriety. When the text’s signification is 
expanded to include a panoply of contemporaneous issues, a comparable 
dynamic occurs. That is to say, discursive systems such as political rhetoric, 
moral instruction, and scientific research are reformulated when they oper-
ate within the freakish signifying field of Demon of the Lonely Isle. As a result 
of this process, fundamental concepts that underpin some of the fascistic 
ideological conceits of the era are destabilized, although never completely 
elided. In the remaining sections of this essay, I will explore the complex 
manner in which Demon of the Lonely Isle thematizes two closely related issues 
of particular concern to fascist ideologues and their constituents: the im-





















The Meanings of Deviance
Demon of the Lonely Isle was composed at a historical moment when deviations 
from respectability were frequently treated as a social problem with wide-
ranging implications. This tendency to consider various categories of devi-
ance as forms of socially disruptive or dangerous behavior reflects a wider 
set of concerns that preoccupied the era. There was widespread concern, 
Donald Roden informs us, among early-twentieth-century Japanese ideo-
logues that deviance was sapping the Japanese nation of its vigor. Moralists 
such as Nogami Toshio and Tokutomi Sohō predicted, for example, that 
the appearance of aggressive, “masculine” women and passive, “feminine” 
men would be the undoing of Japanese society.18 Fueling these apocalyptic 
prophecies was the perception that modernism, and the resulting redefi-
nition of gender roles, had overturned the “natural” sexual order and con-
sequently threatened the basic fabric of society. Paralleling developments 
in the West, these alarmist claims were lent further credibility when they 
became linked with scientific “advances.” The discipline of sexology offered 
an intellectually legitimate system for categorizing and evaluating differ-
ent expressions of human sexuality. Despite their pretensions of scientific 
objectivity, Roden points out, most prewar studies of “deviant” sexuality 
amounted to nothing more than ideologically determined prescriptive 
tracts. Habuto Eiji’s and Sawada Junjirō’s influential Hentai seiyoku ron (The 
Theories of Deviant Sexual Desire; 1915) was typical:
The format of the book bears a close resemblance to Krafft-Ebing’s Psy-
chopathia Sexualis (1886), to which the authors refer explicitly through-
out the text. And like their Viennese predecessor, Habuto and Sawada 
seemed obsessed by the destructive threat that “unnatural desires” posed 
for the Japanese social order. At the most obvious level, aberrant sexual 
feelings underlay criminal acts of brutality, but of more concern to the 
authors was the less dramatic but more widespread pattern of antisocial 
behavior that arose from the confusion of the sexes.19
As Roden observes, prewar sexology differentiated “natural” or “respect-
able” (the two categories were interchangeable) expressions of sexuality 
from “unnatural” or “deviant” sexual activities and identities. Ultimately, 
these sexological tracts deployed science to reinforce fascistic visions of 
natural, respectable sexuality (and social order) and to decry the toxic effects 
modernism and urbanization had on this idealized prelapsarian state.










ingly perpetuate the most negative stereotypes associated with deviance. 
The focus of these paranoid fantasies is Moroto. As the specific circum-
stances surrounding Hatsuyo’s murder are gradually revealed, all the evi-
dence points to Moroto. It is revealed, for instance, that on more than one 
occasion he had tried to sabotage Minoura’s relationship, even going so 
far as to pursue Hatsuyo’s hand in marriage himself. After this plan failed, 
the narrative implies, Moroto in all likelihood became desperate enough to 
commit murder. Even more damning than this circumstantial evidence is 
the simple fact that Moroto is homosexual. Minoura explains:
It might seem as though I were jumping to ridiculous conclusions [by 
accusing Moroto]. But you can’t judge a pervert by normal standards. 
Wasn’t he a man incapable of loving the opposite sex? Wasn’t it more 
than likely that he had tried to interfere with my engagement because 
of his homosexual desire for me? Wasn’t his campaign to win Hatsuyo’s 
hand in marriage excessive? Didn’t his love for me border on the in-
sane?20
The reasoning here is echoed throughout the first few chapters of the novel. 
Moroto figures as the most likely suspect merely because he prefers men 
as his sexual partners. Variant sexuality, in other words, is tantamount to 
criminality, a recognizable threat to the smooth operation of a civil so-
ciety.
 There are occasions, however, when the text undermines the facile as-
sumption that variant sexuality is inherently dangerous or socially disrup-
tive. These instances mostly occur in the “treasure story” sections of the 
novel, after Minoura and Moroto embark on their expedition to find the 
buried gold. This pattern of imbuing male–male bonds with an implicit 
erotic component is not out of character for the genre of adventure litera-
ture. In fact, homoeroticism energizes texts ranging from Mark Twain’s 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1885) to lwaya Sazanami’s Koganemaru (1891).21 
In the particular case of Demon of the Lonely Isle, the text infuses the Minoura–
Moroto partnership with erotic overtones by presenting them as an updated 
version of premodern samurai comrades. The model for this pattern of male 
bonding is derived from Edo-period (1615–1867) literary representations 
of an idealized form of samurai love known as the shud (Way of Young 
Men). By implying that Minoura’s relation with Moroto conforms loosely 
to this ideal, the narrative eroticizes Minoura’s and Moroto’s relationship 





















 In Demon of the Lonely Isle’s reformulation of the shud couple, Minoura 
clearly plays the role of the youthful partner (wakashu). The text underscores 
this position by having Minoura regularly acknowledge the spiritual and 
intellectual superiority shown by the older, more experienced Moroto. 
Indeed, mirroring the dependence of a youth on his adult lover, there are 
numerous occasions during their quest when the callow Minoura actually 
relies on Moroto to save his life. The most striking instance of this depen-
dence occurs when the two young men are trapped together in a cave that 
is filling with water. Just as Minoura is about to give up, Moroto revives his 
flagging spirit:
Moroto put his arm around my waist and held me tightly. The darkness 
prevented me from seeing his face even though it was only about one 
or two inches away from mine. But I could hear his steady breathing 
and feel his breath upon my face. Comforting warmth from his muscu-
lar body passed through our soaking-wet clothes and enveloped me. I 
noticed that he gave off a pleasant scent, which wafted all about us. All 
of these things gave me the strength to carry on. Thanks to Moroto, I 
was able to stay on my feet. If it were not for him, I would certainly have 
drowned.23
Incidents such as this counteract the impression that Moroto’s sexuality is 
inherently detrimental to the establishment and maintenance of construc-
tive social bonds. To the contrary, the narrative suggests that his sexual 
attentions can have an energizing effect on Minoura. Without it, Minoura 
would never be able to contribute to the important task of finding the 
buried treasure and overthrowing Ototsan. The narrative thus implies that, 
under certain circumstances, intense, sexually charged male–male bonds 
can foster concrete, useful achievement.
 The ambiguous way that the text thematizes male–male sexuality reflects 
the indeterminacy of its position on the meaning of abnormality in general. 
This uncertainty is played out most dramatically in the novel’s concluding 
chapter. On one level, the denouement is noteworthy for its seemingly un-
problematic valorization of the status quo. Like the grand finale (daidan’en) 
of Edo-period drama and fiction, an association that is underscored by the 
use of this outdated term as the title of the last chapter, Demon of the Lonely 
Isle’s conclusion seems to uphold the generic conventions of reward virtue 
and punish vice (kanzen chōaku). In this particular context, virtue equals 
“normality” and vice equals “abnormality.” The grand finale consists of a 










covery of Hide-chan’s true lineage, the successful performance of Hide-
chan’s corrective surgery, the marriage of Hide-chan and Minoura, and the 
timely death of Moroto. Every one of these resolutions asserts the primacy 
of normative values; the threat of abnormal elements disrupting Japanese 
society is totally erased through death, incarceration, or assimilation. In a 
manner reminiscent of the Bakufu-endorsed literary convention of reward 
virtue and punish vice, Demon of the Lonely Isle appears to end on an appro-
priately orthodox note.
 Of all the events recounted in Demon of the Lonely Isle’s grand finale, the 
transformation of Hide-chan seems to conform most completely to fascis-
tic imaginings of “natural” gender and sexual roles. After all of his travails, 
Minoura proclaims that nothing could be more satisfying than the thought 
of Hide-chan becoming a “normal” woman who “styles her hair, puts on 
makeup, wears a beautiful kimono, and speaks in the standard Tokyo dia-
lect.”24 With these changes, she becomes a suitable choice for his wife. 
The text implies that after years of suffering, she has finally achieved ful-
fillment through the triple intervention of corrective surgery, repatriation 
into mainstream society, and, most important of all, “normal” heterosexual 
love and marriage. In this manner the text overcomes the type of deviance 
and unnaturalness bemoaned by ideologues and sexologists and reasserts 
the more “natural” order. The final image of Hide-chan as a conventional 
housewife is a far cry from the young girl who once believed that “humans 
come in different forms” and assumed that a person with only one head was 
somehow deficient.25 Once she is exposed to the values and aesthetics of 
respectable society, Hide-chan comes to realize the “error” of her youthful 
misconceptions. Only then, after she has come to accept the “shameful-
ness” of her previous condition, can she fully appreciate the gallantry of 
Minoura’s actions.
 The assimilation of Hide-chan is also reflected in Takenaka’s illustra-
tions. Figure 4 offers a reassuring vision of the new and improved Hide-
chan. In physical terms, she is now part of the “normal human race.”26 
The illustration also suggests that she has successfully taken on a “normal” 
social/gender role; she has been transformed into the picture-perfect bride, 
signaling her domesticity through her choice of traditional Japanese cloth-
ing and her sophistication through her stylish modern-girl bob. With her 
outstretched arms she displays the results of this successful metamorphosis 
to the paternalistic gaze of her husband (the cigarette-smoking figure in the 
lower-left corner of the composition) and, by extension, the viewer of the 




















impression made on the reader. The tone of this conclusion seems to sug-
gest that, despite its gratuitous attention to the erotic-grotesque, Demon of 
the Lonely Isle endorses “normal” values and a “natural” social order. Specifi-
cally, it valorizes conformity to a rigid set of physical, sexual, and gendered 
standards. Heightening this impression is Minoura’s decision to open a 
philanthropic institution. After returning from his quest with a beautiful 
wife and an immense fortune of about one million yen (approximately four 
billion yen in today’s currency), Minoura decides to use a portion of his 
newfound wealth to establish a haven “where the latest advances in medi-
cine can be used to turn freaks into normal humans.”27 This act is presented 
as the ultimate sign of Minoura’s fundamental decency.
 Yet the text simultaneously enables a more skeptical interpretation of 
this outcome by gesturing to its absurdity. The absurd nature of the situa-
4. Hide-chan showing off her new appearance to her husband, Minoura. Originally 
published in Asahi, vol. 2, no. 2, 1930, 181. Reproduced with permission of the 
National Diet Library, Tokyo.
[Duke University Press does not hold electronic rights to this image. 










tion becomes apparent when the reader recalls that at the outset of his retro-
spective narrative Minoura describes himself as a “white-haired demon (ha-
kuhatsuki).”28 This is an explicit reference to his “weird” appearance. The 
comparison refers to the fact that Minoura’s hair has been permanently 
bleached white by the traumatic experiences he has undergone. The con-
dition is so unusual that it elicits questions and comments from complete 
strangers. On an implicit level, the white hair also functions as a physi-
cal manifestation of Minoura’s deep-seated deviance, which reveals itself 
through his tendencies toward male–male sexuality, teratism, and canni-
balism.29 It is highly ironic therefore that Minoura would appoint himself 
the patron of an institute whose sole purpose is to isolate or cure, both for 
their own sake and for society’s, individuals who show deviant characteris-
tics comparable to his own.
 The text further opens the possibilities for an ironic reading of the final 
triumph of fascistic values by providing the reader with details of Moroto’s 
death. The final lines of the novel read as follows:
I anxiously awaited Moroto’s return, since we had arranged that he would 
become the director of my new medical institute. But alas he passed away 
while still visiting his birth parents. After all of my recent good fortune, 
this alone turned out unhappily. His father wrote me a letter describing 
the last moments of Moroto’s life: “As he drew his last breath, Moroto 
clutched to his breast a letter he had received from you. The last words 
on his lips were not the name of his father or his mother, but your name, 
repeated over and over.”30
In practical terms, of course, Moroto must die to ensure a smooth conclu-
sion to the story. His continued presence would only destabilize Minoura’s 
domestic situation. At the same time, however, the manner in which Mo-
roto’s demise is presented conveys a certain aversion to the final turn of 
events. As his last words suggest, the most important presence in Mo-
roto’s life was not his biological family, the mythical foundation of fascist 
constructions of the national community, but Minoura, the object of his 
ceaseless affection. By closing with a reference to Moroto’s love, the novel 
suggests that, although a world where the regime of normalcy prevails is 
inevitable, there is always a segment of the population that is sacrificed to 
this social order. By giving Moroto the last word, the narrative acknowl-
edges the burdens endured by those who do not conform to an increasingly 





















Responding to widespread concerns about the impact that deviant individu-
als can have on society, the Japanese discursive field of the 1920s and 1930s 
was overrun with “scientific” proposals promising to contain this potential 
threat. One major source of these proposals was the discipline of eugenics, 
or the science of improving the hereditary qualities of a race or breed. As 
the historian of science Suzuki Zenji points out, eugenics exerted consider-
able influence on prewar Japanese social policy.31 Among the proponents of 
these social programs, certain factions worked under the assumption that 
the sole application of eugenics was in modifying the hereditary composi-
tion of the national community through programs of selective breeding, 
birth control, and sterilization. But in its more popular formulations, eu-
genics dealt with questions of culture as frequently as it did with issues of 
heredity. The following statement issued by the Nippon Yūsei Undō Kyōkai 
(Japanese Eugenics Society) in 1928 typifies this tendency:
The primary goal of the Japanese Eugenics Society is to ensure that in 
the future the Japanese people can maintain their position of world 
leadership. There are two essential steps that will allow us to achieve this 
goal. First, we must work to improve our mental and spiritual health, 
strengthen our physiques, extend our life spans, and create families 
without any trace of psychological weakness or hereditary illness. Sec-
ond, we must commit ourselves to raising the level of our national cul-
ture, to familiarizing ourselves with the Imperial Constitution, and to 
realizing our full potential as law-abiding citizens.32
Showing a clear investment in the fascistic linkage of cultural purity, na-
tional health, and global domination, the Japanese Eugenics Society offered 
a blueprint for strengthening Japanese imperial subjects so they could con-
tribute to Japan’s success in the competitive arena of international rela-
tions. This process did not simply involve selecting the fittest members of 
a community and making sure that only they reproduced. It also entailed 
improving the character and vitality of society and national culture.
 Criminology was another discipline that offered solutions to the deleteri-
ous effects that aberrant individuals have on society. In the prewar context, 
Japanese criminology operated in compliance with a set of assumptions 
remarkably similar to those of eugenics. For example, criminology was also 
predicated on the Social Darwinist belief that society is divided into two 










category of the “unfit” consisted of criminals, mostly denizens of Japan’s 
urban centers, whose actions disrupted society, while the category of the 
“fit” consisted of law-abiding citizens whose behavior contributed to so-
ciety’s betterment. The two disciplines had in common another important 
characteristic: they shared the absolute conviction that science offered the 
best weapon in the battle against forces threatening to diminish society.
 A comment by the cultural critic Hirabayashi Hatsunosuke exemplifies 
the widespread belief that science was an essential component of any seri-
ous crime-prevention program:
In abstract terms, the necessary condition is the establishment of a civili-
zation of science; in other words, the establishment of rationality, an 
analytical outlook, and a rigorous methodology. To put it simply, crimes 
and crime solving are by nature scientific, the investigation and convic-
tion of suspects relies on the collection of physical evidence, and a care-
fully conceived body of laws maintains the order of the nation-state.34
Hirabayashi thus envisioned criminology as an intellectual discipline that 
ordered, and therefore empowered, the nation-state. As was the case with 
eugenics, the authoritarian overtones of this rhetoric were legitimated 
through the imprimatur of science. Actions committed in the name of 
these disciplines were rationalized by asserting their foundation in the in-
fallible epistemology of science. Further linking the two disciplines was 
their mutual suspicion of the urban environment; eugenics treated the 
modern urban landscape as a source of physical enervation and cultural 
degeneration, while criminology treated it as a breeding ground for crimi-
nal behavior.
 Significantly, Hirabayashi’s commentary on criminological science 
occurs in the context of a discussion of detective fiction. This suggests that 
even fictional accounts of criminal investigations were expected to show 
a sufficient air of scientific rigor. Moreover, as Hirabayashi explicitly indi-
cates, science continued to function, even in the fictional realm, as an intel-
lectual justification for what typically constituted conservative promotions 
of law and order. As I mentioned earlier, Demon of the Lonely Isle was noted 
for its departure from this approach. This, not coincidentally, was one of 
the main reasons that critics dismissed it. I assert once again, however, that 
this deviation from the standard model of detective fiction is not grounds 
for characterizing Demon of the Lonely Isle as a failed literary exercise. Rather, 
it further demonstrates the complexity of the text’s engagement with the 




















vided a way to achieve a more wholesome, harmonious society through the 
systematic containment and neutralization of the unfit and the criminal.
 That is not to say, however, that Demon of the Lonely Isle dismisses science 
as a means of responding to problems caused by the unfit/criminal elements 
in society. To the contrary, the text frequently endorses the applicability of 
scientific rationality in such cases. These endorsements primarily appear 
in sections of the narrative that conform most faithfully to the contours of 
conventional detective fiction. They are conspicuously present, for example, 
in the scenes where Minoura and Moroto collect and analyze various pieces 
of evidence in the course of investigating Hatsuyo’s murder. Interestingly 
enough, the character that best exemplifies a scientific approach toward life 
is not the novel’s protagonist, Minoura, but his comrade, Moroto. On the 
most basic level, his profession as a research physician signals his invest-
ment in this system. This scientific background, he insists, is what makes 
him an ideal candidate to undertake a criminal investigation. He reassures 
an uncertain Minoura, “I might just turn out to be an exceptional detective. 
After all, didn’t I study science in medical school?”35 The reliability of the 
scientific method for Moroto is underscored constantly. During his lengthy 
explanation of how an intruder broke into Hatsuyo’s room, murdered her, 
and then managed to escape leaving all the doors and windows locked from 
the inside, Moroto makes clear that all of his conclusions have been based 
on careful “deductive reasoning.” He explains how he first conducted pre-
liminary “research,” then “developed a hypothesis,” and finally “examined 
the existing evidence,” before offering a solution to the crime. After listen-
ing to this report, Minoura can only marvel at the “systematic order” of 
Moroto’s approach.36
 The results of this deductive tour de force are far too elaborate to sum-
marize here. Suffice it to say that a ten-year-old professional acrobat flex-
ible enough to conceal himself in a large vase committed the murder. Of 
course, the premise is fantastic; this is precisely what makes the narrative 
so entertaining. What is interesting, though, is the way that scientific theo-
ries are used to shore up the plausibility of this incredible scenario. For ex-
ample, when the dubious Minoura questions the likelihood of a ten year old 
committing such a heinous crime, Moroto explains, “Child specialists know 
that, contrary to our expectations, children are much crueler than adults. 
. . . According to proponents of evolution, children resemble primitive man; 
they are barbaric and cruel.”37 Leaving aside the question of whether there 
is any truth to these “scientific facts,” statements like this play a crucial 










theory. Science also figures prominently in the “adventure-story” sections 
of the narrative, which focus on Minoura’s and Moroto’s efforts to locate the 
hidden treasure and rescue Hide-chan. The ability to reason scientifically is 
ultimately what allows Moroto to accomplish these goals. The race to find 
the hidden treasure, for example, involves an elaborate process of decoding 
a secret message and then using the information to follow a trail of inge-
niously concealed clues. Moroto’s scientific expertise also proves invaluable 
in the quest to deliver Hide-chan from her misfortunes, for it is he who per-
forms the surgical procedure that separates her from her lascivious worse 
half, Yoshi-chan, and allows her to begin life anew as a “normal person.”
 Throughout the novel, then, science is key to the resolution of various 
crises. In the first half of the story, things are resolved when Moroto deduces 
the circumstances surrounding the murder of Hatsuyo. More complete clo-
sure is achieved when the mysteries of the hidden treasure and Hide-chan’s 
lineage are made clear. In short, science makes possible a progression from 
a state of chaos to a state of order. More important, the “natural” order of 
society is restored with the triumph of the “normal” over the criminal and 
the unfit. The legitimacy of this hierarchy is assured, because it is founded 
on truths attained through the incontrovertible logic of science.
 Questions about the utility of science as a system for social manage-
ment, however, emerge in the subplot involving Ototsan’s plan to flood 
Japan with an army of freaks. The narrative makes clear that Moroto’s medi-
cal experiments and research provide the intellectual foundation that ulti-
mately enables Ototsan to inflict various physical deformities on human 
subjects. Ironically, Ototsan’s efforts can easily be interpreted as a eugenics 
program gone awry. Like proponents of eugenics, Ototsan exploits science 
to engender hereditary changes in the Japanese race. To be sure, his scheme 
is motivated by hatred and desire for revenge and therefore involves “di-
minishing” the population rather than “improving” it. Yet the basic for-
mula is the same: science provides the know-how that makes it possible to 
bring about lasting changes in the composition of a racial community. This 
threat was all the more credible for readers in the early 1930s because neo-
Lamarckian theories of heredity were still in common currency. In other 
words, it was widely believed that acquired characteristics, such as those 
that Ototsan visited on his victims, could actually be passed on to future 
generations.38
 Science, then, is represented as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
it offers solutions to perceived social problems. On the other hand, it is 




















unimaginable proportions. In both cases, however, the perceived enemy is 
any threat to the vigor and purity of the Japanese bloodline. Moroto gives 
voice to these concerns in a speech vilifying Ototsan and his project: “what 
a hideous nightmare, flooding Japan with freaks until not a single normal 
person remains. If my father has his way, Japan will become crippled, a 
nation of cripples.”39 In diatribes such as this, the narrative expresses an 
unmistakable revulsion at the prospect of Japan being overrun by physically 
“deficient” freaks. The outrage elicited by Ototsan’s plan is clearly premised 
on the conviction that the presence of unfitness, regardless of its origins, 
will seriously compromise the health of the Japanese national body. Indeed, 
suspense in the narrative’s second half is generated entirely by the question 
of whether Moroto and Minoura will be able to foil Ototsan’s plot and pre-
vent this disaster from occurring. The text thus reveals a clear investment in 
the fascistic principles regarding the sanctity of the Japanese national body 
and the need to protect it from contamination and degradation.
 At the same time, operating in accordance with the logic of the erotic-
grotesque spectacle, Moroto’s excessive rhetoric also invites titillation. 
Eugenic paranoia becomes grist for the mill of Demon of the Lonely Isle’s 
outrageous exploration of the bizarre. The text thus deflects serious con-
templation of its more sober implications and encourages an ironic appre-
ciation of its sensational pyrotechnics. This is a natural tendency for any 
piece of erotic-grotesque entertainment, since its success as a commodity 
is directly proportional to its capacity to attract an extensive audience.
Conclusion
Ranpo’s Demon of the Lonely Isle was closely linked to the bourgeois con-
sumer/cultural movement known as Erotic Grotesque Nonsense. The text 
embodied the spirit of this movement by tacitly authorizing the audience’s 
pursuit of pleasure—or, at least, by providing the audience with a medium 
through which it could vicariously observe an assortment of “bizarre,” 
“perverse” characters indulging themselves in unsanctioned activities. 
Challenging this permissive tone, however, was the text’s subscription to 
currents of Social Darwinist thought that were the intellectual foundation 
for such disciplines as sexology, eugenics, and criminology, all of which 
endeavored to contain or eradicate perceived abnormalities within the 
Japanese population. Indeed, Demon of the Lonely Isle was produced at the 
precise moment when fascist concerns about issues such as respectability, 










Affiliation with these ideological fantasies is legible in sections of the text 
in which any deviation from accepted sexual, physical, and psychological 
norms is treated as a potential threat to the homogeneity and purity of Japa-
nese society. At these moments, Demon of the Lonely Isle can be read as a form 
of covert propaganda that impressed on readers the need to monitor both 
themselves and those around them for signs of deviance and freakishness.
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Hamaosociality: Narrative  
and Fascism in Hamao Shirō’s  
The Devil’s Disciple
To order my story properly I should start with the time you and I split up.
—Hamao Shirō, Akuma no deshi
The detective novelist Hamao Shirō’s (1896–1935) family back-
ground, his education, and his profession gave him a privileged insight into 
the workings of the prewar Japanese state and legal system. His adoptive 
father, Viscount Hamao Arata, served as minister of education, as a member 
of the Privy Council, and as president of Tokyo Imperial University. Hamao’s 
grandfather was Baron Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1913), the towering scholar 
who lectured the Meiji emperor on Western legal thought and served as the 
first (and third) president of Tokyo Imperial University. In modern Japan it 
would be hard to come by a more elite pedigree.1 Hamao himself studied 
German law at Tokyo Imperial University and worked as a public prosecutor 
from 1919 until 1929. But in that year he gave up his prestigious position as 
a prosecutor to become Japan’s first practitioner of legal detective fiction. 
By so doing, Hamao transformed himself from an enforcer of the law into 
one of its harshest critics. Thus, a former prosecutor and the grandson of 
one of the founders of the modern Japanese legal system ended up writing 
detective fiction shot through with what Gonda Manji describes as a “deep 
skepticism about [the possibility of ] justice through the law.”2



















is one that Hamao would turn to over and over in his fiction. It is his radi-
cal mistrust in the law that makes his work so different from the classic 
detective novel as it emerged in the late nineteenth century and that, by 
the 1920s, had gained wide popularity in Japan. Classic detective fiction is 
a genre that serves both to frighten and to reassure. However disturbing 
the crime and however gruesome the murder, the rules of the genre dictate 
that the criminal will eventually be brought to justice and the social order 
restored. Cast initially into a state of generalized paranoia in which “every 
external sign is given equal weight, meaning, and menace,”3 the reader of 
the detective novel, like the detective himself or herself, works to distin-
guish clues from mere details, to fish a coherent narrative out of a pool 
of red herrings. In its classic “whodunit” form, the detective novel also 
strives for an airtight correlation of character with plot. Over the course of 
its narrative and through the application of scientific ratiocination, it fixes 
the criminal as a determinate subject by tying him tight to the predicate of 
his crime.
 Hamao’s novella Akuma no deshi (The Devil’s Disciple; 1929) offers no such 
reassurance. Written just as the promise of so-called Taishō democracy 
was giving way to unchecked militarism and colonial expansion, it reverses 
the stabilizing work of modern detective fiction and stages an unresolved 
struggle between a homosocial heaven in which both narrative closure and 
juridical certainty are possible and a hell of perversion and addiction where 
the law is undermined and the national order is threatened. Suspended in 
such a purgatorial state, the reader of The Devil’s Disciple is confronted with 
the same aporias of subjectivity and representation that the culture of fas-
cism promises, disingenuously, to resolve. Such aporias are, of course, the 
problems raised by modernity itself. The culture of fascism, for our pur-
poses, is that which responds to these problems with insistent certitudes. 
While there are many ways of producing such certitudes (such as myth, 
spectacle, architecture, or rhetoric), the focus here will be on the work done 
(and undone) by narrative in the transformation of subjects into identities 
and the reduction of language to communication. The complex narrative 
structure of The Devil’s Disciple, I will argue, works as a kind of participatory 
theory of fascism. It exposes us to temptations that might lead us into fas-
cist positions; but it also provides the instruction we need to avoid them. 
And yet the trick of The Devil’s Disciple is not simply to follow the instructions 
but, rather, to stick with the text, to stay put in the dilatory middle of nar-
rative. In The Devil’s Disciple, this is a space in between a series of oppositions 












heterosexuality, instruction and seduction, insomnia and sleep, and speech 
and writing. It is also a space between the formal experimentation of mod-
ernist narrative and the blunt instruments of fascist melodrama.
Hetero-Narrative
The plot of The Devil’s Disciple revolves around its narrator Shimaura Eizō’s 
attempt to murder his wife Tsuyuko. Heavily addicted to sleeping medica-
tion, Shimaura tries to use subliminal messages to make Tsuyuko take the 
same amount of sleeping medication as he. Since a normal dose for him 
is an overdose for her, he hopes that Tsuyuko will die and the whole thing 
will look like an accident. With his wife out of the way, Shimaura plans to 
marry his mistress, Sueko, and settle down into a happy marriage based on 
genuine love and affection. But his attempt to use his own addiction to rid 
himself of his cloying wife takes an unexpected turn when Sueko takes the 
bait instead. While his wife, whom he despises for her abject dependence 
on him, turns out to be smart enough to know how much medicine she 
needs,4 his mistress is dumber than he thought. Sueko dies of an overdose, 
and Shimaura ends up in jail charged with her murder.
 Accused of a crime he did not commit but burdened with the knowledge 
of his murderous intentions, Shimaura can neither protest his innocence 
nor plead his guilt. Instead, he writes a letter to the public prosecutor in the 
court where he is being tried, one Tsuchida Hachirō, who also happens to 
be Shimaura’s ex-boyfriend. The letter relates the events summarized above 
for the prosecutor’s (and the reader’s) benefit. But this narrative function 
is compromised by Shimaura’s relentless diatribe against the prosecutor 
himself. Shimaura accuses Tsuchida of seducing him into a homosexual 
relationship and getting him addicted to the sleeping medication that has 
caused Sueko’s death and landed him in jail. This letter to his former lover 
constitutes the entire text of The Devil’s Disciple, thus placing a homosexual 
frame around what is otherwise a heterosexual story. More a stream of 
invective than an accusation of any specific criminal acts, the letter sets 
the integrity and character of Shimaura against that of Tsuchida, without 
giving us any means of knowing what to believe.
 While Shimaura claims to have learned to love women since Tsuchida 
left him, he believes that Tsuchida remains exclusively homosexual. On the 
most basic level, then, Hamao’s short novel shows us the attempt of one 
man to shore up his compromised heterosexuality by projecting the threat 










Shimaura, “You have no interest in the opposite sex. So I believe you must 
still be a bachelor (dokushin).”5 While Shimaura has moved on, Tsuchida has 
remained the same. This belief not only anchors Shimaura’s own narrative of 
“recovery” from homosexuality, but also equates the redemptive power of 
narrative with that of heterosexuality itself. The corollary of this equation 
is that homosexuality in The Devil’s Disciple, through the phantasmatic figure 
of Tsuchida, is that which threatens to disrupt or unbind the (hetero-)nor-
matizing work of narrative.
 In its insistence on narrative as that which secures heterosexual identity, 
Shimaura’s story follows the Freudian theory of sexual development. In his 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud crafts a narrative (much 
like Shimaura’s) that begins with perversion and ends in genital hetero-
sexuality. While Freud himself was careful in that text not to confuse the 
normal with the normative and insisted that “the disposition to perversions 
is itself of no great rarity but must form a part of what passes as the nor-
mal constitution,”6 far too many of his epigones overlooked Freud’s care-
ful insistence on the pervert in all of us. And for those who later sought a 
psychoanalytic explanation of the rise of fascism, Freud’s work was easily 
and often (mis)appropriated to read fascism in relation to sexual perversion 
(most typically embodied by the male homosexual). This made it possible to 
contain both fascism and homosexuality outside the interlocking domains 
of heteronormative domesticity and the liberal-democratic public sphere. 
The pervert or the homosexual was thus hypostatized as one whose story 
has stalled, as a person who has lost his way along the Oedipal path to 
normality and fortified subjectivity—now understood in both sexual and 
political terms. “The people who are most subject to the wiles of Nazi pro-
paganda,” argued Freud’s biographer Ernest Jones in no uncertain terms, 
“are those who have neither securely established their own manhood and 
independence from the father nor have been able to combine the instincts 
of sexuality and love in their attitude toward the mother or other women. 
This is the psychological position of the homosexual.”7
 The “homofascist” subject is thus a case of failed development, a story 
of “not yet” that presumes there is only one happy ending.8 Three decades 
later, Doi Takeo resorted to the same notion of the stalled Oedipal narrative 
to elaborate his theory of “dependence,” or amae. It was amae, he argued, 
that accounted for the “childishness” of Japanese society and its “failure, so 
far, to develop individual freedom in the Western sense.”9 While Doi held 
out the possibility that the (heterosexual) Japanese might (yet) overcome 












pletion, homosexuals were stuck by definition. “The essence of homosexual 
feelings,” Doi wrote with the same flat-footed finality we heard from Jones, 
“is amae.”10 As I have argued elsewhere, not even Ōe Kenzaburō could resist 
the easy appeal of showing us a teenage “fascist” whose indifferent and 
(too) Americanized father turns him from the left to the right until he ends 
up masturbating over the image of his (too) beloved emperor.11
 As all of these examples suggest (and I could cite many others), there is 
a whole mess of theories in which the Oedipal narrative of sexual develop-
ment and gender differentiation is read alongside that of the development 
of the political subject. When the narrative stalls or goes astray, so the story 
goes, you get (homo)fascists, and when it comes to maturation, you have 
heterosexual, democratic subjects. What I want to argue here is that these 
narratives of narratives are themselves symptomatic of a paranoid fascist 
subjectivity. In my reading, the narrator of Hamao’s novella is an example 
of such a fascist subject. He uses (or abuses) narrative as what Judith Roof 
calls “a structural defense against a chaotic world” to reassure and stabi-
lize himself through the production/projection of an imagined male homo-
sexual.12 This imagined male homosexual is sexually predatory, politically 
dangerous, prone to addiction, and suffering from arrested development. 
Obviously, the production of such a fantasy is not the only way in which 
fascist subjects seek to stabilize themselves. Indeed, there is no end to 
the kinds of enemies a fascist culture can conjure up. But the figure of the 
homosexual proves particularly useful to those for whom narrative serves as 
a defense against chaos. As the introduction of difference into sameness, 
of the hetero into the homo, narrative serves as a means of differentiation 
and othering. Shimaura’s desperate attempts to differentiate himself from 
Tsuchida through an insistent narrative of his own achievement of hetero-
sexuality is clearly a means of warding off the “homo-ness” that threatens 
to engulf him.
From Instruction to Seduction
Yet things were not always this way in Japan. There was a time, not too long 
before this story was written, when male–male sex (as distinguished from 
“homosexuality”) posed less of a threat to narrative coherence. If homo-
sexuality remained a disease and an unspeakable sin in the West until well 
into the twentieth century, it had only recently become pathologized in 
Japan when Hamao was writing. Thus, in the larger narrative of Japanese 










ent ways of understanding male–male sexuality were still competing for 
dominance. This sets up a certain undecidability as to whether the relation-
ship between Shimaura and Tsuchida is to be understood from the perspec-
tive of the premodern tradition of what was called nanshoku, or in the psy-
chologized modern model of exclusive “homosexuality.”13 As we shall see, 
this interpretative undecidability is what makes it possible to hypostatize 
both ends of the tale, and both at Tsuchida’s expense.
 In its ideal(ized) form, the nanshoku model involved a hierarchical re-
lationship of fictive fraternity between two men, where the older brother 
“offered the youth physical and social protection, a role model, and ma-
terial aid,” and the younger “reciprocated through obedience, respect, and 
intimate access to his person.”14 The older partner expected loyalty and mo-
nogamy from his younger brother, but the practice of nanshoku did not pre-
clude marriage to a woman. As such, it retained the possibility of a narrative 
arc in the form of development toward “responsible,” reproductive adult-
hood and participation for both parties in the homosocial corporate family 
system (ie seido). To the extent that Tsuchida fulfills the role of teacher and 
benefactor and remains faithful to Shimaura, he is an exemplary “older 
brother.”
 Echoes of the nanshoku model abound in The Devil’s Disciple and may ac-
count for the fact that the two men’s love story can be narrated in such 
an uncensored, if not undistorted, form. Shimaura refers to the beginning 
of their relationship as the moment when he became Tsuchida’s “one and 
only younger brother (muni no otōto).” Tsuchida, who is a brilliant student, 
helps Shimaura with his studies, and for two years they are never apart. 
Their dorm mates refer to them as a “Paar,” the German word for “couple,” a 
contemporary (non-derogatory) student slang for male–male couples. “You 
were my older brother” and “my teacher,” Shimaura writes. “I respect you 
and stand in awe of you.”15
 Of course, none of this can be read at face value, since it is all just a 
setup. Sharing space in the same letter and coming even after Shimaura’s 
accusation that Tsuchida is “the most dangerous person in the world,” this 
nostalgic evocation of the early days of their love affair is necessary for 
the narrative of seduction and corruption. But that does not make it true. 
To the extent that it also recapitulates on the personal level the historical 
“transition” from nanshoku to dōseiai, it works nostalgically to evoke the 
loss of something that exists only through the retroactive magic of narra-
tive. This is the misogynous but not yet homophobic practice and discourse of 












as a threat to one’s masculinity or patriotic duties. But whatever kind of 
male–male relationship might have been possible in the context of histori-
cal nanshoku toward which Shimaura’s reminiscence seems to gesture, it 
is clear that what we have here has as little to do with that (unknowable) 
historical reality as “samurai values” had to do with the conduct of the Im-
perial Japanese Army. This is an instance in which narrative’s tendency to 
put things in order works to isolate what are in fact overdetermined and 
coexisting ideologies. The pair/series “instruction/corruption” is just one 
example of a set that also includes “nanshoku/homosexuality,” “tradition/
modernity,” and “modernism/fascism.”
 Thus it is that Tsuchida’s ability (in Shimaura’s letter) to appear as both 
an “older brother” in the discourse of nanshoku and as a “homosexual” out-
side the bonds of filiation in the discourse of modern sexology allows him 
to do double duty in figuring Shimaura’s corruption. As an “older brother” 
in the nanshoku mode, he stands in for the misogynous ie seido in which 
women are considered objects of exchange, marriage for love is unheard 
of, and relations among men exist along a seamless homosocial continuum 
from friendship and mutual support to sexual relations. Shimaura be-
lieves at a certain point that heterosexual love will differentiate him from 
Tsuchida, both exonerating him from the misogyny of the ie seido and 
promoting him to modern and enlightened subjecthood. And yet it is only 
by accusing Tsuchida of being an exclusive “homosexual” rather than an 
“older brother” in the discourse of nanshoku that Shimaura can accom-
plish this differentiation. Thus, Tsuchida must be homosocial and homo-
sexual, premodern and modern at once for Shimaura to assert himself as 
a modern heterosexual. When he was together with Tsuchida, he writes, 
“the opposite sex may as well not have existed for us.” But after Tsuchida 
leaves him and he meets Sueko, he believes for a time that he has overcome 
Tsuchida’s baneful influence by shedding his misogyny and learning to be 
a heterosexual. “I had come to know the beauty and sanctity of women of 
which you are utterly ignorant.”16
 Unfortunately, however, this first attempt at differentiation crashes and 
burns when his beloved Sueko succumbs to the pressures of that same 
homosocial family system by agreeing to marry the man her parents have 
chosen for her. Shimaura construes Sueko’s acquiescence as a failure of 
heterosexual love to overcome the force of the patriarchal family system. 
“At the time Sueko said she was doing this for her parents’ sake, but for me 
that made no difference. The point was that Sueko had chosen someone else 










his faith in heterosexual love and regresses to the homosocial misogyny of 
the ie seido. And, of course, this is all Tsuchida’s fault. “I cursed women,” 
he writes. “And Tsuchida-san, it was then that what you always said began 
to come back to haunt me. I cursed all women.”17
 As if to confirm his re-entry into the homosocial world, Shimaura rushes 
into a marriage with Tsuyuko, whom he does not love and only wants to ex-
ploit. “This marriage was not based on love (at least on my part).” Shimaura 
tells Tsuchida:
It was because I required her loyalty, her kindness, and the little money 
she had saved. Tsuchida-san. I say this without any shame. I was a little 
devil. I’m sure you would agree that there was no reason not to sacrifice 
a woman or two so that I could grow up into a big one.18
 Shimaura’s renewed identification with Tsuchida is thus clearly medi-
ated by the homosocial traffic in women exemplified by the ie seido. But the 
bitter irony evident in his tone makes clear that Shimaura also associates 
Tsuchida with something far worse than the evils of premodern patriarchy. 
From the very beginning of Shimaura’s letter, mixed in with a language 
of respect and tutelage in which the two men’s relationship, though hier-
archically structured, remains uncoerced and mutually beneficial, there is 
another language of seduction and indoctrination. A benign paternalism of 
the older for the younger “brother” is now read in terms of quasi-religious 
enthrallment. In becoming Tsuchida’s “disciple,” Shimaura writes, “I sold 
my soul for knowledge. I will have to live with the fact that I sacrificed my 
body to your strange love, but I cannot bear the thought that I sold my soul 
as well.” Tsuchida has turned Shimaura from an “innocent boy” who lit-
erally “wouldn’t hurt a fly” into his “plaything.” He has brought Shimaura 
under the sway of his “strong personality” and has impregnated him with 
his “seed.”19 He has also introduced him to alcohol and gotten him ad-
dicted to sleeping medication.
 As the agent of seduction and corruption rather than instruction and 
guidance, Tsuchida has left the premodern sphere of nanshoku altogether 
to become a quintessential example of the modern homosexual. His trans-
formation from loving pedagogue to perverted predator thus echoes that 
of the historical discourse of male–male sexuality in Japan more generally 
and, I would argue, that of the transition from a modernizing enlighten-
ment to fascism. The endpoint of both of these transitional narratives is a 












and instruction are superseded by seduction and indoctrination. And yet 
it is crucial to recognize that these “transitional” narratives are not in fact 
reducible to a series of discrete stages or events, however much they might 
present themselves as so. Shimaura’s storyline is constantly undermined 
by his retrospective rancor, its beginning colored by its end. Vampire-like, 
Tsuchida has poisoned Shimaura with his “strange love,” and they have 
both stepped outside of time.
Repetition and Recovery
As readers of the letter we have already gotten a glimpse of this other, poi-
sonous side of Tsuchida in Shimaura’s account of how the former uncere-
moniously dumped him for a younger boy. Shimaura’s realization that he is 
only one of many younger men that Tsuchida has corrupted is another point 
when Tsuchida’s position as the embodiment of the ie seido gives way to his 
identity as a modern homosexual. In this instance, homosexuality figures 
as a pathology of repetition and destruction:
You told me that life wasn’t a rose-strewn path. That it was a battle that I 
would have to learn to fight. But it isn’t fighting you like. You get off on 
destruction . . . You take boys who’ve never had a drink and make them 
suffer while you stand back and watch. . . . You love nothing more than 
to watch them destroy themselves with alcohol while you never touch a 
drop.20
Rather than mentoring them into maturity, Tsuchida corrupts one promis-
ing young man after another for his own viewing pleasure. Both Tsuchida’s 
serial seductions and the addictions that he foists on his victims are mani-
festations of what Freud calls, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “a compulsion 
to repeat . . . [which] exhibit[s] to a high degree an instinctual (triebhaft) 
character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give[s] 
the appearance of some ‘daemonic’ force at work.”21 Tsuchida represents 
precisely such a demonic force for Shimaura.
 Of course, repetition can also work as a means of mastering traumatic 
experiences or anxieties about the future. Recurrent nightmares are one ex-
ample. Although they may not be pleasurable themselves, to the extent that 
they pave the way for mastery and pleasure Freud considers such repetitions 
“in the service of the pleasure principle.” The example Freud gives is that of 










for war by repeatedly re-enacting the scene of that departure. These forms 
of repetition are attempts to master an actual or imagined trauma, to “get 
over it” and move on. And it is this kind of repetition, according to Peter 
Brooks, that drives narrative. In his reading of narrative dynamic through 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Brooks writes of a “binding of textual 
energies that allows them to be mastered by putting them into serviceable 
form, usable ‘bundles,’ within the energetic economy of the text.”22 But 
when such repetition fails to “bind” the excitations that set the narrative 
in motion (in the detective novel, this is most typically the murder and the 
mystery of “whodunit?”), it sets off a compulsion to repeat that has no end 
in sight. It is an addiction, a hunger that will never be sated, a drive. When 
an adult reads a narrative through to the end, “It is hardly possible to per-
suade [him or her] to re-read it immediately.”23 When we find out “what 
happens” we are able to put the book down and go to sleep, to close its bind-
ing. But children (and, as Roland Barthes adds, old people and professors) 
never tire of hearing or reading the same story over and over.24 This rela-
tion to repetition is also what distinguishes the pervert from the paranoiac. 
While the former may linger unhurried over the “trivial” details of a text, 
the latter will recruit them all into “serviceable form,” only to throw them 
away when they are no longer necessary for the narrative.
 The fact that we do not know whether Tsuchida ever responded to Shi-
maura’s letter, let alone whether he ever did or would receive it, makes of The 
Devil’s Disciple itself an achingly (or deliciously) unbound and uncompleted 
narrative. That unbound quality thus reproduces in formal terms the per-
version that Tsuchida figures for the paranoid Shimaura. Perhaps Shimaura 
has become addicted to sleeping medication because he fears a sleep in 
which he will be faced with those unconscious drives, in which the binding 
force of his recovery story will be weakened even further. This would explain 
his compulsion to repeat that narrative in a futile attempt at mastery. In this 
light, his addiction serves as a metaphor for the compulsion to repeat that 
Freud associates with the death drive.
 The fact that sleeping medication is both what keeps Shimaura and 
Tsuchida alive and a means of murder and suicide in The Devil’s Disciple 
also figures perfectly the contradictory nature of the death drive. Take just 
enough and you get the rest you need, but too much and it kills you. Shi-
maura (and Tsuchida) keep increasing their dosage as their tolerance in-
creases, treading an ever thinner line between life and death. “These circu-












instincts, would thus present us to-day with the picture of the phenomenon 
of life.”25
 Shimaura is stuck somewhere between the unbound and a-temporal 
state of sleep and the narratives of the waking day. In this light, his insom-
nia emerges as a fear of the unbound energies of the drives, the a-temporal 
and thus non-narratable energies of the primary process (“with its hint of 
possession by some ‘daemonic power’”)26 that threaten to undo the day-
time (narrative) work of the ego instincts.27 As a self-described “devil’s 
disciple,” Shimaura experiences Tsuchida as a “daemonic power” beyond 
his control and yet part of himself. Perhaps it is for this reason that his 
accusations of homosexuality and seduction fail to stick to the prosecu-
tor. Instead, they linger in the air and threaten to undermine his narrative 
by boomeranging right back to him. Thus, the homosexual “frame” to his 
heterosexual narrative threatens to frame Shimaura himself.
 The term fascism is of course rooted etymologically in the same notion 
of “binding” that appears as a central concept in Freud’s Beyond the Plea-
sure Principle and functions as the motive force of narrative. In the face of 
an eminent collapse of identity and subject–object relations, the culture of 
fascism resorts to the force of narrative to bind errant drives into normative 
channels. Whether it takes the form of what Andrea Slane calls “nationalist 
melodrama” in her discussion of fascist culture in the United States,28 or 
the more benign injunction to “share” narratives of recovery in a culture ob-
sessed with addiction (“I will always be a recovering alcoholic”), narrative 
is that which keeps the drives in their place. For our purpose, fascist culture 
might be thought as one in which narratives of recovery themselves become 
compulsory and addictive.
 Shimaura is culturally fascist to the extent that what he perceives as 
Tsuchida’s “daemonic power” drives him to write his long, accusatory let-
ter. His desire to tell his own story is both an attempt to “get his story 
straight” in the eyes of the law and, on a more fundamental level, to formu-
late an identity for himself that is separate from that of the prosecutor. He 
must tell the story of his own seduction by Tsuchida to contain and bind his 
past homosexual acts into a narrative that begins with his sexual innocence, 
moves through a homosexual “stage,” and ends with his achievement of a 
differentiated (hetero) self:
So we were lovers of a sort (isshu no koibito dōshi datta deshō), weren’t we? 
And sure enough, I was dumped by that lover (sōshite watashi wa sono koi-










moved away (hanareta) from you, I was able to look hard at myself (wata-
shi wa, jishin o mitsumeru koto ga dekita), and at the same time to see every-
thing about you, all the way through (anata jishin o zenbu mitōshite shimatta 
no desu).29
 As this rather strangely worded passage suggests, Shimaura’s narrative 
culminates in a self-knowledge attained through knowingness.30 Shimaura 
can see himself because he can see through Tsuchida. By separating himself 
from Tsuchida, Shimaura is cured of blindness and able to see Tsuchida for 
what he is—a “devil” and a homosexual. This process is echoed in the verb 
forms used in the passage, which chart an emergence from a passive state 
into active subjectivity. Beginning with a conspiratorial copula (datta deshō), 
Shimaura moves on to two iterations of the passive verb “to be dumped 
(suterareta),” then to the intransitive “moved away (hanareta),” and finally to 
two active transitive verbs of seeing, the first, “to look hard (mitsumeru),” 
responsible and unflinching when the object is himself, and the second, 
“to see through (mitōsu),” contemptuous and withering when it switches 
to Tsuchida. The personal pronouns undergo a similar progression—from 
“we (wareware)” to an objectified “that lover (sono koibito)” that works to 
yank the narrator out of the dialogue and into a third person narrative.31 
Finally, fortified by the distance thus gained, he enters again into dialogue, 
but this time as a separate subject confronting its other: “I (watashi)” versus 
“you yourself (anata jishin).” The “I” does the seeing now. It can see itself 
and “you,” too. And yet this assertion of Shimaura’s separate (heterosexual) 
identity will not last long. Eventually his story will lead him back to the 
realization that he is indeed “the devil’s disciple.” He writes, “I felt the seed 
you planted inside me getting stronger and stronger. I became afraid of 
myself.”32
 The more afraid Shimaura becomes, the less certain he is of his own 
status as the subject of the gaze or of anything else. This is not helped by 
the fact that his former lover is now in the position of passing judgment on 
Shimaura as the prosecutor in his trial, thus blurring the boundary between 
public and private that would (or should) otherwise create the condition 
for unbiased judgment. As a prosecutor who cannot sleep, and with whom 
Shimaura has already slept, Tsuchida appears in Shimaura’s imagination 
not as the embodiment of “blind justice” that a prosecutor should be, but 













In Shimaura’s account, insomnia is the only thing he and Tsuchida have 
always had in common. Hamao himself suffered terribly from insomnia, 
according to his friend Edogawa Ranpo,33 but we need not resort to the 
biographical to appreciate the possible meanings of sleeplessness in his 
work. What was it, one wonders, that kept the author and his protagonists 
up at night?34
 It was sleeplessness that brought Shimaura and Tsuchida together when 
the two were still at boarding school. Unaccustomed to life in the dormi-
tories and overworked with preparations for college entrance exams, Shi-
maura finds himself unable to sleep for nights on end. Late one night as 
he wanders the campus, he meets Tsuchida, who also has trouble sleep-
ing, and they immediately bond over their common affliction. Shimaura 
narrates their first meeting in language that evinces a clear connection be-
tween sleeplessness and homoeroticism:
Until then you and I had never spoken a word to each other. But there 
is nothing strange in two dormitory mates having a conversation when 
they find themselves at two in the morning standing in a schoolyard 
overgrown with fall grasses. The first thing I said to you was that my 
nights had been made miserable for the previous month out of an in-
ability to sleep. You were deeply moved by these words. You yourself had 
suffered from insomnia for two years already. Under the dark skies our 
conversation drifted towards those sleepless nights and as we spoke a 
warm intimacy grew between us. By dawn we two were bound in a beau-
tiful friendship (utsukushiki yūjō).35
Insomnia in The Devil’s Disciple serves Shimaura as a displacement for the 
homoerotic bond that once united the two men and continues to subtend 
his ambivalent relation to Tsuchida. The narrator goes on to explain that 
he complained of his insomnia on every occasion when he met Tsuchida. 
He refers to Tsuchida as the one “who showed me the way when it came to 
insomnia ( fuminshō ni kakete wa senpai de aru anata).”36 And soon he begins 
taking sleeping powder under Tsuchida’s direction. This “education” in 
sleeping medication would lead to a terrible addiction and, as I mentioned 
earlier, progressively larger doses for both men. Here again we have a narra-
tive of decline from education (staying up all night studying) to corruption. 
Not sleeping has been unmoored from its “use value” to become a perverse 










self-improvement and sent spinning into the circle of drug addiction. Once 
again we hear echoes of the death drive, in the shadow of which perverse 
(homo)sexuality and addiction add up to the same thing.37
 For a brief period in the beginning of his marriage to Tsuyuko, Shimaura 
gets a job as a translator, settles down in a “little house in the suburbs,” 
and begins to imagine a comfortably heteronormative life for himself.38 
His father dies at the same time, and the small inheritance he receives sup-
plements the couple’s income. Having set up his own household and in-
herited his father’s property, Shimaura further reconfirms his entry into 
the heteronormative family narrative. The idyllic coziness of this period as 
it is evoked in the text even suggests he might have gotten some sleep. All 
he and Tsuyuko need now is a child.
Misogyny Inside and Out
But that, Shimaura writes, “was just a daydream. I had forgotten that I was 
the devil’s disciple.” After just six months he grows tired of the very “chas-
tity,” “obedience,” and “goodness” in Tsuyuko that had first attracted him 
to her. These “feminine” qualities begin to drive him mad. To test the limits 
of her submissiveness, he begins to treat her in the most abominable fash-
ion, staying away from home for days on end carousing with other women, 
purposely sending her out on trumped-up errands in bad weather, and, 
employing an expression used earlier to describe Tsuchida’s treatment of 
himself, selfishly turning her body and soul into his personal “plaything.” 
But rather than fighting back, Tsuyuko only becomes more submissive, 
meekly permitting his every indiscretion. “In the end,” he writes, “having 
tormented her mercilessly, I could no longer stand myself and began to 
wonder if I had not been possessed by my wife’s living ghost (ikiryō).”39
 When he finds out that Tsuyuko is pregnant, the baby appears to him not 
as a confirmation of his ability to carry on the family name but as a mon-
strous “gaybie” that materializes his connection to Tsuchida and reaffirms 
the homo-ness of which he is so afraid. He calls it both a “second me” and 
a “devil’s seed.”40 It is at this point that he moves from merely fantasizing 
about murdering Tsuyuko to actually planning the deed. By doing away with 
Tsuyuko, he will be able to kill the fetus at the same time, making the mur-
der an abortion and a kind of suicide, as well.
 This “devil’s seed” is both Shimaura himself (as the eponymous “devil’s 
disciple”) and the spawn of the devil (“I felt the seed you planted inside 












is a negation of the homosexual fantasy Freud describes in his analysis of 
the Wolfman “to be copulated with by the father, and therefore both to be 
born of him and to present him with a child.”42 Freud’s description of the 
Wolfman’s “constant ambivalence” between the active and passive positions 
sounds like a description of Shimaura:
No position of the libido which had once been established was ever com-
pletely replaced by a later one. It was rather left in existence side by side 
with all the others, and this allowed him to maintain an incessant vacil-
lation which proved to be incompatible with the acquisition of a stable 
character.43
This is also, of course, a description of the failure of narrative, a failure 
to move on. It is Shimaura’s “incessant vacillation” that both drives him to 
reach for certainties (whether they be sexual, historical, or otherwise) and 
prevents him from ever finding them.
 But the “devil’s seed,” the “second me,” is not really a baby born between 
two men, however much Shimaura might fear (and desire) it to be so. It 
is, after all, Tsuyuko and Shimaura’s baby. Shimaura’s revulsion at having 
been impregnated by Tsuchida (which we are reading as a negated desire for 
such impregnation) registers a threat both to his active masculinity and to 
his differentiation from Tsuchida. But when Tsuyuko is in the picture, this re-
vulsion is transformed into a bond mediated by the misogyny that courses 
through the homosocial triangle among Shimaura, Tsuchida, and Tsuyuko. 
Indeed, as the misogynist crescendo of Shimaura’s narrative grows, it be-
comes apparent that it is fueled by his desire to come as close to his former 
lover as a homosocial libidinal economy will allow—by bonding with him 
over their common hatred of women.44 After explaining to Tsuchida how he 
would comfort himself on sleepless nights with images of Tsuyuko dying 
by disease, by suicide, or murder, how he would gaze smilingly on her sleep-
ing face knowing that only her death would bring him satisfaction,45 he 
addresses Tsuchida yet again in the second person. But this time around, 
rather than distancing himself from Tsuchida the devil, he pivots back into 
devilish identification. “What do you think? Tsuchida-san! Had I not be-
come the perfect inheritor of your soul?”46
 By this point, Shimaura’s dead father, from whom he has inherited prop-
erty, has been completely eclipsed by his former lover, whose very soul has 
passed into him. He has been infected by Tsuchida’s soul and in the process 
the vertical narrative of succession and filiation has been replaced with a 










his nocturnal companion, and now he imagines the two of them staying 
up all night together, relishing “devilish fantasies” of his murdered wife.47
 As if in reaction to the description of such an intense and non-narratable 
bond between the two men, Shimaura picks up the thread of narrative al-
most immediately with the story of how Sueko came back into his life. In 
doing so, he returns to the work of differentiation. After first establishing 
that Tsuchida (who hates “sentimentalism”) would find his continued at-
tachment to her laughable,48 Shimaura relates that Sueko’s husband and en-
tire family were killed in the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. Sueko alone 
survives, perversely freed, like the city of Tokyo itself, from the bonds of the 
past. Suddenly become a free agent able to make her own decisions outside 
the structure of the ie seido, Sueko gets back together with Shimaura, and 
their love returns stronger and hotter than ever. And once again, the hetero-
sexual bond promises the freedom to grow and develop on a slate wiped 
clean.
 But tragically, by falling into a trap set for someone else, Sueko once 
again reverses Shimaura’s work of separation and identity formation. With 
her death by overdose, what began as an act (the intended murder of Tsu-
yuko) in which subjective intention was already made intransitive through 
“suggestion” ends up as an occurrence (Sueko’s death) without a transitive 
subject at all. This ambiguity regarding agency is also in evidence in the 
strange wording with which Shimaura describes the moment he decides 
that he wants Tsuyuko dead. He seems to stumble initially over who will do 
the killing and who will die. “All I could come up with was a terribly prosaic 
way out of my dilemma. Only one way. Namely, death. To die. And according 
to our philosophy, she would be killed.”49 Sueko’s death will simply substi-
tute, as we will see later, one “she” for another in a kind of paroxysm of un-
differentiated misogyny. It is this shared misogyny that Shimaura imagines 
will both implicate Tsuchida in Sueko’s death and mediate his love for the 
prosecutor. The death of Sueko seems to have resulted from a strange mish-
mash of subjectivities and intentions, of unfinished sentences that bring 
the two men together beneath a cloud of guilt.
The Insistent Voice
To read The Devil’s Disciple is to feel suffocated and embattled, as anyone 
might who has received a letter that is forty pages long. The ceaseless drum-
beat of the second person positions the reader along with Tsuchida on the 












sympathy and identification with the prosecutor. And yet to the extent that 
we take Shimaura’s calumnies seriously, the prosecutor with whom we have 
just identified emerges as a diabolical figure all the same. Our sympathies 
are thus divided much as Shimaura’s seem to be, whose hatred for Tsuchida 
is matched only by the intensity of his spurned affections.
 The form of the letter makes it impossible for the reader to get outside 
Shimaura’s head to find out how much of what he says is “true.” Moreover, 
the paranoid and accusatory nature of the writing renders it suspect from 
the start and gives the impression that Shimaura is desperate to maintain 
control of how the text will be read. In fact, one senses that he does not 
want the text to be read at all. He wants to keep yelling at Tsuchida without 
being interrupted. All of this yelling paradoxically produces a rather hushed 
mood as the reader is put into an almost embarrassing position somewhere 
between that of an eavesdropper and a voyeur. Or perhaps we are simply 
theatergoers.
 Hamao’s choice to make a novel out of this letter is his way of staging 
Shimaura’s desire for unmediated (and unreciprocated) communication. 
Shimaura depends on the possibility of such communication to make his 
narrative of recovery believable and to reaffirm his heterosexuality. He 
wants to make an identity out of a grammatical subject, to make who he is 
the ground of what he says. And the only way that this can happen is if he can 
get someone not only to believe what he says, but to believe (in) him. “You 
may be the only person who will believe what I have said thus far,” Shimaura 
writes. “You will believe that I have told no lies. . . . I call out to you in the 
name of that friendship we once shared, please believe me. And in believing 
me, believe what I say.”50
 These are the last lines of a letter bound together by repeated apostrophes 
to its recipient: “Tsuchida-san!” “Tsuchida-san!” This use of apostrophe, a 
mode perhaps more suited to a lyric than a letter, is another way in which 
Shimaura struggles to push forth his own identity through the appeal to 
an absent other. Its vocative mood is the closest one gets to speech in writ-
ing. As what might be thought of as an acute or synchronic instance of the 
same binding that enables diachronic narrative, apostrophe is exemplary 
of political rhetoric in general, and fascist rhetoric in particular. Barbara 
Johnson has analyzed apostrophe in a way that sheds light on the way it 
functions in The Devil’s Disciple. As a trope that “calls up and animates the 
absent, the lost, and the dead,” apostrophe is, to paraphrase Johnson, the 
mode of Shimaura’s letter and the theme of The Devil’s Disciple. While the letter 










hetero, the novel poses the question, “Can this gap be bridged? Can this 
loss be healed through language alone?”51 The answer, of course, is “no,” 
and the novel seems to know this. But Shimaura keeps trying. As readers of 
The Devil’s Disciple, we watch him try as we might watch Pat Robertson de-
nounce the “homosexual lifestyle.”52
Escape from the Third Person
Shimaura’s preference for speech over writing is also understandable, given 
that it was the ambiguity of writing that landed him in jail in the first place. 
He tells Tsuchida that after he discovered Sueko’s death, he took the train 
to a small inn in Kiso, “where you and I went as a couple.”53 Here again we 
have a repetition and circling back of narrative, from the “heterosexual” to 
the “homosexual” position.
 It is at this inn in Kiso that Shimaura resolves to kill himself after writ-
ing an account of all that had led up to Sueko’s accidental death. But no 
sooner does he finish composing the document than he decides that “it 
is more interesting to leave behind a crime that will never be solved” and 
burns it.54 Of course, as we have already noted, no actual crime has been 
committed. Sueko’s death was an accident. But in what looks like a last 
grab at some stable form of subjectivity, Shimaura retroactively renders it a 
crime of which he is guilty. In penance, he takes an enormous overdose of 
sleeping powder and lies down to die.
 But Shimaura’s tolerance for the medication proves greater than even he 
had imagined. An unspecified number of days later, he wakes up in a police 
station accused of murder, somehow having neglected to destroy all of the 
pages of the letter in which he told of his plan to kill Tsuyuko. His memory 
of the whole affair is temporarily wiped out by the overdose but preserved 
partially in those surviving pages. Discovered by the maid who came into 
his room after he failed to emerge for so long, the pages tell only of a plan 
to kill “her (kanojo),” and this is what lands Shimaura in jail. With no mem-
ory and only the letter to go by, Shimaura at first believes that he has in fact 
killed Sueko. As for Tsuyuko, he does not even remember having a wife. But 
when she comes to visit him in jail, the sight of a packet of sleeping powder 
tucked into the obi of her kimono jogs Shimaura’s memory, and he realizes 
that it was she and not Sueko whom he had planned to kill.
 But by then it is too late. “If I had written ‘my wife’ or ‘Tsuyuko’ instead 
of ‘her’ the letter would not have served as evidence of homicidal wrong-












bizarre result.” The free-floating, third-person pronoun “she,”55 like the un-
specified guilt that suffuses the text, speaks of a crime without a clear sub-
ject or object. “What a strange coming together of coincidences!” Shimaura 
writes to Tsuchida. “My hateful wife and the woman I loved! And from now 
on, when will I ever be able to really sleep?”56
The Hole Story
But there is one more twist to this tale. Shimaura’s near-overdose on sleep-
ing medication has introduced a black hole in the middle of the text that 
undoes (and indeed motivates) all of his efforts to bind it together. The let-
ter we have been reading turns out (according, as always, to the letter itself ) 
to have been written just after Shimaura began to recover from the total loss 
of his memory and his cognitive abilities. “Everything seemed shrouded in 
mist. I didn’t understand myself,” the letter says. “I couldn’t even remem-
ber who I was.”57 His brush with death and his loss of memory has thus cut 
his tale in two and rendered his narrative radically unreliable. Knowing the 
way the letter ends, if the reader goes back to the beginning (which is, of 
course, to treat the letter as a written narrative rather than the act of com-
munication Shimaura wants it to be), we are reminded that Shimaura is not 
so sure of his story after all: “Prosecutor Tsuchida, I am imprisoned here 
on suspicion of murder. But I am probably not the guilty party. That’s right. 
Probably not. . . . I regret that I have to say it in such a strange way. But if 
you read this letter to the end you will surely understand why.”58
 Read this letter to the end, writes Shimaura. The letter ends, as we have seen, 
with a plea to Tsuchida to believe him and to believe the story it tells. But it 
is precisely by reading it to the end that Tsuchida and the reader will under-
stand the meaning of this “probably,” this doubt as to whether the letter is 
believable after all. And now that the narrative is subjected to doubt, all that 
can anchor our belief is Shimaura himself. “Tsuchida-san! I call out to you 
three times in the name of that friendship we once shared. Please believe 
me. And in believing me, believe what I say.”59 Shimaura, of course, is very 
unlikely to be believed. But it is Hamao’s genius to show us his attempts to 
coerce belief through a narrative that is both held together and pulled apart by 
the ambivalent force of a homosocial bond. Such is the seductively redemp-
tive lure of fascist narrative.
 The Devil’s Disciple gives us a clear sense of the genocidal consequences 
of this narrative by showing us how Shimaura’s story gets out of hand and 










here becomes a stranglehold. When Shimaura finds Sueko dead, he tells 
Tsuchida:
I saw in it the result of the murder I had so carefully thought out (kan-
gae ni kangaeta). Strangely, at that moment, I did not feel the sadness 
of having lost someone I loved. I just (tadatada) looked at this strange, 
happy-making lump of flesh, there before my eyes. And it was the result 
of all my planning (keikaku ni keikaku shita).60
In a stunning reversal of the structure of melancholy or nostalgia, in which 
the lost object is animated retroactively to make up for a lack felt in the 
present, Sueko (whose name means “last child”),61 exists here in the pure 
present, unhinged from the narrative and indistinguishable from Tsuyuko 
or any other woman. To have lost a loved one would be a narrative. But to 
gaze on a “happy-making lump of flesh” is to enter the realm of repetition 
and the death drive. The Japanese text evokes this tension between narrative 
and repetition by doubling the very verbs that describe Shimaura’s actions. 
He “just just (tada tada) . . . thought and thought (kangae ni kangaeta)” and 
“planned and planned (keikaku ni keikaku shita).” Like what Freud would call 
a sexual aim unsoldered from its object, Shimaura’s machinations have be-
come ends in themselves. As the “last child,” Sueko’s lump of flesh, indis-
tinguishable from any other and outside the confines of time and narrative, 
figures the end of history. It is the ultimate unbinding that fascism both 
fears and brings about. “It was the result of all my planning.”
The Perverted Persecutor
But what of the fact that the person with whom Tsuchida is trying to com-
municate (or trying to lie to) is both a homosexual and a prosecutor? And 
what of the fact that Shimaura believes that this homosexual prosecutor is 
the only one who will believe what he says? Shimaura blames the prosecutor 
Tsuchida not for the crime he has (not) committed but for the person he has 
become. “If I had not met you as a young boy,” writes Shimaura, “I would 
not be in prison now. You may not have taught me crime, but you gave me 
the personality of a criminal.”62
 As the “devil’s disciple,” Shimaura has become who he is as a result of 
Tsuchida’s instruction and seduction. As we have seen, the story he tells 
inside the letter of his attempted escape from Tsuchida’s influence is a des-
perate attempt to differentiate himself from the prosecutor and to (re)claim 












tells suggests to the reader the impossibility of his ever extricating himself 
from that influence. I should emphasize that by this I do not mean to say that 
Shimaura is “really” a closeted homosexual. This is no more demonstrable 
from this text than the idea that Tsuchida is an exclusive homosexual. What 
the text shows is the attempt of one man to shore up his own identity by 
holding these two “orientations” apart. Indeed, there is no “homosexual” 
in this text (any more than there are in “reality”) except to the extent that 
such a figure serves to isolate and contain the scourge of sexual perver-
sion in the other. “Homosexuality is constituted as a category,” writes Lee 
Edelman, “to name a condition that must be represented as determinate, 
as legibly identifiable, precisely insofar as it threatens to undo the determi-
nacy of identity itself; it must be metaphorized as an essential condition, 
a sexual orientation, to contain the disturbance it effects as a force of de-
orientation.”63
 Shimaura needs Tsuchida to be a homosexual. This is an essential part of 
the story he needs to tell. His is a story of recovery from homosexuality (and 
criminality, and perhaps even insomnia) that may or may not have been suc-
cessful. But Tsuchida has no story. He simply remains a homosexual with a 
criminal personality who suffers from insomnia and addiction. Shimaura 
may be all of these things as well, but he is also addicted to narrative in the 
hope that it will tell him that he is not. And part of that narrative depends 
on casting Tsuchida as somehow outside narrative, like the death drive 
itself, circling around in the endless repetition of addiction and seduction, 
remaining single and thus outside the narrative of reproduction as well. If 
Sueko as a dead lump of flesh existed only in the present because severed 
from the past, Tsuchida lives only in the present because he has no future. 
“Tsuchida-san. I hear you’re increasing your dosage as well. And not even 
you in all your brilliance can see where you’ll end up.”64
 The homosexual predator Tsuchida is at the same time a prosecutor, the 
very embodiment of the law, the enforcer of social order. In a move that will 
be familiar from our earlier discussion of “homofascism,” Shimaura inter-
twines the story of Tsuchida’s sexual perversion with that of his alleged 
perversion of the social order. Not only has Tsuchida corrupted Shimaura; 
he has also weakened and poisoned the law itself. Consider the following 
passage:
Not only did you mercilessly transform me into your plaything, but now 
you see me languishing in prison. But you, who taught me everything, 










misstep. I respect and admire you from the bottom of my heart. But at 
the same time I cannot help being appalled at the frailty of the laws of 
this nation that are powerless to do anything to stop someone as dan-
gerous as you. You’re the prosecutor and I’m the criminal. How perfectly 
appropriate.65
By contrasting his own powerless state with that of Tsuchida, who has so 
cleverly managed to dissimulate his homosexuality while personifying the law, 
Shimaura manages to homosexualize the arbitrariness of legal power. Or, 
rather, he is able to salvage his (impossible) ideal of justice by casting it as 
“frail” and “powerless” in the face of this Trojan horse of a homosexual. 
One cannot help but be struck by the resonance of Shimaura’s claim to 
victimhood with the recent uproar on the right in the United States over 
“activist judges forcing their arbitrary will on the people” by shoving gay 
marriage down their throats.66 Shimaura’s hatred and homosexualiza-
tion of Tsuchida seems almost to pale in comparison to the climate in the 
United States today, where judges’ lives are threatened for the decisions 
they make.67 This fear that the legal system and the government will take 
on a “daemonic” life of its own and cease to represent “the people’s inter-
est,” that they will cease to hear its voice, is surely at the root of the fascist 
revolution that seeks to restore some fictive, unmediated form of political 
representation.
 The fact that these anxieties over narrative, representation, and subjec-
tivity surface so often around the person of the homosexual is both symp-
tomatic and instructive. Occupying the constitutive outside of the naturaliz-
ing narratives of heteronormativity, and made to figure a fixation past which 
that reproductive and redemptive narrative can proceed, the homosexual as 
he is imagined by fascists like Shimaura and our own crusaders for “family 
values” is an indispensable figure.68
Conclusion
According to the Marxist critic Hirabayashi Hatsunosuke, writing in 1931, 
“love scenes”69 in and of themselves are not interesting to the reader of a 
detective novel except to the extent that there might be something “behind 
them”:
Indulging oneself (hitori de etsu ni itte) in drawn-out accounts of [sex and 
love] is enough to destroy a work. . . . Details that do not relate to the 












writer must work to make every line and every letter come together into 
a single point at the end, like the spokes of a radiating highway system 
(hōshasen dōro).70
The ideal reader of the detective novel should be able to stand firm against 
sexual temptation, like a spy who will not be waylaid by feminine charms. 
And the ideal detective novel should help him out by binding sexual and 
textual excess and waste (that which is “not necessary”) into a rational and 
satisfying ending. For Hirabayashi, “every line and every letter” must be 
recruited to this end, lassoed in to close up some gaping hole in the heart 
of the city and the novel at once. Hirabayashi’s “radiating highway system” 
might suggest such centripetal figures for narrative closure as a closing 
eye or the tightening of a sphincter if it were not for the fact that (1) “radi-
ating” happens outward; and (2) the cars on the highway system are most 
likely going in both directions. Thus, his simile (inadvertently?) figures the 
impossibility of closure through written narrative. If the modern detective 
novel finds such clean closure indispensable, its precondition is to be found 
in another impossible project, described famously by Hirabayashi in an 
earlier essay as “the maintenance of the national order through a complete 
(kansei sareta) system of written laws.”71 The use of writing to “complete” a 
system of laws and to bring a novel to a single closural point is among the 
most cherished fantasies of modernity. For the fascist subject it becomes an 
obsession. The fact that it is a fantasy is a knowledge that most detective and 
legal fictions work to suppress. Their chronic failure or principled refusal to 
do so are symptoms of and resistances to a culture of fascism that seeks to 
cure itself through the production of increasingly implausible fictions.
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Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping,  
and the Nine Gods of War:  
“Fascist Proclivities” Made Real
On March 6, 1942, Captain Hiraide Hideo, section chief in the 
Kaigun Hōdōbu Kachō (Naval Information Bureau), delivered a radio ad-
dress relating details of the top-secret submarine component of the tre-
mendously successful surprise attack that Japan had executed three months 
earlier at Pearl Harbor. The story he told, and the manner in which he told 
it, struck a cord with the Japanese people, setting off an avalanche of retell-
ings, additions, and commentaries across a wide spectrum of media out-
lets. A transcript of Hiraide’s broadcast was carried in all of the major news-
papers the following day; it was reproduced in a host of periodicals the next 
month. There then followed a veritable flood of cultural artifacts dealing 
with the men and the mission: nonfiction books, poems, essays, a Kabuki 
play, short stories, novels, songs, and educational material. Perhaps the 
most memorable was Iwata Toyoo’s novel Kaigun (The Navy) and the direc-
tor Tasaka Tomosaka’s feature film based on it. The 1943 release of the film, 
produced with the full support of the Imperial Navy, represents the com-
pletion of a circle: ideologically motivated government propaganda had in-
spired public participation in a discourse that was subsequently reclaimed 





















binding the public to the state is a distinguishing characteristic of cultural 
production in the opening days of the Asia-Pacific War, and it transformed 
what began as but another round in the public-relations competition be-
tween the Imperial Navy and Imperial Army into something much larger: a 
communal myth propagated and consumed by the entire nation.
 While the individual articulations of the submariners’ tale varied in 
genre, focus, and style, virtually all of them tapped into the same core of 
emotionally charged tropes. In a sense, the discourse was modular. The 
components were largely limited to those presented in the Navy’s original 
announcement, but each retelling of the submarine mission would inflect 
the story by varying the particular configuration of the elements, adding 
texture to the overall portrait. Three components of the tale stand out for 
their prominence in the media firestorm: (1) the heroes as guileless agents, 
so pure in spirit that they transcend the political motivations of the war; 
(2) mother figures distinguished by their down-to-earth pragmatism and 
their unwavering devotion to both the nation and its warriors (their sons); 
and (3) points of rural origins, hometowns ( furusato) noted for distinctive 
natural landscapes and customs that, paradoxically, bind their native sons 
all the more tightly to the nation as a whole.
 This third feature also demonstrates the trope that is repeated at various 
levels of this cultural phenomenon: the concrete specificity of the hero’s 
birthplace merges with the abstract concept that is the nation in much the 
same manner as each uniquely inflected reiteration of the story contributes 
to the communal myth. This looping action fuses the particular to the uni-
versal, and it is ubiquitous. It binds unique locales to an all-encompassing 
nation; it ties the present incident to historical precedents through both the 
mode and contents of the representations. The singular event of the sub-
marine attack thereby becomes somehow also eternal, timeless. The task of 
telling, too, loops from the state to the citizenry and back to the state again, 
binding the two in a communal act of mythmaking. The very erasure of self 
through surrender to the state that is the subject of the myth is therefore 
embodied in the praxis generating and sustaining that myth.
 The discourse surrounding the submariners of Pearl Harbor shows all 
the elements of a culture of fascism. In it one finds a large swath of the 
population assuaging the anxieties of modernity through participation in 
a totalizing myth that envelopes the individual in an eternal essence that is 
the state. Most important, though, the myth that is repeated endlessly in 
so many corners of culture, looping between the present and the past, be-




















representation and new media, is one that invariably concludes in an apoca-
lyptic act of glorious, violent self-destruction. Such acts were to become 
normal in the final year of the war as thousands upon thousands of Japanese 
military became “shattered jewels (gyokusai)”—the euphemism for those 
meeting a glorious death against hopeless odds—in either futile charges 
against superior forces or in kamikaze missions from which there was to 
be no return. Shocking and unthinkable as those episodes are to us at this 
historical remove, they were apparently not so to the participants. Such 
deaths had, after all, been rehearsed through the participation—sometimes 
as active producers and sometimes as passive consumers—in the commu-
nal myth.
The Initial Act of (Attempted) Violence
The radio address that so inspired the Japanese nation in 1942 took as its 
subject a military exploit that in the postwar years came to be all but en-
tirely forgotten. While on both sides of the Pacific today the attack on Pearl 
Harbor is associated with the endless stream of fighter planes and bombers 
that attacked an unsuspecting Pacific Fleet early on a Sunday morning, in 
wartime Japan that opening salvo conjured up images of an attack from 
below, one designed to take advantage of Japan’s secret weapon: a “midget” 
submarine. Measuring but twenty-four meters in length and two meters in 
diameter, these battery-powered vessels were armed with two torpedoes.1 
In the plan hatched by Squad Leader Captain Sasaki Hanku, these tiny ves-
sels would be attached to full-size submarines for transportation to within 
striking distance of Pearl Harbor, where they would then be released into 
the waters under cover of darkness on the night before the aerial attack. 
Infiltrating the harbor by either squeezing under the anti-submarine nets 
or slipping through undetected in the wake of a U.S. vessel, the midget 
subs would then sink to the ocean floor and wait, attacking either in unison 
with the morning’s aerial attack or, alternatively, after nightfall the next 
day, when they would target whatever U.S. ships remained afloat. After ac-
complishing this mission, the submariners were to leave the harbor and 
rendezvous with the mother ships at one of two points near Lanai Island, 
where the vessels would be scuttled and the crewmen would board the 
larger submarines for their escape.
 Five such subs were deployed in the attack, and they were manned by 
crew members selected according to the following criteria.The submariners 










aggressive spirit; (3) single; and (4) without binding familial obligations.2 
Chosen for the mission were the following five two-man crews: Lieutenant 
Iwasa Naoji and Ensign Sasaki Naokichi, First Lieutenant Yokoyama Masaji 
and Ensign Ueda Sadamu, First Lieutenant Furuno Shigemi and Ensign Yo-
koyama Shigenori, Second Lieutenant Hiroo Akira and Ensign Katayama 
Yoshio, and Second Lieutenant Sakamaki Kazuo and Ensign Inagaki Kiyo-
shi.3 The men were all young; Sasaki was the oldest at twenty-nine, and 
Hiroo was the youngest at only twenty-two. The officers were all graduates 
of the prestigious Naval Academy at Etajima, and, as if by design, all crew 
members were of rural origin.
 As is well known, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a success. When day 
was done, three U.S. battleships had sustained heavy damage, and five 
others had been sunk completely, most notably the mighty U.S.S. Arizona. A 
number of cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels were also seriously dam-
aged. Furthermore, large numbers of U.S. military aircraft on the island 
were rendered inoperable—having been grouped together for easy pro-
tection against anticipated sabotage from the Japanese Americans on the 
islands, these planes made easy targets for the bombing and strafing Japa-
nese aircraft. Human casualties were devastating. More than 1,100 Navy, 
Army, and civilian personnel had been wounded, and more than 2,400 had 
lost their lives.
 The first detailed report of the attack issued by the Naval Division of 
Japan’s Imperial Headquarters came ten days later, on December 18, 1941. 
Here the aerial component of the assault was underemphasized, the only 
mention being of the twenty-nine airplanes lost. However, one entire sec-
tion of this terse four-point bulletin is dedicated entirely to the submarines: 
“in this same naval battle our special attack force, composed of special sub-
marines (tokushū senkōtei), exercised the utmost caution in a harbor infiltra-
tion that they realized could cost them their lives. Some attacked the heart 
of the enemy forces just as the Japanese planes fiercely struck from above; 
others acted independently to launch nighttime attacks. At the very least 
these submarines sank the aforementioned battleship Arizona and left the 
enemy fleet quivering in fear over their grand military feat.” In its summary 
of Japan’s losses during the attack, this report mentions the five submarines 
that “have yet to return.”4 This short news bulletin constitutes the first ver-
sion of the mission that would attain mythic proportions in the months to 
come. Other than its (mis)representation of the submarines’ grand success, 




















kōgeki tai; often abbreviated as simply tokkōtai). This label was to become 
the generic term used to describe all future military assignments carried 
out with the expectation that they would end in death. What are known in 
the United States as the kamikaze are in Japan universally referred to as the 
“Special Attack Forces (tokkōtai).”
 The December 18, 1941, appraisal of the submariners’ accomplishments 
remained the accepted version for the duration of the war. Almost none of 
it is true, however, other than the fact that no submarine returned from 
the mission. The U.S.S. Arizona was sunk by the aerial attack, and though it 
seems that two submarines did succeed in infiltrating the harbor, neither 
was able to use its torpedoes effectively. Furthermore, at least one of the 
midget submarines was spotted by a U.S. naval vessel outside the harbor 
hours before the aerial attack began and, had it been dutifully reported 
rather than dismissed as a false alarm, the Pacific Fleet might very well 
have been better prepared when the planes appeared in the skies above Pearl 
Harbor.
 The most fascinating escapade of the submarine squad was undoubtedly 
that of Second Lieutenant Sakamaki Kazuo and Ensign Inagaki Kiyoshi. 
When last-minute preparations revealed their submarine’s key navigational 
device as malfunctioning and beyond repair, their commanding officer 
asked Sakamaki how he wished to proceed. Sakamaki would later recall, 
“It was unthinkable that I abandon [the operation] at this point. A powerful 
feeling of responsibility and a sense of mission bound me tightly and gave 
me courage. With energy and enthusiasm . . . I answered, ‘Commander, I 
will go!’”5
 Not surprisingly, the mechanical problems rendered the men unable to 
stealthily enter the harbor, and they repeatedly suffered damage to their 
craft. Still, it was only after nightfall on December 7 that the crew of this 
submarine decided to abandon the mission. Floundering in search of the 
rendezvous point, however, their submarine ran aground on a coral reef, 
where its power supply then expired. While Inagaki did not survive the swim 
ashore, Sakamaki did, but only to fall unconscious as soon as he pulled 
himself up on the sandy beach. When he regained consciousness, Sergeant 
David M. Akui, a Nisei, stood over him with a pistol. Sakamaki Kazuo thus 










Political Propaganda from Imperial Headquarters (I):  
The Guileless Hero
By any objective account, the midget submarine “Special Attack Forces” 
that participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor were a military failure, and 
though the quality of military intelligence at the time is a matter of some 
dispute, Imperial Headquarters back in Japan was almost certainly aware 
of this fact. That knowledge, however, did not prevent the Imperial Navy 
from declaring the mission a success and initiating a public-relations drive 
that succeeded far beyond its wildest dreams. It began with the March 1942 
press release providing details of the submarine squad, a curious document 
stitched together from a variety of tones and rhetorical modes. It includes 
not only a journalistic narrative of the mission but also vitriolic denuncia-
tions of Western imperialism and decadence. For example, Captain Hiraide, 
the Navy spokesman, insists that the fallen seamen were
enacting an annihilation of the England and America that lurks in our 
hearts; they were acting on their conviction that we must exterminate—
destroy—the American and English egocentrism that through culture 
and philosophy has over long years wormed its way into the spirit of the 
citizens of Japan.
 We can hope for success in the Greater East Asian War only when we 
have both expelled the concrete, visible tyrannical influence exercised 
by England and American on East Asia and cleansed our hearts of their 
invisible concepts of egotism and materialism. From this perspective, 
too, our heroes have provided us all with a good example to follow.7
The deluge of media representations prompted by this press release, how-
ever, indicate that it was not the hackneyed diatribes in Hiraide’s announce-
ment that resonated in the communal psyche. Rather, the other dimensions 
of Hiraide’s bulletin exercised an appeal: specifically, the poignant anec-
dotes of the submariners in their final hours and the paeans to selfless sup-
porters on the home front. It was here that the press release successfully 
introduced two of the three emotionally charged tropes that would drive 
the myth: that of the heroes as innocent, almost childlike agents immune 
to the political dimensions of their act and that of the mother figures who 
firmly grounded both the heroes and the nation. The third trope—that of 
a specific rural locale serving as a synecdoche for the nation as a whole—
would only appear at the next stage of the communal mythmaking.




















submariners came to be known, rendered them heroes more for their at-
tainment of a spiritual, egoless state than for their military exploits or 
dedication to a political or ideological cause. The submariners, as Hiraide 
paints them, are utterly guileless to the point where they assume childlike 
qualities. Though Hiraide himself does acknowledge a political context for 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, painting it as the moment when “the sword of 
justice was lowered on the tyrannical United States, which has trampled on 
the great spirit of a Japan dedicated to world peace,” nowhere does he at-
tribute such consciousness to the submariners themselves.9 Hiraide insists 
instead on an almost religious selflessness: “each and every one of them 
was completely without desire for promotion, and they had all rejected the 
concepts of glory, pleasure, personal comfort—even the very idea of the 
‘self.’”10
 Interestingly, this selflessness is so complete that it transcends even a 
conception of surrendering themselves to a larger cause. As Hiraide de-
scribes them, the men do not sacrifice themselves for nation or race or lib-
erty; such abstractions no longer have meaning for them. Instead, they en-
gage the material world in a most concrete sense: through their corporeal 
being. “The squad truly transcended the question of life and death, and 
concentrated to the very end on the destruction of the enemy ships. There 
was no thought of returning alive in their heads. . . . There are more than 
a few examples of men who have in the heat of the battle gone willingly to 
their deaths. Still, the pinnacle of bushidō lies in that pure, sublime, and 
selfless realm wherein one’s convictions are realized with the body.”11 Here 
the heroes are intent on their mission, but it is not a mission to free Asia 
from subjugation by the West, not an assignment to gain redress for Japan’s 
treatment as a second-class citizen of the world, not an obligation to secure 
Japan’s access to colonies and resources—all of which would imply a con-
cern with the larger, abstract context within which they act. To the subma-
rine crew, the mission is simply a matter of sinking ships.
 This artless authenticity of the men is further developed through Hi-
raide’s introduction of various anecdotes from their final moments, anec-
dotes that highlight their guileless nature by returning them to childhood 
and stripping them even of the marks of the military. This characterization 
appears when Hiraide describes the simple pleasure the men took in the 
special supplies provided them for the mission. “I am told that valiantly 
boarding his submarine, one of these young officers said, ‘We’ve got our 
lunchboxes and some cider, and they even gave us some chocolate. I feel 










field trip (ensoku) must have come flooding back to the mind of this young 
hero for a moment. His heart filled with the dear memory of such field trips, 
this hero danced cheerfully towards the site of his death.”12 The political 
and ideological context framing their mission erased, the men are depicted 
as innocent children off on a “field trip.”
 A second telling anecdote related by Hiraide also serves to erase any ab-
stract motivation that might sully the innocence of the crew. Hiraide tells 
of how one of the men, about to board his submarine, said, “I suppose we 
should wear our uniforms, but they’re so hot that I’ll just take the liberty 
of going in my work clothes.”13 By stripping the men of their military uni-
forms, the quintessential symbol of dedication to the abstract notion that 
is nation, Hiraide succeeds in further distancing these men from any con-
scious, reasoned motivation. Without uniforms, the men act for neither 
personal military glory nor national interests; in their work clothes they 
simply focus on the concrete task at hand. These depictions establish the 
image of an apolitical, genuinely selfless hero, one whose childlike art-
lessness suggests an unmediated, ingenuous interaction with the material 
world.
 In this portrait of the heroes Hiraide is, consciously or unconsciously, 
tapping into a trope that had been infused with an enormous emotional 
charge by roughly contemporaneous literary and cultural trends. The phi-
losopher Nishida Kitarō’s conception of “pure experience ( junsui keiken),” 
his student Nishitani Keiji’s privileging of the “position of subjective noth-
ingness (shutai-teki mu no tachiba),” the writer Hayashi Fusao’s understand-
ing of the significance of the widespread conversions (tenkō) away from 
a Marxist orientation, the critic Kobayashi Hideo’s longing for a literary 
“home” antecedent to contrived narratological strategies—all of these 
ideas were responses to a perceived crisis of modernity, a crisis marked by 
a nagging suspicion that protracted intellectual discourse ultimately alien-
ated humans from the very realities they were attempting to fathom.14 In 
Hiraide’s portrayal, the Nine Gods of War seem to embody all that these 
writers had been espousing: the submariners had transcended the desire 
to explain or rationalize their act by an appeal to any abstract “ism” and 
instead devoted themselves single-mindedly to a simple, concrete act—in 
this case, the sinking of enemy ships. Thus, Hiraide’s anecdotes portray the 
squad as having achieved a childlike innocence.15 The incorporation of this 
charged image into this early narrative of the mission is one of the primary 




















Political Propaganda from Imperial Headquarters (II):  
Mothers Serving Sons and the Nation
Hiraide’s press release also taps into the potent literary trope of the mother. 
There were, to be sure, practical reasons for him to pay tribute to this sector 
of the home-front population. With the conscription of an ever increasing 
percentage of able-bodied men laying a onerous burden on the communi-
ties that depended on their labor, it was the women left behind who were 
called on to maintain production on the farms and in the factories. They 
were incorporated into the national agenda through the mobilization of 
the local chapters of the Kokubō Fujinkai (Women’s Defense League), an 
organization charged with planning and executing the village-wide “cele-
brations” of military call-ups.16 Depending on women for these duties, the 
propaganda bureaus of the armed services surely recognized the need to 
tend to their morale.
 Still, in acknowledging the mothers of Japan in this ode to the fallen 
submariners, Hiraide is incorporating another charged image that would 
resonate in the public imagination. Hiraide’s announcement included the 
following lines:
I must point out here that this grand spirit of sacrifice in which the self 
is extinguished in becoming a martyr for the nation was made possible 
largely through the influence of exceptional mothers. As if by design, all 
of our heroes were famous for their filial piety.
 One of the heroes enjoyed nothing more than using his furloughs, no 
matter how short, to return home and spend a day in his mother’s com-
pany. This gives us a glimpse of the devotion they felt to their mothers. 
Such devotion attests to the immensity of the behind-the-scenes 
strength with which these mothers lovingly raised these valiant heroes—
they toiled endlessly and without thought for themselves, dedicating 
everything to their families, their husbands, their children, and therein 
finding a supreme happiness. The self-sacrificing spirit of these mothers 
lived on as a powerful force within the heroes. If not for these grand 
mothers of Japan we would be bereft of men capable of selfless service 
to the nation. In short, these egoless mothers who live on through their 
children are mothers who live for the nation itself.17
This tribute to the mothers, like the depiction of the submariners as guile-
less heroes, taps into tropes cultivated in more rarefied literary texts in the 










(which includes the transcendence of an ultimately alienating analytical 
stance in a return to an unmediated engagement with the concrete world), 
women—and in particular mothers—had frequently been painted as firmly 
rooted in the realities of the material world, unperturbed by complex ab-
stractions and keenly attuned to their emotions. This image of women is 
presented in a broad range of texts, including Kawabata Yasunari’s Snow 
Country and Kobayashi Hideo’s “Literature of the Lost Home” and “History 
and Literature.” In Kawabata’s work, it is the impetuousness and forth-
coming character of the country geisha Komako that soothes the frayed 
nerves of the intellectual Tokyoite Shimamura. In Kobayashi’s essays, it 
is a mother figure who embodies the “natural” mode of apprehension for 
which he longs.18 By incorporating mothers into its account, the Imperial 
Navy had co-opted the emotional charge that such literary texts had infused 
in the image of mothers and nurturing women.
 By weaving into its narrative both of these images—that of the pure hero 
and that of the selfless mother fully integrated into her world—the Imperial 
Navy succeeded in appealing to the populace more powerfully than if it 
had restricted itself to the facts of the mission and its clichéd assertions 
that Japan “must exterminate—destroy—the American and English ego-
centrism that . . . [has] wormed its way into the spirit of the citizens.” As 
a pastiche of varying tones, perspectives, and rhetorical modes, the narra-
tive of the mission served to invite popular participation in the continued 
construction of the myth of the submariners. The populace did respond, 
enthusiastically, and across a wide variety of genres.
The Popular Imagination Responds:  
The Navy Fuses Local to National
Captain Hiraide’s press release on the submarine mission prompted an ava-
lanche of representations dealing with the subject. The Nine Gods of War 
were the subject of at least nine full-length books published in the year or 
so after Pearl Harbor: Ah, The Special Attack Force!; Biographies of the War Gods; 
The Special Attack Force: Traces of the War Gods; War God Special Attack Force of the 
Seas; Aa, The Nine War Gods!; Submerged at Pearl Harbor: The Record of Lieutenant X; 
The True Story of the Nine Special Attack War Gods; Mothers of the War Gods; and 
The Mothers Who Gave Birth to the War Gods.19 Short stories and essays dealing 
with the topic were too many to count, and a seemingly infinite number 
of verses offered by patriotic poets appeared in the newspapers and maga-




















newspaper’s recording division released both “The Special Attack Forces” 
and “Commander Iwasa, War God” in 1942. The latter included the follow-
ing verse:
When I die for your sake, my lord, kimi no tame ni shisuru toki
Consider it the fulfillment of my  kō o togeshi to oboshimese 
filial duty
Final lines written before my  kaoru isao no zeppitsu o 
brave deed
Taking them in hand, father smiles ste ni suru chichi ha hohoemite
And the mother of a War God never  aa gunshin no haha nakazu21 
weeps!
These songs were later approved by the Ministry of Education and distrib-
uted to public schools for educational use.
 Within this deluge, the most compelling and widely consumed reitera-
tion of the myth was the novel Kaigun (The Navy; 1942), by Iwata Toyoo, and 
the film by the same name directed by Tasaka Tomotaka. Although Iwata 
had originally hoped to tell the story of the entire squad, he soon realized 
that such an undertaking was beyond him, and he opted instead to create 
a fictional composite character based largely on First Lieutenant Yokoyama 
Masaji. Because he was participating in a “communally owned” discourse, 
Iwata was cautious and waited nervously for over a month before his pre-
liminary five-page treatment was cleared by Navy officials. This is not to 
say that he wrote as a spokesperson for the Imperial Navy. Quite the con-
trary: no naval official was enthusiastically behind the project, and it was 
only with serious reservations that Tomonaga Kengo, one of Hiraide’s col-
leagues, agreed to help Iwata with the portrait of the Naval Academy at 
Etajima and the basic facts of a life in the Navy.22
 Iwata began serializing the novel in the Asahi Shimbun on July 1, 1942, 
with the final installment published there on December 23 of the same year. 
After garnering the Asahi Bunkashō (Asahi Cultural Prize) for 1942, it was 
released as a single volume in 1943. The initial run of fifty thousand copies 
soon sold out. An edition published in December 1943, its cover decorated 
with a bluish demon (oni) straddling a torpedo coursing through the sea, 
indicates that the novel had already gone through six printings.23
 Hoping to capitalize on the novel’s success, the once wary Naval Pro-
paganda Division of Imperial Headquarters performed an about-face and 
promptly commissioned a film treatment from the Shōchiku studios. Di-










pleted in December 1943. The film deviates only slightly from the novel; 
both incorporate at their cores the same anecdotes and suggestions intro-
duced in Captain Hiraide’s original statement. In both the novel and the 
film, the mother figure functions as an imperturbable touchstone through 
the vicissitudes of the historical moment, and the daring submarine attack 
on Pearl Harbor is executed by a pure, artless hero whose engagement with 
a concrete task is so single-minded that the process leading to his death 
is more a narrative of ego-effacing spiritual transcendence than an act of 
violent warfare. Contributing to this image of the hero is the depiction of 
his roots in a distinct rural locale ( furusato) that serves as a synecdoche for 
the nation as a whole.
 The Navy (novel and film) follows the life of Tani Masato through his 
birth and childhood years in Kagoshima, his studies at the Naval Academy 
at Etajima, and the early years of his career as a naval officer and submarine 
pilot. Like his model Yokoyama Masaji, protagonist Masato is born to a 
large Kagoshima family managed by a strict, hardworking mother. As is 
the custom for such families, she does not coddle her children, especially 
her sons—she refrained from accompanying Masato even to his first day of 
school. Her importance to the family’s well-being and the production of the 
future war god is further emphasized by the complete absence of a father 
figure. As the novel and film open, Masato’s father has already died from 
a sudden illness. We learn that Masato’s mother has mourned for a week, 
then returned to work in the family rice shop, where she refuses the help 
of her sons who have started other careers. So hardworking is this mother 
that the family not only survives but flourishes: “in time the children forgot 
that empty feeling of being without a father. This was possible because at 
some point a new pillar had been erected. Waka [Masato’s mother] was that 
pillar. She was not one of those women with a chip on her shoulder when 
it came to men, neither was she particularly adept. But her children grew 
to trust her and rely on her, and the world around her did the same.”24 Ma-
sato’s mother is the ideal mother for wartime Japan. She is so industrious 
that she can replace the father, and yet her rise to the position of “pillar” of 
the family does not pose a threat to the males increasingly absent (due to 
death or military service) from the domestic landscape. She is the glue that 
holds not only the family but all of society together. As she appears in the 
film version, Waka is largely silent, offering little more than poignant facial 
expressions and quiet support of her son as he sets out on this dangerous 




















she inculcates through example the simple sincerity and selflessness that 
eventually lead Masato to heroism.
 Working in parallel with the mother figure is the trope of the furusato, 
the rural hometown. Masato is a native of Satsuma (Kagoshima), and in his 
youth he is painted as very much a part of the distinctive landscape of that 
locale. The movie, in fact, opens with a shot of Sakurajima, the off-shore 
volcano that spews an endless pillar of ash high into the air, and revisits 
this symbol of Masato’s hometown repeatedly throughout the film. Iwata’s 
novel, too, provides great detail on the landscape within which this hero 
was raised: “the sandy shores stretched out forever, and the children could 
roll about on them endlessly, without ever reaching their end. The flowers 
crinum and moonflower blossomed on the sands and there was nobody to 
object to the children skipping stones and snapping branches off the pines. 
The children were kept company by nothing but this exceedingly beauti-
ful nature—the most beautiful scenery in the realm, the natural vistas of 
the Satsuma shores.”25 This rural locale allows Masato to grow up “natu-
rally,” free from the distractions and temptations of a Westernized urban 
setting.
 The concrete rendering of this sylvan origin is necessary for a convincing 
depiction of a pure and wholesome childhood. In its specificity, however, it 
risks detracting from the appeal of Masato as a national hero. Both the novel 
and its film treatment engage this problem, and both are careful to craft 
a “dual citizenship” for this local boy–cum–national hero. While Masato 
comes of age in a distinctive rural locale, he is also painted into the land-
scape of the nation. When his naval training cruise takes him into the port 
at Yokosuka, Masato hurries into Tokyo proper to see the sites. The imperial 
palace sends shivers down his spine, and he visits the Meiji Shrine (Meiji 
jingū) and Yasukuni Shrine.26 Most striking, however, is the site spied from 
the deck of his ship as it approaches the capital city:
It was while they were gliding through the seas off the coast of Shimizu. 
After dinner Masato had made his way to the stern of the ship. It was 
already that time when the white, green, and purple running lights of 
the ship began to glow. Turning his eyes briefly towards the darkening 
shore, he discovered a most startling sight. “My God, it’s Mount Fuji,” 
he thought. It had been an overcast day, but fortunately the mountain 
alone had burst through the cloud cover. He had not seen the moun-
tain except in photographs and paintings, and yet all the same it was a 










a silhouette, and he could not determine whether or not it was covered 
in snow. Still, the mountain had a majesty that inspired in Masato a rev-
erence. Seeing Mount Fuji, Masato felt that he had indeed arrived at the 
heart of Japan.27
The image of Mount Fuji, symbol par excellence of the nation, overlaps with 
that of Sakurajima, the mountain that marks Masato as a product of a par-
ticular rural locale. This same “dual citizenship” is forged in the realm of 
language as Masato learns to speak standard Japanese in addition to the 
dialect of Kagoshima. The construction of a “dual citizenship” for Masato 
through the layering of a national language (hyōjungo) and a Japanese land-
scape on top of his guileless dialect and pristine hometown inculcates the 
same emotional, nostalgic bond for the nation that has been established 
for the hometown.
 Just as had been the case in Hiraide’s naval press release, both Iwata’s 
The Navy and its film treatment avail themselves of the emotional charge 
that had been infused by literary texts into the images of mothers and rural 
hometowns.28 From these sources emerges the artless subjectivity that dis-
tinguishes the hero of the Asia-Pacific War. This subjectivity is, of course, 
embodied in the hero Masato, whose very name reflects his nature: the 
character shin (or, alternatively, makoto), meaning “true” or “honest,” fol-
lowed by the character read hito, meaning “person,” mark Masato as the 
truly “genuine man.” True to his name, he is always frank, honest, and true. 
The evolution of Masato toward this spiritually transcendent state is such 
a pronounced element of the film treatment that Peter B. High categorizes 
it as one of the wartime “spiritist (seishinshugi) films,” works that “stake out 
for themselves a special psychological terrain, sealed away from modern 
rationality.”29
 Masato’s guileless nature is attested to throughout the novel, and the 
signs of this innocence and spiritual purity actually increase as Masato be-
comes more deeply enmeshed in the military and the war. For example, as 
Masato and the new recruits in the Etajima Naval Academy are led off to the 
communal bath for the first time, an upperclassman tells them, “Be sure to 
wash off the dirt of the secular world (shaba)!”30 Indeed, particularly in the 
film treatment of the novel, the Naval Academy at Etajima strikes one as 
more a temple for ascetic training than an institute promoting the mastery 
of higher learning or military strategies. Masato’s visits to the academy’s 
museum feature shots of him dwarfed by monumental, cathedral-like ar-




















there. In addition to the photos of heroes such as Tōgō Heihachirō, the mu-
seum is filled with samples of calligraphy, the jet-black ink on snowy white 
presented more as religious iconography or fetish than language producing 
meaning in the conventional sense. The spiritual training of the academy 
is rounded out by ascetic practices, the film including a detailed treatment 
of the annual boat race. The scene features young, beautiful male bodies 
covered in sweat as they move in unison and an endless line of countless 
bodies standing along the course as they scream encouragement to the 
rowers—all staples of fascist imagery.31
 Masato’s purity continues to grow even after graduation from the 
academy. Not only does his tendency to blush remain with him throughout 
his short life; he actually takes on more and more of the luster of youth 
as his fatal mission approaches.32 In his press statement, Hiraide had em-
phasized the childlike innocence of the men by relating the anecdote of 
the crew member who compared the suicide mission to a “hike,” and this 
episode is reproduced in both Iwata’s novel and Tasaka’s film. The original 
press release’s muting of a military identity is here, too: Masato has a ten-
dency to shed his naval uniform in favor of “civvies.”33 Finally, as this return 
to a childlike innocence precludes any sustained concern for the historico-
political dimensions of the upcoming mission, such references are kept to 
a minimum. The film version only hints at the international situation by 
flashing newspaper headlines across the screen to mark the march toward 
Pearl Harbor. The only other references to Japan’s increasingly problematic 
position in the world community come in the form of lectures delivered to 
Masato and his comrades by teachers, advisers, and military officers. As 
in Hiraide’s original announcement, these diatribes against Western im-
perialism provide the viewer/reader with a context for the actions of the 
heroes while simultaneously divorcing the heroes themselves from such 
explicitly nationalistic stances and, more important, from that analytical 
mode of being. Peter High points out how this delicate balance is presented 
visually in Tasaka’s film version. While a teacher lectures Masato and his 
classmates about Japan’s predicament, “the camera views the scene from 
different places in the room, as if overcome by impatience. This is followed 
by an abrupt cut to a parade ground where thousands of white-clad cadets 
are singing and marching in a series of vast concentric circles. The whole 
sequence is a subtle subversion of the assertion that the war can (or should) 
be placed in a rational historical context. Although the boys listen and re-
spond respectfully, they have already given themselves to the cause and feel 










 Everywhere the larger context is erased, and in its place the submariners’ 
mission is portrayed as the pinnacle of a quest for spiritual purity. This lack 
of context is reflected, too, in Masato’s personal motto: “where one treads 
with true conviction, both gods and demons withdraw (danjite okonaeba 
kishin mo kore o saku).”35 The nature of the conviction is irrelevant.
 So powerful is Masato’s purity that under its influence the world around 
him is reborn. His childhood friend Takao, who had thrown himself into a 
life of debauchery as an artist, mends his decadent ways as he becomes re-
acquainted with Masato the naval officer. In one of the many melodramatic 
turns of the novel, the reborn Takao ends up as the Navy’s official painter 
and is required to paint scenes from the Pearl Harbor attack in which his 
friend perished. Takao’s high-spirited sister Eda is also reborn. Once filled 
with dreams of a career or college education in Tokyo, her contact with 
Masato reforms her. At one point Takao notices the change: “she had never 
treated men with the respect that they deserve, so the only thing that could 
possibly have elicited such a violent change in her is love. Takao realized 
that Masato, without even knowing it, had transformed Eda into a tradi-
tional woman of Satsuma. Takao was also fully aware how these women 
of Satsuma could have their hearts wildly aflame with passion while all the 
while refraining from any self-assertion and continuing to be fully obedi-
ent.”36 Masato’s purity permeates the world around him, turning that world 
and its inhabitants away from the decadent trends of urban, Westernized 
lifestyles and back toward the simple values of the furusato, the rural towns 
and villages untouched by the complexities of modernity.37 The myth of the 
Nine Gods of War promised to do much the same: provide the nation with 
an alternative to the anxiety-ridden present in the form of a return to an 
authentic subjectivity lying dormant beneath their intellectualizing modern 
selves.
The Ties That Bind
The co-opting of the charged images outlined here (the pure hero, his 
roots in an idyllic, unchanging natural landscape, the support of a selfless 
mother) was one reason the discourse on submariners reached mythic pro-
portions. The audience had been primed to respond by the development of 
those images through many literary texts produced over many years. The 
second distinguishing characteristic of this myth was its repetition of a 
looping rhetorical trope that bound the populace to a timeless national 




















ing, motion operated at many levels. It is evident in the manner in which 
these images were generated by literary texts, only to be appropriated by the 
Imperial Navy for clearly ideological purposes before being embraced once 
again by literary figures. Iwata’s The Navy is but one example; even novelists 
as different as Yokomitsu Riichi and Sakaguchi Ango felt compelled to ad-
dress the topic of the submariners in their writing.38 This popular response 
then prompted the Navy to commission the film The Navy as the task of 
mythmaking looped back around to its origin. The state and the civilian 
population were thereby bound together in the production of the myth.
 The looping motion whereby the civilian population is merged with the 
agents of the state is echoed within the tales of the Nine Gods of War. 
Just as each specific articulation of the story contributes to the entirety of 
the universally shared myth, so, too, does each representation of a unique 
individual or specific location contribute to the construction of archetypal 
heroes and the abstract concept that is the nation. In Iwata’s novel and 
Tasaka’s film, this process is evident in protagonist Tani Masato’s “dual 
citizenship,” his identity as both a native of Satsuma and a citizen of Japan. 
Sakurajima, the landscape feature that defines his roots in Kagoshima, is 
associated with Mount Fuji, that symbol of the nation, and Masato’s local 
dialect is first traded for the standard Japanese he uses in the Naval Academy 
before later serving as an alternative language strategically employed in his 
ongoing negotiation of his identity as a native both of Kagoshima/Satsuma 
and of Japan. This looping action ties the particular with the universal, the 
local with the national, the individual with the state.
 The rhetorical looping also works diachronically, fusing the singular act 
of the Nine Gods of War to heroes of earlier days. This looping is worked 
through the press release’s invocation of the genre known as the bidan (beau-
tiful tales of exemplary behavior) and, more specifically, the gunkoku bidan 
(beautiful tales of the militarized state). While the latter surely have roots 
dating back to the touching tales of warriors depicted in the thirteenth-
century epic The Tales of the Heike, their modern lineage can be traced back 
to the Meiji state’s strategic deployment of what Naoko Shimazu calls “the 
myth of the patriotic soldier.” Novels such as Sakurai Tadayoshi’s Human 
Bullets: A Soldier’s Story of Port Arthur (Nikudan, 1906), Shimazu argues, were 
produced and disseminated for the purpose of instilling patriotism in rural 
populations not yet fully incorporated into the ideology of the nation-
state.39 At some level, the Navy’s press release most certainly had similar 
intentions, and it employed similar means.










gests a unidirectional, top-down attempt at ideological indoctrination, 
subsequent “beautiful tales of the militarized state” demonstrate an in-
creasing degree of communal interest, participation, and consumption. 
One such bidan was that told of the Russo-Japanese War hero Commander 
Hirose Takeo, who died at Port Arthur after searching valiantly for a missing 
crewman on his sinking ship. Hirose’s tale was commemorated in poetry 
and song; it was later included in school textbooks and even memorialized 
in the construction of a bronze statue in Kanda, Tokyo.40 An even greater 
popular response was elicited by the tale of the “Three Heroic Human 
Bombs (Bakudan sanyūshi),” the privates who, in 1932, died while detonating 
a crude explosive device deployed to open a hole in the enemy defenses for 
an attack. This bidan inspired not only songs, poetry, and schoolbook ver-
sions, but also a spate of representations in other media, including comics, 
puppet-theater productions, newspapers, radio, film, and even the Kabuki 
stage.41
 Navy Captain Hiraide’s press release concerning the submariners of 
Pearl Harbor is, in its portrait of the heroes, reminiscent of this genre. Curi-
ously, in the next stage of the development of the myth, the tradition of 
bidan is explicitly incorporated into the works. In his novel, Iwata includes 
an extended, detailed rehearsal of naval submarine heroes, all of whom dis-
tinguished themselves by remaining diligently at their posts while waiting 
to drown as their damaged vessels fill with water.42 In Tasaka’s film version, 
the model for young Masato’s budding bravery is the Russo-Japanese War 
hero Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, himself a native of Masato’s Satsuma and 
the subject of various heroic tales. Masato pays his respects at Tōgō’s grave, 
studies for the Naval Academy’s entrance exams beneath a portrait of the 
admiral, and bows reverently before that same portrait as it hangs on the 
walls of the academy’s museum.43 In this way, the bidan that is the tale of 
the submariners loops back to incorporate previous heroic tales, installing 
them as inspiration for new acts of selfless sacrifice. The layering effect ren-
ders the unique heroes and their singular event simultaneously a part of a 
timeless, cyclical tradition.
 Evidence suggests that such “beautiful tales of the militarized state” did 
indeed inspire patriotism and self-sacrifice for the national cause. One of 
the submarine pilots who died at Pearl Harbor, twenty-four-year-old Fu-
runo Shigemi, included in his final letter home an explicit comparison of 
himself to the Commander Hirose of bidan fame: “the crisis increasingly 
demands we face the autumn of our lives. . . . [What I am about to do rep-




















alive. It is a task no less valiant than that undertaken by Commander Hirose; 
please treasure the memory of my act as something no less worthwhile than 
his.”44 Similarly, the twenty-two-year-old submariner Hiroo Akira, in the 
document he left behind, wrote that the mission they were setting out to 
accomplish was “like the suicide missions (shinjū) of Commander Hirose’s 
blockade squad and the three heroic human bombs. Of course, the issue 
of life and death is something we do not consider.”45 Furthermore, just as 
their embodiment of the recurrent myth was inspired by those that came 
before, so, too, did the tale of the Nine Gods of War shape the subjectivity 
of those who were to follow: the journalist Ushijima Hidehiko, author of 
numerous works on the Nine Gods of War, recalls how, as a fifth-grader 
in 1945, he had been inspired by the story of Tani Masato and was deter-
mined to follow in his footsteps.46 Linking heroes past with heroes present 
through the invocation of the bidan genre propels the looping action into 
the future, guaranteeing an unlimited source of individuals ready to sustain 
the communal myth.
 The myth of the submariners at Pearl Harbor shows in its contents, its 
rhetoric, and its mode of circulation all the elements of a culture of fascism. 
It is composed of emotionally charged images (the guileless hero rooted in 
a concrete world; the self-sacrificing, salt-of-the earth mother; the idyllic, 
eternally unchanging rural hometown) produced in the attempt to ease the 
anxieties of the hyper-conscious, alienated modern individual living in a 
cold, industrialized world, and it depicts an act of spiritual transcendence 
through a merging of the self with the collectivity of the eternal nation. This 
fusion of the individual (the particular, the contemporary) to the state (the 
universal, the eternal) is then replicated in both the rhetoric and the pro-
duction of the myth. The allusions, both implicit and explicit, to the corpus 
of “beautiful tales of the militarized state” fuse the nine submariners to 
the pantheon of bidan heroes, creating as well the illusion that the present 
is the eternal. The depiction of a hero whose unique roots make him, para-
doxically, a national “everyman” similarly functions to render all elements 
of a diverse population integral elements of a single nation. Finally, the 
innumerable rearticulations of the submariners’ tale, for all their varied in-
flections and points of origin, ultimately reify an increasingly textured, all-
encompassing myth constructed and sustained through the joint efforts of 
the state and its population. This “looping” of the tale through time, space, 
and multiple discursive zones generates a centripetal force that draws all 
toward the aestheticized act of apocalyptic self-destruction that centers the 










that actual merging of the individual with the eternal nation: the “shatter-
ing of the ten million jewels (ichioku gyokusai)” in desperate, suicidal attacks 
launched against insurmountable odds. In this myth and its physical re-
enactment, the fascist proclivities often identified in Japan’s cultural dis-
course are made real.
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The Spanish Perspective:  
Romancero Marroquí and the Francoist  
Kitsch Politics of Time
In “Narrating the Nation-ality of a Cinema: The Case of Japa-
nese Prewar Film” in this volume, Aaron Gerow argues that any fascistic 
element to Japanese cinema “lies less in the vision of the nation represented 
or the cinematic aesthetic itself than in the process involved in creating a 
national cinema.” For Gerow, Japanese national cinema was always subject 
to hybridity and contamination; it is precisely this hybrid, contaminated 
state of Japanese cinema that paradoxically constitutes for him the con-
dition of possibility for a fascist Japanese cinema. As he writes, “The fas-
cist ideal of a pure, controlled cinema was based on its own impossibility.” 
Therefore, fascism in wartime Japanese cinema, he concludes, is rather a 
process than a state.
 Michael Baskett’s exploration of intra-Axis cooperation on film legis-
lation also reveals similar cracks and fissures in what to the eyes of the 
Western allies was supposedly a unified fascist aesthetic. Baskett’s analy-
sis of Arnold Fanck’s The New Earth—a German–Japanese co-production 
about the Japanese colonization of Manchuria—for example, shows how 
the intra-Axis collaboration “did not lead to the successful creation of a col-



























link among Axis film cultures for the Japanese film critic Iwasaki Akira, 
Baskett writes, The New Earth ultimately failed with Japanese audiences pre-
cisely “because of the impossibility of Germans’ understanding the Japa-
nese experience of modernity.”
 I would argue, however, that this failed attempt to create a state-
sponsored totalizing “fascist” cinema aesthetics in Japan, a successful 
intra-Axis co-production policy, did not amount to an ultimate failure of 
the various fascist states to achieve a high degree of ideological hegemony. 
In fact, as Lutz Koepnick has observed regarding the Nazi case, the German 
state attempted to impose ideological hegemony on its citizenry using a 
variety of cultural channels; thus implying a higher degree of laissez-faire 
governance than is normally assumed.1 This indicates that the cultural poli-
cies of the various national fascisms, as well as their attempts to reach out 
to one another, were weighed down by inner contradictions and substantial 
cultural differences right from the start. The Axis nations never formed the 
homogeneous political and cultural front that, as Baskett observes, Allied 
propagandists made them out to be. As he writes, “Unlike the enduring 
images of an Axis united in power and purpose churned out by wartime 
Allied propagandists, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy were 
not all cut from the same political or cultural cloth; nor did any single entity 
ever truly dominate over another.”
 Focusing on Japanese cinema, Baskett naturally leaves Francoist Spain 
out of the collaborative and legislative intra-Axis film agenda. Although 
Franco’s Spain did not have any official ties with wartime Japan’s film indus-
try, as early as 1938 it did collaborate in a variety of film projects with Ger-
man and Italian production companies, resulting in five feature films made 
in less than two years through the Spanish–German joint venture Hispano-
Film-Produktion, and in the shooting in 1940 of Assedio dell’Alcazar, a film by 
the renowned Italian fascist director Augusto Genina about the siege of the 
Alcázar of Toledo by Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War.2
 Despite several grandiose but short-lived attempts to create a Francoist 
national cinema, Francoist film policy was even more relaxed than that of 
its German, Italian, or Japanese counterparts. The case of Francoist film 
politics helps illuminate the hybrid and apparently contradictory ways in 
which fascist regimes attempted to secure ideological hegemony. Much like 
the Imperial Japan described by Gerow and Baskett, Franco’s Spain lacked a 
cohesive film aesthetic, produced early film legislation plagued by apparent 
contradictions, and attempted to stimulate the production of a line of colo-
















 As we shall see in the following analysis of Romancero marroquí (dir. Carlos 
Velo and Enrique Dominguez Rodiño, 1939),3 a documentary about Spanish 
Morocco, Francoism attempted to achieve ideological hegemony in post–
Civil War Spain by means of what could be characterized as a totalitarian 
kitsch aesthetic, a kitsch aesthetic functioning in much of the cultural work 
done in Japan in the same years, as described in this volume. This kitsch aes-
thetic is best exemplified by a series of texts (a film script, a war memoir, a 
political treatise) written by Franco himself, as well as by a series of films, 
memoirs, and novels produced by several prominent Spanish fascist artists. 
By a totalitarian kitsch aesthetic, I simply mean an aesthetic that resorts to 
artistic cliché and erases, in Milan Kundera’s words, “every display of indi-
vidualism . . . ; every doubt . . . ; all irony.”4
 However, as we will see in the example of Romancero marroquí, the state-
planned attempt to secure consent from the Spanish citizenry ultimately 
failed—as Gerow suggests it did in the Japanese case—as the ideological 
suturing that these Francoist kitsch fascist texts were supposed to attain 
ultimately unraveled. Through this failure, the inner contradictions—but, 
paradoxically, also the strength—of Francoism were made patently clear.
 Romancero marroquí, a film with a clear political intent, was officially 
sponsored by Franco’s provisional government.5 In Romancero, religious 
iconography helped create a mythical representation of Morocco. By offer-
ing Moroccans a highly favorable portrait of themselves, the High Spanish 
Commission in Morocco aimed to pay homage to the Moroccans who had 
already enlisted in Franco’s colonial army, but, more important, they also 
hoped to procure a constant flow of new recruits. By doing so, however, 
Romancero wrongly presupposed a Moroccan audience that would respond 
obediently to its kitschy message.
 The kitschy mythical place the film evoked was precisely the Spanish 
Morocco where Francoism—that eclectic kitsch fascist ideology that estab-
lished itself in Spain by means of a military uprising that began in Morocco 
and was waged against Republican legality—was born. For Francoism, 
Spanish Morocco was not a geographical reality but a mental space, an ideo-
logical fantasy—“the immortal cradle of the [Francoist] movement,” as it 
was sometimes called. This was the ideological fantasy Romancero meant to 
signify and that was at the core of the Francoist kitsch politics of time and 
space.
 As it turned out, Romancero was rejected by high Moroccan officials and 
was never dubbed into Arabic for its intended target audience. It is my 














goal of persuading conservative Spaniards of the legitimacy of deploying 
forty thousand Muslim “Moors” on Spanish soil during Franco’s “crusade” 
against the Republicans.
 Romancero’s failure to connect with its intended audience—and its double-
edged identificatory agenda—provides valuable insights into the question 
of how the state-planned attempts to secure consent from the Spanish 
citizenry seem ultimately to have failed. Through this “failure,” the inner 
contradictions of Francoism were made clear: its lack of a unified social, 
political, and cultural agenda due to the vastly different political, economic, 
and ideological interests it tried to accommodate. In the cultural sphere, 
these contradictions were expressed most clearly in film legislation passed 
in 1941—such as compulsory dubbing—which almost single-handedly de-
stroyed the Spanish film industry, seemingly undermining Franco’s official 
cultural and political attempt to create a submissive Francoist subject. I 
would suggest here that the lack of a “unified” agenda behind Japanese 
fascism did not preclude it from similarly gaining forms of consent.
 Francoism took the political potential of cinema seriously. As early as 
1938, still in the midst of the Spanish Civil War, the Departamento Nacional 
de Cinematografía was created both to supervise “nationalist” cinema and 
to control the state’s visual propaganda.6 Important fascist leaders such as 
Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Franco’s first press secretary, theorized about 
the role cinema should play in the construction of the new Spanish state. 
For Giménez Caballero, the goal of this new cinema would be to achieve 
a mystical synthesis between self and society to supersede both the dis-
appearance of the self as it appeared in Russian film and the self ’s over-
whelming predominance as it appeared in American film. These two power-
ful “empires,” Giménez Caballero warned, were advancing over Europe 
“to the drumbeat of their camera shutters more than with cannons and 
armies.”7 The creation of such European, universal, and Catholic cinema, 
Giménez Caballero mused, could very well be the spiritual mission of Span-
ish cinema.8
 I should point out that the idea of using film politically to advance the 
interests of the Spanish state, although fervently renewed by Francoist 
ideologues at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, had begun 
as early as 1909 at the onset of the military conflict in Spanish Morocco. 
The Ministry of War enlisted cinema as part of its military effort against the 
“hostile Moroccan tribes” attacking Spanish positions in the city of Me-
lilla. In requesting cinema’s aid in this effort, the Ministry of War had a 
















the waves of protest that the conflict produced in a wide sector of Spanish 
society” and to propagate Spain’s “mission civilisatrice” in North Africa 
abroad.9 Thus, from the beginning, as Martin Corrales has suggested, “the 
movie camera aimed in the same direction as the Spanish rifles.”10
 As part of its recruitment effort, the Spanish Ministry of War supported 
and encouraged Spanish filmmakers to produce documentaries about the 
Spanish colonial army’s fight against Moroccan tribes hostile to Span-
ish interests in Morocco. Even General Millán Astray, one of the most re-
nowned Spanish generals of the time, used cinema as a medium to glamor-
ize the Spanish Foreign Legion, the new military body he co-founded with 
General Franco in 1921.11 Franco himself was enthralled by the seductive 
power of cinema. As a contemporary witness reported in 1924, he took the 
time amid enemy fire to personally film the withdrawal of Spanish troops 
from the Moroccan city of Xauen.12
 Pre-Francoist films had depicted Morocco and the Moors through a typi-
cally self-righteous colonial lens. But the films of 1936 through 1942 could 
be characterized, oddly enough, as Domínguez Búrdalo has pointed out, as 
representing an attempt to replace old colonial clichés with a more nuanced 
and positive representation of Morocco and its inhabitants.13 This was a 
radical move for Francoism, which had aligned itself ideologically with a 
Spanish ultra-Catholic and nationalist conservatism that had traditionally 
defined Spain’s essence in radical opposition to the Muslim other, seeing it 
as a heretical foreign intruder.
 It is in this historical context of the Francoist shift in the film representa-
tion of Morocco that I would situate Romancero marroquí. Romancero attempted 
to stage a mythical representation of northern Morocco to persuade Moroc-
cans to enlist in Franco’s army; this representation in turn helped convince 
conservative Spaniards of the moral soundness of enlisting “Muslims” in 
Franco’s “Christian crusade.”
 According to the High Commissioner of the Spanish Protectorate in 
Morocco under whose auspices the movie was produced, and who was pri-
marily responsible for its narrative concept, Romancero should capture in 
documentary format “all the natural and artistic beauties of the area,” as 
well as its “regional traditions and costumes,” while at the same time, “by 
means of its story line,” pay homage to “the fervent participation of the 
Moroccan people in our glorious uprising.”14
 Because of this double objective, Romancero was a hybrid product. In its 
visual idealization of the Moroccan lifestyle, it was influenced by Robert 














Moana (1927), and Man of Aran (1934). The film portrays an organic com-
munity blending harmoniously with its environment—the Moroccan in-
habitants from the Yebala area of the Spanish Protectorate—supposedly 
a spiritually unified community un-fractured by the alienating forces of 
modernity.
 With a painstaking eye for detail, Romancero tries to capture the “mythi-
cal” world of these Moroccan “natives” through a highly choreographed 
visual composition, beautiful cinematography, and an extensive cinemato-
graphic repertoire in which dissolves and close-ups clearly stand out. How-
ever, unlike Flaherty’s documentaries, Romancero adds a voice-of-God-style 
commentary over the images of its Moroccan natives; it is the commen-
tary’s function to cue viewers into how to best interpret the images. Trying 
to eliminate any possible ambiguity generated by the silent images them-
selves, the voiceover transformed an otherwise beautifully crafted, albeit 
kitsch, film into a perfect example of totalitarian kitsch aesthetics, with its 
ability to restrict meaning and close down visual signification. The tension 
generated by the friction between the visual images and the verbal commen-
tary is paradoxically exemplified by exclusive visual means in the first shot 
of the film (see figure 1).
 The opening still shot of the film joins the traditional Islamic decorative 
style in the background with “the yoke and the arrows,” the Phalange’s own 
visual icon, thus establishing a visual parallel between the Islamic tradition 
and the Francoist ideological cause. Following this initial shot, a written 
text also informs us that Romancero was made “thinking of Franco,” and 
“with deep love and respect towards our Muslim brothers,” to whom, in 
fact, it wants to pay homage “for their virtues” and their “generous loyalty.” 
The text describes the Moroccan people, as well as the film’s hero, not as 
barbaric tribesmen or as the heretic infidels of past traditional depictions, 
but as “noble and simple, brave and pure.” Finally, it also reminds us that, 
like the protagonist, they took part in “our Crusade” voluntarily, guided by 
ancestral forces. The text ends with a poetic wish: “let the blood ties that 
unite our two ‘peoples’ flourish in a luminous future for both.”
 And yet, despite Romancero’s stated goal of paying homage to Moroccans 
helping in Franco’s cause, its main goal was in fact to convince conservative 
Spaniards of the moral righteousness behind the decision to enlist Mus-
lims—Spain’s traditional enemies—in their “Christian” crusade against 
Republicans on Spanish soil. (Romancero did open in every major provin-
cial town in Franco’s Spain.)15 It had to persuade conservative Spaniards 
















nate “pious” Muslims brothers but to eliminate Spanish Republicans now 
labeled traitors to the fatherland and unworthy of the term Spaniard.16
 Given its hidden propagandistic and ideological agenda, it is no surprise 
that Romancero did not really attempt to seriously explore the cultural and 
ethnographic differences of Moroccans living under Spanish rule. On the 
contrary, and without ever abandoning the use of ethnographic cliché, it 
set out to reveal the deep similarities between Christian and Muslim “be-
lievers.” Thus, in Romancero’s representation, northern Moroccans resemble 
much more the biblical images of Semitic tribesmen in white flowing robes 
tending to their flocks, plowing their land, or playing their musical instru-
ments—images that filled the standard Spanish Catholic catechisms of the 
time—than they do the more realistic images that would correspond to the 
starker reality of a hungry and disease-ridden Spanish Moroccan Protec-
torate in 1938 (see figure 2). For Francoism, Spanish Morocco was thus a 
kitschy mythical place, like the Japanese countryside that Nina Cornyetz de-
scribes in this volume. It was not a geographical reality but a mental space, 
an ideological fantasy that was at the core of the Francoist kitsch politics 
of time.
 One of the defining traits of early Francoism was this politics of time. 
Specifically, Romancero is structured around a notion of messianic time, 














characterized by what Benedict Anderson, following Walter Benjamin, 
called “prefiguring and fulfillment.”17 The film is subdivided into four 
main segments: the first one revolves around Aalami’s family life in his 
native village around sowing time; the second focuses on Aalami’s travels 
around Morocco in search for work; the third follows him to Spain, where 
he fights in Franco’s colonial army; and the fourth depicts Aalami’s return 
home from Spain in time for the harvest. Each segment prefigures and ful-
fills the preceding one. Aalami first feels compelled to leave his village after 
receiving an ancestral call while he is plowing his land, visually represented 
by the close-up of an ox’s head underlined by a few musical chords on the 
soundtrack reminiscent of the music played at bullfights, which here is 
meant to underline the ancestral call Aalami receives back from Spain, his 
supposedly former fatherland.
 He travels on foot around Morocco in search of work. The narrator’s 
ethnographic excuse for photographing white mosques and villages, color-
ful markets and ritual weddings is nothing but a disguised pilgrimage 
toward his embrace of Franco’s higher cause. After a brief encounter with 
a Francoist messenger riding a white horse—an obvious reference to San-
tiago “Matamoros” (Saint James of Compostela), patron saint of Spain and 
the mythical Moor slayer of the Spanish Reconquest—he finally stops his 
















wandering at the recruitment office to join Franco’s army; put simply, this 
has been a pilgrimage in search of a destiny that has already been deter-
mined for him. His fighting in Spain—where he receives three wounds—
fulfills this predetermined “destiny.” Finally, his return home in time for 
the harvest not only brings the narrative to a close but also implies that 
even nature itself rewards his courage for fighting for the right cause with 
a bountiful crop.
 Romancero’s narrative thus “moves” cyclically, revolving around agricul-
tural events inextricably tied to the religious, the political, and the tran-
scendental. Time is contained within an organic community of believers 
and never spills out into the empty, homogenous time of history, the linear 
historical time of the modern nation.
 This circular, a-historical, Francoist temporality around which Roman-
cero’s narrative is built is what Mark Neocleous sees at the heart of fascism, 
which can also be said to characterize all forms of kitsch.18 At the heart of 
the power of fascist kitsch is its hallucinatory power, “its compulsion to 
escape from abstract sameness,” to use Adorno’s phrase, from the empty 
homogeneous time of modernity.19 Kitsch, like Francoism (and like Japa-
nese cultural fascism), promised a refuge against the passing of time, 
against the decay of the aura that Benjamin saw at the center of modernity. 
This fear of change and, ultimately, of the inevitability of death implied by 
the modern teleological conception of history accounts for the emergence 
of political kitsch as refuge, a “home”—as the Spanish avant-garde writer 
Gómez de la Serna calls it—looking into the past, not into the future.
 Yet this notion of kitsch only goes so far in explaining the film’s political 
aesthetic. To fully understand Romancero’s attempt to persuade Moroccans 
to join Franco’s army, it is important to recall Saul Friedlander’s crucial 
distinction between two different types of kitsch: “common kitsch,” which 
“tends to universality,” and “uplifting kitsch,” which “is rooted, symbol-
centered, and emotionally linked to the values of a specific group.”20 This 
uplifting kitsch, which exploits “obvious mythical patterns,” has a clear 
mobilizing function: its emotionally coded and readily available message 
is presented aesthetically, not rationally, thus eliciting from its audience 
an automatic “unreflective emotional response,” making that audience un-
aware of the ideology being imparted. It is the harnessing of the power of 
kitsch that, I suggest, Francoism shared with Japanese fascism.
 Romancero’s narrative, whose explicit goal was military mobilization, to 
make Francoist soldiers out of starving Moroccan peasants by promising 














in one ideal” is carefully constructed around this notion of uplifting kitsch; 
appealing to Moroccan “tribal” emotion in order to mobilize. Romancero at-
tempts to link the pristine natural landscape of the Moroccan Rif to the tra-
ditional values of its inhabitants. It prepackages its own political message 
as a closed ideological system, which, to be made more effective, it renders 
aesthetically, producing that “confusion of the ethical with the aesthetic 
category” that for Hermann Broch is the essence of kitsch.21
 The first section of the film introduces us to the harsh natural environ-
ment of Spanish Morocco and directly into the land of the mythical pat-
terns of uplifting kitsch. The various shots of giant cacti and the mosque’s 
white tower with the muezzin calling to prayer combine with shots of arid 
mountains and ocean waters through a chain of dissolves. These estab-
lishing shots visually conflate the natural and the spiritual in a series of 
“organically” linked shots—with hardly any visible cuts—rendered in that 
“curative imagery of unity” that for Kenneth Burke was so characteristic of 
fascism (see figure 3).22 Immediately after these shots, the camera gives a 
long panoramic shot of Aalami’s village, followed by a long panning take 
accenting the immaculate pure white dwelling against whose walls a few 
rural implements idly rest. The palm roof is metaphorically linked to the 
tree branches surrounding the small house, suggesting nature and civiliza-
tion blending harmoniously (see figure 4). The camera comes finally to rest 
with a medium shot on two pairs of traditional Moroccan slippers in front 
of the house—metonymically indicating the people resting inside.
 The next series of shots progressively introduces Aalami’s family: a cry-
ing baby in the cradle; his oldest son, Ahmed, waking up and immediately 
transforming his blanket into a chilaba (robe), leaving the house moments 
later with his mother, Fatima; and finally, a shot of Aalami himself tight-
ening his turban around his head. At this point, the voiceover, guiding the 
viewer on how to see the scene, makes its first utterance connecting the 
natural, the social, and the spiritual: “the Muezzin’s voice, extending itself 
through mountains and valleys, the skies and the seas, has called to life. 
Morocco wakes up, the day has arrived, and the fields get flooded with 
light.”
 These first shots, then, visually follow the pattern set by films such as 
Karl Freund’s Berlin Symphony or the opening of Dziga Vertov’s Man with a 
Movie Camera. However, unlike those documentaries, whose opening shots 
emphasize new rhythms and patterns in celebration of modern technology 
and city life, in Romancero anything artificial that distracts from the organic 














flow of life has been removed from sight. The voiceover draws on an old 
narrative model, from the biblical Genesis, in an attempt to give the phrase 
“let there be light” a faithful visual representation. Therefore, from the very 
beginning Romancero frames an unfamiliar Moroccan reality for the Span-
ish audience within the parameters of an immediately familiar narrative 
structure—a structure that stands outside linear historical time. While in 
traditional colonial representations the colony becomes an alluring, albeit 
inferior, other to the colonizing metropolis in need of progress and civiliza-
tion, paradoxically in Romancero’s representation, Spanish Moroccan society 
becomes a model to be imitated, a biblical kitsch paradise opposing—like 
Francoism itself—modern materialism and parliamentary democracy.
 It is in this kitschy visual idealization of a premodern way of life that 
the Spanish Morocco depicted in Romancero becomes the ideal embodiment 
of the “scattered fragment” of the aura, to use Celeste Olalquiaga’s term, 
that Franco hoped to restore and bring back to Spain by his new crusade of 
reconquest.23
 In this kind of Francoist kitsch, the “empty space” opened up by the 
flattening out of a distinct geographical and cultural reality and its replace-
ment by a historical cliché is metaphorically filled with moral and political 
content: with irrationality and blind faith, guilt, repentance, punishment, 
and the seemingly beautiful appearance of death. Romancero was, after all, 
a cry for war, an attempt to persuade young Moroccans to die for Franco’s 
cause.
 But as I already mentioned, Romancero failed to connect with its Moroc-
can target audience. Ironically, and much like the rejection of Fanck’s The 
New Earth by Japanese critics because it failed to come to terms with Japan’s 
modernity, high Moroccan officials ultimately rejected the film because it 
depicted northern Morocco as a poor, premodern, backward place.24 Ro-
mancero had a very limited distribution within the Spanish protectorate; in 
fact, it was never released with its soundtrack dubbed into Arabic. It also 
had a very short run in Spain. Romancero was supposed to be the beginning 
of a soon to be abandoned new line of “Africanist cinema” that would help 
advance Spain’s colonial expansion in Africa.
Romancero’s difficulty in successfully addressing its intended audience, 
however, allows us a precious glimpse into the inner ideological contradic-
tions that plagued Francoism right from the start—contradictions that are 
highly visible in the cultural and political arena in apparently self-defeating 
















have created screen quotas or prohibited the import of foreign, ideologi-
cally suspect films. Instead, as early as 1941, and under the excuse of pre-
serving Spain’s imperial language from foreign contamination, it passed 
legislation enforcing compulsory dubbing and ruled that only producers of 
Spanish films could import foreign films. This legislation single-handedly 
struck a powerful blow to the Spanish film industry, from which it would 
never fully recover. As expected, Spanish audiences flocked to Hollywood 
films dubbed into Spanish and widely available in Spanish theaters.25
 Such legislative measures undermined the efforts of the more genuine 
fascist elements within Franco’s regime. As a result, their attempt to con-
duct a uniform process of ideological interpellation never really worked, 
though its effects were certainly not negligible. In this way, the Francoist 
case, riddled with internal contradictions and lacking a unified fascist cul-
tural agenda, greatly resembled the Japanese case.
 It has often been said that because Francoism (like Japanese fascism, as 
described by Alan Tansman in the introduction to this volume) was an “er-
satz” form of fascism from the start formed by competing political inter-
ests, it might have outlasted other forms of fascism. Francoism was a per-
fect example of Ernesto Laclau’s empty signifier, which can be filled with 
all kinds of contradictory content, and as such, it perfectly fit Ortega y Gas-
sett’s well-known definition: “fascism is A and B.” In reality, Francoism, 
like Japanese fascism, was A, B, and C. Ultimately, Francoism, as seen in its 
film legislation, was an arrangement that suited all concerned: “the regime 
got its films, the producers massive profits and the public the Hollywood 
films they liked.”26 But perhaps in the end what the regime really needed 
was not its propaganda films, whose effect on audiences is at best dubi-
ous, but the Hollywood films Spanish audiences loved to watch. In the end, 
then, I would argue that Francoism, though lacking a systematic and cohe-
sive cultural politics, was able to secure ideological consent less through 
centralized, grandiose projects such as Raza, a 1941 film based on Franco’s 
script, and Romancero than through the popularity of American films and 
sentimental comedies. It might be argued that in this diffuse mode of 
securing consent, Francoist Spain shared much with Nazi Germany, fascist 
Italy, and Imperial Japan.
 Francoism practiced above all a very successful politics of survival. It is 
not purely coincidental, after all, that while Mussolini was executed by Ital-
ian partisans and his body hung upside down in Loreto Square, and Hitler 
killed himself hidden in a lonely bunker, and Japan was transformed by its 














bed at eighty-two, softly uttering the words, “How hard it is to die.” He was 
buried with all the honors of a head of state.
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